Albertus Magnus

The Opera Omnia of the Universal Doctor, rendered into English

Works

Volume 2 · pp. 1–232

Posterior Analytics, Books I–II

Libri I-II Posteriorum Analyticorum

70 sections · translated from Borgnet vol. 2, pp. 1–232

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  1. First Book of the Posterior Analytics, Treatise I, Chapter I · pp. 1–12 Ch. II. On the proof of Avicenna and Algazel, that this book immediately follows the book of the… · Ch. III. That intellectual science is from pre-existing cognition. · Ch. IV. That knowing beforehand is twofold, and especially in demonstrative science.
  2. Chapter IV. That Knowing Beforehand Is Twofold, Especially in Demonstrative Science · pp. 13–24 Ch. V. On the cognition of conclusions. · Ch. VI. On the doubt of Meno and the solution. · Tr. II. From what things and of what sorts demonstration is. · Ch. I. On the definition of what it is to know, which is the end of demonstration. · Ch. II. What conditions the propositions of demonstration require.
  3. Treatise II, Chapter II. What Conditions the Propositions of Demonstration Require · pp. 25–36 Ch. III. In what modes a principle is prior and more known. · Ch. IV. How demonstration is from first things, and what this statement is. · Ch. V. How demonstration is from things more known. · Ch. VI. On the exclusion of two errors from the aforesaid errors of the Ancients. · Ch. VII. What are the conditions more contracting the aforesaid conditions of demonstration, and…
  4. Treatise II, Chapter VII Continuation. On Necessary Things and On Every · pp. 37–48 Ch. VIII. On the modes of speaking per se, which are four, and on the first and per se. · Ch. IX. On the second mode of speaking per se, and on the third. · Ch. X. On the fourth mode of speaking per se, how it is related to demonstration. · Ch. XI. On the comparison of the modes of speaking per se to demonstration and on their sufficie… · Ch. XII. What the universal is in demonstrative matters.
  5. Treatise II, Chapter XII Continuation. On the Universal · pp. 49–60 Ch. XIII. On the errors and causes of errors which take a property proved of the universal. · Ch. XIV. On the art of avoiding the errors introduced. · Ch. XV. How it is shown that these conditions are necessary to demonstration. · Ch. XVI. That this condition, according to what it itself is, belongs to demonstration, and how i…
  6. Treatise II, Chapter XVI Continuation. On Passing From Genus Into Genus · pp. 61–72 Ch. XVII. That demonstration is from those things which are per se and according to itself with re… · Ch. XVIII. That demonstration is not from common things, but from proper things. · Tr. III. On the use of principles in demonstrations. · Ch. I. On the use of incomplex principles. · Ch. II. On the use of complex principles in demonstrations.
  7. Treatise III, Chapter II Continuation. On the Use of Complex Principles in Demonstrations · pp. 73–84 Ch. III. On the common principle which is a dignity, which rarely enters ostensive demonstration. · Ch. IV. How sciences communicate and differ in the use of common and proper principles. · Ch. V. On the differences between logic and the special sciences. · Ch. VI. How demonstration that and demonstration why differ when taken in the same science [fn1]. · Ch. VII. On the difference between demonstration that and why in diverse sciences.
  8. Treatise III, Chapter VII Continuation. On The Difference Between Demonstration That And Why In Diverse Sciences · pp. 85–87
  9. Treatise III, Chapter VIII. On Syllogisms, And First In What Form Syllogisms Are Made Most Especially · pp. 88–90
  10. Treatise IV, Chapter I. On The Things Which Are Preliminary To The Treatise On The Necessary Proposition · pp. 91–93
  11. Treatise IV, Chapter II. On Ignorance Of Bad Disposition · pp. 93–95
  12. Treatise IV, Chapter III. How A Syllogism Of Ignorance Is Made In The First Figure Concerning Immediate Negatives · pp. 95–96
  13. Treatise IV, Chapter III Continuation. How A Syllogism Of Ignorance Is Made In The First Figure Concerning Immediate Negatives · pp. 97–99
  14. Treatise IV, Chapter IV. How A Syllogism Of Ignorance Is Made In Mediate Propositions · pp. 99–101
  15. Treatise IV, Chapter V. How A Syllogism Of Ignorance Is Made In The Second Figure Against A Universal Affirmative · pp. 101–102
  16. Treatise IV, Chapter VI. How A Syllogism Of Ignorance Is Made In The First Figure Concluding A Mediate Affirmative · pp. 102–104
  17. Treatise IV, Chapter VII. On The Causes Of Ignorance Said According To Negation · pp. 104–106
  18. Treatise IV, Chapter VIII. On The Two Suppositions · pp. 106–107
  19. Treatise IV, Chapter IX. On The Questions Whether There Is A Stand In Extremes And Middles · pp. 107–108
  20. Treatise IV, Chapter IX Continuation. On The Questions Whether There Is A Stand In Extremes And Middles, Lest One Proceed To Infinity · p. 109
  21. Treatise IV, Chapter X. On The Solution Of The Third Question, Whether The Middles Are Infinite Both In Affirmatives And In Negatives · pp. 109–113
  22. Treatise IV, Chapter XI. On The Solution Of The First And Second Questions, Namely That The Extremes Stand Finite, Etc. · pp. 113–117
  23. Treatise IV, Chapter XII. That One Stands In The Highest And Lowest If Knowing Through Demonstrations Is Supposed · pp. 117–118
  24. Treatise IV, Chapter XIII. That The Principles Of Demonstration Stand Is Proved Analytically · pp. 118–120
  25. Book I, Treatise IV, Chapter XIII · p. 121
  26. Chapter XIV. On the corollary that follows from what has been said. · pp. 121–122
  27. Chapter XV. On the reduction of mediate propositions to immediate propositions. · pp. 122–125
  28. Treatise V. On the comparison of demonstration to demonstration. Chapter I. · pp. 126–130
  29. Chapter II. On the six reasons by which it is proved that universal demonstration is preferable to particular. · pp. 130–132
  30. End of Chapter II and Chapter III · pp. 133–136
  31. Chapter IV. On the reasons by which it is proved that ostensive demonstration is preferable to that which leads to the impossible. · pp. 136–138
  32. Chapter V. On the comparison of demonstration to demonstration according to its proper effect, which is science. · pp. 138–140
  33. Chapter VI. On the comparison of science to science according to unity or identity. · pp. 140–142
  34. Chapter VII. That there is no demonstrative science concerning the fortuitous and the sensible. · pp. 142–144
  35. Chapter VIII. That the principles of diverse sciences, diverse syllogisms, and diverse demonstrations are diverse. · pp. 144–149
  36. Chapter IX. On the diversity of science, understanding, and opinion. · pp. 149–153
  37. Chapter X. On solertia. · pp. 153–154
  38. Book II of the Posterior Analytics. Treatise I. Chapter I. · pp. 155–158
  39. Chapter II. On the exclusion of doubtful things concerning the principles. · pp. 159–161
  40. Chapter III. On the reduction of four questions to two, and of two to one another. · pp. 161–164
  41. Treatise II. Chapter I-Chapter II. · pp. 165–168 Tr. II. On the cognition of the demonstrative middle and of what things there is definition. CHA…
  42. Chapter II. Whether the syllogistic way is the way of coming into cognition of definition. · pp. 169–170
  43. Chapter III. Whether the mode of introduction into definition can be a syllogism. · pp. 170–173
  44. Chapter IV. Whether the way of introduction into definition is through the definition of definition or of the contrary. · pp. 174–176
  45. Chapter V. Whether definition according to itself is demonstrable or not. · pp. 177–180
  46. Chapter VI. That nominal definition is not a demonstrable what, just as neither is real definition. · pp. 180–182
  47. Chapter VII. In what way, according to the mode of demonstration of the things introduced, definition also can be demonstrated or syllogized. · pp. 182–184
  48. Chapter VIII. In what way definition is elicited from demonstration, although it is not demonstrated. · pp. 184–187
  49. Chapter IX. To which definition it belongs to be elicited from demonstration, and to which not. · pp. 187–188
  50. Chapter X. On the doubt of the ancients, which definition is according to species and which according to matter. · pp. 188–190
  51. Chapter XI. Of what sort the definition ought to be as a middle in the demonstration of a passion. · pp. 190–193
  52. Chapter XII. Whether definition and demonstration are in some way the same, and how definition is related to demonstration. · pp. 193–196
  53. Treatise III. In what way demonstration is in the several causes. Chapter I. That when something is demonstrated through a cause, the cause ought to be ordered in the middle. · pp. 197–198
  54. Chapter II. In what way demonstration is through the material and formal cause. · pp. 198–199
  55. Chapter III. In what way it is made through the efficient cause, and in what way through the final cause. · pp. 199–200
  56. Chapter IV. On those things which are demonstrated through several causes. · pp. 200–202
  57. Chapter V. That by the same causes a thing is demonstrated to be, to be future, and to have been made, with the cause varied according to differences of times. · pp. 202–203
  58. Chapter VI. On demonstration in causes and caused things which are not simultaneous. · pp. 203–206
  59. Chapter VII. On the demonstration of those things which are frequent and have circular generation. · pp. 206–207
  60. Treatise IV. On the hunting of definition, which is the discovery of the middle of demonstration by the way of discovery. Chapter I. How one proceeds through division in the hunting of the definition of a subject. · pp. 208–211
  61. Chapter II. On the mode of finding the definition of a subaltern species. · pp. 211–212
  62. Chapter III. On finding definition through division, and that this way is useful. · pp. 212–214
  63. Chapter IV. How many and what things must be considered in division. · pp. 214–215
  64. Chapter V. On the discovery of the definition of a passion. · pp. 215–217
  65. Chapter 6. On finding the why, or the cause, in particular demonstration. · pp. 218–221
  66. Chapter 7. A doubt about the relation of cause to caused, and conversely of caused to cause. · pp. 221–223
  67. Chapter 8. On the determination of the question introduced. · pp. 223–225
  68. Chapter 9. That in a demonstration which is through accident and particular, or of one affection, there can be several causes. · pp. 225–227
  69. Treatise 5. On the cognition of the principles of demonstration. Chapter 1. Whether cognitions of principles are in us, or not. · pp. 228–231
  70. Chapter 2. What habit is cognoscitive of principles. · pp. 231–232