These things are so arranged that in words as well as in opinions they agree most excellently with those things which we have brought forward from the works of Chrysostom1. And first they agree in words. For just as Chrysostom divides the divine will into the first and the second, so Damascene distributes the same into the first and antecedent will, and θέλημα δεύτερον καὶ ἑπόμενον, the second and consequent will.
Just as Chrysostom calls the first will εὐδοκίαν, good pleasure, so Damascene calls that same will εὐδοκίαν, good pleasure and benignity implanted in God.
Just as the former marks the first will by no other name than that of the will which is God’s proper will and native to him, so Damascene defines the antecedent will as ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄν, that which is from God himself and flows spontaneously from him.
Just as, according to Chrysostom, the first will is χωρὶς αἰτίας, and has no external cause, so, according to Damascene, the antecedent will is defined: ὅπερ τις ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ θέλει, that which God wills from himself and to the willing of which he is moved interiorly.
Just as Chrysostom teaches that the first will flows ἀπ᾽ ἀγάπης μόνης, from the charity of God alone, so Damascene hands down that it is θέλημα τῆς ἀγαθότητος, the will of implanted and connatural goodness.
Just as Chrysostom calls the second will θέλημα κατὰ συγκατάβασιν, the will from condescension, and θέλημα μετὰ αἰτίας, the will which borrows its cause from us, so Damascene calls it θέλημα ἐξ ἡμετέρας αἰτίας, the will of which we are the cause, θέλημα κατὰ παραχώρησιν, the will from permission, and θέλημα, ὅπερ ἐκ τῆς τῶν γινομένων αἰτίας, the will which is to be derived from those things which are done by us.
Just as, finally, for Chrysostom the second will is second in order, and God does not assume it before men are understood to have despised the gifts of the antecedent will, so for Damascene the second will is θέλημα ἑπόμενον, the consequent will, and is called absolutely θέλημα τῆς δικαιοσύνης, the will of justice.