Works › Posterior Analytics, Books I–II
Volume 2 · pp. 215–217
Chapter V. On the discovery of the definition of a passion.
CAPUT V. De inventione diffinitionis passionis. Intendentem autem ad inveniendam diffinitionem passionis, quae non est ut ens stans per seipsum, sed sicut ens in hoc quod inclinatum ad aliquid sicut ad subjectum in quo habet esse, oportet quaerere (intendentem in similia et indifferentia specie) primum quae per unam naturam et rationem communem illam passionem participant: et oportet inspicere quid omnia illa in specie indifferentia idem habeant secundum quod inest eis illa passio communiter: quia secundum illud inerit eis illa passio. Postea autem iterum prospiciendum in alteris individuis, quae cum primo consideratis individuis in eodem genere sunt et specie, quibus illa passio inest secundum alteram et alteram rationem inventam in eisdem quae cum primis quidem sunt idem specie, et illorum alteri inest per aliam rationem illorum sive ab illis, ita quod ista cum illis non participant illam passionem per eamdem rationem. Cum autem in his (quae illam passionem per unam rationem participant) accipiatur quod omnia, sive quod in omnibus illis idem sunt, scilicet quae illam passionem participant: et in aliis quae illam passionem per aliam rationem participant, accipiatur similiter quae eamdem participant passionem. In acceptis sic dupliciter singularibus intendendum si sit idem quo illam participant passionem: et hoc quidem per omnia singularia sic faciendum est, semper a singularibus incipiendo, et resolvendo ad communem, quousque illud (secundum quod omnibus illa inest passio) veniat ad communem rationem illius secundum quod inest omnibus illis illamet passio: et quando congregata fuerint secundum quod inest passio, hoc utique congregatum erit illius diffinitio passionis. Si vero consideratis omnibus singularibus (et his quibus secundum unam naturam inest, et his quibus inest secundum plures) non vadit per resolutionem in unam rationem, sed in duas, vel plures rationes, manifestum est quod non utique est unum secundum naturam et nomen et rationem, quod quaeritur diffiniendum (hoc est, passio diffinienda) sed est plura secundum rem et rationem et nomen: unde illa plura habet aequivoce. Ut dico per exemplum, si quaerimus quid est per diffinitionem magnanimitas (quae passio est magnanimi), intendendum in quosdam magnanimos, qui magnanimitatem per unam et eamdem participant rationem, quos scimus per eamdem rationem esse magnanimos: et videndum quid unum secundum speciem et rationem habent omnes secundum quod magnanimi sunt, hoc est, in quantum hujusmodi sunt, secundum quod dicitur. Alcibiades magnanimus, aut Ajax dicitur esse magnanimus, aut Achilles, considerandum quid unum secundum speciem et rationem sint, secundum quod dicuntur esse magnanimi: sicut quod est non tolerare injurias, hoc est, quod injuriati sint et injuriam non patiantur, quia videntur sibi indigni esse quod injurias sustineant aliquorum: propter hoc enim quod injurias pateretur aliquorum Alcibiades, pugnavit et periculo bellorum se commisit. Ille vero Achilles insanivit, indignans quod injurias pateretur. Hic vero tertius, Ajax scilicet, interfecit seipsum, ne injurias pateretur: et sic omnibus his magnanimitas infuit secundum unum et idem specie, quod est non posse tolerare injurias. His autem consideratis iterum in aliis qui magnanimi sunt, non per eamdem rationem alicujus quod eis insit, ut in Lysandro et Socrate qui magnanimi esse dicti sunt, non per idem quo supradicti magnanimi esse dicti sunt: sed isti indifferentes specie ab illis, quod et illi et isti homines fuerunt: et dicuntur magnanimi, quod prosperati et improsperati indifferenter se habuerunt, nec prosperis elati, nec improsperis et infortuniis dejecti fuerunt. Haec igitur duo, scilicet eumdem animum in prosperis et adversis habere, et injurias non posse sustinere, intendendo quid idem habent secundum quod inest utrisque his magnanimitas: aut quid idem habent impossibilitas dejectionis animi quae est circa fortunas.
CHAPTER V. On the discovery of the definition of a passion. But one aiming at finding the definition of a passion, which is not as a being standing through itself, but as a being in this respect, that it is inclined to something as to a subject in which it has being, must seek, while aiming at things similar and indifferent in species, first those things which participate in that passion through one nature and common account. And one must inspect what all those things, indifferent in species, have the same according as that passion belongs to them commonly, because according to that the passion will belong to them. But afterward one must again look ahead in other individuals which are in the same genus and species with the individuals considered first, to which that passion belongs according to another and another account found in the same things which indeed are the same in species with the first; and to one of those it belongs through another account of those or from those, so that these with those do not participate in that passion through the same account. But when in these things, which participate in that passion through one account, it is received that all things, or that in all those things, are the same, namely the things which participate in that passion; and in others which participate in that passion through another account, the things which participate in the same passion are similarly received. In the singulars received in this twofold way one must aim to see whether there is the same thing by which they participate in that passion; and this indeed must be done thus through all singulars, always beginning from singulars and resolving to the common, until that according to which that passion belongs to all comes to the common account of it according as that very passion belongs to all those things. And when they have been gathered according as the passion belongs, this gathered thing will certainly be the definition of that passion. But if, after all singulars have been considered, both those to which it belongs according to one nature and those to which it belongs according to several, it does not go by resolution into one account, but into two or several accounts, it is manifest that what is sought to be defined, that is, the passion to be defined, is certainly not one according to nature and name and account, but is several according to thing and account and name; hence it has those many things equivocally. As I say through an example: if we ask what magnanimity is through definition, which is the passion of the magnanimous person, one must aim at certain magnanimous persons who participate in magnanimity through one and the same account, whom we know to be magnanimous through the same account; and one must see what one thing according to species and account all have according as they are magnanimous, that is, insofar as they are of this sort, according to what is said. Alcibiades is magnanimous, or Ajax is said to be magnanimous, or Achilles; one must consider what one thing according to species and account they are, according as they are said to be magnanimous: as that which is not to tolerate injuries, that is, that they have been injured and do not suffer injury, because they seem to themselves unworthy to sustain injuries from anyone. For on account of this, that he suffered injuries from some persons, Alcibiades fought and committed himself to the danger of wars. But Achilles went mad, being indignant that he suffered injuries. But this third one, namely Ajax, killed himself lest he suffer injuries. And thus magnanimity belonged to all these according to one and the same thing in species, which is not being able to tolerate injuries. But when these have been considered, again in others who are magnanimous, not through the same account of something which belongs to them, as in Lysander and Socrates, who were said to be magnanimous, not through the same thing by which the aforementioned were said to be magnanimous; but these are indifferent in species from those, because both those and these were human beings. And they are called magnanimous because, having prospered and having not prospered, they held themselves indifferently, neither lifted up by prosperous things nor cast down by adverse things and misfortunes. Therefore these two, namely to have the same soul in prosperous and adverse things, and not to be able to sustain injuries, while aiming at what same thing they have according as magnanimity belongs to both these, or what same thing the impossibility of casting down the soul has, which is concerned with fortunes.
prosperas et adversas, aut non tolerantia injuriarum quae fuit secundum quod dicebantur magnanimi tres primi inducti; et si haec in uno aliquo conveniant, sicut in amplitudine animi contemnentis minorantia. Si vero nullum sit in quo ista conveniant, tunc duae utique erunt species magnanimitatis, et non habent nisi nomen unum aequivoce de illis dictum. Si autem omnibus his commune secundum quod magnus et non minoratus attenditur animus, tunc una ratione et nomine univoco participant magnanimitatem: hoc enim unum quod in illis est universale secundum quod inest illis magnanimitas, et semper hoc danda est magnanimitatis diffinitio.
Semper enim in demonstrativis omnis diffinitio est universalis: cujus probatio est, quia et medicus assignans oculi passionem quae est sanabile, non dicit, hoc est, non diffinit, sanabilitatem prout est in quodam oculo, et quaedam sanabilitas; sed aut dicit eam prout in omni universaliter, aut diffinit eam secundum se, sed non secundum accidens, aut diffinit tantum in specie universaliter determinans, hoc est, diffiniens ipsam. Sed a singularibus inspiciendum est si per unum aliquid conveniat omnibus, quia facile, hoc est, facilius, est diffinire, hoc est, univocationem nominis et rationis invenire, in singulari quam in universali. In quantum enim aliquid communicat nomine, plus appropinquat universali quam singulari, et plus convenit cum aequivocis quam singulare, et ideo unitas naturae, secundum quam inest passio in universali, minus videtur. Unde, ut videtur, oportet in consideratione talium diffinitionum a singularibus in singularium inspectione ad universalia procedere, et sic universale inventum diffinire. Et namque hoc est, quia aequivocationes magis latent in universalibus quam in his quae differentia numero sunt et singularia. Et haec ratio jam dicta est.
Sicut enim in demonstrationibus oportet syllogizari esse aliquid vel non esse secundum complexionem certam et determinatam in esse et substantia, hoc autem convenienter erit si per ea sigillatim inspecta quae singularia sunt in unoquoque genere vel specie secundum aliquam passionem diffiniri studeant separatim inspecta, in quo illam passionem participent. Cujus exemplum est si simile vel similitudo diffiniri debeat, quae est passio eamdem qualitatem habentium, non statim diffinietur ut omne est, sive prout in omnibus est, sed inspicitur primo simile prout est in coloribus, et prout est in figuris. Et si acutum debeat diffiniri, inspicitur primo prout est acutum in voce, et prout est in angulis, et prout est in saporibus, et sic in singularibus inspecta passio est. Et viso secundum quid est in singulis, tunc et ascenditur in commune quod est universale, ab aliquo timente ne aequivocatio contingat in communi nisi per singula inspiciatur. Si autem ita procedat, non erit ambigua diffinitio: ambigua enim esse non debet in demonstrativis, quia si in demonstrativis non est disputare, hoc est, demonstrare, metaphoris, hoc est, ambiguis, multipliciter per similitudinem aliquam factis, sic neque quaecumque dicuntur, hoc est, diffiniuntur, dici vel diffiniri debent in metaphoris sive ambiguis. Si enim aliquid in metaphoris diffiniatur, necesse erit etiam disputare, hoc est, demonstrare, in metaphoris, quia diffinitio est medium demonstrationis et principium.
<marginal-label>Removet dubium.</marginal-label>
Sic igitur colligitur diffinitio passionis quae dicit quid tantum passio, quae est ex communibus quae considerat logicus. Diffinitio enim passionis quae dicit quid et propter quid, quia est propria scientiae metaphysicae, reservanda est ei. Haec autem ars tradita est in adinventionem diffinitionis, quod quid insit ut diffinitio ad determinationem problematis de diffinitione pertinet; et haec reservanda est dialectico topico in sexto Topicorum.
prosperous and adverse fortunes, or the non-endurance of injuries, which was according to the way in which the first three introduced were being called magnanimous; and whether these things come together in some one thing, as in a breadth of soul that contemns things that lessen it. But if there is nothing in which those things come together, then there will certainly be two species of magnanimity, and they have only one name said of them equivocally. But if there is something common to all these, according as the soul is considered great and not lessened, then they participate in magnanimity by one account and by one univocal name; for this one thing which is universal in them, according as magnanimity is in them, is what must always be given as the definition of magnanimity.
For always in demonstrative matters every definition is universal; the proof of this is that even a physician, assigning the affection of the eye which is curable, does not say, that is, does not define, curability as it is in a certain eye, and a certain curability; but either he says it as it is in every case universally, or he defines it according to itself, but not according to accident, or he defines it only in the species, determining universally, that is, defining it itself. But one must inspect from singulars whether through one thing something belongs to all, because it is easy, that is, easier, to define, that is, to find the univocation of name and account, in the singular than in the universal. For insofar as something communicates in name, it approaches the universal more than the singular does, and it agrees more with equivocals than the singular does, and therefore the unity of nature, according to which the affection is in the universal, is seen less. Hence, as it seems, in considering such definitions one must proceed from singulars, in the inspection of singulars, to universals, and so define the universal that has been found. And this indeed is so because equivocations lie more hidden in universals than in those things which are different in number and singular. And this reason has now been stated.
For just as in demonstrations one must syllogize that something is or is not according to a certain and determinate composition in being and substance, and this will suitably be so if, by those things inspected one by one which are singular in each genus or species according to some affection, they endeavor to be defined when inspected separately, in respect of that in which they participate in that affection. An example of this is if the similar, or similarity, must be defined, which is the affection of those having the same quality: it will not immediately be defined as everything is, or as it is in all things, but first the similar is inspected as it is in colors, and as it is in figures. And if the sharp must be defined, it is first inspected as it is sharp in voice, and as it is in angles, and as it is in flavors, and so the affection has been inspected in singulars. And when it has been seen according to what it is in singulars, then one also ascends to the common which is universal, while someone fears lest equivocation occur in the common unless it is inspected through the singulars. But if one proceeds in this way, the definition will not be ambiguous; for a definition ought not to be ambiguous in demonstrative matters, because if in demonstrative matters one must not dispute, that is, demonstrate, in metaphors, that is, in ambiguous things made in many ways through some similarity, so neither should whatever things are said, that is, defined, be said or defined in metaphors or ambiguous things. For if something is defined in metaphors, it will also be necessary to dispute, that is, to demonstrate, in metaphors, because definition is the middle of demonstration and its principle.
<marginal-label>He removes a doubt.</marginal-label>
Thus, therefore, the definition of an affection is gathered, the one which says only what the affection is, and which comes from the common things that the logician considers. For the definition of an affection that says what it is and why it is, because it is proper to metaphysical science, must be reserved to it. But this art has been handed down for the finding of a definition, that what belongs as the definition pertains to the determination of the problem concerning definition; and this is to be reserved for the dialectical topical art in the sixth book of the Topics.
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