XXII. What is intended by the difference between the appellations by which each will is distinguished

And he sets these things forth much more clearly when, upon the words of Paul¹, κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ, “according to the good pleasure of his will, unto the praise of the glory of his grace”², he writes thus³:

“He predestined us unto the adoption of sons,” θέλων καὶ σφόδρα βουλόμενος καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν, willing, and vehemently willing and desiring, τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ εὐδοκία, for this is good pleasure… Εὐδοκία οὖν ἐστι τὸ προηγούμενον θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ· οἷον· θέλημα πρῶτον τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸ μηδένα ἀπολέσθαι· θέλημα δεύτερον, τὸ γενομένους κακοὺς ἀπολέσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκῃ κολάζει, ἀλλὰ θέλων· ἡ τοίνυν εὐδοκία, τὸ προηγούμενόν ἐστι θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, good pleasure, therefore, is the antecedent will of God. For example, the first will of God is that no one perish; the second will is that those who are evil perish. For God punishes not by necessity, but willingly. Wherefore good pleasure is the preceding will of God.

Namely, a twofold will of God must be distinguished: θέλημα πρῶτον καὶ προηγούμενον, the first and antecedent will, and θέλημα δεύτερον, the second will.

Moreover, θέλημα πρῶτον καὶ προηγούμενον, the first and antecedent will, is will properly so called, εὐδοκία, good pleasure, θέλημα σφοδρόν, an earnest and vehement will, ἐπιθυμία, desire; but the second will is θέλημα συγκαταβατικόν, a condescending will, a will which accrues to God, as Theophylact affirms in so many words when writing of Christ⁴:

προηγουμένως ἐπὶ τὸ σῶσαι τὸν κόσμον ἦλθε· καὶ τοῦτο σκοπὸς ἦν αὐτῷ· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κρίνει τοὺς μὴ πιστεύσαντας,

He came first and chiefly to save the world, and this was his purpose; but by accident he judges those who have not believed.

Nor is it obscure why each will is signified by such diverse appellations. For the first and antecedent will is called εὐδοκία, θέλημα σφοδρόν, ἐπιθυμία, good pleasure, intense will, and desire, because it derives its origin from the benignity of God; but the second and consequent will is therefore called will κατὰ συγκατάβασιν, from condescension, and κατὰ συμβεβηκός, by accident, because it is assumed by God only on account of men hardened in their impiety.

This diversity, proceeding from their origin, is followed by another which concerns the object and amplitude of each will. For the object of the will by accident is the punishments themselves by which God punishes perverse and wicked men. But the object of the antecedent will is the salvation of men itself, which Theophylact declares with no less evidence than brevity when he writes⁵: θέλημα Θεοῦ ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωτηρία, “the will of God is the salvation of men.”

But as regards amplitude, the will by accident regards only those who put no limit upon their sins and persevere in impiety even to the end. But the first and principal will, by benefits poured forth, goes before all, draws all toward the highest good, and with singular benignity strives that they may become partakers of it. Theophylact proposes and establishes this amplitude both by denying and by affirming: first by denying, when he writes that by this principal will God intends τὸ μηδένα ἀπολέσθαι, that no one perish; then by affirming, when, on the occasion⁶ of Christ’s words, πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσι κλητοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί, “for many are called, but few are chosen.”

He says⁷: χάριτι γὰρ μόνῃ πάντες ἐκλήθημεν ἀγαθοί τε καὶ πονηροί, “for by grace alone we have all been called, both good and evil.” And again⁸: πολλοὺς γὰρ καλεῖ ὁ Θεός, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντας· ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί, ὀλίγοι καὶ οἱ σωζόμενοι καὶ ἄξιοι τοῦ ἐκλεγῆναι παρὰ Θεοῦ· ὥστε τοῦ μὲν Θεοῦ τὸ καλεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἐκλεκτοὺς γενέσθαι ἢ μή, ἡμέτερόν ἐστι, “for God calls many, or rather, more correctly, all; but few are chosen. For few are those who are saved and who are worthy⁹ to be chosen by God; so that it is indeed God’s part to call, but ours to become chosen or not.”