That [ornament], of which [in] the previous question — the square ornament of the Pontiff — is called: 1. by the Hebrews חֹשֶׁן [choshen], by the Chaldees choshena. And Calvin says (on Exod. 28) that this was derived, [as it seemed] to him, from “fortitude” or “treasure” — “it does not displease” [him]. But since “fortitude” is written by ʿoz [עז], [and] “treasure” by otzar [אוצר], what similitude have these with choshen? 2. by Josephus [it is called] “essen,” with a somewhat harsh Hebrew word softened (as is often done by him), and perhaps with another vowel-point; [it] was written essen, unless ossen. 3. by the 70, λόγιον [logion], that is, “oracle.” In certain Greek copies, and in St. Jerome (Isa. 50; Hos. 4), it is read λογεῖον [logeion]. But less well, as it seems, if we regard either the analogy of the other Greeks of that kind, or the usage of good authors. According to that [analogy], it should rather be called the “consulting-place” [logeion], as μουσεῖον [museum], διδασκαλεῖον [school], ξενοδοχεῖον [inn], ὀρφανοτροφεῖον [orphanage], and the like [are formed]. But according to these [authors], as in Plutarch’s Sylla, the seers [vates] are called λόγιοι; and in Hesychius, the very [things which are] τὰ μαντεύματα [“oracular responses”] are λόγια. 4. From the “breast” [pectore], under which it is placed, it is called both by our interpreter and by the Hebrews “pectoral.” 5. Because λόγος means not speech only, but also reason — and its seat, or workshop, or at least beginning and origin, is wont to be placed in the breast — therefore St. Jerome sometimes renders [it] “Rationale.” “It is called Rationale,” says Philo (bk. 2 On the Monarchy), “by [its] true name; because whatever is contained in heaven is fabricated by fixed reasons, and adorned, which agree among themselves.” 6. It is also sometimes called, synecdochically, “Ephod” — because it is namely a part, and a certain emblem, of it. 7. Finally, with an adjunct, it is wont to be called “the Rational of Judgment” (Exodus 28, vv. 15 & 30), “the Judgment of the children of Israel” (same, v. 30), “the Judgment of the Urim” (this very [place], Num. 27). The cause [Rabbi David] gives (in the cited place), [namely] because through that [Urim] were indicated the judgments of men who should ask God something. But Rabbi Solomon [Rashi], because Mishpat [מִשְׁפָּט] was superscribed — that is, “judgment.” But others bring better causes: namely, that by it either God’s judgment about some thing might be demonstrated, or [it] itself be proper [to that]; or, on the contrary, that men’s judgments, will, desire, and cause might be set before God Himself. For all these [things] the Priest does, when, adorned with that sacred vestment, he asks, receives, [and] announces to men the divine responses; or, with the same ornament, offers their vows.
(col. 207)
But there is also another cause, which is, as it were, the foundation of the higher [former ones], or auxiliary [to them]: [namely] that rightly is it added, [that] by that ornament was represented the right of the sons of Israel to those [things] which were divinely made [as] promises to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob — so that, by that symbol, the memory of those [promises] might always be renewed, and, as it were, revived before God, as men revive [remember]. For thus He was invited to benevolence and beneficence; these [Israel] were invited to faith, hope, and all the sanctity of religion. It can indeed be added, [that] the responses which God gave through that kind of oracle were, as it were, certain most wise judgments, and most certain rules, which, in judging and acting, the children of Israel might most safely and most usefully follow. But all these things [that] illustrious [passage] of St. Cyril will illustrate not a little (bk. 11 On Adoration, the oration).
For Palladius thus interrogates him: “For what cause was this workmanship called the Rational of judgments?” He himself [Cyril] responds: “Was not the superhumeral likewise called ‘superior’ [upper] from this, that it was drawn over both shoulders — [we] regarding the origin of the word, [as] we said? — Palladius: So [it is]. — What then? — Cyril: Because likewise rightly, from the origin and proportion of the word, [namely] that it is placed in the heart and viscera, we say it is called the ‘rational of judgments’ — since the heart is, in a certain manner, the seat of our rational faculty, and the viscera [are]; and there inheres, and is well-nigh fixed according to nature to this rational faculty, that [power] too [which is] in whatsoever things are to be done rightly, and the whole and integral faculty of judging — that is, just judgment, and [the sense of] what befits each thing. But does not the faculty of reason, which is in us, weigh the natures of things to be done, and separate, from the things to be preferred, the little-pleasant and the useless? — Palladius: Assuredly. — Cyril: But indeed, divine Scripture is wont to call ‘judgment’ that power by which we judge rightly and justly. And so blessed David says in the Psalms, ‘Blessed [are they] who keep judgment and do justice at all time.’ He said also again, ‘And the honor of the King loves judgment’ — for illustrious is the King’s glory and honor, if he love justice. That ornament, therefore, which was cast over the heart and breast, is called the ‘rational of judgment’ for this cause: because it is placed there, where the faculty of reason is — [that] place, in which faculty is contained the reckoning of judging rightly and justly.”