203. Having set forth the nature of miracle and established its possibility, we make a step toward investigating its force of proving. For if this is once demonstrated, there is already at hand for us the principal means of discerning whether some religion, which ascribes divine origin to itself, truly proceeds from God through revelation. The Vatican Council defined this force of proving of miracles in the canon cited (n. 171), which must be kept before our eyes.
204. But in order that we may rightly understand this doctrine of the Church, and then invincibly assert it, the state of the question must be set forth. And first, the force of proving of miracles can be considered as regards itself and as regards us. It can scarcely be doubted whether miracles have this force in themselves; for since it is established from what has been said (the preceding article) that the principal cause of miracles is none other than God, and since from another side it is established that He cannot confirm anything false as true, for this is repugnant to His supreme veracity, by the very fact that a miracle is done in confirmation of some revealed doctrine, we are made certain that it is revealed and consequently is true. Hence the whole question chiefly turns on this: whether miracles have force of proving as regards us.
205. Now in order that a miracle have force of proving as regards us, it is necessary that we be certain of their objective truth. But for this three things are required: 1) that the truth of the narration of that physical fact which is proposed as a miracle be certainly established for us, the historical truth of the miracle; 2) that it be certainly established that that fact is truly so outside the order and faculty of the whole of nature that it has none but God as author, the philosophical truth of the miracle; 3) that it be established that it was truly done in confirmation of revelation, if we intend to prove the existence of revelation by it, the relative truth of the miracle. Wherefore, since the Vatican Council defined not only that miracles can be known with certainty, but also that they can be so known that by them the divine origin of the Christian religion is rightly proved, it must certainly be held that we can know with certainty that those things which are narrated as miracles done in confirmation of that religion truly happened; that they were true miracles; and that they were truly done in confirmation of Christian revelation.
206. In reality, some I. deny the force of proving of miracles as regards us because they think that we can by no means attain their historical truth with certainty. They assert this chiefly by a twofold reason. The first affects moral certainty generally. For they say that miracles performed in confirmation of some revealed doctrine, and which we by no means behold with our eyes, cannot be established otherwise than from human testimony. But from human testimony there can arise only that certainty which is called moral; and this is by no means true certainty, but at most great probability.
207. But the other reason by which they attack the knowability of the historical truth of miracles specifically affects miracles themselves. For after Hume they say (Works, vol. 3, p. 178, ed. 1770): “It is easier for a thousand witnesses to err or deceive than for a fact repugnant to the laws of nature to exist. The first is only morally impossible and consonant with experience; the second is physically impossible and contrary to experience. Moreover, in every miracle a thousand rise up against one witness; thus, for example, if one person testifies that a dead man was raised, thousands of witnesses affirm that the dead do not return to life.” Compare the treatise On the Infused Virtues (n. 685-704). Hence this twofold difficulty must be met, so that it may be shown that we can know the historical truth of miracle with certainty.
208. Others II. deny the force of proving of miracles as regards us because they judge that we are not permitted to attain their philosophical truth with certainty. And they assert this also chiefly by a twofold reason. The first is: no one has all the powers of nature thoroughly known; therefore no one can discern between a natural work and a prodigious one. We know that men have more than once wrongly judged that nature could not do something and that it was opposed to its laws; and this can happen especially to the uneducated, to whom the powers and laws of nature are not thoroughly known. Hence some doubt can always remain in forming such a judgment; and therefore it cannot be said that a miracle is a most certain note of divine revelation, for which it is assumed as testimony. Indeed, some impious man of our time went so far that he boldly demanded that a miracle be performed in an assembly of men pre-eminent in science, who could rightly judge concerning the truth of the miracle. Unless this were done, he said, the notion of miracle must be attributed to ignorance. (1) The eminent Cardinal Bishop of Poitiers wrote to the point against this blasphemy (Third Instruction, etc., Works, vol. 5, p. 105): “To establish as a principle that a wonder-worker deserves credit only insofar as he appears before the tribunal of the principal representatives of nineteenth-century science and submits to the conditions of their program: this is to mock past centuries and the whole human race, to whom one refuses the dose of good sense necessary for establishing the most palpable facts; and it is also to mock God, whom one supposes able to bend to the whims and accept the regulations of His creature at the very moment when He is about to manifest His highest power; it is to condemn Him not to act as God at the hour when He wishes to prove that He is God.”
209. But the other reason is of this sort: even if, they say, the doctrine established by us above is admitted, namely that angels cannot effect true miracles, nevertheless it cannot be denied that they can imitate some miraculous works as regards appearance; and produce others as regards the truth of the work, which nevertheless are not true miracles because they are effected by them by applying their proper causes. At least, therefore, it will always be uncertain whether those things which we believe to be miracles, as exceeding the powers of nature known to us, ought to be ascribed to divine or diabolical operation.
210. Now we do not contend that concerning all and each of the facts which are called miracles we can always bear a certain judgment; nor in some cases should this be judged easy. Hence also the Church, as is established from Benedict XIV (On the Canonization of Saints, especially book 4), institutes a stricter examination, so that even Protestants have been forced to confess the prudence of the Church in this matter. For our matter, therefore, it suffices to show that concerning at least some events of this sort, especially when several concur for confirming revelation, it can be certainly established for us both that they exceed the powers of the whole of nature, and that they proceeded not from evil angels but from God, and therefore that they are true miracles. (2) It is known, for example, what Fr. Daubenton reports (The Life of Blessed Jean-Francois Regis, Paris, 1716, apud Perrone): “A distinguished English Protestant had come to Rome. A certain Roman prelate, who had entered into friendship with him, gave him documents to read which contained proofs of several miracles. When he had read these with the greatest pleasure of mind, he returned them to the prelate, saying: ‘That is certainly the surest way to prove miracles. If all those which are received in the Roman Church were established on proofs as evident and authentic as these are, we would have no difficulty in subscribing to them, and by this you would save yourselves from all the mockery which we make of your alleged miracles.’ ‘Well then,’ replied the prelate, ‘know that of all these miracles, which seem to you so verified and so well supported, none has been admitted by the Congregation of Rites, because they did not appear sufficiently proved.’ The Protestant, struck by this unexpected answer, confessed that nothing but blind prejudice could stand against the canonization of the saints, and that he had never thought that the caution of the Roman Church progressed so far in the examination which it institutes concerning miracles” (p. 31).
211. Finally, others III. deny the force of proving of miracles as regards us because they judge it impossible for us to know their relative truth with certainty. In order that this may be understood, the doctrine common among theologians must be recalled, which teaches that the grace of miracles is freely given grace, and not grace making one pleasing; and therefore that it can be conferred by God even upon impious men. Hence: 1) Christ the Lord says (Matt. 7:22): “Many will say to me on that day: Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in Your name, and in Your name cast out demons, and in Your name done many mighty works?” Many of the Fathers, such as Jerome, Chrysostom, Euthymius, and Theophylact, understood this of men who performed miracles even while they were impious. 2) Likewise, just as to the other Apostles, the Lord seems also to have granted to Judas the grace of miracles. 3) And St. Thomas (II-II, q. 172, a. 4) admits that the gift of prophecy is sometimes communicated by God to the wicked, and he explains how this can happen by that reason which can also be adapted to miracles. For he teaches that such a gift is sometimes conceded to the wicked in order to show the power of the name of Christ and for the usefulness of others. “The gift of prophecy,” he says, “is sometimes given to a man both for the usefulness of others and for the illumination of his own mind… But some obtain the gift of prophecy only for the usefulness of others, who are, as it were, an instrument of divine operation. Hence Jerome says on Matthew 7: ‘To prophesy, and to do mighty works, and to cast out demons is sometimes not of the merit of the one who works, but either he does this by invocation of the name of Christ, or it is conceded for the condemnation of those who invoke and for the usefulness of those who see and hear.’” 4) St. Augustine had already written similar things concerning miracles (Eighty-Three Questions, q. 73): “Good Christians,” he says, “do miracles through public justice; wicked Christians through the signs of public justice, as by invoking the name of Christ or by exhibiting certain sacraments.”
212. This having been posited, behold the difficulty which arises, and which Suarez clearly proposes (On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ, disp. 31, sect. 2, n. 6): “Someone could evade by saying that it is by no means repugnant that God by special aid and freely given grace concur with a man for doing miracles, although the man himself does them in confirmation of falsehood. For from this it does not follow that God lies, and there is no other principle of this repugnance or inconvenience which would follow from it. “The antecedent is declared. First, God gives to a priest the supernatural faculty of consecrating and commits it to his liberty, so that he may use it well or badly; and when he uses it badly, God nevertheless concurs with him by special and supernatural aid for making a work miraculous by its own power. And nevertheless the wickedness of the man does not redound upon God. Therefore the same will be the case in the present matter, proportion being preserved. “Secondly, God can confer on a man the grace of healings, so that he may likewise use it well or badly. Therefore, just as God can concur with such a man for conferring health miraculously even if he does this on account of greed or vain glory, He can also concur even if he does this in order to deceive other men, and therefore in confirmation of falsehood. “Thirdly, there is an a priori reason: because although the man who does miracles says that he does this in confirmation of the things which he speaks, it does not follow from this that God concurs for the same confirmation. But He will concur only by force of a prior gift, or law, or pact by which He established to give to that man such power and to concur with him for whatever end he himself operates. Therefore even if God concurs, it does not follow that He lies, nor that He confirms a lie, but only that He permits others to think that He confirms it.” These difficulties must be satisfied, so that we may vindicate the knowability of the relative truth of miracles.
213. Therefore, with these things having been noted beforehand for understanding the matter: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. IX. If miracles are employed in confirmation of divine revelation, there is in them an unconquered force for proving it, 1. not only as regards itself, but also as regards us. For even if it cannot be established for us concerning all and each, nevertheless concerning many it can be established with certainty both 2. that they truly existed just as they are narrated, 3. that they truly are miracles, and finally 4. that they were performed for confirming revealed doctrine.
214. The first part is proved. I. There can be no divine word or testimony concerning a false thing. But miracles are a certain divine word and testimony. Therefore if they are employed in confirmation of divine revelation, it cannot be false; or that revelation is truly divine, and consequently the doctrine which it contains is true. The major is proved. The pronouncement of the true as false, and of the false as true, can indeed in man be material, and therefore not wound his veracity; but in God it would always be formal, and therefore a true lie. For in man an erroneous pronouncement can happen from ignorance, by which it comes about, and sometimes invincibly, that he thinks true what is false and false what is true. But in God this cannot happen without a lie, since He is powerful with infinite knowledge. Wherefore in God this pronouncement is always opposed to veracity; but since God is infinitely truthful, it is impossible that He affirm as true what is false, and as false what is true. Compare what we said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues (n. 619 ff.). The minor is proved. The author of a miracle is none but God, since, from what has been said, a miracle is an effect exceeding every faculty of created nature and contrary to the customary laws of that nature. Therefore, if it is employed in confirmation of revealed doctrine, God Himself says, not indeed by words but by other signs, that that doctrine is revealed, and consequently true. Hence St. Thomas (Quodlibet 2, a. 6, ad 4) says: “It cannot happen that someone announcing false doctrine should do true miracles, which cannot be done except by divine power; for thus God would be a witness of falsity, which is impossible.”
215. But in order that this argument may be understood more deeply, it will help to weigh other words of the holy Doctor. “Because,” he says (III, q. 43, a. 1), “those things which are of faith exceed human reason, they cannot be proved by human reasons, but must be proved by an argument of divine power; and when someone does works which God alone can do, those things which are said are believed to be from God, just as when someone bears letters sealed with the ring of the king, what is contained in them is believed to have proceeded from the will of the king.” Hence Bellarmine (On the Sacraments in General, book 1, c. 14) says: “The force of a seal and of a miracle is the same. For a royal seal is always more known and firmer than the letters of the king; for all know how to discern the seal, but not all discern the letters; and the seal without letters has authority, while letters without a seal do not. But a miracle also is more known and more efficacious than preaching. For all who see a blind man enlightened, or a dead man raised, understand that this is a supernatural and divine work, and therefore they are moved to believing that which is confirmed by such testimony; but not all who hear someone preaching immediately understand that those are the words of God.” And De Lugo (On Faith, disp. 2, sect. 2, n. 25) writes: “But if some seal were so essentially affixed to the king that it could not be applied except by the king himself, conscious of the writing, then the king would speak through the seal, because that seal would sufficiently signify the knowledge which the king had and intended to communicate when he applied the seal. But true miracles performed by God in circumstances of this sort are such. Since they cannot be done except by God, and indeed by God conscious of the doctrine which is sealed by such a miracle, by that very fact they show that God speaks through miracles and seals of this sort, and manifests His mind.”
216. II. Here the common persuasion of men could be invoked. For not only Christians, but the very assertors of false religions appeal to miracles, indeed they also strive to prove the excellence and authority of men by miracles as by divine signs. This is so true that unbelievers themselves, by one of the many contradictions familiar to them, seek from this an objection against the force of proving of miracles. Namely they say: several religions, contradicting one another, equally appeal to miracles; therefore miracle cannot be a certain criterion of revelation. But in truth, unless a persuasion common to all concerning the force of proving of miracles dwelt within them, they certainly would not appeal to miracles. Yet it by no means follows that miracle is not a certain note of revelation, just as from the fact that various philosophical schools boast evidence for their own doctrine, no one would rightly infer that evidence is not a criterion of truth. Therefore diligence and examination are needed for discerning the aforesaid threefold truth of miracles. (1) Behold, for example, how Origen argues (Against Celsus, book 3, n. 37): “You who think that the things which the disciples committed to writing concerning the miracles of Jesus are altogether inventions, and accuse those who join faith to them, how do you not judge things of this kind, which are reported concerning Aristeas, to be prodigiously invented things and fables? How do you, who charge others with fault because they admit the miracles of Jesus without any reason, seem to admit such things with no proof brought forward and no argument that those things happened? Do you think Herodotus and Pindar do not deceive by lies, but those who choose to die for the documents of Jesus, and who left writings concerning things which they had thoroughly known to be transmitted to posterity, fought so greatly for inventions, fables, and fabricated wonders that they wished to live miserably and be removed from the midst by force? Rather, making yourself judge between those things which are written about Aristeas and those which are narrated about Jesus, see from the outcome and from those things which each did for the amendment of morals and for inducing piety toward the supreme God whether this judgment ought not to be made: that what history handed down concerning Jesus must be believed to have been done not without God, but not those things concerning Aristeas of Proconnesus.” Indeed the first Christian Apologists already knew the miracles which the gentiles boasted, and they judged many to be only tricks of demons (compare Tertullian, Apology, c. 22-23; St. Augustine, On the Trinity, book 4, c. 17; On the Divination of Demons, c. 5 ff.), although their historical faith itself totters. Thus, for example, Valerius Maximus (book 1, c. 8, n. 6) writes: “Nor does it escape me in what doubtful opinion judgment turns concerning the movement and voice of the immortal gods perceived by human eyes and ears.” And Curtius (book 9, c. 1): “Indeed I transcribe more than I believe. For I do not sustain affirming things about which I doubt, nor subtracting things which I have received.” Thus concerning the miracles of Hadrian it is read in Aelius Spartianus (Hadrian, c. 25), who reports them, “although Marius Maximus mentions that these things were done by simulation.” Concerning the miracles of Vespasian it suffices to read what Suetonius himself reports; for they are said to have been done (Vespasian, c. 7) to conciliate authority for the new emperor. Concerning the miracles of Apollonius, the things which Huet learnedly discusses can be read (Demonstration of the Gospel, prop. 9, c. 147).
217. The second part is proved. I. If the possibility of acquiring historical certainty of miracles is denied because it rests on fallible human testimony, every historical and moral certainty will have to be rejected; yet the adversaries themselves do not admit this. And deservedly indeed; for what sane person would attribute any force to arguments which attack every historical certainty and render uncertain whatever is said to have been done in antiquity?
218. II. Indeed human testimony clothed with due conditions, especially if it is public and is borne by many witnesses diverse in character, age, education, nation, etc., as is shown in logic, can ultimately be resolved into the metaphysically certain principle “there is no effect without a cause”; or, there is no effect greater than its cause (compare the treatise On the Infused Virtues, nn. 686 ff.). Hence, if testimony of this sort reporting miracles can be given, historical certainty of a miracle can be had. But testimony of this sort reporting miracles can be given. For 1) although miracles are supernatural events, they are nevertheless sensible, insofar as they strike the exterior senses of sight, hearing, etc.; and if they are public, as was the raising of a man dead for four days, they are subject to the senses of several witnesses. Hence if many eyewitnesses narrate that they saw a mute man suddenly endowed with speech, hearing restored to a deaf man, and, what is still greater, life to a dead man, certainly those witnesses are no less worthy of faith than when they narrate that they saw the one whom they now see hearing, speaking, alive, etc., formerly deaf, mute, dead, etc. 2) Indeed, as Perrone rightly observes, since men of past times were endowed with the same faculties with which we too have been gifted, and were of the same nature, it must be presumed that they did those things which we also would have done, had we been placed in the same circumstances. If we, for example, heard that a man had been recalled to life from the dead, would we immediately give faith to it? On the contrary, we would first subject all things to the most accurate examination: whether he who is said to have been raised truly was dead; at what time; through whom he was raised; how; by what witnesses it is reported, etc. Let the same be said of sight restored to one born blind and other similar things, especially if these things were done in confirmation of some doctrine; for then those things would concur which by their own nature arouse and sharpen human investigation, and can easily be weighed and known. Therefore it must be presumed that our ancestors conducted themselves thus, unless we wish to suppose them dull and leaden, or of another nature and character than men now are; and this cannot be thought except by the highest shamelessness and madness. to suppose that they were dull and leaden, or of another nature and character than men now are; and this cannot be thought except by the highest shamelessness and madness. 3) But men would apply this care and diligence a fortiori if the event were extraordinary and wondrous; for this usually makes witnesses or spectators more attentive to examining and weighing it rightly; and therefore, other things being equal, their testimony is of greater weight in facts of this sort. 4) The argument grows further when several of the witnesses strive with every effort to contradict the truth of the miraculous event, and yet cannot deny it, because it is too evident. We know that this indeed happened, for example, in the resurrection of Lazarus, when they wanted to kill him, lest the people, moved by that miracle, should believe in Christ. Indeed, it happened in many miracles performed by Christ; for when His enemies could not deny the truth of the fact, they attributed them to the demon.
219. III. Nor can Hume’s exception (n. 207) in any way weaken the historical certainty of miracles. For 1) that argument proves too much. If it proved anything according to the principles of the adversaries, then even if we beheld with our own eyes a dead man rise, we ought by no means to believe it, since it is contrary to the customary testimony of the senses that men once dead do not rise. Therefore the argument supposes a false principle, namely, that in the nature of things or in society nothing ever happens which is not consonant with our customary observations. 2) Moreover, the physical impossibility of some event would conflict with its historical certainty if it could be overcome by no power; for if it could be overcome by some power, due human testimony would furnish a sufficient argument that, in the case, it has been overcome. But when the question concerns miracles, that which is lacking to natural powers is abundantly supplied by the omnipotence of God, to whom alone the fact is ascribed as to the principal cause. 3) Who does not see that it is ridiculous to assert that a thousand witnesses rise up against one witness of a miracle? For a thousand witnesses who were not present at the fact can indeed affirm the ordinary law of nature, but they cannot testify that an exception was not made against that law. Otherwise it would have to be said that the testimonies of those who are ignorant of the whole matter are valid for absolving a thief whom three persons caught in the act of theft, even though the rest of men did not see him. 4) In order that this whole response may have greater force, let it be noted that testimony concerning a miracle performed can be compared either 1) with present experience concerning events according to the laws of nature; and then between testimony concerning an extraordinary past fact and present experience there can be no contradiction, since, as is plain, they do not fall upon the same object; or 2) with the testimony of those who report that the same events happened according to the same laws; and then there can be no contradiction between either testimony, for one reports what has been done for the most part, the other what sometimes happened by exception; or 3) it is compared both with our present experience and with the testimony of those who preceded, with the principle concerning the constancy of the laws of nature added; and then neither can testimony concerning a miracle performed be rejected a priori, since, as we showed, the laws of nature are not so constant that they do not admit an exception through divine omnipotence. Compare what we said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues (n. 704).
220. The third part is proved. I. The philosophical truth of a miracle is first said not to be able to be known by us with certainty because not all the powers of nature are thoroughly known to us; and therefore, they say, what seems to exceed nature must perhaps be attributed to hidden powers. But this reason is of no moment. For: 1) If those hidden powers existed, to which a miracle would have to be attributed, they would act either always or sometimes. But not always, for the discussion is about a miracle, which is rare; not all the dead have been recalled to life, sight has not been restored to all the blind, etc. Nor sometimes; for the discussion is about hidden powers producing an effect against some constant law of nature, and this is a miracle. But the adversaries ascribe to this or similar laws such constancy and necessity that they cannot be suspended even by divine omnipotence. How, then, do these things cohere with one another? Besides, this derogation would be independent of man, as one which would flow from the very nature of the thing. But a miracle happens when man commands, and in the name or authority of God. Therefore a miracle is not a derogation from a general law made by some hidden force of nature, which acts either always or only sometimes. 2) Indeed we do not know all laws positively, so that we could affirm concerning all how far their efficacy extends; but we know them negatively, so that we can know how far they cannot reach. But this suffices for discerning some miracles. For, to look at the matter concretely, even if we admit, for example, that we do not know how far the most noble art of medicine rises, nevertheless we know certainly that no physician can recall to life one dead, and indeed one already four days dead and stinking. Similarly, although we do not know with exactness what the voice of a man can do, nevertheless we know with all certainty that it cannot make one blind from birth receive sight, or a deaf man hear, or a mute man speak, or a dead man revive, etc. Therefore it is not necessary that it be known how far the natural power of some agent extends; but it suffices that one know that it cannot extend to the said works, in order that they be judged miracles. 3) Although we do not positively know all the laws of nature, nor how far their efficacy extends, nevertheless we can know the powers which in fact are applied as regards the subject in which the miracle is done. But this suffices for discerning some miracles. For when Jesus Christ, for example, gave sight to one blind from birth by smearing his eyes with mud, it is evident that mud cannot give sight to one blind from birth, but rather can blind a healthy eye. But if it is supposed, in this or similar events, that hidden powers can be applied to which the effect must be attributed, then we shall destroy all physical certainty. 4) From the very mode in which a miracle is done it is sometimes evident that it cannot be attributed to any power of nature. In reality, if a man wishes to do something external, it is necessary that the soul move its own body and operate externally through its own body; for the word of man is not productive of a thing, but significative. Does a physician heal a sick man by the command of will alone? Rather, by prescribing medicines and giving them to the sick man, or applying them to him, he can obtain his health. Wherefore, if someone healed a sick man by command alone, saying: rise; and immediately the one who was sick rose, that person would certainly have to be said to perform a miracle. This inference especially holds when miracles are performed at the nod of a man ignorant of the natural sciences, solely in the name and authority of God; when they are performed precisely at the time when some necessity, or at least evident usefulness, is urgent for confirming truth, defending innocence, etc. For who would say that hidden powers operate at the nod of a man ignorant of them?
221. You will say: “Miracles which must be derived from the faith and will of the agents are that which once was called imagination operating outside its own body, whose efficacy Avicenna and Pomponazzi made so great, but now is called animal magnetism or mesmerism; its effect will be greater if contact, whether mediate or immediate, is joined to faith; if with the faith of the agent there is united the faith of the patient, or with the force of magnetism the force of imagination.” I answer: It is not ours now to treat of magnetism and mesmerism. But it suffices to observe: 1) Not all miracles consist in healings alone, as the adversaries seem to suppose. Have the patrons of magnetism ever been able, with five loaves and two fish, to feed a multitude of five thousand men, as Christ accomplished? Have they ever been able to convert water into wine, as happened at the wedding of Cana? If they had accomplished this, the force of their imagination would be greatly commended, and they would gladly be received by all. 2) But if we consider the healings themselves, we concede that persuasion of recovering health sometimes contributes greatly, and in some cases has force especially for correcting a damaged fantasy. This is known by all; and not only physicians admit it, but Benedict XIV (On the Canonization of Saints, book 4, last chapter) holds it as certain. Hence this case also is kept before the eyes in the Congregations of Rites. But it belongs to a stubborn man, not to say a mad one, to wish to extend such a force to all cases, for example, to the bruising and fracture of bones, wounds, incurable diseases, etc. If this were so, we could easily bid farewell not only to miracles, but also to therapeutics and surgery. 3) It is further false that faith is always required in those for whose sake miracles are performed. Certainly Christ demanded no such faith in the cited miracles of the multiplication of loaves and the conversion of water into wine; nor when He raised the dead, the son of the widow of Naim or the daughter of Jairus, could He have demanded faith from them.
222. II. Nor can the philosophical truth of miracles be called impossible to know on account of the natural faculty of angels by which they can work tricks. For angels are either good or evil, according as they are either subject to God and in agreement with His will, or adversaries of Him, that is, rebels against Him. If they are good, then neither because of their zeal for truth and men, nor because of the union of their wills with the divine will, can they aid an impostor by confirming false doctrine with wondrous facts. But if they are evil, they are prohibited by God from aiding an impostor, or herald of pretended revelation, unto the invincible seduction of men.
223. In order that this last part of the argument may be well understood, first let it be noted what Benedict XIV teaches (On the Canonization of Saints, book 4, part 1, c. 3), who, copying the words of Suarez (On Religion, book 2, c. 16, n. 2), says: “Although the power itself of demons was not diminished in itself, nevertheless because of the order of grace and the punishment of fault, its subjection was in some way changed. A superior angel naturally, in natural perfection, can compel an inferior one, or resist lest he use his externally operative power, because just as he is superior in nature, so also in force and faculty of acting. But this order has not been changed among the demons among themselves; yet with respect to the holy angels it has been changed, because although a good angel is often inferior in nature, nevertheless the least holy angel can compel the highest demon and command him efficaciously, since then he does not operate by natural power alone, but as a minister of God, without whose nod and will he attempts nothing. This is the common opinion of the theologians.” Hence we say: it pertains to divine providence that if either wonders or tricks are done by malignant spirits, God does not permit this in those circumstances in which sufficient indications are not available for judging that those signs are not divine. For 1) if such power were conceded to demons that they could at will overturn the order of nature and deceive men, without their frauds and illusions being able to be detected, all physical certainty would cease; indeed, very many duties of man toward men would also be rendered doubtful, because illusions would have to be feared everywhere. But who of sound mind would say that God so rules the world and governs it by His providence that, with any physical certainty repudiated, we always cling uncertainly as to whether duties to be exhibited according to the general rules of morals should be exhibited in concrete and particular cases or not? Therefore no one of sound mind will deny that the natural power of demons for effecting wonders and tricks is impeded by divine providence if a sufficient means for discerning them is lacking. Compare On the Infused Virtues (n. 692). 2) Hence Suarez (On the Mysteries of the Life of Christ, disp. 31, sect., n. 8) says: “It does not pertain to the providence of God not to permit false signs, since they profit for the trial and advancement of the elect; but it does pertain to the providence of God that aid and a mode be given by which they can be judged and known, because it is not of divine goodness and wisdom to permit man to be tempted beyond that which he can. And for this reason, when, after moral diligence and investigation have been made, it is still evidently established that the miracles which are done in confirmation of doctrine are true, no reason for doubting about the truth of such doctrine is left, especially if the miracles are frequent and done with great authority and power, and confirmed by innocence and holiness of life, and if in the doctrine itself nothing appears against honesty, nothing against right reason, and finally nothing against other divine revelations.” 3) Wherefore, “when there are false miracles,” as the same Suarez teaches (loc. cit.), “there always remains some mode by which they can morally be judged, if men do what lies in them for knowing the truth. First, by considering well the works and signs themselves and their circumstances. Secondly, by considering the person, life, and morals of the one who thus speaks and works. Thirdly, by considering the doctrine itself, whether in any part it is opposed to reason, or to other divine revelations sufficiently proposed,” etc. And (On Faith, disp. 4, sect. 3, n. 9): “In these works, therefore, first the duration of the effect and perseverance must be considered, which is a great indication of truth; for things which are done only fictitiously suddenly vanish. And thus the death of Lazarus was proved for four days to have been true, and afterward life restored to him for long times. Then there come the effects through which such truth is manifested; such as actions of life are especially accustomed to be, as seeing in one blind from birth. Thirdly, the multitude and frequency of such effects is considered, with all the signs and indications of truth which are accustomed to exist in all things which we handle before our hands. For by what greater evidence can it be established that some wine is true wine than that wine into which the Lord converted water? Hence fourthly there is also considered the manifold wondrous mode of working such signs, by command, by prayer to God, by joining at the same time another work proper to God, such as the manifestation of the thoughts of the heart, which Christ often did. Besides, the end of such works must be considered, because nothing temporal and human, and nothing depraved, was intended through them, but rather rectitude and honesty of morals, and knowledge of the true God, and the assault upon the demon himself.”
224. From these things the worn difficulty is easily dissolved: the truth of the miracle, they say, is proved from the truth of the doctrine, and the truth of the doctrine is proved from the truth of the miracle. Behold a vicious circle. Now the holiness of doctrine is applied for discerning a true miracle from a trick of demons when it is already established that the work surpasses the powers of sensible nature. But then: 1) the holiness of doctrine, as is clear from what has been said, is not the only criterion which we use; 2) when we use it, we take doctrine as promoting holiness of morals, piety, etc., in order to judge that the work performed in its confirmation, concerning which it is already established that it is above the powers of sensible nature, is not from a demon. Hence we conclude that it is from God, and therefore, in the case, that the doctrine is revealed. Therefore the same is not proved by the same. 3) If at any time doctrine is taken as revealed for discerning a miracle from a trick of demons, then this is when revelation has been proved by other signs. Hence from doctrine already approved by many other signs, we deduce that this new sign performed in its confirmation is not from a demon; and since it is a work above the powers of sensible nature, it is therefore from God. But by hypothesis it was produced in confirmation of revelation; therefore revelation is confirmed by this new sign. Let us suppose, for example, what will be demonstrated below, that Christian revelation was confirmed by so many and wondrous signs that no reasonable doubt can be had about its divine origin. If afterward some wondrous work were performed, surpassing the powers of visible nature, for confirming a doctrine opposed to Christian revelation, would it not deservedly be attributed to the evil arts of a demon?
225. The fourth part is proved. The knowability of the relative truth of miracles would be denied insofar as God could perform a miracle if a man falsely proposed as revealed a doctrine which he intended to confirm by a miracle. But God cannot do this. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1) Just as God would testify to what is false if He performed a miracle in confirmation of false doctrine, so He would attest to what is false, and, as it were, apply His own seal to the lie of a man, if, when that man proposed a miracle in confirmation of false doctrine, God worked it. But God can neither testify nor attest what is false. Therefore. The arguments given for the first part of the thesis return here. 2) Although God can permit error, nevertheless He cannot Himself lead us into error. But if, when a man promised a miracle in confirmation of false doctrine, God worked a miracle, He Himself would lead us into error. Therefore. Here also apply the arguments by which we recently proved that, in those circumstances in which no means is available for detecting error, God cannot permit evil angels to work tricks.
226. You will say I: A seal can be impressed on a false and royal writing from the wickedness of the minister guarding the seal; therefore, by parity, from the wickedness of a creature having the power of miracles, a miracle could be performed in confirmation of error, signing it with the divine seal. I answer by denying the consequence. “Because,” says De Lugo (On Faith, disp. 2, n. 24), “just as a prince, if in the very act of sealing or subscribing he noticed the falsity contained, could not seal or subscribe, but would have to take back the seal, lest he cooperate in deception and a lie, so God would be bound to the same. Hence, since God not only antecedently, but in the very act of sealing and working the miracle, always sees the falsity of the doctrine to be confirmed by the seal of the miracle, He does not then seem able to cooperate in the wickedness of the minister without being a participant in deception and falsity. For He did not only subscribe before or give the seal, but then subscribes and seals.”
227. You will say II: But, once the power of consecrating has been conferred, can God not concur for consecration even when man abuses it? (n. 212). De Lugo answers (loc. cit., n. 25) that “God can give that general power in two ways. First, in such a way that it is established, or can be established, for what end or when God gave it; in which case, if afterward a man abuses that power for another end, for approving something false, or for another depraved end, it can also easily be established that God does not here and now work a miracle for that depraved end, but for the other ends which He intended in that first general concession. Such is the case concerning the power of consecrating and converting bread into the body of Christ. This conversion, even if it were done sensibly, would still happen when a priest wished to consecrate for a depraved end or for approving an error, because it could be established from elsewhere that the miracle is not done by God on account of that depraved end or for approving an error, but for sustaining the truth of the institution of the sacrament. Therefore I have often said that a miracle cannot be done by God in those circumstances when, speaking per se, it cannot be gathered from elsewhere that it is done by God for another end, etc.”