228. We embrace two questions at once in this article, as the title itself manifests. But before we touch them, it is necessary to set forth briefly the nature of the prophecy with which we are concerned. And first, it should be noted that the word prophecy has multiple acceptions, not only among profane authors, but also in the Sacred Scriptures. For sometimes it is taken in a very broad and less proper sense; and then it signifies: 1) interpretation, in which sense it is read (Exod. 7:1-2): “Aaron your brother will be your prophet,” that is, your interpreter before Pharaoh. “You shall speak to him all things which I command you, and he shall speak to Pharaoh.” 2) A man endowed with cognitions above the common people is called a prophet. In this sense the Apostle wrote (Titus 1:12 ff.): “A certain one of them, their own prophet, said: The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, sluggish bellies. This testimony is true.” 3) Sometimes the composer of sacred hymns and songs is called a prophet, indeed also the singer of them in praise of God; in this sense it is taken (1 Kings 10:5-6): “When you have entered the city, you will meet a band of prophets coming down from the high place, and before them a psaltery and timbrel, and pipe, and harp, and they themselves prophesying. And the Spirit of the Lord will leap upon you, and you will prophesy with them.” 4) By the name prophet also come teachers and interpreters of the law; whence some were called sons of the prophets, insofar, namely, as they were taught the doctrine of the law by those teachers, to some of whom, however, divine light was often communicated. 5) All inspired writers, although they did not write prophecies properly so called, are also called prophets, as we noted in the treatise On the Infused Virtues (n. 954). It is useful to keep these diverse acceptions of the words prophet and prophecy before one’s eyes, so that response may be made to those who, abusing the ambiguity of the word, would wish to show that prophecy properly so called is not a supernatural gift.
229. Yet in the proper sense, prophets were anciently called those who knew and announced hidden things, namely those things which could not be known except in a supernatural mode. Hence the knowledge and prediction of things of this sort was properly called prophecy. “Prophecy,” says St. Thomas (II-II, q. 171, a. 1), “first and principally consists in knowledge, because namely the prophets know those things which are far off and remote from the knowledge of men. Hence they can be called prophets from pro, which is far off, and phanos, which is apparition, because, namely, certain things which are far off appear to them. And because of this, as Isidore says in book 7 of the Etymologies, c. 8, in the Old Testament they were called Seers, because they saw those things which the rest did not see, and they foresaw those things which were hidden in mystery. Hence also paganism called them vates from the force of the mind, as he premised in the same place. But because, as is said in 1 Cor. 12:7, ‘To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit unto usefulness,’ and below, ch. 14:12, it is said: ‘Seek that you may abound unto the edification of the Church,’ hence it is that prophecy secondarily consists in speech, insofar as the prophets announce for the edification of others those things which, taught divinely, they know.” Hence it is that prophecy secondarily consists in speech, insofar as the prophets announce for the edification of others those things which, taught divinely, they know, according to that saying of Isaiah 22:14: “The things which I have heard from the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have announced to you.” And according to this, as Isidore says in book 7 of the Etymologies, c. 8, they can be called prophets, as if praephatores, because they speak from afar, that is, they speak from remote things and truly predict future things.”
230. Under this proper acceptation of prophecy is comprehended the knowledge of all things remote from natural knowledge. Hence St. Gregory says (On Ezekiel, hom. 1, near the beginning), that “one kind of prophecy is concerning the future, as that which is said in Isaiah 7: ‘Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son’; another concerning the past, as that which is said in Genesis 1: ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth’; another concerning the present, as that which is said in 1 Corinthians 14: ‘If all prophesy, and an unbeliever enters, the secrets of his heart are made manifest.’”
231. But in the strictest acceptation prophecy imports knowledge of an event freely future; and in this sense Cassiodorus (Prologue on the Psalms, c. 1) said: “Prophecy is divine inspiration or revelation announcing the event of things with immovable truth.” Here St. Thomas notes (De Veritate, q. 12, a. 2, ad 1): “the events of things are placed in the definition of prophecy as the matter most proper to prophecy”; and in the body he had already said that future contingents “seem chiefly to pertain to prophecy, to such a degree that, as the chief matter of prophecy, they are placed in the definition of prophecy, in this that it is said: prophecy is divine inspiration of the event of things, etc. From this also the name prophecy seems to have been received. Hence Gregory says on Ezekiel that, since prophecy is so called because it predicts future things, when it speaks of the past or present, it loses the reason of its name.”
232. Since we must deal with prophecy according to its strictest signification, it is useful to unfold Cassiodorus’s definition a little. And so prophecy is called 1) inspiration and revelation; for, as St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 171, a. 1, ad 4), “inspiration is required for prophecy as regards the elevation of the mind, according to that saying of Job 32: The inspiration of the Almighty gives understanding; but revelation as regards the very perception of divine things, in which prophecy is perfected, and by which the veil of obscurity and ignorance is removed, according to that saying of Job 12: He reveals deep things from darkness.” 2) It is called divine inspiration and revelation; for in order that what is far from natural knowledge be known, supernatural light is required. “Just as,” says St. Thomas (loc. cit., a. 2), “the manifestation of bodily vision takes place through bodily light, so also the manifestation of intellectual vision takes place through intellectual light. Therefore the manifestation must be proportioned to the light through which it takes place, as an effect is proportioned to its cause. Since, therefore, prophecy pertains to knowledge which exists above natural knowledge, the consequence is that for prophecy there is required a certain intellectual light exceeding the light of natural reason.” In this matter observe “that what is formal in prophetic knowledge is the divine light, from whose unity prophecy has unity of species, although the things which are prophetically manifested through the divine light are diverse” (loc. cit., a. 3, ad 3). (1) In order that the character of prophetic light may be better understood, it is useful also to recall what St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 173, a. 4): “It must be said that in prophetic revelation the mind of the prophet is moved by the Holy Spirit as a deficient instrument with respect to the principal agent. But the mind of the prophet is moved not only to apprehend something, but also to speak something, or to do something; and sometimes indeed to all three at once, sometimes to two of these, but sometimes to one only. And any of these can occur with some defect of knowledge. For when the mind of the prophet is moved to judge or apprehend something, sometimes he is brought to this, that he apprehends that thing only; but sometimes further to this, that he knows these things have been divinely revealed to him. Likewise sometimes the mind of the prophet is moved to speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Spirit intends through these words… sometimes he does not understand what the Holy Spirit intends through these words, as is plain concerning Caiaphas (John 11). Likewise also when the Holy Spirit moves the mind of someone to do something, sometimes he understands what this signifies… (Jer. 13); but sometimes he does not understand, as the soldiers dividing the garments of Christ did not understand what this signified. Therefore, when someone knows that he is moved by the Holy Spirit to judge something, or to signify by word or deed, this properly pertains to prophecy. But when he is moved and does not know it, it is not perfect prophecy, but a certain prophetic instinct.” 3) Prophecy is called revelation and inspiration of the event of things, etc.; by these words the object of prophecy according to its strictest acceptation is determined, that is, the future contingent not knowable in its natural causes. Hence St. Thomas, weighing this definition (II-II, q. 171, a. 3, ad 1), says: “Prophecy is defined there according to that which is properly signified by the name prophecy. And in this way also prophecy is divided against the other freely given graces.” 4) Prophecy is called revelation and inspiration announcing, etc.; this indicates not only the announcement made by God to the prophet, but also, indeed chiefly, the announcement made by the prophet himself to others, or prediction; by this reason also prophecy is distinguished from simple revelation. 5) Finally, prophecy is called revelation announcing with immovable truth, etc.; by these words is expressed the certainty required in prophecy. This imports: a) that prophecy cannot have what is false underlying it; for, as St. Thomas says (II-II, q. 171, a. 6), “prophecy is a certain knowledge impressed upon the intellect of the prophet from divine revelation by way of a certain teaching. But the truth of knowledge is the same in the disciple and in the teacher, because the knowledge of the learner is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher… Therefore there must be the same truth of prophetic knowledge and enunciation as there is of divine knowledge, under which it is impossible for falsehood to lie.” b) It imports certainty in the prophet concerning the truth of the things which he says, and concerning the revelation received about those same things. “Concerning those things, therefore,” says St. Thomas (loc. cit., a. 5), “which the prophet knows expressly through the spirit of prophecy, he has the greatest certainty, and he holds as certain that these things have been divinely revealed to him. Hence it is said in Jeremiah 26: In truth the Lord sent me to you, that I should speak in your ears all these words. Otherwise, if he himself did not have certainty about this, the faith which rests upon the sayings of the prophets would not be certain. And we can take a sign of prophetic certainty from this, that Abraham, admonished in prophetic vision, prepared himself to sacrifice his only-begotten son; which he would in no way have done unless he had been most certain of divine revelation.” c) It imports that the prediction itself, when the mode in which the matter is enunciated is inspected, be certain: both insofar as it is not vague and flexible in speech, and hence applicable to any event; and insofar as it is not conjectural, like that, for example, by which politicians announce and foresee human events, or physicians the health or death of a sick man. (1) To understand the mode of prophetic inspiration, it is pleasing here to copy out what St. Thomas has (II-II, q. 173, a. 2): “It must be said that, as Augustine says (book 12 On Genesis according to the Letter, q. at the beginning), prophetic knowledge pertains chiefly to the mind. But concerning the knowledge of the human mind two things must be considered, namely the reception or representation of things, and judgment concerning the things represented. Now when certain things are represented to the human mind according to certain species and according to the order of nature, first the species must be represented to sense, secondly to imagination, thirdly to the possible intellect, which is changed by the species of phantasms according to the illumination of the agent intellect. But in imagination there are not only the forms of sensible things according as they are received from sense, but they are transformed in diverse ways, either because of some bodily transformation, as happens in those sleeping and those mad, or also phantasms are disposed according to the command of reason in order to that which is to be understood. For just as from the diverse ordering of the same letters diverse understandings are received, so also, according to the diverse disposition of phantasms, diverse intelligible species result in the intellect. But the judgment of the human mind is made according to the power of intellectual light. “But through the gift of prophecy something is conferred upon the human mind above that which pertains to the natural faculty, as regards both: namely both as regards judgment, through the influx of intellectual light, and as regards reception or representation of things, which takes place through certain species. And as regards this second point, human teaching can be assimilated to prophetic revelation, but not as regards the first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple through signs of speech; but he cannot illuminate inwardly as God does. But of these two, the first is more principal in prophecy, because judgment is the completion of knowledge. And therefore, if there is divinely made for someone a representation of certain things through imaginary likenesses, as for Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, or even through corporeal likenesses, as for Belshazzar, such a person is not to be judged a prophet unless his mind is illuminated for judging; but such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy… But one will be a prophet if only his intellect is illuminated for judging even those things which were seen imaginatively by others, as is plain concerning Joseph, who explained Pharaoh’s dream. But, as Augustine says (loc. cit., in the middle), he is most of all a prophet who excels in both, namely that he sees in spirit the signifying likenesses of corporeal things and understands them with liveliness of mind.”
233. Having touched upon these things concerning the nature of prophecy, we now approach the explanation of the first of the two questions to be treated here, which is concerning the possibility of prophecy. As regards the false and imaginary notions which the rationalists invent, there is no leisure to call them back to the scales, both because their falsity is too evident of itself, and also because we shall vindicate the possibility and force of proving of prophecy as defined by us. See, if you wish, Perrone in the objection.
234. Therefore the question concerning the possibility of prophecy finally returns to this: 1) whether God can foreknow the things which are future; 2) whether, supposing divine foreknowledge of them, God can manifest or reveal those same things to others, by one of the aforesaid modes. Now we have already shown that revelation generally is possible; and therefore there is no need here to demonstrate again that God can reveal even future contingents. But as regards divine foreknowledge of future things, it is attacked from a twofold side. For they say first that future things cannot be known because they do not exist, and therefore cannot be the object of knowledge. This difficulty was seriously proposed, among others, by Voltaire (Essay on the Morals and Spirit of Nations, preliminary discourse), as though its solution were not found everywhere among the Scholastics. Secondly, they say that divine foreknowledge of future contingents utterly destroys the choice of human liberty. This difficulty also is most ancient: “Nothing,” wrote Cicero (On Divination, book 2, c. 7), “is so contrary to reason and constancy as fortune, so that it does not seem to me to fall even in God that He should know what is to be by chance and fortune. For if He knows, it will certainly happen; there is no fortune. But there is fortune. Therefore there is no presentiment of fortuitous things.” Compare St. Augustine (City of God, book 5, cc. 7 ff.).
235. Yet more recent rationalists have by no means feared to renew this difficulty. Kant (Anthropology, section 103) says: “All prophecies which announce the inevitable fact of some people, which nevertheless is brought on by the fault and therefore by the free choice of that people, are useless, because it will nevertheless not be permitted to escape fate; and they have in themselves this absurdity, that in such an absolute decree a certain mechanism of human liberty is conceived, which involves an intrinsic contradiction.” Rationalists everywhere repeat the same things, among whom Wegscheider (Institutions of Dogmatics, section 19) says: “Any prediction divinely disclosed, by which the inevitable fate of a man or of some people, which depends on some thing to be perpetrated by him, is expressly announced, is repugnant to the idea of the most holy and most benign God, fosters fatalism, and removes the moral liberty of men.” Behold the progress of reason through rationalism!
236. As regards the other question, which concerns the force of proving of prophecy, it will help to note these things in order. 1) Every prophecy of the true name is a true miracle, or a species of it, since it imports knowledge and prediction which exceeds every natural faculty and order; and in this is properly situated the notion of miracle, as we declared above. Nevertheless, not every miracle is prophecy, as is plain of itself. 2) Hence it is that the same force of proving belongs per se to prophecy as to the other miracles. For whoever knows with certainty that an event naturally hidden to the one predicting was predicted with certainty, and then contemplates in mind the outcome of that prediction, knows with certainty that something has been done by God, who cannot lead us into error as a false witness. 3) Nevertheless there is some difference here between miracle and prophecy. For the effect of a miracle immediately appears, and therefore immediately proves that for whose confirmation it is performed; thus if someone, in order to prove that he has been sent by God, heals a sick man by a word in an instant, raises a dead man, etc., he immediately proves his divine mission. But prophecy of itself does not prove except when it has been fulfilled by the event. The event, however, is often not fulfilled except after some period of time, sometimes a very long one. Thus it was with the prophecies of the Old Testament pertaining to the Messiah, and with the prophecy of Abraham regarding the return of the Jewish people from Egypt: “but in the fourth generation they shall return here.” 4) Therefore we must consider prophecy before a twofold difference of time: before that time, namely, in which it has already been fulfilled by the event, and before that time which precedes the fulfillment of the prophecy already issued. For the first time, as we said, prophecy has force of proving per se. For the other, however, it cannot have the same force unless from elsewhere it is established that that prediction was truly from God. Thus, for example, when the prophets of the old law showed themselves to be legates of God by their manner of living, by miracles, by other prophecies soon fulfilled; when afterward they had already been authentically received as God’s legates by the legitimate leaders of the Synagogue, they also conciliated faith for their prophecies before they were fulfilled by the event. This yielded to the greatest utility of the people of the Israelites. For the prophecies which they issued concerning Christ, the future Redeemer of the human race, stirred up the faith of the Jews, fostered their hope, and brought to them the greatest consolation in tribulations. And by this reason St. Thomas wrote (II-II, q. 171, a. 1): “But those things which are divinely revealed above human knowledge cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they exceed… Hence, thirdly, to prophecy belongs the operation of miracles, as a certain confirmation of prophetic enunciation. Hence it is said in the last chapter of Deuteronomy 34:10: ‘There has not arisen a prophet further in Israel like Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face in all signs and portents.’” 5) From these things it is plain that miracles and prophecies add force to one another. For if someone announces something future and, in confirmation of his prediction, works a miracle, for example recalls a dead man to life, the miracle in the case exists as a valid argument of the prophecy to be fulfilled in its time by the event. And likewise, if in confirmation of the same thing, for example of revealed doctrine, both miracles and prophecies are issued, when the prophecies are afterward fulfilled, a new argument arises both for the truth of the doctrine and for the truth of the miracles which had been performed in its confirmation.
237. Nevertheless, for now we consider that force of proving which is per se in prophecy, and therefore for that time in which it has already been fulfilled by the event. But since this force of proving of prophecy is demonstrated by almost the same moments of reasons which we gave for the force of proving of miracles, recalling the same things, we shall indicate only what is proper to prophecy.
238. Therefore, with these things set forth: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. X. 1. Right reason evidently shows that God knows future free things, and that He can communicate that knowledge to others. Therefore prophecy, which is the certain prediction of an event freely future, must be called possible. 2. But since certain knowledge of future free things belongs to God alone, prophecy uttered in confirmation of revealed doctrine supplies an inescapable argument of its divine origin.
239. The first part is proved. I. The infinite perfection of the divine nature certainly requires knowledge of infinite perfection. But if God did not know events freely future, His knowledge would not be infinitely perfect. Therefore. The minor is proved. Those events, when they are actually fulfilled in a difference of time, either are known by God, or they are not. If the first, then, since by supposition He was formerly ignorant of them, His knowledge will afterward be increased and perfected. But if the second, then God will always be ignorant of that event. Yet each is repugnant to the perfection of divine knowledge, and therefore absurd. Wherefore St. Augustine cleverly observes that in God there is rather knowledge than foreknowledge of future things; for the knowledge which He has concerning them is not conjectural or obscure, as ours is, but He clearly beholds all things as present to Himself, since whatever things are to exist in any difference of time are present to eternity. “If,” he says (To Simplician, book 2, q. 1, n. 2), “He has the things themselves in knowledge, they are not future to Him, but present; and by this it can now be called not foreknowledge, but only knowledge. But if with God those things which are future do not yet exist, but He anticipates them by knowing, then He perceives them twice, in one way according to foreknowledge of future things, and in another way according to knowledge of present things. Therefore something happens to the knowledge of God. This is most absurd and most false… But if even when those things which were foreknown as future have come, nothing new is added to the knowledge of God, but that foreknowledge will remain just as it was even before those things which were foreknown came, how is it now called foreknowledge when it is not of future things? For the things which He discerned as future are now present.”
240. II. Whatever has objective truth is necessarily an object of divine knowledge. But an event freely future has objective truth. Therefore. The minor is proved. A proposition concerning the present, enunciating a fact already existing, is true; therefore also a proposition enunciating the fact for the future, or for that difference of time in which it will be, will be true from eternity. If it is true that I am now speaking, it was antecedently true that I was going to speak. Therefore God knew from eternity this objective truth of my present free speech. Hence, as Viva rightly notes, “from the determination which an object has in the present, it comes about that a proposition antecedently enunciating the same object as future, or a proposition consequently enunciating it as past, is determinately true. Indeed, let us posit two propositions: ‘Antichrist will sin,’ ‘Antichrist will not sin.’ These two propositions are contradictory. For to exist and not to exist are formally contradictory; but to be, namely the sin of Antichrist, is had through existence; not to be, namely the sin of Antichrist, is had through non-existence. Therefore those two propositions are contradictory. But of two contradictories one is necessarily true, the other false. Therefore, if in time the sin of Antichrist truly exists, from eternity it is determinately true that he is going to sin.” (1) It can indeed be disputed among theologians from where future free things have determinate objective truth; but it is certain that they have it. Hence St. Thomas (II-II, q. 171, a. 8, ad 1) says: “the certainty of divine foreknowledge is borne upon them, future contingents, according as they are present and already determined to one”; and (ad 2): “divine foreknowledge regards future things according to two points: namely according as they are in themselves, insofar as it intuits them present, and according as they are in their causes… And although contingent future things, insofar as they are in themselves, are determined to one without the other being able to happen, nevertheless insofar as they are in their causes, they are not determined.” Therefore when the holy Doctor says (loc. cit., a. 3): “in themselves they are not knowable as future contingents, whose truth is not determined,” this must be understood, as Sylvius notes (in this place), insofar as “future contingents, as they are contingent future things, are not knowable in themselves, namely with certainty. For then they are considered as contingent future things when between the knowledge of the one knowing and the thing to happen there is found the order of past to future,” as he, St. Thomas, speaks in the aforesaid q. 2 De Veritate, art. 12, “that is, when the event of the thing is considered only as future, and by no means present to the one knowing.” Indeed, to deny the determinate objective truth of future contingents would be the same as to deny their infallible knowability before any intellect whatever; for knowledge is impossible without an object. Compare Sylvius (loc. cit.). It is pleasing to report other words of the same author (on I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 1): “Although,” he says, “it is unknown to men which part of the contradictories concerning a future contingent is determinately true, nevertheless in reality one part is determinately true, the other false, as not only Blessed Thomas teaches, but also Durandus, Richard, Scotus, and others; because one of them is actually conformed to the thing which it enunciates, the other deformed from it; that is, one enunciates that which truly is future, but the other the opposite. Therefore if it is true today that you write, from eternity it was true that you were going to write today.” He then reports the objection from Aristotle, at the end of book 1 Perihermenias, and adds: “What the Philosopher thought is ambiguous. Not a few judge that he erred, and we would altogether subscribe to them if it were established that he had asserted that, of contradictories concerning a future contingent, neither is determinately true, neither false.” He then shows that this is not established; and the things which seem contrary, “perhaps,” says Sylvius, “can be explained so that he wished to teach that of contradictories concerning a future contingent it is not necessary that one, which is determined or designated by us, be determinately true, and the other similarly designated be determinately false; as in propositions about the present or past one can be determined which is determinately true and the other which is determinately false.” We have set forth these things more fully in the treatise On Grace (n. 672), and they are treated professedly as in their proper place in the treatise On the One God, where divine knowledge is discussed. Yet I wished here to report the opinion and words of a grave theologian of another school.
241. Therefore it is plain that foreknowledge of a free future event does not require its physical existence from eternity, but only the logical, or objective, truth of that physical existence which it will have for its own difference of time. And it seems undeservedly attributed by some to St. Thomas that he taught that future things exist from eternity according to their real being. In reality (I Sent., dist. 28, q. 1, a. 5) he writes: “Before a thing is, it does not have being except in its causes”; and (On Power, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2): “From this very fact that being is attributed to a quiddity, not only being but the quiddity itself is said to be created, because before it has being, it is nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the Creator, where it is not a creature, but the creating essence”; and (I, q. 10, a. 3, ad 3): “According to this, true and necessary things are eternal, because they are in the eternal intellect, which is the divine intellect alone. Hence it does not follow that anything outside God is eternal.” Compare Sylvius (on I, q. 14, a. 13, question 1). Therefore, when it is objected: a free future thing does not exist, therefore it cannot be known, the response is easy. I distinguish the antecedent: it does not exist according to intentional being, I deny; according to real and physical being, either I concede, or I subdistinguish: it does not exist according to physical being from eternity, I concede; it does not exist according to that same being for its own difference of time, I deny.
242. III. The certain knowledge of free future things is chiefly denied to God because it would destroy human liberty. But this is altogether false. Therefore. The minor is proved. 1) Just as true liberty consists in immunity from a principle intrinsically and antecedently determining the will to one thing, so that which does not posit a principle of this sort by no means removes liberty. But divine knowledge of a free future thing posits no principle in the will intrinsically and antecedently determining it to one thing. Therefore it does not remove liberty. Wherefore it is more truly said that what God foresaw will certainly be, than that it will necessarily be. “If therefore,” says Origen (Against Celsus, book 2, c. 20), “that ‘altogether’ is understood as necessary, so that it signifies that a thing will come forth from necessity on the side of the cause, we do not grant it; but if only the fact is enunciated as certainly future, not the mode, which would be necessity on the side of the cause, we concede it.” we do not grant that the fact was thus future, if it is only enunciated that the fact is certainly future, but not the mode, which would be necessity on the side of the cause; this we concede.” 2) God intuits from eternity the future free determinations of man as if they were present; and therefore, as we heard from St. Augustine, this knowledge of God must be called knowledge rather than foreknowledge. But the present knowledge of an object now freely existing does not remove its liberty, just as it does not change its nature. Therefore. Hence Boethius (Consolation of Philosophy, book 5, prose 6) writes: “Why do you demand that those things which are surveyed by divine light become necessary, when not even men make necessary those things which they see? For does your intuition add any necessity to those things which you discern as present? By no means. But if there is a worthy comparison of divine and human present, as you see certain things in this temporal present of yours, so He discerns all things in His eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge does not change the nature and property of things, and He beholds as present with Himself such things as will one day come forth in time as future. Nor does He confuse the judgments of things; rather, by the intuition of His mind, He discerns things about to come both necessarily and not necessarily. Just as you, when you at the same time see a man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the sky, although you behold each at the same time, nevertheless distinguish them, and judge this one voluntary, that one necessary; so the divine intuition, looking upon all things, by no means disturbs the quality of things, present indeed with Himself, but future as regards the condition of time.” 3) If some priority is to be considered between a free future event and the knowledge which God has concerning it, it must be said that divine foreknowledge supposes it as the object to which it is terminated. “For,” says the Author of the Orthodox Questions (q. 53 among the works of St. Justin), “the future thing does not follow foreknowledge, but foreknowledge follows the future thing.” But that which presupposes a free act, or the free determination of the will, cannot determine the will antecedently to one thing, or cannot destroy liberty. Therefore divine foreknowledge of a free future event is not hostile to liberty.
243. Wherefore to more recent rationalists we can give the same answer which Origen in the third century gave to the gentile philosopher Celsus, who argued thus: “It was God who predicted Judas’s betrayal and the crimes of the Jews, and what had been predicted had altogether to happen.” Origen answers these things (loc. cit.): “Celsus thinks that what is predicted from some foreknowledge therefore happens because it was predicted; but we, conceding this by no means, say that the cause of the future thing is not in the one predicting because he predicted that it would be future; rather, the future thing, which was certainly going to be future even if it had not been predicted, furnishes the cause to the foreknowledge for foreannouncing it.” Compare the treatise On Grace (n. 671-701). Hence when they object: if God foresaw future free events, it is necessary that they happen, otherwise God could be deceived in His knowledge; one can answer: I distinguish. It is necessary that they happen by a necessity consequent upon the free determination of man, and hypothetical, taken from the hypothesis of the truth of the free determination, I concede; by a necessity antecedent to the free determination, and absolute, I deny. “There is,” says St. Anselm (Why God Became Man, book 2, c. 18), “a preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing is, and there is a following necessity, which the thing makes… Thus it is when I say that you speak of necessity when you are speaking.” Compare the treatise On Grace (n. 84).
244. And so, in order that prophecy be possible, two things are required and suffice: 1) that God can know future free things; and 2) that He can communicate knowledge of them to others. But the first is plain from the arguments just given, the second from the things disputed above (nn. 106 ff.). Therefore.
245. The second part is proved. I. Prophecy has no author except God; therefore if prophecy is issued in confirmation of revealed doctrine, it is God who confirms that doctrine. But God cannot confirm error or falsehood by His authority (n. 214 ff.). Therefore prophecy uttered in confirmation of revealed doctrine supplies an inescapable argument of its divine origin. By this indeed is shown the force of proving of prophecy as regards itself. The antecedent is proved. The author of prophecy cannot be anyone except one who can know future free things with certainty. But this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore. That it belongs to God has already been proved; that it truly belongs to no one besides Him is proved. 1) Divine revelation being set aside, future free events cannot be known except either in their causes or in themselves. But they cannot be known in their causes, since by the very fact that those causes are free, they can be borne to either alternative, and therefore the events to follow do not have determinate truth in them. Nor can they be known in themselves by any creature. For for knowledge of this sort there is required the power of immutable and eternal intellection, by reason of which future free events, according to objective truth, are as present. But power of intellection of this sort belongs to God alone. Therefore. Compare what we said in the treatise On God the Creator (n. 378 ff.; 387 ff.), where natural and certain knowledge of future things is denied even to the angels. 2) It has always been the persuasion of all peoples that prophecy cannot be except from God. Hence those who foretold future things were called divine, as if, as Isidore says (book 3, Etymologies), full of God. Likewise prophets were consulted as gods; and among them Apollo Pythius stood out, who was held as author of divination. Hence Valerius Maximus says: “The observance of all is bound up with some contact of religion, since it is believed to stand not by fortuitous motion, but by divine providence.” And Cicero (On Divination, book 1, c. 5) reports the saying received among the ancient wise men: “if indeed these things reciprocate in this way, that if there is divination, there are gods, and if there are gods, there is divination.” And (book 1, c. 1) he writes: “There is an old opinion, already drawn down from heroic times, and confirmed by the consensus both of the Roman people and of all nations, that a certain divination turns among men, which the Greeks call mantiken, that is, the presentiment and knowledge of future things. It is a certain magnificent and salutary thing, if there is any such thing; and by it mortal nature can come nearest to the power of the gods. And so, as in many other things we have done better than the Greeks, so our people drew the name of this most excellent thing from the gods, the Greeks, as Plato interprets, from frenzy, etc.”
246. You will say: Prophecies are ascribed to God in vain; for they can be explained through a more vivid imagination. For it is not difficult for a more vehement affection of the soul so to inflame the imagination that the soul imagines as present the things which it hopes or fears. Rationalists dream that this is especially open from the phenomena of animal magnetism. I answer: 1) “The soul,” says St. Thomas (II-II, q. 172, a. 1, ad 1), “when it is abstracted from corporeal things, is rendered more apt for perceiving the influx of spiritual substances, and also for perceiving subtle movements which are left in the human imagination from the impressions of natural causes. The soul is impeded from perceiving these when it has been occupied with sensible things. And therefore Gregory says, in the place cited in the argument, that ‘the soul, when it approaches death, foreknows certain future things by the subtlety of its nature,’ according as it perceives even slight impressions, and therefore in causes; or also it knows future things by angelic revelation, but not by its own power, because, as Augustine says, book 12 On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 13, at the beginning, ‘if this were so, then whenever it wished, it would have in its power to foreknow future things,’ which is plainly false.” 2) Hence the holy Doctor, comparing certain natural previsions with true prophecies, says (loc. cit.): “This foreknowledge of future things differs from the first, which is had from divine revelation, in two ways. First indeed, because the first can be of any events whatever and infallibly; but this foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about certain effects to which human experience can extend. Secondly, because the first prophecy is according to immovable truth; but not the second, for falsehood can underlie it. But the first foreknowledge properly pertains to prophecy, not the second, because, as was said above, in the preceding question, art. 1, prophetic knowledge is of those things which naturally exceed human knowledge. And therefore it must be said that prophecy simply so called cannot be from nature, but only from divine revelation.”
247. II. In order that prophecy have force of proving as regards us, it is required and sufficient that it can become known to us with certainty: 1) that it is true prophecy; 2) that the event was truly predicted and afterward fulfilled in deed; 3) that the prophecy was made in confirmation of revelation. But these three things can become known to us with certainty. The minor is proved as to the first part. For 1) prophecy taken most strictly, with which we are now dealing, has as object a future free thing which exceeds the knowledge of all created intellects. 2) Indeed, often a future free thing of this sort has relation to the supernatural order, and so depends on the free will of God that it cannot be known except by Him who intuits that will, or by one to whom God reveals it; for in natural causes there is rather a contrary disposition, as we said concerning miracles. 3) It can indeed happen that something is rashly or conjecturally predicted, and that the same thing sometimes happens. But if the events which are predicted are clear and determinate, if they are multiple, if some of them are even supernatural, if minute circumstances are designated, etc., and nevertheless all are fulfilled in deed, it is impossible that their prediction be attributed to conjectures or rashness. Recall, for example, the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament, which clearly announce that the Messiah is to be born from the progeny of the Patriarchs and from the Davidic stock; they designate the place of His birth, Bethlehem of Judah; the virginity of His mother; the time in which He will be born; the circumstances of His passion and death, etc. Who will say that all these things were rashly predicted and fulfilled by chance? (1) Hence it is plain how foolishly Rousseau wrote (Emile, vol. 3): “I say that no prophecies can have authority for me, because in order that they have it, it would be necessary… that it be demonstrated to me that this event could not have coincided fortuitously with the prophecy. For even if it were more precise, clearer, more luminous than an axiom of geometry, since the clarity of a prediction made at random does not make its fulfillment impossible, this fulfillment, when it takes place, proves nothing strictly for the one who predicted it.” The minor is proved as to the second part. It is plain of itself that it can be established for us, either through our own experience or through human testimony, that an event had first been determinately predicted and afterward fulfilled in deed. Wherefore Rousseau (loc. cit.) attacks the force of proving of prophecy altogether foolishly, because for this it would be required “that I had been a witness of the prophecy, that I were a witness of the event.” For prophecy is a certain fact; and therefore it is subject to the same laws as other facts. But certainty concerning other facts can be had even through the testimony of others. Therefore the first condition which Rousseau demands either is not necessary, or it removes the certainty of any fact which we do not see with our own eyes; and this would overthrow the certainty of all history. Moreover, the Apostles themselves immediately heard the prophecies of the resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ; likewise of the mission of the Holy Spirit, and also other prophecies, such as the denial of Peter, the overthrow of Jerusalem and the temple, etc.; and they themselves were also eyewitnesses of their fulfillment. The minor is proved as to the third part by the same arguments by which we showed the knowability of the relative truth of miracles.
248. You will say: There is no religion which does not have its prophecies; therefore an argument taken from prophecies in confirmation of supernatural revelation always turns out doubtful. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: which does not have its prophecies, true or fictitious, I concede; true, I deny. And so, as regards the oracles of the pagans, Perrone rightly notes: “For although we grant, with Fr. Baltus, S.J., against Van Dale and Fontenelle, which we judge truer on account of the open testimonies of the Fathers, that not all the oracles of paganism are to be ascribed to the frauds of priests, nevertheless we rightly affirm that characteristic notes are given which essentially distinguish the oracles of the pagans from the biblical ones.” For, to omit the rest, oracles and divinations were: 1) only singular utterances, connected among themselves by no reason; 2) concerning events immediately impending, and therefore subject to some conjecture, so that counsel might be given to certain persons or cities; 3) so ambiguous that whatever happened would seem to have been predicted. Thus Cicero writes concerning the most celebrated oracles of Apollo: “But now I come to you, holy Apollo… for Chrysippus filled a whole volume with your oracles, partly false, as I think, partly true by chance, as happens very often in every discourse, partly flexible in speech and obscure, so that the interpreter needs an interpreter, and the lot itself must be referred to lots, partly ambiguous and such as must be referred to dialectic.” Hence the opinion of those who ascribe all the oracles of paganism to the frauds of priests seems by no means to be approved. For this contradicts not only the authority of the ancient pagans, Plutarch excepted, but also that of the Fathers. Certainly St. Justin, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, St. Athanasius, Lactantius, and St. Augustine attributed several to demons, so that St. Augustine wrote: “The most talkative statues, once the demons were driven out by Christians, were silent like instruments without breath.” And Bertier, S.J., having weighed all things, concludes: “The veneration by which we ought to follow the Fathers of the Church does not allow us to doubt that certain prophecies were issued by the art of demons.” If there were any true prophecies among the pagans, namely predictions of events which could be known with certainty only by God revealing, as the Sibylline oracles seem to some, whatever may be the case concerning their historical truth, about which see Perrone in the notes if you wish, certainly they were not issued to confirm pagan superstition. Indeed, they rather serve for confirming the truth of Christian revelation. But predictions of this sort in confirmation of truth, as we have already heard from St. Thomas, can be made even by sinners and unbelievers, just as Balaam, an impious man, prophesied.
249. The investigation of the preceding disputation has brought the matter to this point, that the possibility, fittingness, indeed moral necessity, of revealed religion must be acknowledged by all. Moreover, we established criteria from which the truth of divine revelation can be judged. It would indeed be opportune immediately to add to these things those which place in clear light the offices of reason both as regards the obligation and method of investigating revelation, as regards the necessity of embracing it once found, and finally as regards the relation which ought to exist between reason and revelation. But since we dealt sufficiently with these things in the treatise On the Infused Virtues (disp. 4, arts. 7-9), it remains that, employing the established criteria, we turn our mind to inquiring into the fact itself of revelation, so that from this it may become known whether revealed religion exists, and what that religion is.
250. Nevertheless, it is useful from the beginning to open the way which we shall follow. For first, no one is unaware that there does not exist in the world only one religion which ascribes to itself divine origin through revelation. But it is by no means necessary to subject all and each to examination; for since one of them, namely the Christian, has been propagated through the whole world, shines with a more splendid light, and draws the eyes of all to itself, we undertake immediately to examine it. This is all the more so because if it is once established that it proceeds from God revealing, then it will be easy to reject, by the best right, all the remaining religions plainly opposed to it.
251. Nor, secondly, are we unaware that God manifested Himself to men from the beginning, and afterward through Moses and the Prophets instructed the Israelite people in the true religion; that revelation, whether primitive or of the Mosaic law, was a preparation for Christian revelation; and that Christ the Lord exists as the center and end of both those revelations. Hence from the very writings of the old Covenant the strongest arguments could be taken for proving the divinity of the Christian religion; for the prophecies, especially the Messianic ones, while they directly show the divine nature or mission of Christ, consequently also proclaim as divinely revealed the doctrine which He Himself announced. But what prevents us from entering upon this way, above all, is the special inquiry instituted on this matter in the treatise on the Incarnation, which is handed down in this same year in this University.
252. But thirdly, even when we restrict our investigation to those things which immediately and directly touch Christian revelation, a very broad field of speaking opens to us; for the works of the Apologists are innumerable, from which it would be permitted to derive arguments. But we must be mindful of the space and time which are granted to us, lest, unfolding one matter with too much breadth, we be forced to omit the rest, which are also necessary. Therefore we shall set forth the principal arguments by which the divine origin of the Christian religion is sufficiently demonstrated for our matter; and then we shall indicate the sources from which the doctrine of this religion must be drawn.