But I would by no means wish those things to be separated from these by which, in the dialogue κατὰ Μανιχαίων, Against the Manichaeans, after Basil1, he settles the notable question whether God ought to be regarded as the author of punishments. For he writes2:
Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ αἱ τιμωρίαι ἡμῶν τὸν Θεὸν ἔχουσιν αἴτιον, οὐ γὰρ ὁ κριτὴς ἐστι τῆς τιμωρίας τοῦ πονηροῦ αἴτιος, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς θέλων κρίνει· ἀλλ᾽ αἴτιος μὲν ἐστιν ὁ πταίσας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τιμωρίας, ὁ δὲ κριτὴς, τῆς δικαιοσύνης αἴτιος· ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη· εἰ γὰρ θέλων κρίνει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ προηγούμενον θέλημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον· προηγούμενον μὲν ἐστι θέλημα, ὅπερ τις ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ θέλει, ἑπόμενον δέ, ὅπερ ἐκ τῆς τῶν γινομένων αἰτίας· προηγουμένως γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ θέλει ὁ Θεὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους σωθῆναι, καὶ εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν· ἁμαρτανόντων δὲ ἡμῶν, θέλει παιδεύεσθαι ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον· καὶ τὸ μὲν προηγούμενον θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῆς ἀγαθότητός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἑπόμενον, τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ,
But not even our punishments have God as their author. For the judge is not the author of the wicked man’s suffering punishment, even if he himself willingly passes sentence; rather, the one who committed the crime brought the punishment upon himself, while the judge is the cause of justice, which is a good thing. For although he judges willingly, he does so not by the antecedent will but by the consequent. Thus the antecedent will concerns that which one wills from himself, but the consequent concerns that which one wills only because of the things which have been done. For God3 antecedently, from himself, wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. But when we sin, for the sake of our utility he wills us to be chastised. For the antecedent will of God belongs to his goodness; but the consequent to justice.