13. Demonstration. It must frankly be admitted that there is no principle known by reason alone from which, by a consequence both legitimate and necessary, it is inferred that the hope of pardon cannot be extended beyond the limits of the present life.
For what principle of this kind would there be? Whence would it be derived? From the divine attributes? But among the divine attributes there stands forth and is eminent the fact that God is the Lord of his own gifts, that he can always raise up fallen man and save him once raised up by imparting pardon.
From the nature of things? Certainly the nature of things could be urged if the whole man, all that he is, perished with the present life. But his better part remains surviving: the natural liberty of the will, which, at least if it is divinely assisted, can repent and at length make satisfaction to God in some manner for the injury inflicted.
Nor should you infer from this that even probable reasons are lacking which persuade us that it is most fitting for the hope of pardon to be confined within the compass of the present life. Reasons of this kind are present, some of which I shall indicate.
14. The first is sought from a certain anticipation by which the human race seems always to have been persuaded that the time for meriting and demeriting is restricted to this life, and that after this life there is no place except either for reward for deeds well done or for punishment for deeds wickedly done.
There is added the fact that, although the soul remains surviving after death, nevertheless man, who consists of soul and body, ceases to be. But the law was given to man, the duty of obeying was enjoined upon man, and the sanction was proposed to man. Therefore it belongs to man to make satisfaction for the faults contracted; and when man ceases to be, there seems able to remain no place for satisfaction and pardon.
Furthermore, suppose that God had willed the hope of pardon and condonation to remain even after the final day. Do you think that sufficient provision would have been made for the good
and order of human society? The good and order of human society depend chiefly upon men holding it as certain that after death they must render an account of the things they have done, and that they will receive reward or punishment according to the nature of their acts. Therefore whatever hinders this persuasion, whatever enervates it, is exceedingly hostile to the good and order of society. But the knowledge, or even a not improbable conjecture, that after death every faculty of escaping divine vengeance is not taken away greatly hinders that persuasion and enervates its efficacy; and, by furnishing men with the hope of reparation after death, gives them courage to indulge themselves in the present life and to contemn the observance of their duties for the sake of present advantage and delight. Since, therefore, God is the author and defender of the good and order of human society, he must be judged to speak truly who contends that God willed every hope of pardon and reparation to cease together with the present life.