Theorem IV. Well-considered reason finds nothing absurd in the fact that one who dies subject to sin should pay punishment for as long as he exists.

15. Demonstration. Suppose that in human society a certain time has been appointed, after the lapse of which a prince has declared by an enacted law that no pardon is granted for crimes contracted, but that punitive action is to be taken against each and every person according to the norm of justice. Certainly, if those guilty of crimes do not use the opportunity granted and permit the appointed time for attaining pardon to pass by, no one would reproach the prince if he took punitive action against them according to the norm of justice and chastised them even with a perpetual punishment in proportion to the gravity of the crime.

Who, therefore, would dare to reproach God if in the other life he punishes, according to the tenor of the law, wicked men who have contemned in the present life the opportunity of obtaining pardon, and exacts from them punishments which will last as long as they themselves remain? This manner of acting fittingly agrees with the natures of things: that those who have been unwilling to make use of the indulgence of the prince should experience his vengeance.

16. Furthermore, human reason perceives nothing discordant, repugnant, or unjust in the fact that the duration of the punishment and of the fault for which the punishment is inflicted should be one and the same. For someone is worthy of being punished for as long as he remains bound by the guilt of the fault. But the guilt of a fault which is not forgiven continually remains. Therefore, if it is never forgiven after death, it will continually remain; and one who continually remains bound by the guilt of the fault will continually be worthy of being punished. Therefore a punishment which after the present life lasts as long as the sinner exists can be disapproved only on the condition

that the time of condonation and pardon is restricted to this mortal life unjustly.

But three things have been demonstrated by us: I. that it is in no way contrary to reason that the time of pardon be defined by certain limits;¹ II. that it is likewise not contrary to reason that these limits be contained within the compass of the present life;² III. that it accords beautifully with reason that the hope of condonation and pardon not be prolonged beyond the time of the present life.³ Therefore, far from being contrary to reason, it rather accords most beautifully with reason that those who die their final day bound by the guilt of a fault should pay punishments for as long as they exist.