Lots which are engaged in play alone require the conditions of that virtue which by Aristotle is called εὐτραπελία [eutrapelia, “wittiness, good-humored playfulness”]; but those [engaged] in play and some gain [require] the conditions both of that virtue and of justice — concerning which, [see] Molina in the place cited. II: The conditions of serious lots are various.
The first [is] necessity. As long as affairs can be conducted by the force and judgment of human reason, so long must one abstain from serious lots. Because human reason is the rule of human life, and, as it were, [its] carpenter’s-level [amussis]. Always, therefore, must all our actions be measured out to it. Otherwise it would be a mere tempting of God — as St. Thomas says (a. 8 of the cited question). For, as St. Ambrose says (on Luke ch. 1, [the passage] on the entrance of Zechariah): “the things which are sought by lot, [those] are unknown; and where they are found, how they were found is not known.” But it is not [a mark] of prudence to keep a mode of acting which is not known and explored. But I understand “necessity” not as extreme and physical, but moral — which is understood [to hold] unless God clearly signify or inspire [otherwise]; and [it is not present] if we can equally conveniently [determine] something by counsel as
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by lot. Hence, therefore, we shall gather: First, that it is not lawful to use lots rashly and promiscuously. Secondly, that it must be diligently attended [to] whether, by human industry, we can perceive what and how [is] to be done. Thirdly, [that] if, after human judgment and industry, anything of quarrels, suspicions, or that kind of evils remains, it is lawful to lull it to sleep by lot. For although the extreme necessity may not appear, yet there is that moral [necessity] which suffices for acting well (Prov. 18:18). Fourthly: If it is established that two are innocent, or that on neither’s guilt sufficiently grave conjectures appear, it will not be lawful to cast a lot between them, [as to] which is guilty. Likewise, if two [are] unfit to rule the Church, one must not seek by lot which [is] the fitter. If the portions of a matter to be divided [res herciscunda] [are] clearly unequal, one must not cast lots over them. If, finally, in some matter the right of the two is unequal, there is no place for the lot between them. The reason [is] because concerning all these, human reason alone can judge and determine.
The second [condition]: according to the magnitude of the thing which is sought by the lots, there ought to be present in them a reverence toward God and prayer. In the sacred writings, because lots occur only concerning weighty and great matters, therefore we always see prayers and great veneration [attending them]. As in this very place, [with] the raising [washing] of garments and the sleeping-apart [secubatio], as was said concerning the sanctification (q. 12, and ch. 3, v. 5); and “before the Lord [there] is a confrontation” (Lev. 16:16); prayers (1 Sam. 14, Jonah 1). Even the Gentiles say, before the lots, “Arise, invoke thy God” [Jonah 1:6]. Nay, for this cause the same [Gentiles] of old cast, equalized, [and] drew lots in certain temples, in the sight of certain gods — as is understood from Cicero’s books On Divination. (Acts 1.) The Apostles, [when] about to cast lots, prayed: “if any,” [Peter] says, at that place; the Venerable Bede: “let those who, compelled by some necessity, think that God is to be consulted by lots after the example of the Apostles, see that these Apostles did this only [after] the assembly of the brethren was gathered and prayers poured out to God.” And this Origen too advised (homily 23 on this book), as [was] said before. But if the matters be very small — although it is good always to invoke God, yet if it be not done, nothing is sinned. The reason [is] because God is prayed to for this, that he may in a special way temper the lots and bid [them] fall aptly; but even if this be not done in small things, it matters little or nothing. And those who, in matters of this kind, wish the lot to come out in whatever way, without a special effecting of the divine concurrence — those all cede, by their own quasi-right, from a compact, so that whatever shall have fallen out be accepted. And in rules of this kind this cession [is] not iniquitous. To that condition of divine reverence, that [condition] can not inconveniently be recalled which St. Thomas, in the place cited, makes the third — namely, lest the divine oracles be turned to earthly affairs. For so St. Augustine (Epistle 119, ch. 20; and cited, 26, q. 2, ch. Hi, qui): “those who read lots from the Gospel-pages — although it is to be wished that they do this rather than run to the consulting of demons — yet even this custom displeases me: to wish to turn the divine oracles, which speak concerning another life, to secular affairs and to the vanity of this life.” Yet if earthly affairs were taken up as they ought to be taken up by us Christians — [namely] that by them we should use [them] toward the glory of God and our eternal life — there would be no irreverence to sacred [things] of this kind. For the oracle Urim and Thummim too was applied to [things] of this kind, as appeared in bk. 1. And our God is also the giver and preserver of this earthly life, and from him daily bread is assiduously sought. But those who, on account of the prayers of old joined to lots, think this whole business of casting lots [to be] ceremonial, and therefore [think] that, by the abrogation of the ceremonies of the old law, this ceremony of lot-casting too has ceased — [these] indeed seem to be deceived. For what ceremony [is it]? Of what thing [is it] a sign? Or [are] prayers joined to anything [therefore] a ceremony of that old law which is now antiquated? But neither does that [argument] disprove every use of lots — which the same [men] say, [that] God promised all things to those who pray, but not to those who cast lots. Yet [Scripture] approves that prayers not be omitted, in greater matters at least, as [was] explained.