Theorem I. Well-considered reason finds no contradiction in the fact that God has appointed a certain time after which there remains to sinners no hope of obtaining pardon.

9. Demonstration. The annals of history bear witness that human princes have more than once adopted this course: that they willed every hope of pardon to be taken away either from rebellious provinces or from certain citizens unless they returned to their duty within an appointed and definite time. But well-considered reason neither disapproves nor condemns those things which the annals of history relate, but approves and commends them. Therefore it will also approve and commend it if God, who is the Prince of princes and the Lord of those who rule,¹ employs the same right which human princes claim for themselves. Namely, reason will approve that a definite time be appointed by God, beyond which no hope of obtaining pardon remains to men who do not return to their duty.

10. And why would reason not approve this? By what title would it disapprove? Must the door of pardon always remain open with God so that the door of sinning may never be closed to men? By what right can men exact from God that God never, at any time, deny pardon to them when they sin? By what duty is God bound toward men to bestow pardon upon them at every time?

I shall add another consideration: Does reason possess some clear and indubitable argument by which it might confirm that God is bound even once to grant pardon to sinners? I shall not altogether deny that some conjectures are available; but I would not dare to affirm that a clear and indubitable argument is available.

For whence would this argument be sought? Perhaps from the divine goodness toward men? But this is a goodness which is not separated from justice, which is free in its external communication of itself, and which manifested itself sufficiently by creating man and adorning him with safeguards by the use of which, if he had so willed, he would have observed the law and would not have offended the divine majesty.

Perhaps from the weakness of the creature? But this weakness was divinely strengthened; and although the creature could fall by its nature, it did not therefore actually fall by sinning except because it freely willed to do so and freely chose to prefer the creature to the Creator.

Let it therefore remain fixed that from no principle of reason is it gathered that God could not confine within certain limits the time in which pardon might be hoped for.