Section CXCIV

And to this power and heavenly efficacy it must be attributed that no man is held by the most miserable necessity of perishing. “The author of the Psalms,” says Gregory¹, “declaring the end of the economy undertaken by the Lord, sings: ‘Unless the Lord had helped me, my soul had almost dwelt in hell.’ Ἡ γὰρ βοήθεια τοῦ Κυρίου, οὐκ ἀφῆκεν ἡμᾶς τοῦ ᾅδου παροίκους εἶναι. For the help of the Lord did not permit us to be inhabitants of hell.” Indeed, he conferred upon us all the liberty by which we might possess eternal beatitude. “For God did not² reduce nature to servitude, ὃς γε καὶ αὐθαιρέτως ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ δουλωθέντας εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀνεκαλέσατο, who even of his own accord recalled us, enslaved to sin, into liberty.” But he recalled us by other gifts, and chiefly by the aid of his grace, which he imparts to all. “For the Lord is witness³ in the Gospel⁴ that he who sows the word sows not only in a good heart, but also if someone is stony, if he abounds in thorns, and if he is beside the way and trodden down, πᾶσιν ἐπὶ φιλανθρωπίας ἐπιβάλλει τοῦ λόγου τὰ σπέρματα, he casts the seeds of the word to all on account of his benignity.”

Whence there can be no difficulty in meeting those who, as Gregory reports⁵, opposed Christian truth by this argument: “Why has grace not come to all, but, although some have approached the word of God, no small part of them is absent? Is it because God was unwilling to impart the benefit to all, or because he was altogether unable? Yet neither is free from reproach; for it does not befit God either not to have willed what is good or not to have been able to do what he willed. Εἰ οὖν ἀγαθόν τι ἡ πίστις, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντας ἡ χάρις; If, then, faith is some good, why does grace not come to all?”

“For,” he adds⁶, “if this were asserted by us—that faith is distributed among men by the divine will in such a manner that some indeed are called while others remain without a share in the calling—an objection of this kind would opportunely be cast against the mystery. Εἰ δὲ ὁμότιμος ἐπὶ πάντας ἡ κλῆσις, οὔτε ἀξίας, οὔτε ἡλικίας, οὔτε τὰς κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη διαφορὰς διακρίνουσα· (διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ παρὰ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχὴν κηρύγματος, ὁμόγλωσσοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν οἱ διακονοῦντες τὸν λόγον ἐκ θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀθρόως ἐγένοντο, ὡς ἂν μηδεὶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀμοιρήσειε·) πῶς ἂν κατὰ τὸ εὔλογον ἔτι τὸν Θεὸν αἰτιῷντο, τῷ μὴ πάντων ἐπικρατῆσαι τὸν λόγον; But if the calling proceeds equally to all, distinguishing neither dignity, nor age, nor the differences among nations—(for on this account, at the very beginning of the preaching, those who ministered the word were suddenly made, by divine inspiration, to speak the same language as all the nations, lest anyone should be without a share in the goods)—how would it still be reasonable for them to accuse God because the word did not obtain dominion over all? For he who possessed free power over all, δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τιμῆς, on account of the extraordinary honor which he willed to be conferred upon man, left something also within our power, οὗ μόνος ἕκαστός ἐστι κύριος, of which each one of us alone is lord. But this is the free election of free will, which cannot be subjected and is of its own right, being situated in liberty of mind and thought.

Therefore the accusation may be transferred far more justly to those who were not brought to the faith, rather than to him who called them to assent.”

Having resolved the difficulty in this manner, he proposes another⁷, by which some were accustomed to say: “God, if he wills, is able necessarily to compel and draw even those who resist to receive the preaching.” But he aptly answers: “Where, then, in these things is τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, free will? And where is the praise of those who conduct themselves rightly? For it belongs only to inanimate things, or things destitute of reason, to be led by the will of another to that which seems good. But a nature participating in reason and intelligence, if it loses free will, at the same time also loses the gift of intelligence. For to what good will it employ its mind and thought if the power of choosing that which it determines by its own judgment is situated in another? But if the free election of the mind remains ineffectual and of no use, virtue also is necessarily abolished. And if there is no virtue, life is deprived of honor, fate rules, the praise of those who conduct themselves rightly is removed, anyone may sin with impunity, and no distinction in the ordering of life remains… Οὐκοῦν οὐ τῆς ἀγαθότητος τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ ἔγκλημα, τὸ μὴ πᾶσιν ἐγγενέσθαι τὴν πίστιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν δεχομένων τὸ κήρυγμα. Therefore blame is not to be laid upon the goodness of God because faith was not present in all, but upon the disposition of those who hear the preaching of the word.”

Let power, therefore, be carefully distinguished from necessity, and then, with Gregory leading the way, let the reasons be reckoned thus. Through the original transgression the human race fell away from God and, having lost the faculty of obtaining salvation, encountered the most bitter necessity of perishing. But divine clemency was at hand: it applied medicine to the sick, raised up the fallen, and by the power of the Redeemer broke the iron chain. But with what result? Was it that necessity should be substituted for necessity and men should be advanced to salvation by an imposed necessity? That is most foreign to the wisdom of God and is what most greatly conflicts with the free and moral nature of men. Therefore the universal necessity was met by a universal power—

—by which men, raised up and strengthened, might, if they willed, regain their former dignity and possess eternal beatitude with God. The Nyssene signified this in very few words indeed, but words altogether worthy never to fall from the mind, writing⁸: Οὐ κοινὴ βασιλεία, καὶ γέεννα κοινή; “Are not the kingdom common and Gehenna common?”