But lest what he had affirmed should seem entangled and obscure to anyone - “εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἀπὸ ἀγάπης μόνης, ἐχρῆν ἅπαντας σωθῆναι, for if the salvation and election of men depended upon divine charity alone, all would have to be saved” - he opens the whole matter when, having advanced to the following words1 of Paul, ἐν ἀγάπῃ προορίσας ἡμᾶς εἰς υἱοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς αὐτόν, κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, “in charity he predestined us unto the adoption of sons through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will,” he adds2:
Κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ. Τουτέστιν, διὰ τὸ σφοδρῶς θελῆσαι· ἡ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι, αὕτη ἐστί· πανταχοῦ γὰρ εὐδοκία τὸ θέλημά ἐστι τὸ προηγούμενον. Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἄλλο θέλημα· οἷον, θέλημα πρῶτον, τὸ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι ἡμαρτηκότας· θέλημα δεύτερον, τὸ γενομένους κακοὺς ἀπολέσθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοὺς κολάζει, ἀλλὰ θέλημα. Τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐπὶ Παύλου ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον ὡς ὅταν λέγῃ· θέλω πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ὡς καὶ ἐμαυτόν. Καὶ πάλιν, θέλω νεωτέρας γαμεῖν, τεκνογονεῖν. Εὐδοκίαν οὖν τὸ πρῶτον θέλημα φησί, τὸ σφοδρὸν θέλημα, τὸ μετ᾽ ἐπιθυμίας θέλημα, τὸ πεῖσμα. Οὐ γὰρ παραιτήσομαι καὶ κοινοτέρᾳ λέξει χρήσασθαι σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν τῶν ἀφελεστέρων. Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν ἐπίτασιν τοῦ θελήματος δηλοῦντες, κατὰ τὸ πεῖσμα ἡμῶν λέγομεν. Ὃ οὖν λέγει, τοῦτό ἐστι· σφόδρα ἐφίεται, σφόδρα ἐπιθυμεῖ τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς ἡμετέρας. Τίνος οὖν ἕνεκεν οὕτως ἡμᾶς ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ πόθεν οὕτω φιλεῖ; Ἀπὸ ἀγαθότητος μόνης· ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἀγαθότητός ἐστι. Διὰ τοῦτο, φησίν, εἰς υἱοθεσίαν ἡμᾶς προώρισε θέλων, καὶ σφόδρα τοῦτο βουλόμενος, ἵνα ἡ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ δόξα δειχθῇ.
According to the good pleasure3 of his will. That is, because he wills it greatly. This, so to speak, is his desire4. For everywhere εὐδοκία5 - for Paul employs this word here - is the principal will and that which precedes; for there is also another will. For example, the first will is that those who have sinned should not perish; the second will is that those who have become evil should perish. For it is not necessity, but will, that punishes them. Such a thing can also be seen in Paul, as when he says6, “I will all men to be as I myself am.” And again7, “I will younger women to marry and to beget children.” Therefore he calls the first will εὐδοκία: the vehement will, the will that is accompanied by desire, the will that consists in a firm purpose. For I will not refuse to employ a more common expression, so that the matter may be clearer to the more simple. For thus do we also say, when indicating the intensity of the will, κατὰ τὸ πεῖσμα ἡμῶν, “according to our persuasion”8. This, therefore, is what he means: he earnestly wishes and earnestly desires our salvation. Why, then, does he love us thus? Whence does he cherish us thus? This proceeds from goodness alone. For grace is from goodness. Therefore, he says, he predestined us unto the adoption of sons, willing it, and willing it exceedingly, so that the glory of his grace might be manifested.
Footnotes
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Ephes. I. 5. ↩
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In the Epistle to the Ephesians, homily I, no. 2. ↩
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For illustrating the meaning of εὐδοκία, the following words from the Etymologicum Magnum contribute: εὐδοκία· ἡ ἀρίστη καὶ καλλίστη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἑκούσιος θέλησις, “εὐδοκία: the best and most beautiful voluntary will of God”; likewise these words of Phavorinus: εὐδοκία· τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθοποιΐᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ θέλημα παρὰ τὸ καλῶς δεδοχθαι, “εὐδοκία: the will of God directed toward doing good, from its having been well resolved”; he soon adds: εὐδοκίαν τὴν ἐπ᾽ εὐεργεσίᾳ βούλησιν ἔθος τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ καλεῖν, “Divine Scripture is accustomed to call the will directed toward beneficence εὐδοκία.” Suidas agrees, writing in his Lexicon: Εὐδοκία· τὸ ἀγαθὸν θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡς ὅπλῳ εὐδοκίας ἐστεφάνωσας ἡμᾶς. καὶ ὁ Ἀπόστολος· κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ. “Εὐδοκία: the good will of God. You (Ps. V. 15) have crowned us as with the shield of your benevolence. And the Apostle (Ephes. I. 5): according to the good pleasure of his will.” If you desire more, consult Budaeus under this word; he also observes that Jerome thought εὐδοκία to be a new word devised by the Alexandrian interpreters. ↩
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Although, from the definition of the Stoics, as may be seen in Suidas and Budaeus, there is this difference between βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία: βούλησις is called εὔλογος ὄρεξις, “rational appetite,” whereas ἐπιθυμία is ὄρεξις ἄλογος, “irrational appetite”; nevertheless, it has been received in usage that any desire and any will, even if most honorable and especially conformed to the prescription of reason, is called ἐπιθυμία. Whence Phavorinus says, ἐπιθυμίᾳ δηλοῦσιν ὁρμὴν ψυχῆς καὶ κίνησιν ἐπί τι, “by ἐπιθυμία they signify an impulse and motion of the soul toward something.” ↩
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Appositely Theodoret, in his commentary on this passage, says: Εὐδοκίαν γὰρ τὴν ἐπ᾽ εὐεργεσίᾳ βούλησιν ἔθος τῇ θείᾳ καλεῖν γραφῇ. “For it is the custom of Divine Scripture to call the will proceeding from beneficence εὐδοκία.” He immediately confirms this with examples. ↩
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I Cor. VII. 7. ↩
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I Tim. III. 14. ↩
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Stephanus treats of the derivation of this word and of its power of signification in the Thesaurus under the word πείθομαι. Isaac Habert also treats of it in book II of The Theology of the Greek Fathers on Grace, chap. VIII, § III, saying: “It is certain that the word πεῖσμα is taken for a vehement and firm persuasion and purpose; in this sense it is also employed among the Fathers, as by Clement of Alexandria, who for this reason calls it βεβαιότατον πεῖσμα, ‘the most steadfast persuasion,’ in the seventh book of the Stromata. In his Protrepticus that universal and antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved is also called τὸ προκείμενον, as though you were to say, ‘the will lying before.’” ↩