Works › The Mariale: Questions on “Missus est”
Volume 37 · pp. 153–156
Question 95. In what manner graces given gratis were in the Blessed Virgin, sections 1-2
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QUAESTIO XCV.
Qualiter gratiae gratis datae fuerunt in B. Virgine?
Viso de gratiis gratum facientibus qualiter fuerunt in beatissima Virgine, videndum est de gratiis gratis datis.
Et primo de his quas ponit Apostolus, I ad Corinth. XII, 8 et seq.: Alii quidem per Spiritum datur sermo sapientiae, etc.
Primo igitur quaeritur de sapientia quam habuit beatissima Virgo in contemplatione aeternorum: et quaeritur primo, an viderit Angelos et spiritualia per species proprias?
§ I.
Utrum viderit Angelos et spiritualia per species proprias?
Et videtur, quod sic:
1. Ipsa enim videre potuit et vidit spiritum increatum per speciem propriam: ergo et quemlibet alium.
2. Item, Gregorius: "Quid est quod non videant, qui videntem omnia vident?" 1 Sed ipsa videt videntem omnia: ergo vidit omnia.
3. Item, Philosophus dicit, quod intellectus cognoscit omnia propter seipsum cognoscendum: quidquid autem est secundum naturam cognoscitivum alicujus, cognoscit illud nisi impediatur: illa autem impedimenta secundum quod in superioribus dictum est, secundum Augustinum, sunt phantasmata corporalium, animae per amorem conglutinatae, quibus abstractis ipsa seipsam videt: sed ab his anima beatissimae Virginis potuit seipsam abstrahere: ergo potuit seipsam videre per speciem propriam.
4. Item, Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et Anima: "Anima concupiscibilitatem, rationabilitatem, et irascibilitatem habet antequam corpori infundatur 2." Et intelligitur, quod non eam habet a corpore, sed a sua natura in se: ergo anima in se naturaliter est cognoscitiva. Et posito per impossibile, quod non infunderetur corpori, adhuc esset cognoscitiva, si non esset coarctata per aliam naturam: ergo apta nata est cognoscere omnia: sed inordinatum esset, quod aliquid esset cognoscitivum omnium aliorum, et non suiipsius: ergo naturaliter anima cognoscitiva est suiipsius et omnium aliorum: ergo cognoscet omnia et seipsam, nisi impediatur: hoc autem est impedimentum quod dictum est supra: sed in anima beatae Virginis hoc fuit sublatum: ergo vidit seipsam et omnes Angelos et omnia creata. Unde Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et Anima: "Animus corporis dominator, rector, et habitator videt seipsum per semetipsum. Non quaerit auxilium corporalium oculorum, imo vero ab omnibus corporeis sensibus tamquam impedientibus et perstrepentibus abstrahit se ad se, ut videat se in se, et noverit se apud se. Et cum vult Deum cognoscere, elevat se super se mentis acie 3."
5. Item, Philosophus dicit 4, quod non omnino et penitus difficillimorum est cognoscere, et aliquam fidem accipere de anima. Et intelligitur secundum suam substantiam: operationes enim et potentias ipsius et accidentia cognoscere non est difficillimorum. Sic igitur cognoscere animam in se per suam speciem est de numero difficillimorum: ergo est de numero cognoscibilium: ergo secundum Philosophum, qui non habuit respectum ad gratiam, possibile est animam cognoscere per speciem propriam, licet difficulter: sed illa difficultas removetur per abstractionem a phantasmatibus corporalibus. Sed illa abstractio fuit completissima in contemplatione beatae Virginis: ergo vidit Angelos et spiritus et animas in sui contemplatione, et substantias incorporalium.
QUESTION 95.
In what manner graces given gratis were in the Blessed Virgin.
Having seen in what manner graces making one pleasing were in the most blessed Virgin, one must see concerning graces given gratis.
And first concerning those which the Apostle sets down, 1 Corinthians 12:8 and following: To one indeed through the Spirit is given the speech of wisdom, and so forth.
First, therefore, inquiry is made concerning the wisdom that the most blessed Virgin had in contemplation of eternal things; and first it is asked whether she saw Angels and spiritual things through their proper species.
Section 1.
Whether she saw Angels and spiritual things through their proper species.
And it seems that she did:
1. For she was able to see and did see the uncreated spirit through his proper species; therefore also any other spirit.
2. Likewise, Gregory says: "What is there that they do not see, who see the one who sees all things?" 1 But she sees the one who sees all things; therefore she saw all things.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher says that the intellect knows all things for the sake of knowing itself. But whatever, according to nature, is cognitive of something, knows it unless it is impeded. But those impediments, according as was said above, according to Augustine, are the phantasms of corporeal things, glued to the soul through love; when these have been abstracted, the soul sees itself. But the soul of the most blessed Virgin was able to abstract itself from these; therefore it was able to see itself through its proper species.
4. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Spirit and Soul says: "The soul has concupiscibility, rationality, and irascibility before it is infused into the body 2." And it is understood that it does not have it from the body, but from its own nature in itself; therefore the soul in itself is naturally cognitive. And if it is posited through the impossible that it would not be infused into a body, it would still be cognitive, if it were not narrowed by another nature. Therefore it is naturally apt to know all things. But it would be disordered for something to be cognitive of all other things and not of itself. Therefore naturally the cognitive soul is cognitive of itself and of all other things. Therefore it will know all things and itself unless it is impeded. But this impediment is what was said above; and in the soul of the blessed Virgin this was removed. Therefore she saw herself and all Angels and all created things. Hence Augustine in the book On Spirit and Soul says: "The mind, master, ruler, and inhabitant of the body, sees itself through itself. It does not seek the assistance of bodily eyes; rather, from all bodily senses as things impeding and making noise, it abstracts itself to itself, so that it may see itself in itself and know itself within itself. And when it wishes to know God, it lifts itself above itself by the keen sight of the mind 3."
5. Likewise, the Philosopher says 4 that it is not wholly and entirely among the most difficult things to know, and to receive some assurance concerning, the soul. And this is understood according to its substance; for to know its operations and powers and accidents is not among the most difficult things. Thus, therefore, to know the soul in itself through its own species is among the number of the most difficult things; therefore it is among the number of knowable things. Therefore according to the Philosopher, who did not have regard to grace, it is possible to know the soul through its proper species, though with difficulty. But that difficulty is removed through abstraction from corporeal phantasms. But that abstraction was most complete in the contemplation of the blessed Virgin; therefore she saw Angels and spirits and souls in contemplation of herself, and the substances of incorporeal things.
6. Item, Philosophus in III de Anima ponit intellectum agentem. Et quod ille non sit pars animae, sic probatur: Sicut in omni natura causa formalis quae est faciens omnia, penitus alia est in essentia a causa materiali in qua fiunt omnia, et ex his duobus numquam componitur unum: ita se habet intellectus universaliter agens et intellectus possibilis in anima: ergo neque sunt idem in essentia, neque sunt partes componentes unum totum: ergo intellectus agens non est pars animae, nec potentia.
Item, Nulla ars neque mechanica, neque liberalis, eadem est in essentia cum anima in qua est, neque est eadem in essentia cum materia quae sustinet operationes venientes ab ipsa: sed intellectus agens se habet ita ad possibilem sicut ars ad materiam: ergo non sunt eadem in essentia, neque constituunt aliquid totum ut partes animae.
Item, Nulla potentia est habitus: et intellectus possibilis dicit potentiam per se, intellectus vero agens ut habitus: ergo non sunt idem in essentia.
Item, Numquam lumen quod facit potentia colores actu esse colores, est idem in essentia cum coloribus qui fiunt actu, neque in sensitivo visus susceptivo coloris, neque constituunt aliquid unum essentialiter cum altero illorum: sed intellectus universaliter agens se habet ad species intelligibiles sicut lumen ad colores, et se habet ad intellectum possibilem ut lumen ad sensitivum visus: ergo non est essentia eadem intellectus possibilis et agentis, neque constituunt unum ut partes animae.
Ex his rationibus et ex dictis Philosophi inductis patet, quod intellectus agens non sit pars animae.
Item, Omnia quae intus sunt in anima, proportionabilia sunt eis quae sunt extra, et anima quodammodo est omnia, quia omnia cognoscit: ergo sicut est una omnia tamen faciens, sic species ipsius accepta in anima et intellectu omnia erit faciens in intellectu. Major patet in capitulo de reminiscentia. Minor in tractatu de intellectu agente. Intellectus enim per cognitionem creatorum venit in cognitionem primi principii secundum quod est causa omnium, et suscipit in se speciem intelligibilem ab ipso, et intellectus iste acquisitus in anima omnia facit in anima, eo quod dicitur intellectus agens universaliter facere.
Et si quaeritur, utrum contingat aliquem habere intellectum agentem, qui non novit primam causam, neque habet speciem acceptam ad cognitionem primae causae? Dicimus quod homines non habent complete intellectum agentem hujusmodi, sed habent dispositionem quamdam fluentem a prima causa quae dicitur lumen illuminans intellectum possibilem.
Et si quaeratur, cum intellectus sit nobilissima pars animae perfectissime cognoscens, minus indigens exteriori adminiculo quam aliae partes, quare indigeat hujusmodi lumine, sensus autem et phantasia minime? Dici oportet, quod minime indigeat hujusmodi lumine ad cognoscendum species intelligibiles, quae prius sunt phantasmata, quia sic est minoris et debilioris potentiae quam sensus et phantasmata, sed indiget lumine hujusmodi ad cognoscendum talia quae sunt occulta naturae, quae non possunt apprehendi sensu vel phantasia, cujusmodi sunt substantiae quae in rebus sunt naturalibus phantasmata facientibus, ipsae vero minime phantasmata facere possunt, et substantiae hujusmodi sunt separatae, ut Angeli, et separabiles, ut animae, in quarum cognitione indiget intellectus tali lumine a primo principio infuso, et ad cognitionem ipsius primi principii.
6. Likewise, the Philosopher in book 3 On the Soul posits the agent intellect. And that it is not a part of the soul is proved in this way: just as in every nature the formal cause, which is making all things, is entirely other in essence from the material cause in which all things are made, and from these two one thing is never composed, so the universally acting intellect and the possible intellect in the soul are related. Therefore they are neither the same in essence, nor parts composing one whole; therefore the agent intellect is not a part of the soul, nor a power.
Likewise, no art, neither mechanical nor liberal, is the same in essence with the soul in which it is, nor is it the same in essence with the matter that sustains the operations coming from it. But the agent intellect is related to the possible intellect as art to matter; therefore they are not the same in essence, nor do they constitute some whole as parts of the soul.
Likewise, no power is a habit; and the possible intellect expresses power through itself, but the agent intellect as a habit; therefore they are not the same in essence.
Likewise, never is the light that makes colors in potency to be colors in act the same in essence with the colors that are made actual, nor in the sensory power of sight receptive of color, nor do they constitute something essentially one with either of them. But the universally acting intellect is related to intelligible species as light is to colors, and is related to the possible intellect as light to the sensory power of sight. Therefore the essence of the possible and agent intellect is not the same, nor do they constitute one thing as parts of the soul.
From these arguments and from the adduced sayings of the Philosopher, it is plain that the agent intellect is not a part of the soul.
Likewise, all things that are within the soul are proportionable to those things that are outside, and the soul in some way is all things, because it knows all things. Therefore, just as there is one thing nevertheless making all things, so its species received in the soul and intellect will be making all things in the intellect. The major is plain in the chapter on memory. The minor is in the treatise on the agent intellect. For through cognition of creatures the intellect comes into cognition of the first principle according as it is the cause of all things, and it receives in itself an intelligible species from it, and this intellect acquired in the soul makes all things in the soul, because the agent intellect is said universally to make.
And if it is asked whether it happens that someone has an agent intellect who does not know the first cause, nor has a species received for cognition of the first cause, we say that human beings do not completely have an agent intellect of this kind, but they have a certain disposition flowing from the first cause, which is called the light illuminating the possible intellect.
And if it is asked, since the intellect is the noblest part of the soul, knowing most perfectly and needing external assistance less than the other parts, why it needs light of this kind, while sense and phantasy do not at all, one must say that it least of all needs light of this kind for knowing intelligible species that first are phantasms, because in that case it would be of lesser and weaker power than sense and phantasms; rather, it needs light of this kind for knowing such things as are hidden things of nature, which cannot be apprehended by sense or phantasy, of which sort are the substances that are in natural things making phantasms, but they themselves are least able to make phantasms, and substances of this kind are separated, as Angels, and separable, as souls. In cognition of these the intellect needs such light infused by the first principle, and for cognition of the first principle itself.
Et de hoc verum est quod dictum est quantum ad cognitionem talium specierum: quia sicut facit lumen potentia colores, actu colores, ita hujusmodi lumen impressum intellectui a primo principio facit hujusmodi species occultas potentia intelligibiles, actu intelligibiles.
Ex his etiam patet, quod physice procedendo, possibile est animam existentem in corpore spiritus et spiritualia et substantias corporis videre etiam sine praesentia gratiae: ergo multo fortius anima beatissimae Virginis elevata et abstracta gratiae plenitudine.
Item, Secundum philosophiam oportet dici, quod intellectus habet duplicem potentiam, phantasticam dum in corpore est, et non phantasticam dum est separatus a corpore. Et sic ejus potentia phantastica est corruptibilis mediante phantasia, et in quantum talis, corruptibilis est, potentia vero sua per naturam simpliciter inest ei per naturam suae substantiae et non alio mediante, unde et ista potentia incorruptibilis est sicut sua substantia. Inde sic: Omne principium quod habet potentiam unam per se et secundum suam naturam, aliam vero mediante alio et per accidens, essentialius uti debet potentia quam habet per se, quam illa quam habet mediante alio et per accidens: sed intellectus hujusmodi potentiam habet duplicem: ergo utilius, nobilius et melius uti debet potentia quam habet per se, quam illa quam habet per accidens.
Item, Omnis intellectus qui habet unam potentiam per se, aliam per accidens, melius et verius uti debet et cognoscere per illam quam habet per se, quam per illam quam habet per accidens: ergo si est per accidens in corpore, nihil aufertur ei, sed magis confertur: quia dicitur de anima existente in corpore, quod omnia cognoscit et quodammodo dicitur omnia: ergo melius et verius cognoscet per potentiam non phantasticam, quam per potentiam phantasticam: ergo melius cognoscet spiritualia quam phantastica.
§ II.
Solutiones.
Ad haec dicimus, quod inconveniens est ponere substantiam sine potentia, et ponere substantiam perpetuam et potentiam ipsius non esse perpetuam. Similiter inconveniens est ponere potentiam intelligendi quam habet intellectus in corpore, esse perpetuam.
Unde nota, quod qualitates naturales sensibus propriis proportionabiles sunt, et appropriantur, quantitates vero sensui communi, substantiae vero intellectui: hic enim est ordo cognitionis ipsius animae dum est in corpore. Intellectus autem separatus a corpore, aut habebit eumdem ordinem intelligendi quem habuit in corpore, aut contrarium. Si eumdem: ergo erit idem modus intelligendi in corpore et extra corpus, quod est impossibile. Sed si proprium est ei cognoscere substantiam, et hoc est ei principale secundum se, tunc extra corpus habebit principaliter potentiam intelligendi substantiam, et secundum posterius accidentia: haec autem potentia simul est creata cum intellectu, et est perpetua sicut intellectus perpetuus. Alterata autem haec est potentia ex conjunctione ipsius cum corpore: ex conjunctione enim cum corpore cognoscit accidentia et substantias eo modo quo extra corpus cognoscere non potest: quia cognoscit accidentia non solum in illa habitudine in qua se habent ad substantias in quibus sunt, sed etiam in illa comparatione qua sunt principia permutationum, secundum quod generant suas species in aliis substantiis corporeis et incorporeis: secundum enim hanc habitudinem generant suas species in sensibus, ex quibus generatis in sensibus fiunt phantasmata in phantasia, et postea accipiuntur in intellectu, et per hujusmodi phantasmata cognoscuntur substantiae, quae phantasmata facere non possunt. Et sic ex conjunctione ipsius cum corpore potentia ipsius creata non phantastica incipit esse phantastica, id est, phantasmatum et per phantasmata aliorum cognitiva.
And concerning this, what has been said is true with regard to cognition of such species: because just as light makes colors in potency to be colors in act, so light of this kind impressed upon the intellect by the first principle makes hidden species of this kind, intelligible in potency, to be intelligible in act.
From these things it is also plain that, proceeding physically, it is possible for the soul existing in the body to see spirits and spiritual things and the substances of body even without the presence of grace; therefore much more the soul of the most blessed Virgin, elevated and abstracted by the fullness of grace.
Likewise, according to philosophy one must say that the intellect has a twofold power: a phantastic power while it is in the body, and a non-phantastic one while it is separated from the body. And thus its phantastic power is corruptible by means of phantasy and, insofar as such, is corruptible; but its power through nature belongs to it simply through the nature of its substance and not by the mediation of another, whence this power also is incorruptible, just as its substance is. Hence thus: every principle that has one power through itself and according to its own nature, but another by means of another and accidentally, ought to use more essentially the power that it has through itself than the one it has by means of another and accidentally. But the intellect has a twofold power of this kind; therefore it ought to use more usefully, nobly, and better the power that it has through itself than the one that it has accidentally.
Likewise, every intellect that has one power through itself and another accidentally ought better and more truly to use and to know through the one that it has through itself than through the one that it has accidentally. Therefore if it is in the body accidentally, nothing is taken away from it, but rather something is conferred on it, because it is said of the soul existing in the body that it knows all things and in some way is called all things. Therefore it will know better and more truly through the non-phantastic power than through the phantastic power; therefore it will know spiritual things better than phantastic things.
Section 2.
Solutions.
To these things we say that it is unfitting to posit a substance without a power, and to posit a perpetual substance and that its power is not perpetual. Similarly it is unfitting to posit that the power of understanding that the intellect has in the body is perpetual.
Hence note that natural qualities are proportionable to, and are appropriated to, the proper senses, but quantities to the common sense, and substances to the intellect; for this is the order of cognition of the soul itself while it is in the body. But the intellect separated from the body will have either the same order of understanding that it had in the body, or a contrary one. If the same, then there will be the same mode of understanding in the body and outside the body, which is impossible. But if it is proper to it to know substance, and this is principal for it according to itself, then outside the body it will have principally the power of understanding substance, and secondarily, in a posterior way, accidents. But this power is created together with the intellect, and is perpetual just as the intellect is perpetual. But this power is altered from the conjunction of it with the body; for from conjunction with the body it knows accidents and substances in a way in which it cannot know outside the body, because it knows accidents not only in that relation in which they stand to the substances in which they are, but also in that comparison by which they are principles of changes, according as they generate their species in other corporeal and incorporeal substances. For according to this relation they generate their species in the senses; from these, generated in the senses, phantasms are made in phantasy, and afterward they are received in the intellect, and through phantasms of this kind substances are known that cannot make phantasms. And thus from its conjunction with the body, its created non-phantastic power begins to be phantastic, that is, cognitive of phantasms and, through phantasms, of other things.
Et sic patet, quod per conjungi cum corpore alteratur potentia non phantastica in phantasticam: et sicut alii majores motus in anima quibus intendit anima, impediunt minores percipi ab anima, ita dum est in corpore manifestiores motus et majores rerum facientium phantasmata circa animam, impediunt percipi ab anima manifeste ea quae phantasmata facere non possunt. Unde aliquando cum intellectus contrahit se in seipsum abstrahendo speculationem suam a sensu, multa percipit occulta, quae per speculationem ipsius conjunctam speculationi sensuum percipere non potest.
Et sic iterum patet physice, quod anima in corpore etiam citra auxilium gratiae gratum facientis, in contemplationem spirituum et spiritualium adspicere potest et adspectum dirigere et videre: ergo multo fortius beatissima Virgo auxilio gratiae potuit hoc facere in sua contemplatione.
Item, Paulus scribitur in raptu vidisse dispositionem caelestis hierarchiae et beato Dionysio revelasse: ergo multo fortius beatissima Virgo vidit statum Angelorum et triumphantis Ecclesiae. Item, Martinus vidit daemones. Item, Jacob vidit Angelos quando dixit: Castra Dei sunt haec 5.
Ex his autem concluditur, quod beatissima Virgo in sua contemplatione poterat videre Deum, Angelos, et daemones, et animam propriam, et substantias rerum corporalium per seipsas 6.
And thus it is plain that through being joined with the body the non-phantastic power is altered into a phantastic one; and just as other greater movements in the soul to which the soul attends impede the lesser movements from being perceived by the soul, so while it is in the body the more manifest and greater movements of things making phantasms around the soul impede those things that cannot make phantasms from being perceived manifestly by the soul. Hence sometimes, when the intellect draws itself back into itself by abstracting its speculation from sense, it perceives many hidden things that it cannot perceive through its own speculation conjoined to the speculation of the senses.
And thus again it is physically plain that the soul in the body, even short of the aid of grace making one pleasing, can look into contemplation of spirits and spiritual things, and can direct its gaze and see; therefore much more the most blessed Virgin could do this in her contemplation by the aid of grace.
Likewise, Paul is written to have seen in rapture the disposition of the heavenly hierarchy and to have revealed it to blessed Dionysius. Therefore much more the most blessed Virgin saw the state of the Angels and of the triumphant Church. Likewise, Martin saw demons. Likewise, Jacob saw Angels when he said: These are the camps of God 5.
From these things, moreover, it is concluded that the most blessed Virgin in her contemplation could see God, Angels, and demons, and her own soul, and the substances of corporeal things through themselves 6.
Notes
- St. Gregory the Great, book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 33, and book 2 of the Morals, chapter 3. (S. Gregorius M., Lib. IV Dialog. cap. 33, et II Moral. cap. 3.) ↩
- St. Augustine, book On Spirit and Soul, chapter 4. (S. Augustinus, Lib. de Spiritu et Anima, cap. 4.) ↩
- The same author, in the same place, chapter 2. (Idem, Ibid., cap. 2.) ↩
- Aristotle, book 1 On the Soul, text 4. (Aristoteles, I de Anima, tex. 4.) ↩
- Genesis 32:2. (Genes. XXXII, 2.) ↩
- For the solution of the objections, see also below after Question 111. (Pro solutione objectorum, vide etiam infra post Quaest. CXI.) ↩
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