Works › Posterior Analytics, Books I–II
Volume 2 · pp. 228–231
Treatise 5. On the cognition of the principles of demonstration. Chapter 1. Whether cognitions of principles are in us, or not.
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TRACTATUS V. DE COGNITIONE PRINCIPIORUM DEMONSTRATIONIS.
CAPUT I. An sint in nobis cognitiones principiorum, aut non.
Quia cognitio demonstrativa ex cognitione principiorum generatur, oportet hic de principiis ostendere duo, scilicet qualiter sint cognita a nobis, et quis specie et nomine sit ea cognoscens habitus. Hoc autem hinc et ex hic dicendis manifestum, ita quod primum per modum dubitationis inquiramus de illis tanquam nobis dubitantibus ad utramque partem contradictionis rationes ponentibus. Supponamus igitur ea quae circa libri primi hujus scientiae principium sunt demonstrata. Horum autem unum est, quod quidem non contingit scire aliquid per demonstrationem, si aliquis non cognoscat prima principia immediata quae demonstrari non possunt; hoc enim dictum et probatum est prius in anteriori istius scientiae libro. Oportet ergo immediatorum principiorum cognitionem esse ante demonstrationem, ex quo est cognitio talis in omni demonstratione supposita, eo quod non nisi ipsa causa existente incipit demonstratio. Et ex quo est talis cognitio, aliquis dubitabit et jam dubitare potest, utrum cognitio principiorum eadem est cum cognitione demonstrationis sive demonstrativae scientiae vel non. Et hoc est dubitare, utrum utrisque, scilicet cognitioni demonstrativae et principiis, sit eadem scientia vel habitus, vel non est eadem cognitio utrisque, sed diversa; aut quidem demonstratae conclusionis habitus est scientia, illius autem quae est principiorum cognitio, alterum aliquod genus habitus sit, qui dicatur propria principiorum cognitio. Haec est ergo quaestio de principiis determinanda.
Alia autem sive secunda est, utrum principiorum habitus cum insint nobis, utrum fiant et generentur in nobis, cum autem non fuerint in nobis, aut non generarentur in nobis, sed insint per naturam, et nos lateant donec excitati studio percipiamus eos in nobis esse? Hoc enim dixit Plato in libro qui Mennoni inscriptus est. Hanc ergo secundam quaestionem, quantum ad propositum sufficit, prius ut negativam partem determinemus: tunc enim ostendetur qualiter cognitio principiorum fiat in nobis.
Dicamus igitur quod si nos habemus ipsos per naturam existentes in nobis secundum cognitionem intellectivam, videtur accidere inconveniens. Est enim inconveniens si nos habentes talem cognitionem in nobis hoc latet, quia contingit quod certissimae et certissimorum cognitiones, ex quibus omnia alia certa fiunt nobis, sint in nobis, et habeamus eas; et tamen demonstrantes ex illis ipsae nos lateant. Quod esse non potest, cum ex illis demonstret aliquis omne quod demonstrat; omne enim quod demonstratur refertur ad cognitionem principiorum, et certificatur ex illa et ad illam. Si autem detur alia pars quaestionis, quod scilicet eas cognitiones principiorum accipimus generatas et factas in nobis, cum ante in nobis non fuerint, tunc
TREATISE 5. ON THE COGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION.
CHAPTER 1. Whether cognitions of principles are in us, or not.
Because demonstrative cognition is generated from cognition of principles, here it is necessary to show two things concerning principles, namely in what way they are known by us, and what, in species and name, is the habit knowing them. But this will be manifest from this point and from the things to be said here, in such a way that first we inquire about them by way of doubt, as persons doubting and setting down arguments for both sides of the contradiction. Therefore let us suppose the things that were demonstrated around the beginning of the first book of this science. But one of these is that indeed it does not happen that something is known through demonstration, if someone does not know the first immediate principles which cannot be demonstrated; for this was said and proved earlier in the prior book of this science. Therefore cognition of immediate principles must be before demonstration, since such cognition is presupposed in every demonstration, because demonstration begins only when the cause itself exists. And since there is such cognition, someone will doubt, and can now doubt, whether cognition of principles is the same as cognition of demonstration or of demonstrative science, or not. And this is to doubt whether there is the same science or habit for both, namely for demonstrative cognition and for principles, or whether there is not the same cognition for both, but a diverse one; or whether, indeed, the habit of the demonstrated conclusion is science, but of that which is cognition of principles there is some other genus of habit, which is called proper cognition of principles. This, therefore, is the question to be determined concerning principles.
But the other question, or the second, is whether, since habits of principles are in us, they come to be and are generated in us, although they had not been in us; or whether they are not generated in us, but are present through nature, and lie hidden from us until, once stirred by study, we perceive them to be in us. For Plato said this in the book which is entitled Meno. Therefore, as much as suffices for the proposal, let us first determine this second question as to the negative side; for then it will be shown how cognition of principles comes to be in us.
Therefore let us say that if we have those very principles existing in us through nature according to intellective cognition, something unsuitable seems to occur. For it is unsuitable if, while we have such cognition in us, this lies hidden, because it happens that the most certain cognitions, and cognitions of the most certain things, from which all other things become certain for us, are in us, and we have them; and nevertheless, while we demonstrate from them, those very things lie hidden from us. This cannot be, since from them someone demonstrates everything that he demonstrates; for everything that is demonstrated is referred to cognition of principles, and is made certain from that cognition and toward it. But if the other side of the question is granted, namely that we receive those cognitions of principles as generated and made in us, although before they had not been in us, then
quaeratur qualiter cognoscimus cognitionem talem, et qualiter addiscimus tales cognitiones, cum non simus habentes prius cognitionem aliquam priorem ista: tunc enim illorum cognitio non potest referri ad aliquid in nobis unde probemus hanc cognitionem esse principiorum cognitionem; et tunc scientia talium generatur in nobis non ex praeexistente cognitione. Hoc autem impossibile est, sicut diximus in primo libro de Demonstratione et scientia demonstrativa.
<marginal-label>Ratio Socratis et Platonis tollens scientiam de novo.</marginal-label>
Haec autem ratio est cui maxime innitebantur Socrates et Plato, supponentes quod nihil inventum cognoscitur inventum nisi per suum simile, quando intellectus inveniens refertur ad simile quod apud seipsum habet. Et si non habet ad quod referatur, non cognoscit se invenisse; propter quod omnium inventorum et acceptorum per doctrinam oportet apud nos esse similes cognitiones, ut dixerunt.
Manifestum igitur si declarari debeat haec quaestio, quoniam neque per naturam habere possibile est principiorum cognitionem omnino et perfecte, neque possibile talem cognitionem in nobis fieri ignorantibus ignorantia negationis, ita scilicet quod neque unum, hoc est, nullum, apud nos habeamus habitum ipsorum, ex quo cognitionem principiorum accipiamus.
Ante cognitionem ergo principiorum necesse est habere quamdam potentiam ad hujusmodi, quae, inquam, potentia habitualis sit et disposita ad principiorum acceptionem, sicut inferius ostendemus; et necesse est nos non hujusmodi habere cognitionem vel potentiam intellectivam, quae ut cognitio quaedam illis simul sit in nobis per naturam. Quia illa talis aut esset cognitio actualis principiorum, aut esset honorabilior quam cognitio principiorum in eo quod illam cognitionem principiorum acciperemus, sicut honorabiliorem dicimus esse cognitionem principiorum quam cognitionem scientiae demonstrativae, eo quod scientiam demonstrativam accipimus per principiorum cognitionem; et ideo certiorem et honorabiliorem dicimus cognitionem principiorum. Haec autem potentia quae est nobis, est potentia quidem sensus, qui videtur omnibus inesse animalibus, quamvis perfectiori potentia secundum ordinem et gradus cognitionis sit in quibusdam quam in aliis. Habent enim omnia animalia potentiam quamdam primo cognoscibilium judicativam praesente materia, quam nos vocamus sensum communiter loquentes, non secundum quod est sensus simpliciter, sed secundum quod est animae et animali cognitionis indicativus, et ad animam et animal relatum, cui talem indicat cognitionem in ipsis sensibilibus apprehensam, quae potentia fit sensibilium cognitione, compositione, et divisione, et collatione, et judicio eorum quae cum sensibilibus accepta sunt, quando completa est sensitiva potentia, et contingit finem debitum. Ad hoc enim natura data est ut ex apprehensis nocivum ab utili discernat, ad fugam vel ad consecutionem apprehensi.
Cum ergo inest sensus, secundum diversas inest potentias. In quibusdam animalibus enim sic inest, quod eis fit mansio sensibilis, accepto etiam absente sensibili, sicut in his quae cum sensu proprio et communi habent potentiam imaginativam et aestimativam et phantasiam et memoriam. In aliis autem animalibus quibusdam non fit talis mansio sensibilis, sicut quae sensibile non accipiunt nisi praesente sensibili, ut sunt muscae quaedam et parvi quidam vermiculi solo sensu vigentes, et forte parva imaginatione. In quibusdam igitur non fit mansio sensibilis, aut omnino, ita quod nullo modo manet in absentia sensibilis, aut forte si manet, non manet secundum aliquid, ut scilicet aestimetur aestimatione et judicetur de ipso aliquid. In his enim non fit aliqua cognitio judicativa ultra sensum, hoc est, conveniens in sensu; et ideo ad sensum ista fugiunt vel insequuntur apprehensa. In quibus autem inest mansio sensibilium in absentia sensibilis, in illis est vel contingit habere unum quoddam in anima reservatum ex similibus sensibilibus generatum, ad quod convertuntur illa animalia, etiam absente sensibili; et hoc dicunt esse memoriam, quae thesaurus est formarum sensibilium prius acceptarum in potentiis sibi adjunctis, quae sunt imaginativa, phantasia, et aestimativa. In anima autem rationali et homine conjuncta huic potentiae est reminiscentia et rationalis in sensata reflexa, et judicans de ipsis.
it is asked how we know such cognition, and how we learn such cognitions, since we do not have beforehand some cognition prior to this. For then their cognition cannot be referred to anything in us by which we might prove this cognition to be cognition of principles; and then science of such things is generated in us not from preexisting cognition. But this is impossible, as we said in the first book On Demonstration and demonstrative science.
<marginal-label>The argument of Socrates and Plato taking away knowledge from anew.</marginal-label>
But this is the argument on which Socrates and Plato especially relied, supposing that nothing found is known as found except through its likeness, when the intellect finding it is referred to the likeness that it has within itself. And if it does not have that to which it may be referred, it does not know that it has found; on account of this, of all things found and received through teaching, there must be like cognitions within us, as they said.
Therefore, if this question must be declared, it is manifest that it is neither possible to have cognition of principles through nature wholly and perfectly, nor possible for such cognition to come to be in us while we are ignorant with an ignorance of negation, namely in such a way that we have not one, that is, no habit of them within us, from which we might receive cognition of principles.
Therefore before cognition of principles it is necessary to have a certain power for things of this sort, which, I say, is a habitual power and disposed to the reception of principles, as we will show below; and it is necessary that we not have cognition or an intellective power of this sort, which as a certain cognition of those principles is at the same time in us through nature. For such a thing would either be actual cognition of principles, or it would be more honorable than cognition of principles in that we would receive that cognition of principles from it, just as we say cognition of principles is more honorable than cognition of demonstrative science, because we receive demonstrative science through cognition of principles; and therefore we say that cognition of principles is more certain and more honorable. But this power that is in us is indeed a power of sense, which seems to be in all animals, although according to the order and degrees of cognition it is in some by a more perfect power than in others. For all animals have a certain power judging first knowables when matter is present, which we call sense when speaking commonly, not according as it is sense simply, but according as it is indicative of cognition for soul and animal, and referred to soul and animal, to which it indicates such cognition apprehended in the sensibles themselves. This power comes to be by cognition of sensibles, composition, division, comparison, and judgment of those things that have been accepted with sensibles, when the sensitive power has been completed and reaches its due end. For nature has been given for this, that from things apprehended it may discern the harmful from the useful, for fleeing or for pursuing the thing apprehended.
Therefore, when sense is present, it is present according to diverse powers. For in some animals it is present in such a way that a remaining of the sensible comes to be in them even when the sensible has been received and is absent, as in those animals which with proper and common sense have imaginative and estimative power and phantasy and memory. But in certain other animals such a remaining of the sensible does not occur, as in those which receive the sensible only when the sensible is present, such as certain flies and certain small worms living only by sense, and perhaps by a small imagination. Therefore in some there is no remaining of the sensible, either wholly, so that in no way does it remain in the absence of the sensible, or perhaps if it remains, it does not remain according to something, so that, namely, it may be estimated by estimation and something may be judged about it. For in these there is no judicative cognition beyond sense, that is, cognition agreeing in sense; and therefore these flee or pursue the apprehended things according to sense. But in those in which there is a remaining of sensibles in the absence of the sensible, in them there is, or it happens that there is, a certain one thing reserved in the soul, generated from like sensibles, to which those animals are turned even when the sensible is absent; and they say this is memory, which is the treasury of sensible forms previously received in the powers joined to it, which are imagination, phantasy, and estimation. But in the rational soul and in man, joined to this power, there is reminiscence, and it is rational in things sensed that are reflected upon, and judging concerning them.
Multis igitur talibus similiter per sensum acceptis et in anima manentibus, jam fit quaedam differentia, quae ad sensibile differt, quia accipitur similitudo essentialis sensibilium, quae universale differens a sensu et sensibili. Propter quod in his, scilicet sensatis, ita manentibus, est vel contingit quaedam fieri ratione reflexiva ad sensibile manens et eliciente quod universale est. Fit autem hoc ex talium sic manentium in anima memoria per rationem collata. In his autem animalibus in quibus sensibilia talibus potentiis objecta non manent, non fit taliter universalis differentia.
Patet quidem igitur quod ex sensu fit memoria, sola mansione sensibilis in anima; ex memoria autem multoties facta fit experimentum sive compositio experimentatis. Et hoc dupliciter, quod si fiat multiplex acceptio similis sensibilis, et semper judicativa potentia accipiatur esse ad hoc vel illud conferens vel nocens, vel quod hoc ex illo est consequens, tunc fit experimentum. Iterum si semel tantum sit acceptum et judicio inveniatur in omnibus similibus idem, iterum factum est experimentum.
<marginal-label>Experimentum quid, et quomodo multa sunt experta per unam sensibilem cognitionem.</marginal-label>
Experimentum enim est universalis cognitio ex similitudine sensibili accepta per potentiam judicativam. Multa enim sunt experta per unam sensibilem cognitionem, quando statim videtur, quod in omnibus est simile. Multae enim memoriae numero experimentum faciunt; sed multitudini numeri, maxime in numero conversionum rationis super hoc quod in memoria reservatum est, et in judicio quod in omnibus quae vel sunt actu multa vel potentia, est simile. Experimento autem, aut ex omni si in omnibus expertum est, aut in pluribus accepto per rationem universali quiescente in anima, hoc est, cum ita quiescit quod non invenitur aliqua instantia, qua fiat contradictio contra ipsum, tunc enim quiescit et non aliter, quod sit universale. Unde universale secundum sui naturam simplicem est unum praeter multa, quamvis secundum esse sit in multis ut similitudo essentialis in eis, quod scilicet quiescens in anima in omnibus acceptis per sensum, cum unum sit et simpliciter in essentia et effectu, idem illud per rationem est artis principium et scientiae.
<marginal-label>Quomodo universale est principium artis et scientiae determinetur.</marginal-label>
Artis quidem in quantum est unitivum praeceptorum ad unum operationis finem, quia ars operationis est directivus cum ratione habitus. Scientiae autem, in quantum est unitivum principiorum ad finem speculativae veritatis, quia scientia est veritatis contemplativae demonstrativus habitus. Unde siquidem universale illud accipitur circa generationem, hoc est, operationem, principium est artis. Si vero universale accipitur circa principium ipsius rei esse, tunc est principium scientiae, quia eadem sunt et essendi et cognoscendi principia.
Therefore, when many such things have been received similarly through sense and remain in the soul, now a certain difference comes to be, which differs in relation to the sensible, because an essential likeness of sensibles is received, which is a universal differing from sense and from the sensible. On account of this, when these, namely sensed things, remain in this way, there is, or there happens to be, a certain thing that comes to be by reflective reason toward the remaining sensible and by eliciting what is universal. But this comes to be from memory of such things thus remaining in the soul, compared by reason. But in those animals in which sensibles objected to such powers do not remain, a universal difference does not come to be in this way.
Therefore it is indeed clear that from sense memory comes to be, by the sole remaining of the sensible in the soul; but from memory made many times comes experience, or the composition of experienced things. And this happens in two ways: if a manifold reception of a similar sensible occurs, and the judicative power is always received as being useful or harmful for this or that, or that this is consequent upon that, then experience comes to be. Again, if it is received only once and by judgment the same thing is found in all similar things, again experience has been made.
<marginal-label>What experience is, and how many things are experienced through one sensible cognition.</marginal-label>
For experience is universal cognition from a sensible likeness received through a judicative power. For many things are experienced through one sensible cognition, when it is immediately seen that there is something similar in all. For many memories in number make experience; but for the multitude of number, especially in the number of conversions of reason upon that which has been reserved in memory, and in the judgment that there is something similar in all the things which are many either in act or in potency. But from experience, either from every case if it has been experienced in all, or from many cases accepted by reason while the universal rests in the soul, that is, when it rests in such a way that no instance is found by which a contradiction may be made against it, then it rests and not otherwise, so as to be universal. Hence the universal according to its simple nature is one besides the many, although according to being it is in many as an essential likeness in them, namely that, resting in the soul in all things accepted through sense, since it is one and simple in essence and effect, that same thing through reason is the principle of art and science.
<marginal-label>How the universal is determined as the principle of art and science.</marginal-label>
Of art indeed, insofar as it unifies precepts to one end of operation, because art is a habit directive of operation with reason. But of science, insofar as it unifies principles to the end of speculative truth, because science is a demonstrative habit of contemplative truth. Hence if that universal is accepted concerning generation, that is, operation, it is a principle of art. But if the universal is accepted concerning the principle of the being of the thing itself, then it is a principle of science, because the principles of being and of knowing are the same.
His ita habitis, ad dubitationem de principiis inductam dicimus quod principiorum cognitiones non sunt in nobis ut determinati ad sua cognita habitus et perfecti; neque fiunt in nobis per inventionem vel doctrinam ex aliis habitibus cognoscibilium, ex quorum fiant praeexistenti cognitione; sed fiunt in nobis a sensu, hoc est, a sensibili cognitione stante in anima, super quam est conversio rationis judicantis et elicientis universale, sicut dictum est. Hujus autem simile in monomachia sive bello quod est duellum, in quo pugnat unus contra alterum, quod monomachia vocatur. In tali igitur monomachiae eversione, hoc est, quando evertere vult hostem, cum uno primum stante alter accedens ad illum et adjuvans similiter armis et pugnat, stetit, et tertius cum duobus, et quartus, et sic de aliis donec hostis expugnatur, et quousque tot sint quod confortati ad invicem veniant ad principium pugnae. Similiter est in anima, quod stante una acceptione sensibilis stat altera, et tertia; et cum anima his acceptionibus confortata talis sit, quod post ex acceptis incipit ponere universale quod est principium artis et scientiae.
Ut autem omnem removeamus dubitationem, quod jam olim in Metaphysicis dictum est, iterum dicamus hic: non enim satis certo dictum est per ante habita, nisi dubitatio quae oriri posset removeatur. Dicimus igitur quod stante sive manente in anima uno indifferentium sensibiliter deceptorum, quae in universali uno indifferentia sunt, tunc statim ad primum quidem, quod stat in anima, est universale. Et namque hujus ratio est, quia sensus est et sensum accipere est universale, quod mixtum et confusum est in singularibus. Quamvis enim sentire secundum actum sit singulare, tamen sensus, hoc est, acceptio per sensum, est ipsius universalis; sicut acceptio per sensum non est tantum Calliae hominis, sed est acceptio hominis. Talis autem est sensus per accidens qui ex reflexa ratione ad sensum mixtum in sensibili accipit universale adjutorio superioris potentiae; et hoc acceptum manens iterum ratione stat in his universalibus ad universaliora semper resolvendo quae in sensibili mixta sunt, sicut resolvendo speciem ad genus, et genus resolvendo in generalius, quousque sic universalia accepta stent ad impartibilia per resolutionem. Et haec sunt universalia prima et generalissima omnibus priora, sicut hujus animalis considerati in hac specie fit resolutio quousque veniat ad animal simpliciter, et in hoc similiter fit, quousque stet in primo universali communissimo et simplicissimo.
Similiter quidem ex his quae dicta sunt, patet quod prima universalia manifesta fiunt nobis singularium et sensibilium inductione. Talia enim sic primum cognoscere est necessarium; cujus ratio, quia sensus, hoc est, sensibilium inductio, cum in omnibus similiter est, facit universale. Sic igitur patet qualiter universalia principalia fiant in nobis.
With these things held in this way, to the doubt introduced concerning principles we say that cognitions of principles are not in us as habits determined to their known things and perfected; nor do they come to be in us by discovery or teaching from other habits of knowables, from whose preexisting cognition they would come to be; but they come to be in us from sense, that is, from sensible cognition standing in the soul, upon which there is a turning of reason judging and eliciting the universal, as has been said. But a likeness of this is in single combat or a war that is a duel, in which one fights against another, which is called single combat. Therefore in such an overthrow of single combat, that is, when one wishes to overthrow the enemy, when one first stands and another approaches him and helps in like manner with arms and fights, he stands, and a third with the two, and a fourth, and so concerning the others until the enemy is defeated, and until there are so many that, strengthened in relation to one another, they come to the principle of the fight. It is similar in the soul: when one reception of a sensible stands, another stands, and a third; and when the soul has been so strengthened by these receptions that after the things received it begins to posit the universal which is the principle of art and science.
But in order that we may remove every doubt, because this was already said long ago in the Metaphysics, let us say it again here; for it has not been said with sufficient certainty through what was had before, unless the doubt that could arise is removed. Therefore we say that, when one of the undifferentiated things sensibly described stands or remains in the soul, things which are undifferentiated in one universal, then immediately there is a universal in relation to the first thing that stands in the soul. And indeed the reason for this is that sense is, and to receive by sense is, universal, which is mixed and confused in singulars. For although to sense according to act is singular, nevertheless sense, that is, reception through sense, is of the universal itself; just as reception through sense is not only of Callias the man, but is the reception of man. But such is sense by accident, which from reason reflected upon sense mixed in the sensible receives the universal by the help of a higher power; and this received thing, remaining, again by reason stands in these universals, always resolving to more universal things that are mixed in the sensible, as by resolving the species to genus, and by resolving genus into something more general, until the universals received in this way stand by resolution at impartible things. And these are the first and most general universals prior to all, as the resolution of this animal considered in this species occurs until it comes to animal simply, and similarly in this it occurs until it stands in the first, most common, and most simple universal.
Likewise indeed from the things that have been said, it is clear that first universals become manifest to us by the induction of singulars and sensibles. For it is necessary to know such things first in this way; the reason for this is that sense, that is, induction of sensibles, when it is similarly in all, makes the universal. Thus, therefore, it is clear how principal universals come to be in us.
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