Therefore, a twofold disposition and a twofold relation between God and the human race must be distinguished: the disposition and relation of love, benignity, and mercy, according to which God is and is called φιλόστοργος,
φιλάνθρωπος, φιλόψυχος, πατήρ, ὄντως πατήρ, καὶ πατὴρ πατέρων, inclined toward affection, a lover of men and of souls, Father, truly Father, and Father of fathers; and then the disposition and relation of severity, justice, and punishment, according to which God is and is judged the supreme Legislator and the omnipotent guardian and avenger of the order instituted.
But what is the origin of each disposition, and what is their mutual relation? The origin of the former is again twofold: one subjective and inherent in God, and the other objective and following human nature itself of itself. But of the latter there is one sole fountain, flowing from nowhere other than the vice of men.
And in truth, let it be asked of the Alexandrian doctors why God is φιλάνθρωπος, φιλόψυχος, and the Parent of men. They unanimously1 reply that this is the first cause of such a relation: that God φύσει, by nature, is χρηστός, φιλάγαθος, φιλοικτίρμων, ἀγαθός, πηγὴ τῆς ἀγαθότητος καὶ περὶ πάντων εὔσπλαγχνος, benevolent, a lover of good, merciful, good, the fountain of goodness, and one who has mercy upon all; and that he is so inclined of himself toward doing good that ἀναλόγως, by analogy, he is not unjustly compared either with fire, which heats spontaneously, or with light, which spontaneously illuminates by diffused rays.
Then they unanimously add that the second cause of the same relation is drawn from this: that man φύσει, by nature, is τοῦ θεοῦ πλάσμα, a formation of God, having in himself something θεῷ ἴδιον, proper to God, the image of God himself, τὸ κάλλιστον among creatures subject to the senses, the most beautiful work, φιλόθεον ζῷον, a living being that loves God, and therefore δι᾽ αὐτὸν αἱρετός, worthy to be chosen for his own sake and, once chosen, to be loved. But nothing is more evident from these things than that the Alexandrian doctors assign a twofold cause, both subjective and objective, of that relation which we first mentioned and which pertains to this: that a commerce of love and benignity is judged to exist between God and men.
But, on the contrary, they all assign one sole fountain of the latter relation, and that a human one, drawn from the malice and sins of men. For with them it is indubitable doctrine that God
does not proceed to punishments spontaneously, but ἀναγκαίως, compelled by necessity; that he is not angry with men before he has anticipated them with his mercy; and that he does not descend to the supreme sentence of condemnation before they have adhered to sins even unto the end. Indeed, with them it is indubitable doctrine that even the punishments inflicted from heaven upon men while they pass their mortal life are effects not of hatred but of love, by which God leaves nothing untried in order to break their pertinacious will and bring them to penance and salvation. To this surely tend all the testimonies of the Alexandrian writers which we have reported, by which that also is therefore effected which we contend: that there is one sole cause, and the same drawn from sinful men, from which the disposition of severity, justice, and condemnation arises between God and men.
From these things it is easy to understand what the mutual relation of the two relations is and in what order they succeed one another. For it is evident that the disposition of love precedes in origin and efficiency, but that the disposition of justice and punishment follows in a second degree, as it were. This the Alexandrians confirm partly δυνάμει, virtually, and partly ῥητῶς, in explicit words.
And first they confirm it virtually, when they hand down that the disposition of mercy and love is native and derive it from the very nature of God and of men. For that which is native and absolute also goes before and therefore precedes those things which come extrinsically and depend upon a free condition.
They then confirm it in open words, since they testify that the order of justice and the relation of punishment are effects which proceed from the neglected disposition of mercy and the spurned order of love. Therefore, of the twofold relation—of mercy and justice, of love and wrath, of reward and punishment—the former precedes, the latter follows; the former obtains the principal place, the latter the second; the former flows spontaneously from the natures of things, the latter is introduced by the faults of men.
Now the former relation differs from the antecedent will only in name, just as the latter relation is separated from the consequent will only in name. Therefore, in new formulas and by other witnesses, we have confirmed that division of the divine will into antecedent and consequent which
we expounded at the beginning2 and afterward illustrated at greater length.