Volume 2 · pp. 161–164

Chapter III. On the reduction of four questions to two, and of two to one another.

Latin (Borgnet)English

pp. 161–164

CAPUT III. De reductione quatuor quaestionum ad duas, et duarum ad invicem. Quaerimus autem cum quaeramus per quaestionem quia, aut per quaestionem si est, an est simpliciter, hoc est, cum quaerimus per quia, ens scilicet partitum et determinatum per praedicatum in subjecto determinato: et cum quaerimus per quaestionem si est vel an est, per quam quaeritur de esse rei simpliciter et absolute, et non de esse partito et determinato per praedicatum quod sit in subjecto determinato: haec enim isto modo in duabus quaestionibus quaerimus, scilicet utrum sit medium ipsius rei de qua quaerimus definitum, aut non sit medium ipsius ad hoc definitum. Et sic quaestio quia et quaestio an est, sive si est, in idem quaesitum referuntur non differens substantia vel subjecto, sed differens secundum esse tantum, quod scilicet quaesitum partitum quaeritur per quaestionem quia. Simpliciter autem et non partitum quaeritur per quaestionem si est. Istae ergo duae quaestiones sunt circa idem quaesitum. Cum jam scimus per duarum dictarum determinationem, scilicet quia est, aut si est simpliciter, et quod est, et quod hoc in hoc est: et sic scimus quod simpliciter est, et quod est ens partitum et determinatum: tunc enim quaerimus utrum est in parte, sicut ens partitum et determinatum: hoc enim quaeritur per quia: et per si est, quaerimus utrum simpliciter, hoc est, utrum simpliciter et non partitum et determinatum. Et istis quaestionibus quae circa idem quaesitum sunt sic determinatis, quod scimus ipsum quaesitum et esse simpliciter et esse in hoc sicut determinatum, tunc iterum supponentes quod est et quod aliquid est, quaerimus duas alias quaestiones propter quid est, aut quid est: et in his ambabus quaestionibus iterum quaerimus idem, scilicet medium: et sic istae duae quaestiones, quid est et propter quid est, reducuntur in unum quaesitum secundum rationem, tamen secundum esse differens, ut prius dictum est. Omnes ergo quaestiones reducuntur ad duas quae sunt, si est et quid est. Dico autem quia est quaestio et si est, quae quaerunt ambae si est medium, scilicet utrum est sicut ens in parte quod quaerit quia, aut utrum est sicut ens simpliciter non partitum. In parte quidem quaerimus utrum est vel non est, sicut quando quaerimus, utrum deficit luna vel augetur ad solem? In hujusmodi enim quaestione quaerimus si est aliquid aut non aliquid defectus in luna. Simpliciter autem dico quod quaeritur per si est, sicut si quaeramus si est vel an est luna, an non est? aut quando quaerimus si est nox aut non est? quaestio enim an est communiter tam ad subjectum quam ad passionem refertur. Ex quo igitur si est et quia est quaestiones ad idem quaesitum, et quid et propter quid est ad idem referuntur: tunc quaestiones quatuor reducuntur in duo quaesita. Contingit enim in omnibus quaestionibus quaerere, aut si est medium, aut quid est medium. Hujus autem probatio quia in omnibus inductive quaeritur, utrum sit medium et quid sit medium. Hujus autem ratio est, quod medium quaeritur: quia quaerens movetur ad notitiam ignoti, quod non potest sciri secundum esse et secundum veritatem, nisi per causam quae est medium cognoscendi. In omnibus enim quaestionibus hoc quaeritur: quia non nisi per illud venitur ad notitiam ignoti: et hoc patet inducendo quaerimus sic, ut quando quaerimus utrum luna deficit? tunc enim quaerimus utrum aliquod sit medium quod sit causa defectus, aut non est? nihil est enim cujus ortum legitima causa non praecesserit, ut dicit Plato. Postea scientes quia est aliquid defectus in luna, et quia est aliquod medium et causa illius, tunc quaerimus quid igitur hoc sit quod est medium? causa enim ipsius esse simpliciter quod quaerebat quaestio si est, et non esse hoc per substantiale praedicatum partitum vel accidentale, sed simpliciter esse substantiam, hoc est, simpliciter sit aliqua substantia vel natura, aut non sit aliquid simpliciter, sed sit aliquid eorum quae sunt per se, sicut ea quae substantiali praedicato determinata, aut aliquid eorum quae sunt per accidens, hoc est, accidentali praedicato particulata: haec, inquam, talis causa est medium quod quaeritur in quaestione quia. Dico autem exponendo quid intelligatur per simpliciter ens, sicut cum dicimus absolute esse lunam, aut terram, aut triangulum, quae omnia dicunt subjectam secundum rem absolutum et non particulatum: quid autem (hoc est ens existens quid particulatum) sicut cum dico defectum, aequalitatem, inaequalitatem: et si in medio aliquid sit ut terra in centro, vel aequale inter majus et minus aut non, et alia his similia quae sunt nomina passionum et dicunt hoc esse in hoc, sive esse particulatum. In omnibus enim his quaestionibus manifestum est (quantum ad quaesitum quod intenditur) quod idem est et quid est quaerere et propter quid: et sic ad duas quaestiones (scilicet quia est et quid est) omnes quatuor quaestiones reducuntur. Haec quidem igitur quae dicta sunt, usque hic sunt posita ad hoc, quod quatuor quaestiones ad duas reducantur. Amplius adhuc probatur quod idem quaeritur in quaestione quid et propter quid: quia idem quaeritur per quaestiones ad quas per idem respondetur: ad quid est autem et propter quid est, idem respondetur: ergo idem quaerunt. Cum enim quaeritur dicendo, quid est defectus qui est eclipsis in luna? respondetur quod eclipsis in luna, sive defectus in luna, est privatio luminis a luna a terrae objectu inter lunam et solem recto cum diametro. Et cum quaeritur propter quid deficit luna? respondetur idem quod prius. Dicitur enim quod deficit luna propter defectum luminis in luna, opposita terra inter lunam et solem recto diametro. Similiter et in alio exemplo musico cum quaeritur quid est harmonia? et respondetur quod est consonantia: consonantiae autem diffinitio est, quod est ratio sive proportio numeri inter acutum et grave secundum numerum notarum. Et si quaeritur propter quid consonat harmonia in acuto et gravi? respondetur idem, quod scilicet consonat, quia acutum et grave in harmonia habet rationem, hoc est, proportionem numeri in numero notarum sive neumatum. Quaestiones ergo istae sic ordinantur, quod primum quaerimus, utrum sit numerus ratio sive proportio, quae sunt acutum et grave: et hoc quaerimus per si est: quaerimus enim per si est, an est harmonia in numeris talis proportio quae est numerus harmoniae? Accipientes autem per responsionem, quia est harmonia in numeris: tunc quaerimus dicentes, quid igitur est per diffinitionem talis ratio quae vocatur harmonia: et ex hoc ordine quaestionum scitur, quod quaestio an est, et quaestio quid est, sunt circa idem quaesitum. Hic autem est dubitatio de his quae dicta sunt, quod quaestio an est et quia est, reducuntur ad unum: et quaestio quid est et propter quid, reducuntur ad unum: quia si quaestio an est et quid est, sunt de essentia rei: quia autem et propter quid sunt de inesse in hoc, et complexione rei cum re: tunc magis videntur circa unum et idem esse quaestio an est et quid est, quam quaestio an est et quia est: et sic magis debent reduci ad unum quaestio si est et quid est, quam quaestio an est, sive si est, et quaestio quia est. Similiter objectio est de quid est et propter quid est, quia cum quia et propter quid sint circa complexionem rei, magis videntur reduci ad unum quam quid est et propter quid. Sed sciendum quod licet secundum subjectum quaestio si est et quid est conveniant, non tamen conveniunt magis in modo quaerendi et interrogatione: quia quaestioni an est et si est, directe satisfit per quia: et ideo ad unum referuntur: quaerit tamen una de essentia rei simpliciter sive medii, quaerit enim an medium sit: secunda autem quaerit esse medii in hoc et illo, secundum quem modum medium est. Similiter in ratione et modo quaerendi conveniunt quid est et propter quid est: quid enim passionis est inesse, et causa inhaerentiae est, quia subjectum est principium passionis: et ideo scito quod sit et insit passio, quaeritur causa propter quam inest. Adhuc autem notandum quod quamvis aliud res et medium rei communiter loquendo, tamen in potissima demonstratione est: quia medium est diffinitio, et res est diffinitum: diffinitio autem et diffinitum idem sunt. Quod autem omnis quaestio sit medii quaestio, et sic omnes quaestiones ad unum quaesitum reducantur, ex signo tali probatur: quia quandoquidem sensibile est, et non sumus sentientes ipsum: tunc absentia medii nobis est causa quaerendi: et tunc quaerimus videntes effectum, et non videntes causam quae est medium: sicut quando videmus defectum lunae si ponatur esse defectus: tunc enim videmus majorem et minorem extremitates, et majorem extremitatem minori inesse, quod est conclusio: et non videmus sensu corporeo causam quae est medium. Si vero essemus super lunam, tunc sensu de omnibus certificato non utique quaereremus medium: neque quaereremus tunc per quaestionem an est, si sit defectus, quia hoc oculis fidelibus videremus: neque quaereremus quaestione propter quid, propter quid sit defectus, quia visu pateret terra interposita soli et lunae: unde tunc non quaereremus, quia simul utrique utrumque horum esset manifestum. Ex eo enim, hoc est, post hoc quod accipimus per sensum, et quod luna deficit et quod terra interponitur, fit nobis universale per abstractionem ab hoc particulari, cujus est una ratio in omnibus, et ex hoc universali factum esset nobis scire per causam, quae universalis est virtute secundum regularem motum circuli ad solis et lunae diametrum, in qua terra interponitur: quamvis sentire non sit scire, nec universale sit sensibile, sicut in ante habitis dictum est, sed sensibile per abstractionem fit universale quod in nobis est principium scientiae. <marginal-label>Objectio.</marginal-label> Videtur tamen hoc aliquibus forte inconveniens. Si enim omnes quaestiones reducantur ad quaestionem medii, et quaestio medii est quaestio propter quid, videtur quod omnis quaestio et omnis demonstratio sit propter quid. <marginal-label>Solutio.</marginal-label> Sed ad hoc dici potest, quod omnis quaestio medii est sicut omnis devenire volens in finem quaerit medium per quod devenire possit: eo quod finis certus est ei qui se dirigi cupit in finem. Sed medium dupliciter consideratur, scilicet secundum id quod est medium, et secundum id quod est in ratione medii: et quid quidem quaerit de medio, hoc est, de hoc quod est medium: propter quid autem dicit medium secundum id quod est medium, sive in ratione medii. Et quando dicitur quod omnis quaestio est de medio, medium sumitur in ratione communi ad utrumque istorum modorum, et ideo non sequitur quod omnis quaestio de medio sit quaestio propter quid. Adhuc autem sciendum quod quaestio vel est de passione secundum se, vel de esse passionis in hoc: et tamen non dicitur, quod omnis quaestio sit passionis, sed medii: quia quaestio illius dicitur esse per quod determinatur: determinatur autem per medium, et ideo medii esse dicitur: est igitur omnis quaestio medii sicut ejus per quod determinatur, et omnis quaestio est medii sicut finis. Sicut igitur in priori parte istius capituli diximus, quod quid est scire, idem est quod est propter quid. Hoc autem quod est quid, differt in ratione ab hoc quod est propter quid: quia quid est scire, est eorum quae sunt simpliciter secundum quidditatem suae essentiae: et non est aliquid de numero eorum quae insunt, sicut est haec passio triangulo inhaerens, quoniam scilicet tres anguli per aequipollentiam aequalitatis sunt duo recti, aut quoniam idem triangulus secundum valorem trium angulorum aliquid majus aut minus est aliquo cui comparatur. Quod quidem igitur omnia quae quaeruntur, medii sive de medio sint quaestiones (ut in secunda parte capituli ostensum est) manifestum est ex dictis.

CHAPTER III. On the reduction of four questions to two, and of two to one another. But when we ask through the question that, or through the question if it is, whether it is simply, that is, when through that we ask, namely, about a being divided and determined by a predicate in a determinate subject, and when through the question if it is or whether it is we ask about the being of a thing simply and absolutely, and not about being divided and determined by a predicate that is in a determinate subject, in this way in these two questions we ask these things, namely whether there is a middle defined for the very thing about which we ask, or whether there is not a middle of it defined for this. And thus the question that and the question whether it is, or if it is, are referred to the same thing asked, not differing in substance or subject, but differing only according to being, namely because the divided thing asked is asked through the question that. But the simple and not divided thing is asked through the question if it is. Therefore these two questions are about the same thing asked. When now we know through the determination of the two questions mentioned, namely that it is, or if it is simply, and what it is, and that this is in this, and thus we know both that it is simply and that it is a divided and determinate being, then we ask whether it is in a part, as a divided and determinate being. For this is asked through that; and through if it is, we ask whether it is simply, that is, whether it is simply and not divided and determinate. And when these questions which are about the same thing asked have been thus determined, because we know the thing asked itself both to be simply and to be in this as determined, then again, supposing that it is and that it is something, we ask two other questions, on account of what it is or what it is. And in both of these questions again we ask the same thing, namely the middle; and thus these two questions, what it is and on account of what it is, are reduced to one thing asked according to account, yet differing according to being, as was said before. Therefore all questions are reduced to two, which are if it is and what it is. But I say that the question that it is and if it is both ask if there is a middle, namely whether it is as a being in a part, which that asks, or whether it is as a being simply, not divided. In a part, indeed, we ask whether it is or is not, as when we ask whether the moon is eclipsed or is increased toward the sun. For in a question of this kind we ask if there is something or not something, an eclipse in the moon. But I call simple what is asked through if it is, as if we ask if or whether the moon is, or is not, or when we ask if night is or is not. For the question whether it is is commonly referred both to subject and to property. Therefore, from the fact that the questions if it is and that it is are referred to the same thing asked, and what it is and on account of what it is are referred to the same, then four questions are reduced to two things asked. For in all questions it happens to ask either if there is a middle or what the middle is. But the proof of this is that in all things it is asked inductively whether there is a middle and what the middle is. But the reason for this is that the middle is asked, because the one asking is moved toward knowledge of the unknown, which cannot be known according to being and according to truth except through a cause, which is the middle of knowing. For in all questions this is asked, because one comes to knowledge of the unknown only through it; and this is clear by inducing. We ask in this way, as when we ask whether the moon is eclipsed. For then we ask whether there is some middle which is the cause of the eclipse, or whether there is not. For there is nothing whose origin a lawful cause has not preceded, as Plato says. Afterward, knowing that there is some eclipse in the moon, and that there is some middle and cause of it, then we ask what, therefore, this is which is the middle. For the cause of its being simply, which the question if it is was asking, and not its being this through a divided substantial or accidental predicate, but its simply being a substance, that is, whether it simply is some substance or nature, or whether it is not something simply but is something of those things which are per se, as those things determined by a substantial predicate, or something of those things which are per accidens, that is, particularized by an accidental predicate: this, I say, such a cause is the middle which is asked in the question that. But I say, by expounding, what is understood through simply being: as when we say that the moon, or the earth, or a triangle exists absolutely, all of which state a subject according to the thing, absolute and not particularized. But what, that is, a being existing as some particularized what, is as when I say eclipse, equality, inequality, and whether there is something in the middle, as the earth in the center, or the equal between greater and lesser, or not, and other things similar to these, which are names of properties and state this to be in this, or particularized being. For in all these questions it is manifest, as regards the thing asked which is intended, that asking what it is and on account of what are the same; and thus all four questions are reduced to two questions, namely that it is and what it is. Therefore the things that have been said up to here have been set down for this, that the four questions may be reduced to two. Further, it is still proved that the same thing is asked in the question what and on account of what, because the same thing is asked through questions to which response is made through the same thing; but to what it is and on account of what it is, response is made by the same thing; therefore they ask the same thing. For when inquiry is made by saying, what is the defect which is eclipse in the moon, it is answered that eclipse in the moon, or defect in the moon, is the privation of light from the moon by the earth's being placed between the moon and the sun in a straight line with the diameter. And when it is asked on account of what the moon is eclipsed, the same thing as before is answered. For it is said that the moon is eclipsed on account of the defect of light in the moon, the earth being opposed between the moon and the sun in a straight diameter. Similarly also in another musical example, when it is asked what harmony is, and it is answered that it is consonance, but the definition of consonance is that it is an account or proportion of number between high and low according to the number of notes. And if it is asked on account of what harmony consonates in high and low, the same thing is answered, namely that it consonates because high and low in harmony have an account, that is, a proportion of number in the number of notes or neumes. Therefore those questions are ordered thus, that first we ask whether number is the account or proportion which high and low are; and this we ask through if it is. For through if it is we ask whether harmony is in numbers, such a proportion which is the number of harmony. But receiving through the response that harmony is in numbers, then we ask, saying, what therefore is such an account, which is called harmony, through definition? And from this order of questions it is known that the question whether it is and the question what it is are about the same thing asked. But here there is a doubt about the things that have been said, that the question whether it is and that it is are reduced to one, and the question what it is and on account of what are reduced to one. For if the question whether it is and what it is are about the essence of the thing, but that and on account of what are about inherence in this and about the composition of thing with thing, then the question whether it is and what it is seem more to be about one and the same thing than the question whether it is and that it is; and thus the question if it is and what it is ought more to be reduced to one than the question whether it is, or if it is, and the question that it is. Similarly there is an objection about what it is and on account of what it is, because since that and on account of what are about the composition of the thing, they seem more to be reduced to one than what it is and on account of what. But it must be known that although the question if it is and what it is agree according to subject, nevertheless they do not agree more in the mode of asking and interrogation, because the question whether it is and if it is is directly satisfied through that, and therefore they are referred to one thing. Yet one asks about the essence of the thing simply, or of the middle, for it asks whether the middle is; but the second asks the being of the middle in this and that, according to the mode in which the middle is. Similarly, what it is and on account of what it is agree in the account and mode of asking. For the what of a property is to inhere and is the cause of inherence, because the subject is the principle of the property; and therefore, when it is known that the property is and inheres, the cause on account of which it inheres is asked. Moreover it must be noted that, although a thing and the middle of the thing are other, speaking commonly, nevertheless in the most powerful demonstration they are one, because the middle is the definition and the thing is the defined; but the definition and the defined are the same. But that every question is a question of the middle, and thus all questions are reduced to one thing asked, is proved from such a sign: because whenever there is something sensible and we are not sensing it, then the absence of the middle is the cause of asking for us; and then we ask while seeing the effect and not seeing the cause which is the middle, as when we see the eclipse of the moon, if it is posited that there is an eclipse. For then we see the major and minor extremes, and the major extreme inhering in the minor, which is the conclusion, and we do not see by bodily sense the cause which is the middle. But if we were above the moon, then, with sense made certain about all things, we certainly would not ask the middle, nor would we then ask through the question whether it is, if there is an eclipse, because we would see this with trustworthy eyes, nor would we ask by the question on account of what, on account of what there is an eclipse, because by sight the earth interposed between sun and moon would be evident. Hence then we would not ask, because each of these two things would at once be manifest to each. For from this, that is, after this which we receive through sense, both that the moon is eclipsed and that the earth is interposed, the universal is made for us through abstraction from this particular, of which there is one account in all things; and from this universal knowing through the cause would be made for us, which cause is universal in power according to the regular motion of the circle toward the diameter of the sun and moon, in which the earth is interposed, although to sense is not to know, nor is the universal sensible, as was said in the things previously had, but the sensible through abstraction becomes the universal which in us is the principle of science. <marginal-label>Objection.</marginal-label> Nevertheless perhaps this seems unsuitable to some. For if all questions are reduced to the question of the middle, and the question of the middle is the question on account of what, it seems that every question and every demonstration is on account of what. <marginal-label>Solution.</marginal-label> But to this it can be said that every question of the middle is as everyone wishing to arrive at an end asks for the middle through which he can arrive, because the end is certain to him who desires to be directed into the end. But the middle is considered in two ways, namely according to that which is the middle, and according to that which is in the account of the middle. And what indeed asks about the middle, that is, about that which is the middle; but on account of what states the middle according to that which is the middle, or in the account of the middle. And when it is said that every question is about the middle, middle is taken in an account common to each of these modes; and therefore it does not follow that every question about the middle is the question on account of what. Moreover it must be known that a question is either about a property according to itself, or about the being of a property in this; and nevertheless it is not said that every question is of a property, but of the middle, because a question is said to be of that through which it is determined. But it is determined through the middle, and therefore it is said to be of the middle. Therefore every question is of the middle as of that through which it is determined, and every question is of the middle as of the end. Therefore, just as in the prior part of this chapter we said that to know what it is is the same as what is on account of what. But this which is what differs in account from this which is on account of what, because knowing what it is belongs to those things which are simply according to the quiddity of their essence; and it is not something from the number of those things which inhere, as this property inhering in triangle is, namely that three angles through equipollence of equality are two right angles, or that the same triangle according to the value of its three angles is something greater or lesser than something to which it is compared. Therefore that all things that are asked are questions of the middle or about the middle, as was shown in the second part of the chapter, is manifest from what has been said.