Among the things of which a confessor needs knowledge, restitution stands among the first: by it satisfaction is made for a thing taken away, or for damage, or for injury. It is necessary for penitents, because just as to take what is another’s is a mortal sin, so also is to keep it against the owner’s will. What is to be observed about restitution is noted in these two verses: (fol. 47r) Who, to whom, what, how much, or where, at what time,
In what order you restore: so hold it, pious reader.
Yet first it is to be understood that when we speak of the restitution of another’s property that has been received, we speak both of unjust taking, as by robbery, etc., and of unjust retention, as of a loan (which for brevity’s sake will be included under the name of taking).
Who Ought to Make Restitution
Whoever was the cause of an unjust taking is bound to restore; and if many were the cause, all are bound. Now a person can be the cause of an unjust taking in ten ways, which are contained in these verses:
Let him restore who takes what is another’s, and his servant.
Command, counsel, consent, praise, and companion;
He who receives, the silent, who does not hinder, who does not reveal.
The first, then, is he who carries it out himself, whether by his own impulse and for his own gain, or another’s, as the usurer’s servant, and one who wounds by his master’s command. The second is the one who commands, who is bound when from his command an unjust act has followed, or he has ratified (fol. 47v) what was done in his name. The third is the one who effectively counsels: so that by such counsel someone is moved to commit an unjust act, if the effect has followed. The fourth is the one who consents, without whose consent the act would not have followed; otherwise if it would have followed without such consent. The fifth is the flatterer, when from praise and flattery, as from a cause or joint cause, the effect follows. The sixth is a partner in the evil action, as companion, go-between, or one who otherwise shares in the crime, when he is a cause of the unjust taking without which it would not have been done. The seventh is the harbourer of such people. For he is a cause of the crime by giving them security and custody of the plunder: whence thieves steal more boldly and more securely. It is otherwise if he has not received them in order that they might steal. The eighth is the silent one, that is, he who can and ought to speak, by reproving, commanding, and the like, and does not. The ninth, he who does not hinder, that is, who does not impede an unjust action which he can and ought to impede: as those on whom this falls by office. The tenth, he who does not reveal the perpetrator of an (fol. 48r) evil action, when he can and is bound to: as a witness called in court, and keepers of vineyards, and the like, who are liable for the damages which a neighbour suffers from the failure to reveal, insofar as not revealing was the cause of the damage; and when in these three cases it is said “who can and ought,” understand not only of those on whom it generally falls by office, but in a case of necessity, of all who in that case can impede without their own harm and danger, when the unjust action cannot otherwise be prevented.
Any of the above, when damage has followed, is bound to restore in full. But if others have restored for their part, he would be bound only for the rest: for it is enough that the injured party be satisfied; so if one or another has paid the whole, the rest would not be bound.
To Whom Restitution Ought to Be Made
A distinction is needed. If restitution is made solely because of another’s property that is found with someone, it ought commonly to be restored to the one to whom it is owed (if he is known), namely to the owner of the thing, whether he be a cleric (fol. 48v) or a layman. But if it were a prelate who is a dissipator of the Church’s goods, it ought to be restored to the Church, with the superior’s consent obtained if possible.
If the owner of the thing is not known, or there can be no access to him, or not without danger and scandal, let it be restored to Christ, the Lord of all, by giving to the poor.
If restitution is made because of an unjust taking, when the giving also is forbidden (as when an administrator of holy orders receives money, etc.), restitution is not made to the giver, but to the one to whose injury the money was given, whether it be the Church, or some person, or indeed to Christ the heir of all.
If the obligation of restitution arises from unjust taking alone, and the giving was not unjust, as in usury, it ought to be restored to the one damaged, so that these two concur together: unjust taking, and damage that follows from the unjust taking. Whence he who steals a pledge from a merchant ought to restore it to the same merchant; yet in the forum of conscience he could restore it to the owner of the pledge, provided the merchant suffers no loss. Likewise if someone steals a stolen thing, (fol. 49r) let him restore it to the owner, but let the [original] thief understand that he is not bound to restore further.
If the person to whom restitution ought to be made is dead, it shall be given to the heirs; if they are unknown, after due inquiry has been made, it shall be given to Christ in his poor. If he is at a distance, and it can easily and faithfully be sent to him, if the thing is of great value, it ought to be sent to the owner at the expense and loss of the one unjustly detaining it; if it cannot be sent, and the thing is of small value, it could be given to his relatives, or to a poor monastery, at the judgement of a good man, with an agreement that when the owner comes it be restored to him, if the thing can be kept. If a usurer wishes to restore usuries to those who have left the place of the usury, at their expense, he can send it; if the usurer himself has left, he will send at his own expense.
The thing ought not always to be restored to the one whose it is, or from whom it was received, namely when it is harmful to him, as a sword to a madman, etc.; but it can be kept for the heirs.
If only the cause is forbidden, not the taking, as in base gain from prostitution, etc., (fol. 49v) it is not necessary to restore, unless fraud or unlawful extortion has intervened, or it was received from one who cannot alienate; yet they ought to be counselled to give to the poor; likewise concerning what is acquired by gambling.
Uncertain goods liable to restitution, when after diligent inquiry the owner cannot be found, should be given to the poor, at the judgement of the one who has them, or of the confessor; and bishops ought not to reserve such things to themselves, unless the question would have to be brought to judgement—as when someone has publicly plundered a city, and it is not known from whom he took, then restitution shall be made by the counsel of the bishop or of the temporal lord.
Things found which never had an owner, or of which no memory remains, or which he does not care about, belong to the finder. If they had or have an owner, they are to be restored to the owner of the thing; if after diligent inquiry the owner is not found, they can be given to the poor, or kept by a poor finder, with the confessor’s leave.
Of treasure whose owner is unknown: if it is found on one’s own land, the whole belongs (fol. 50r) to the finder; if it is found by chance on another’s, one half will belong to the owner of the land, the other to the finder, according to Thomas;1 if it is found by diligent searching, with the leave of the owner who grants it because he himself does not wish to search, the whole belongs to the finder. If he searches against or beyond the owner’s will, the whole will belong to the owner. If, knowing that treasure is in the land, while the owner is ignorant of it, the land is bought, the whole treasure seems to belong to the [seller as] owner. But the custom by which treasures found are reserved to princes does not bind in conscience, according to the judgements of the doctors.
What Is to Be Restored
Things and damages are to be restored: if the thing still exists, let the thing itself be restored, unless danger of scandal or something else is feared; then an equivalent shall be rendered at the judgement of a good man. If the thing does not exist, or has been made worse, let an equivalent be rendered.
Whoever has another’s property is bound to restore it to the one whose it is, whether he holds it in good faith or not. If he held it in good faith—as if he bought a horse, believing it to be the seller’s, though it was not—if he has already (fol. 50v) sold it, he is bound to restore what he has been enriched by from such a thing, and no more; if he had received it as a gift and sold it, he would owe the whole price. But if he still has it with him, he is bound to restore it, even without having received the price from the one whose the thing is; yet he has an action against the seller of another’s property. But if in bad faith he bought another’s property out of greed for gain, he would be bound to restore that thing if he has it, or an equivalent if he has not, and the profit he acquired from it; and even if it is stolen from him, he is not freed from restitution. But if he took a thing he knows to be another’s not for the sake of gain, but faithfully managing the owner’s business lest the thing perish, he can recover from the one despoiled whatever he spent. And if the owner is not found, he will give to the poor what remained above the price and expenses.
One who lawfully hinders someone from obtaining any good is bound to nothing; if unjustly he hindered one who was going to obtain it, he would be bound to an equal; if the other was near to obtaining it, he would be bound at the judgement of a good man. So also one who hinders (fol. 51r) someone from an office which he justly exercises, as a countryman from his work, and the like, unless he does it according to reason, is bound to restore at the judgement of a good man. Those who hinder a creditor in an unlawful way from being able to exact from a debtor—as by freeing him from prison, or in some other unjust way—and in general those who unjustly inflict damage on another (especially of set purpose) are bound, if the damage is certain, to all of it; if uncertain, at the judgement of a good man. If another’s property perishes in the hand of one who is at fault for its not being returned to the owner: if it would equally have perished with the owner, he is not bound for the damage; otherwise if it would not have perished, or could earlier have been sold by the owner. One who cedes his goods because of poverty, if he comes to a richer fortune, is bound in conscience to restore what he owes. In damages to life, limbs, health, liberty, honour, reputation, strength, fruits, emergent damage, loss of profit, and the like, restitution for the damages shall be made as best it can, at the judgement of a good (fol. 51v) man. He who has deflowered a virgin whom he seduced, promising to take her to wife, is bound to marry her (if she is not of inferior condition); but if he has afterwards married another, he is bound to dower her. But if there were some signs by which the virgin could perceive that he did not mean to marry her, he would not be bound in the forum of conscience to marry or dower her, unless he had forced her violently: for then, even if the girl’s father will not give her, or she will not marry, he must nevertheless dower her.
How Much Ought to Be Restored
If the quantity of the thing or of the damage is certain, just so much shall be restored; if uncertain, as in injuries, etc., as much as a good and prudent man will judge, the particular circumstances of the thing, time, place, and person, and the like, being considered.
A possessor in good faith, if before prescription runs he notices that the thing he possesses is not his, is bound in conscience to restore the whole thing, and the damages, and the fruits received in the time of good faith, deducting the expenses made for the sake of gathering, seeking, and (fol. 52r) preserving the fruits: the same reason holds of one who has not paid a legacy for many years; for he is bound to restore even the fruits received.
Where Restitution Ought to Be Made
If restitution is necessary because of another’s property which someone holds in good faith, it ought to be made in the place where the thing is held.
If restitution is necessary because of unjust taking, let it be restored where the owner of the thing is kept unharmed; and if anyone is to be burdened, let the occupier be burdened, who has always been in delay.
On the Time of Restitution
He who owes is indeed bound to restore at once: for a negative precept is included, namely not to keep what is another’s; yet understand that “at once” thus: that he be ready in mind to restore as soon as he conveniently can; but as to execution, he ought to restore at a suitable time, the due circumstances being observed.
Three things can excuse from making restitution at once. First, the will (fol. 52v) of the owner granting a delay. Second, reasonable ignorance of law or of fact. Third, inability, of which the judgement of the doctors is contained in six conclusions. The first is, that one who is in extreme necessity, having only what is necessary for his own life and that of his household, is not bound to restore at once: because then all things are common. The second is, he who by restoring could not live according to the decency of his state, even if the owner of the thing, who is not in such or greater necessity, will not grant a delay, is not bound to restore at once; yet he ought to take care not to make unnecessary expenses, otherwise he would not be excused according to reason. The third is, when restitution, if made at once, is to the damage of the owner’s body or soul, it ought not to be made at once. The fourth, if the same would redound to damage, or be against the common good. The fifth, if it is probable that it will be to the damage of the reputation, or life, or soul of the one restoring, or of another; or if from this there is imminent danger of some mortal sin, it ought not to be done, except when such danger (fol. 53r) has ceased, because these are greater damages than not restoring at once. The sixth, if to restore at once redounds to a small advantage of the creditor and to a great loss of the debtor: as if a craftsman debtor would have to sell the tools of the trade by which he lives, he is not bound to restitution [at once]: because according to reason a delay ought to be given him. It would be otherwise if the creditor were in a like case, because no one ought to inconvenience another in order to accommodate himself; but if the loss were not of his own goods, but rather that he would forgo a large profit, he is not excused from restoring at once. Note also that if delay would be harmful to the creditor, and restitution were not made at once in order to avoid such a great inconvenience in one’s own goods, at least that creditor ought to be kept unharmed. Note further that confessors ought not to absolve such penitents before they actually restore, if, having been absolved in another confession, they have neglected to restore. But if the debtor cannot obtain a delay from the creditor, who is not in (fol. 53v) necessity, and the debtor himself can restore then without great inconvenience, yet will not, but is ready to restore later, because he thinks he cannot well do so then, he can be absolved if he promises to restore within a set time; but if he can, and he himself knows in conscience that he can then, and will not, he is by no means to be absolved, because it sufficiently appears that he is not contrite.
On the Order and Manner to Be Kept in Satisfactions Claims
He who can restore to all need not keep an order, but restore to all at once (as has been said). If he cannot to all, let certain claims be restored before uncertain ones: unless the uncertain one were of such a kind that it is certain it never belonged to certain creditors, as a chalice: for such things can be given to the poor without injury to the creditors. Among certain goods, those are first to be restored which exist in their own species and belong to another: as deposits, and also purchases not paid for. After such restitution, the statutes are to be observed, and what (fol. 54r) civil law lays down (if it is not against the natural), and if opinions vary, the safer is to be chosen. A usurer, if he has not so many goods that he can satisfy other debts lawfully contracted and the usuries, ought first to satisfy the debts lawfully contracted: provided, however, that two conditions are present: first, that the usurious things do not exist in their own species, as pledges (for those ought to be returned to the owners when they repay the money); second, if from such lawful contracts he would not be made poorer for paying the earlier usuries, as would happen in the promise of a dowry, for he would be made poorer, etc. If the goods are uncertain, they can be restored according to the confessor’s counsel, who, if he sees the debtor in great misery, will be able to dispense that he keep them for himself, as a poor man of Christ, if nevertheless he judges this expedient. For if he were thought likely to be freer for theft on this account, it would not be expedient to use this mercy with him. Hidden things ought to be restored cautiously, lest reputation be hurt; but public usuries are to be restored publicly, for reputation is recovered (fol. 54v) more by restitution.
If anyone has defamed another, or himself, by way of law justly, he ought not to restore; if unjustly and falsely, let him restore by saying that he spoke falsely, or kept silent about the truth; if unjustly but not falsely (as one who has revealed a true sin), by saying that he unjustly defamed someone and did ill in saying such things. But let him beware of lying, and take care how he speaks, lest perhaps while restoring he defame the more: for then he ought not to restore, nor when there follows danger of a greater evil than the good of reputation to be gained. If reputation cannot be restored, compensation ought to be made otherwise, and satisfaction for the damage that followed from the defamation, at the judgement of a good man; in the same way concerning defamatory libels; and restitution ought to be made there where the defamation was made, publicly or secretly. It is also to be noted that when defamatory words have been spoken to one who could help, either according to the order of law or of fraternal correction, or when such things are not truly defamatory, as when they are venial, or can be taken either way, or were not (fol. 55r) said affirmatively but doubtfully, or when someone said only that he had heard them, or which have been published by another way, it is not necessary to make restitution of reputation. Let these things on restitution, gathered from good authors, suffice; now some things on ecclesiastical censures will be added.
Footnotes
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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 2 (on treasure-trove: half to the finder, half to the owner of the land when found by chance). ↩