Section CXCV

It is plainly so, as Basil also—the brother of Gregory of Nyssa, most closely joined in friendship with Gregory Nazianzen, and frequently laden with the highest praises of all men¹—teaches and attests in explicit propositions. Among these is that most illustrious proposition which he subjoins to these words of the Psalms²: “For wrath is in his indignation, and life in his will.” First warning that wrath must be distinguished from indignation³, he says: “Indignation is a judgment concerning the infliction upon one deserving it of certain sorrows; but wrath is the pain and punishment which is now inflicted by a just judge according to the measure of injustice.”

Then, illustrating the proposed distinction with an example⁴, he writes: “If a physician should observe some part affected by inflammation and filled with hidden putrefaction, he judges an incision to be necessary for the sick man. Scripture calls this indignation. But after the physician has pronounced the sentence concerning the application of the remedy, at last there follows the action by which that which was decreed is accomplished, and the iron which cuts and causes pain to the one suffering the incision is applied. This is called the wrath of God.”

Then, proceeding to the exposition⁵, he says: “Come, therefore, to the proposition, and you will discover the sequence of this statement: ‘For wrath is in—’

—his indignation.’ Τιμωρία, κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον κρίμα τοῦ Θεοῦ· ζωὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ θελήματι αὐτοῦ. Τί οὖν φησιν; Ὅτι ὃ μὲν θέλει ὁ Θεὸς τοῦτό ἐστι, πάντας μετέχειν αὐτοῦ τῆς ζωῆς· τὰ δὲ περιστατικά, οὐχὶ τῷ θελήματι αὐτοῦ ἐνεργεῖται, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀξίᾳ τῶν ἡμαρτηκότων ἐπάγεται· τὴν μὲν οὖν ζωὴν ὁ Θεὸς τῷ ἰδίῳ θελήματι ἑκάστῳ χαρίζεται, τὴν δὲ ὀργὴν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ θησαυρίζει ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως καὶ δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ Θεοῦ. Punishment, according to the just judgment of God; but life is in his will. What, then, does he say? That what God wills amounts to this: that all should participate in his life. But evils are not brought about by his will; rather, they are inflicted according to the desert of those who have sinned. Therefore God bestows life upon each one by his own will; but each one heaps up wrath for himself on the day of wrath and revelation and just judgment of God.

In these words is contained the solemn division of the divine will into the first and the second; the origin and object of each are disclosed, and the universal amplitude proper to the former is clearly declared. To the same point also belong those things by which Basil⁶ answers this question⁷: “What is the meaning of that which is said⁸ by the Apostle: ‘That you may prove what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God’?” He says:

Πολλά ἐστιν, ἃ ὁ Θεὸς θέλει· τὰ μὲν ἐν μακροθυμίᾳ καὶ χρηστότητι, ἅπερ ἀγαθά ἐστι τε καὶ λέγεται· τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ὀργὴν διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν, ἅπερ κακὰ ὀνομάζεται. Ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι, φησίν, ὁ ποιῶν εἰρήνην, καὶ κτίζων κακά· κακὰ δὲ, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ὧν κολαζόμεθα, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ὧν παιδευόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παιδεύοντα καὶ διὰ τῆς κακώσεως εἰς ἐπιστροφὴν ἄγοντα, γίνεται εἰς ἀγαθόν. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν μακροθυμῶν καὶ χρηστευόμενος θέλει ὁ Θεός, ταῦτα καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ θέλειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι ἀναγκαῖον… Ὅσα δὲ κατ᾽ ὀργὴν διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἐπάγει, ταῦτα κακὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς εἶπον, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς κακώσεως οὐ πάντως καὶ ἡμῖν ἔξεστι ποιεῖν. There are many things which God wills: some through long-suffering and benignity, which both are and are called good; but others through wrath on account of our sins, which are called evils. “For I am,” he says⁹, “he who makes peace and creates evils.” But evils not on account of which we are punished, but through which we are instructed. Moreover, those things which instruct and lead to conversion through affliction issue in good. Therefore, whatsoever God wills as long-suffering and benign, these things we also must will and imitate… But whatsoever he introduces through wrath on account of our sins—things which, as I have said, are called evils because they bring affliction—these things it is by no means lawful for us to do.

Therefore, in order that we may rightly grasp what must be held concerning the divine will, a manifold and accurate distinction is necessary. And first, a) from those goods which both are and are called good, a twofold¹⁰ kind of evils must be distinguished: both those on account of which we are punished and which are sins, and those through which we are afflicted and which are contained within the compass of punishments. Once this distinction has been established, b) it must be observed that there is in God a will both of goods and also of those evils which are called evils because they create affliction; but that the will of those evils¹¹ by which we offend God and are rendered worthy to be chastised with punishments is most far removed from him. Wherefore, c) according to the twofold object a twofold will must be ascribed to God: one which concerns the good, and another which concerns the evil of punishment. This twofold will d) is distinguished not only by its object but also by its origin, amplitude, and mode and disposition of tending. For the former will, which is called ἴδιον θέλημα, μακροθυμία καὶ χρηστότης, proper will, long-suffering, and benignity, is in God of himself, proceeds from his inherent goodness, excepts no one, and embraces all, as living images of himself, with a beneficent inclination.

But e) the latter, which is called the will κατ᾽ ὀργήν, according to wrath, is of the kind which each one draws upon himself, which comes to God διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν, on account of our sins, approaches him ἔξωθεν, from without, and causes God to be related to sinners in the disposition and person of a judge. Nevertheless, f) so long as we pass this mortal life, it is tempered with long-suffering and benignity to such an extent that, unless we resist, it at last issues in our benefit, and looks to this: that διὰ τῶν κακώσεων, through afflictions, we may be brought εἰς ἐπιστροφήν, to conversion, almost against our will.