171. No one is unaware that the work of the rationalists is now widely diffused through the world, and that it tends to this: to extol our nature and reason in such a way that it thoroughly rejects whatever savors of the supernatural. Therefore no one will wonder if they strive with all force to deny not only the existence and knowability of miracle, but even its very possibility. For they know very well that, once miracles have been admitted, revelation and the supernatural order are invincibly proved by them. Hence it is that the Vatican Council (Dei Filius, can. 4 on ch. 3) most opportunely taught: “If anyone shall say that no miracles can be done, and therefore that all narratives concerning them, even those contained in Sacred Scripture, must be relegated among fables or myths; or that miracles can never be known with certainty, nor by them can the divine origin of the Christian religion be rightly proved, let him be anathema.” (1) The eminent Bishop of Poitiers writes excellently to the point (Third Instruction, etc., Works, vol. 5, p. 106 ff.): “The miracle, which belongs to the order of facts, is infinitely more probative for the multitudes than all other kinds of arguments; it is by it that a revealed religion imposes itself and becomes popular… Most revealed doctrines, presenting themselves as mysteries and being unable to have intrinsic evidence in their favor, the result is that, once the wonder-worker has disappeared, rational objections and pleas of non-receipt abound against the revealer. War, therefore, and war to the death, against miracle: such is the order-word, such is the watchword of the rationalist coalition. No reason to allege. Here is a first principle of which one has no right to ask the proof: miracle does not exist, miracle is not possible; whoever admits miracle becomes the deserter of reason, the accursed of philosophy, the excommunicated of criticism; there is an abyss between him and positive science.”
172. Other things which are contained in this definition we shall later set forth; in this article we institute the question concerning the possibility of miracle. Yet before we vindicate it, it is necessary to hand down the genuine notion of miracle itself. And so it should first be noted that those things which are called miracles are often also called powers, signs, portents, and prodigies. St. Thomas explains the difference of these names (II-II, q. 178, a. 1), saying: “In miracles two things can be attended to. One indeed is that which is done, which is something exceeding the faculty of nature; and according to this miracles are called powers. The other is that for the sake of which miracles are done, namely for manifesting something supernatural; and according to this they are commonly called signs. But on account of excellence they are called portents or prodigies, as if showing something from afar.”
173. But let us retain the common name of miracle; for the very force of the word serves the thing to be declared. For, as St. Thomas notes (Disputed Questions, On Miracles, a. 2): “The name miracle is taken from wondering. But two things concur for wonder: one of them is that the cause of that which we wonder at is hidden; the second is that, in that which we wonder at, there appears something by which the contrary of what we wonder at seems that it ought to be. Thus someone could wonder if he saw iron rise toward a magnet, being ignorant of the power of the magnet, since it seems that iron by natural motion ought to tend downward. But this happens in two ways: in one way in itself, in another way as regards us. As regards us indeed, when the cause of the effect at which we wonder is not hidden simply, but hidden to this or that person, nor is there in the thing at which we wonder a disposition repugnant to the effect at which we wonder according to the truth of the thing, but only according to the opinion of the one wondering. And from this it happens that what is wondrous or admirable to one person is not admirable to another; just as one knowing the power of the magnet by teaching or by experiment does not wonder at the aforesaid effect, but one ignorant of it wonders. “But in itself something is wondrous or admirable whose cause is simply hidden, and when in the thing there is a contrary disposition according to nature to the effect which appears; and these things can not only be called wondrous in act or wondrous in potency, but also miracles, as having in themselves the cause of wonder. But the most hidden and most remote cause from our senses is the divine cause, which operates most secretly in all things. And therefore those things which are done by divine power alone in those things in which there is a natural order to the contrary effect or to a contrary mode of doing are properly called miracles. But those things which nature does, yet are hidden from us or from some one of us, or even those things which God does and which are not naturally apt to be done otherwise than by God, cannot be called miracles, but only wondrous or admirable things.”
174. From these things it is easily plain that, according to the Angelic Doctor, two things are required for the notion of miracle: 1) that its cause be per se and simply hidden, and therefore be God, whose “essence,” as he says (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 101), “no man in the state of this life can grasp by intellect”; 2) that “in the thing” (q. 6, On Power, a. 2, corpus) “there be a contrary disposition according to nature to the effect which appears.” These two conditions must be accurately explained, so that the nature of miracle may be thoroughly known, and at the same time the chief difficulties against its possibility may be anticipated.
175. I. Beginning from the latter condition, according to which a miracle is “an effect outside the order of nature, or contrary to the disposition of the thing according to nature,” we first note the necessity of this condition. For when it is lacking, an effect exceeding the faculty of nature, and consequently having a cause hidden per se, namely God, is not called and is not a miracle. “Creation,” says St. Thomas (I, q. 105, a. 7, ad 1), “and the justification of the impious, although they are done by God alone, nevertheless, properly speaking, are not called miracles, because they are not naturally apt to be done through other causes; and so they do not happen outside the order of nature, since these things do not pertain to the order of nature.”
176. But in order that the character of this same condition may be seen, observe that order always means multiplicity reduced to unity; hence where there are many effects which are reduced to one cause, there some order is given. But there are many causes, each of which can have many effects; hence many orders also exist and can be considered. Therefore, as far as the present matter is concerned, we distinguish a threefold order: the particular order, or the order of some nature, to which some effect can be opposed; the universal order, or the order of all created things among themselves; and finally the most universal order, which is the order of all created things to the first cause, God. But it is better to hear St. Thomas, who says (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 98): “Consideration can be taken of a twofold order, of which one indeed depends on the first cause of all things, whence it also embraces all things; the other is particular, which depends on some created cause and contains those things which are subject to that cause. And this indeed is manifold, according to the diversity of causes which are found among creatures. Yet one of them is contained under another, just as one cause exists under another. Hence all particular orders must be contained by the universal order and descend from that order, which are found in things according as they depend on the first cause. An example of this sort can be considered in political matters. For all the domestics of one father of a family have a certain order among themselves, according as they are subject to him. Again, both the father of the family himself and all others who are of his city have a certain order among themselves and to the ruler of the city, who again with all who are in the kingdom has some order to the king.”
177. Therefore, when a miracle is called a work outside the order of nature, of which order must this be understood? Certainly it must not be understood of the particular order. “It does not suffice,” says St. Thomas (I, q. 110, a. 4), “for the notion of miracle if something happens outside the order of some particular nature; because thus, when someone throws a stone upward, he would perform a miracle, since this is outside the order of the nature of the stone. From this, therefore, something is said to be a miracle, because it happens outside the order of the whole of created nature.”
178. But the very order of the whole of created nature can, as we said, be considered either according as all created things are ordered among themselves, that is, the universal order, or according as they are ordered to God, that is, the most universal order. Which, then, is that order of the whole of nature outside of which a miracle is said to be? It will perhaps help to propose the question itself a little differently, so that the whole doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter may be understood more clearly.
179. In the universal order there can be considered: 1) the ordered things themselves; 2) the principle from which that order proceeds, which is nothing other than divine preordination embracing directing knowledge, commanding will, and goodness, to which all things are ultimately directed. “But the universal order,” says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 98), “according to which all things are ordered from divine providence, we can consider in two ways, namely as to the things which are subject to the order, and as to the reason of the order, which depends on the principle of the order… But if we consider the aforesaid order as to the reason depending on the principle… that order proceeds, as was said (c. 97), from the knowledge and will of God ordering all things to His goodness as to an end.” Hence when a miracle is called a work “outside the order of the whole of nature,” it can be compared either with divine preordination or with the natural things themselves which are ordered by it; and therefore a twofold question arises: 1) is a miracle a work outside divine preordination, or a work which God did not preordain, outside the most universal order? 2) is it a work outside natural things which are subject to divine preordination, or outside the order implanted in them, outside the universal order?
180. Now it is evident that a miracle is not said to be “outside the order of the whole of nature” in such a way that it is outside divine preordination. For “it is not possible,” says St. Thomas (cited c. 98), “that God should do anything which is not willed by Him, since creatures do not proceed from Him naturally, but through will, as has been shown (book 2, c. 23). Nor is it possible that anything should be done by Him which is not comprehended by His knowledge, since will cannot be except of something known. Nor again is it possible that He should do anything in creatures which is not ordered to His goodness as to an end, since His goodness is the proper object of His will. Likewise, since God is altogether immutable, it is impossible that He should will something which He had not willed before, or should begin anew to know something, or should order it to His goodness. Therefore God can do nothing which does not fall under the order of His providence, just as He cannot do anything which is not subject to His operation.”
181. From this theory of St. Thomas, an old objection against the possibility of miracle, repeated by more recent unbelievers, is overthrown from the foundation. Namely, they say: if a miracle could happen, since it is “outside the order of the whole of nature,” something would have escaped the divine knowledge directing that order, and the divine will, which willed the same order, would be changed, etc. “God,” says St. Thomas (On Power, q. 6, a. 1, ad 6), “does not act against natural reasons by a changeable will; for God from eternity foresaw and willed that He would do what He does in time. Therefore He so instituted the course of nature that nevertheless it was preordained in His eternal will that He would sometimes do something outside that course.” And (ibid., ad 12): “The divine art does not explain its whole self in the production of creatures, and therefore according to His art He can operate something in another way than the course of nature has. Hence it does not follow that if He can act against the course of nature, He can act against His own art. For even a human artisan can make another artifact by his art in a contrary mode from that in which he made it before.”
182. Wherefore it remains that a miracle is called a work “outside the order of the whole of nature” insofar as it is outside nature and the order implanted in it, that is, outside the universal order. Since, therefore, the notion of miracle is situated in this, let it be noted: 1) by the name of nature here is signified “the substance of a created thing insofar as it is a suitable principle of its own operations”; 2) if the complex of all created substances is taken, there is had that which is called universal nature; 3) since in the operation of created substances there is a certain constancy, the powers of worldly things can be conceived as tempered by certain norms, so that they constantly operate in the same mode. These norms, and, in the concrete, the powers themselves insofar as they are conceived as affected by these norms, are called laws of nature. 4) But the constant mode of these actions, and one directed toward the proposed end, is called the order of nature. 5) Finally, the succession of effects constantly arising from the powers of creatures is called the course of nature. Since these three mutually imply one another, they are usually used indiscriminately (Liberatore, Cosmology, c. 4, a. 1). Hence a miracle is called “outside the order of the whole of nature” either because it surpasses the powers of created substances, that is, of universal nature, or because there is no power in nature for producing such an effect; or because, although it does not surpass them, that is, although there are powers capable of producing some effect, nevertheless it passes beyond their laws and mode of operating, that is, the order of nature.
183. And from these things one can already gather how it is conceived that God works a miracle, although it is not necessary to assign some determinate mode. For God, who is of infinite power, can either 1) produce an effect for producing which there is no power in nature; or 2) produce an effect which the powers of nature can produce, but without them; or 3) contain the powers of natural things lest they do what they are naturally apt to do. For example, He can prevent fire from burning; this third thing He can effect either a) by withdrawing concurrence, or b) by attributing to the agent a transient contrary activity which frustrates the effect of its proper activity, etc. But these things will become clearer from what will soon be said concerning the division of miracle.
184. To complete this doctrine, one thing can still be asked: whether a miracle can be called a work against nature? In order to answer this question, we observe that something can be said to be against nature either simply or in a certain respect, according as it is repugnant to every, even the most universal, inclination of nature, or only to some inclination of nature. To this latter belongs the connection and dependence of the operation of each creature both with respect to itself and with respect to other created causes; just as to the most universal inclination belongs the subjection and all-sided dependence of creatures upon God.
185. Now it is sufficiently established from what has been said that a miracle is against nature in a certain respect; but in no way can it be called simply against nature. For 1) that is not simply against nature for which nature is in some way in potency. But with respect to God all creatures are in obediental potency, so that they may be moved without their proper causes, or outside the order of their proper causes. Therefore. 2) Hence St. Thomas teaches (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 100): “In corporeal agents also this is seen, that the movements which are in these lower bodies from the impression of higher bodies are not violent nor against nature, although they do not seem fitting to the natural motion which the lower body has according to the property of its form. For we do not say that the ebb and flow of the sea is a violent motion, since it is from the impression of a heavenly body, although the natural motion of water is only toward one part, namely toward the middle, or lowest place. Much more, therefore, whatever is done by God in any creature cannot be called violent or against nature.”
186. And from this the solution is plain to the difficulty of those who say: God can do nothing against the moral order; therefore neither outside or against the physical order. St. Thomas had already answered (On Power, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3), saying: “Although God can act against the order which is of one creature to another, which is, as it were, of a particular nature with respect to Him, nevertheless He cannot act against the order of the creature to Himself. But the justice of man consists principally in the due order of man to God. Hence God cannot act against the order of justice. But the course of nature is according to the order of one creature to another, and therefore God can act against the course of nature.”
187. II. By these things, then, one of the two conditions required for a miracle has been sufficiently explained; now we must deal with the other, according to which, as we said, the cause of a miracle must be hidden. Here it is asked whether such a hidden cause is God alone, or whether it can also be an angel; or whether a miracle exceeds the faculty of the whole of sensible nature, or of the whole of nature simply, so that spirits also are included. This question could seem superfluous, after we have heard from St. Thomas that the cause of a miracle is hidden per se, and therefore is none other than God. Yet it is useful to examine it, both because the nature of miracle will be better understood, and especially because it greatly serves for establishing the force of miracles for proving. For “we suppose,” says Suarez (On Religion, t. 1, book 2, c. 16, n. 2), “that every power and ability of operating ad extra, or by transient and corporeal action, which is natural to angels, remained entire in demons after sin, because natural things were not diminished in the angels by sin, much less lost, as is the axiom of the theologians with St. Thomas (I, q. 64, art. 4), and it is taken from Dionysius (ch. 4, On the Divine Names).”
188. In order to embrace briefly the many things which are usually disputed on this matter, we observe: 1) Here it is properly asked whether angels are, or can be, the principal efficient cause of a miracle by their natural power. For if the question concerns ministerial or impetratory causality, “it must be said,” says St. Thomas (I, q. 110, a. 4), “that some angels are said to do miracles either because God does miracles at their desire, just as holy men also are said to do miracles, or because they exhibit some ministry in the miracles which are done, by gathering dust in the common resurrection, or by doing something of this kind.” We observe: 2) in a miracle there can be distinguished the truth of the work and the truth of the miracle. “It must be known,” says St. Thomas (I, q. 114, a. 4), “that although works of demons of this sort, which seem to us miracles, do not attain to the true notion of miracle, nevertheless they are sometimes true things; just as the magicians of Pharaoh, by the power of demons, made true serpents and frogs.” Hence it could be asked whether angels can do miracles a) true as regards the truth of the work, b) true as regards the truth of the miracle. (1) Explaining these same things more fully, the holy Doctor (On Power, q. 6, a. 4) teaches that angels can be ministers of God in performing miracles in several ways: “in one way by obtaining through prayers… Another way is according as angels dispose matter by their natural power for this, that a miracle be done; just as it is said that in the resurrection they will gather the dust of the dead, which will be brought back to life by divine power… A third way is that they also operate something by co-operating… But how this can be must be considered. It is established that God works miracles by command alone. But we see that the divine command comes to lower rational spirits, namely human spirits, by means of higher ones, namely angels, as appears in the giving of the old law. And in this way, through angelic or human spirits, the divine command can come to corporeal creatures, so that through them the divine precept may in some way be presented to nature; and thus human or angelic spirits act in some way as an instrument of divine power for the perfection of a miracle… Nor is it marvelous if in this way God uses a spiritual creature instrumentally for producing wonderful effects in corporeal nature, since He also uses corporeal nature instrumentally for the justification of spirits, as is plain in the sacraments.”
189. Now two things here are first certain among all. The first is this: there are some miracles which angels cannot effect even as regards the truth of the work. For, as St. Thomas teaches (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 102): “Every creature in its action requires some subject upon which it may act; for it belongs to God alone to make something from nothing, as was shown above (book 1, c. 16). But nothing which requires a subject in its action can act except upon those things for which that subject is in potency; for an agent operates upon some subject in order to bring it from potency into act. Therefore no creature, just as it cannot create, so also cannot act in some thing except that which is in the potency of that thing. But many miracles are done by divine power which are not in the potency of that thing, as that a dead man should revive.” Wherefore, as the same holy Doctor notes (I, q. 114, a. 4, ad 2), “if sometimes something of this sort seems to be done by the operation of demons, this is not according to the truth of the thing, but only according to appearance. This can happen in two ways: in one way from within, according as a demon can change the fantasy of a man, and also the bodily senses, so that something appears otherwise than it is… In another way from without. For since he can form a body from air of whatever form and figure, so that, assuming it, he may appear visibly in it, by the same reason he can place around any thing whatever corporeal form, so that it may be seen in that species.”
190. It is also conceded by all that angels can do some miracles which are true as regards the truth of the work. They explain this in two ways. 1) Through local motion, that is, either by transferring things very quickly from one place into another; or by raising a man or other objects on high, so that he seems to fly; or by withdrawing things from the sight of men, rendering them invisible; or by causing statues and pictures to move, walk, speak, etc. For they themselves move these things and speak through them, etc. 2) By applying active things to passive things. “They can,” says St. Thomas (I, q. 114, a. 4), “employ certain seeds which are found in the elements of the world for completing effects of this sort, as Augustine says, On the Trinity, book 3, c. 8. And therefore it must be said that all transformations of corporeal things which can be done through some natural powers, to which the aforesaid seeds pertain, can be done through the operation of demons, these seeds having been applied.” Compare what we said in the treatise On God the Creator (n. 466 ff.).
191. Therefore it only remains to inquire whether extraordinary effects of this sort, which angels can produce as regards the truth of the work, if they are produced by them, also have the truth of miracle. Benedict XIV (On the Canonization of Saints, book 4, part 1, c. 3, n. 13) answers thus: “But if anyone wished from the things brought forward thus far to infer that miracles exceeding the powers and faculty of visible and corporeal nature can be done by a demon through his natural power, he would openly be mistaken; since it is certainly one thing that God sometimes has used and can use the work of a demon in the performance of miracles, another thing that a demon does miracles. For according to our mode of speaking and common understanding, he is said to do a miracle who effects some extraordinary work for the confirmation of the truth which he preaches, or he at whose intercession something wondrous is done by God, so that his holiness may be established among men.”
192. But here the ontological truth of miracle is properly considered; and concerning it St. Thomas teaches (I, q. 114, a. 4): “If miracle is taken properly, demons cannot do miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone; because miracle is properly called that which is done outside the order of the whole of nature, under which order every created power is contained. Yet sometimes that is called a miracle broadly which exceeds human faculty and consideration; and thus demons can do miracles, namely things which men wonder at, insofar as they exceed their faculty and knowledge.” And (q. 110, a. 4, ad 2) he had taught: “Miracles, speaking simply, are said to occur, as was said in the body of the article, when some things are done outside the order of the whole of created nature. But because not every power of created nature is known to us, therefore when something is done outside the order of created nature known to us, by a created power unknown to us, it is a miracle as regards us. Thus, therefore, when demons do something by their natural power, they are called miracles not simply, but as regards us.” Compare also Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 102.
193. But to one asking why the same effects, which have truth of the work, whether done by God or by angels, nevertheless do not have truth of miracle if they are done by angels through their own power, although they have it if they are done by God, Suarez responds by explaining the doctrine of St. Thomas (On Angels, book 4, c. 39, n. 9): “Because angels can do nothing without the intervention and preparation of natural causes. First, because they always require pre-existing matter, since they can make nothing from nothing. Next, the matter itself does not obey them at a nod, as we also said with Augustine, On the Trinity, book 3, c. 8. Hence they can only transform matter according to some natural capacity, but not according to obediental potency. And finally, if this transformation is toward a form beyond local motion, they cannot make it by themselves, as by their own power, but only by applying an agent which has natural power for introducing such a form.” And (n. 10): “In this also it must be considered that in the present discussion we are speaking of sensible works which appear miraculous to men; concerning these it can and must be conceded that, for them to be true miracles, it is necessary and sufficient that they surpass every natural power of natural and corporeal causes. For from this it is evidently concluded that they are also above every angelic power, since this power cannot effect sensible effects of this sort except by applying natural and corporeal active causes to passive ones.” And (n. 11): “I concede that not all true miracles are equal simply, because some are nobler than others, either on the side of the effect or on the side of the mode. Nevertheless, in this all agree, and have a certain equality or univocity, that all are above the whole order of natural causes, and above the natural capacity of matter, or at least above the connatural mode in which such an effect of itself demands to be made. Hence sudden health, if it is done only by the swift application of natural causes, will not be truly miraculous; yet if it is done by the sole efficacy of a higher cause, or by command alone, or if the healing is so sudden that natural causes, even sufficiently applied, would not suffice by natural power to dispose the matter so suddenly, then the health will be truly miraculous. The same must be said of sudden rain and other similar works.” I wished to copy out these testimonies of the distinguished Doctor because they prove that by some, after Benedict XIV (op. and loc. cit., c. 1, n. 17), his doctrine on this matter is not faithfully reported.
194. Therefore the true definition of miracle is: “an effect transcending the faculty and order of the whole of created nature”; or, as St. Thomas speaks (I, q. 105, a. 7; Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 101): “a work which is done divinely outside the commonly observed order.” But just as the things set forth thus far clearly explain this true notion of miracle, so they exclude false notions, especially those proposed by Locke, Clarke, etc. There is no leisure here to report and refute these one by one, since we are going to demonstrate not the possibility and force of proving of miracle taken in any way whatever, but of miracle as defined by us. See, if you wish, Hooke (On True Religion, diss. 2, c. 1).
195. III. Thus far concerning the nature of miracle. Now as regards the divisions of miracles, St. Thomas first notes (I, q. 105, a. 8) “that nothing can be called a miracle by comparison with divine power; because whatever has been done, compared with divine power, is least, according to that saying of Isaiah 40:15: ‘Behold the nations are reputed as a drop of a bucket, and as the moment of a balance.’ But something is called a miracle by comparison with the faculty of nature, which it exceeds. And therefore, according as it more exceeds the faculty of nature, according to this it is called a greater miracle.”
196. Then he proposes (loc. cit.) the division of miracles according as a miracle is done by a cause per se hidden and thus exceeds the faculty of nature. “But something exceeds the faculty of nature in three ways. In one way as to the substance of the fact, as that two bodies be together… or that a human body be glorified; which no nature can do; and these hold the highest degree among miracles. Secondly, something exceeds the faculty of nature not as to that which is done, but as to that in which it is done, as the raising of the dead and the illumination of the blind, and similar things. For nature can cause life, but not in a dead man; and it can furnish sight, but not in a blind man; and these hold the second place among miracles. In the third way something exceeds the faculty of nature as to the mode and order of doing; as when someone is suddenly cured from fever by divine power without treatment and the customary process of nature in such matters; and when immediately the air by divine power is condensed into rains without natural causes, as was done at the prayers of Samuel and Elijah (1 Kings 12 and 2 Kings 18); and things of this sort hold the lowest place among miracles.”
197. The holy Doctor also hands down another division of miracle, according as a miracle is outside the order of the whole of nature, saying: (Disputed Questions, q. On Miracles, art. 2, ad 3): “Concerning those things which God does miraculously, such a distinction is usually applied, so that some are said to be done above nature, some against nature, some outside nature. Above nature indeed, insofar as nature can in no way attain to that effect which God does; and this happens in two ways, either because the form itself introduced by God can in no way be introduced by nature, as the form of glory, which God will introduce into the bodies of the blessed, and also as the Incarnation of the Word; or because, although it can introduce such a form into some matter, nevertheless not into this matter, as nature is able to cause life, but that nature cause life in this dead man, this it cannot do. It is said to be against nature when in nature there remains a contrary disposition to the effect which God does, as when He preserved the boys unharmed in the furnace, with the power of burning remaining in the fire, and when the water of the Jordan stood still, with gravity remaining in it; and it is similar that a virgin gave birth. But God is said to do something outside nature when He produces an effect which nature can produce, yet in that mode in which nature cannot produce it.”
198. Therefore, with these things set forth beforehand: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. VIII. Having regard both to the order existing in things and to the divine attributes, miracles, or “events exceeding the faculty and customary order of the whole of created nature,” must be said to involve no repugnance; indeed, the perfection of divine power, even as it becomes known by the natural light, wholly claims for itself the power of performing them.
199. I. It is proved from the side of the order existing in things. Some repugnance would be detected in miracle from the side of the order outside of which it is, insofar as that order were necessary. But the universal order, outside of which a miracle is, is not necessary, but altogether contingent. Therefore, from the side of the order implanted in things, there is no repugnance that a miracle be done. The minor is proved. 1) That order certainly cannot be called necessary absolutely, that is, with no hypothesis made. For order cannot be understood without the substances or things in which it exists; nor can it surpass their nature and perfection, since it is called and is natural. But all things which are in the world exist not necessarily but contingently. Therefore the order implanted in them, considered absolutely, must be contingent. 2) Nor can the same order be called necessary on the hypothesis of the existence of those things in which it exists. For only that is altogether necessary, on the hypothesis of the existence of some thing, which pertains to its essence; just as, on the hypothesis that man exists, it is impossible that he be anything other than a rational animal. But the order implanted in things, or the physical laws by which the world is governed, do not pertain to the essences of things existing in the world. Therefore, on the hypothesis of the existence of the things which are in the world, the necessity of the order which exists in them does not follow. Suppose, I ask, that a river changes its course and flows back toward its source; that the motion of the earth around its axis is directed not from east to west, but from west to east; that the motion of the planets is completed with greater or lesser speed than it is now completed, and other things of this sort. Would the essence of the river, of the earth, of the planets, of the world, be so changed that these could no longer be conceived? 3) Nor can the universal order be called necessary on the hypothesis of its own existence, or while it remains, so that if a rare change should happen, by that very fact the order would be destroyed. For a) it is indeed repugnant to an already constituted order that it be changed by one of those who are subject to the same order; but not that it be changed by him who constituted it and is above it. The reason is evident: a change of the order made by one who is subject to it is, as it were, a transgression of it, and therefore repugnant to it; but made by him who constituted the order and is above it, it is a legitimate derogation, which certainly is not repugnant, as can be seen in laws properly so called. But according to us, a miracle is not done except by God, who constituted the universal order and is above it. Therefore. “God,” says St. Thomas (I, q. 105, a. 6), “can act outside the order of things, because He Himself is not subject to the order of second causes, but such an order is subject to Him as proceeding from Him, not through necessity of nature, but through the choice of will. For He could have instituted another order of things. Hence He can act outside this instituted order when He has willed.” Certainly man can throw a stone upward because he is above the particular order of the stone; why will God, who is above universal nature, not be able to do something which is outside the order of the whole of nature? b) We come to the same conclusion if we consider the concept of a law of nature. For it is not of the essence of law that in no case be there a derogation from it, so that derogation is abrogation or destruction of the law itself, but that it have order to its proper effects and be observed in most cases. But once a miracle is posited, the physical laws are still observed in most cases, nor does a miracle remove the order of those laws to their effects. Therefore. “Although God,” says St. Thomas (On Power, q. 6, a. 1, ad 20), “produces some effect outside the action of a natural cause, nevertheless He does not remove the order of the cause to its effect; hence also in the fire of the furnace there remained the order to burning, although it did not burn the three boys in the furnace.” 4) In order that these things may be further clarified and confirmed, observe that a miracle: a) is sometimes properly above the laws of the whole of nature, insofar as some effect is produced for producing which there is no power in nature. This is certainly possible, unless we wish to say that the infinite power of God can do nothing more than the finite power of created things. b) Sometimes a miracle is properly outside the laws of nature, insofar as some effect is produced for producing which there is sufficient power in nature, but it is produced either without that power or without preserving its mode of acting, as if something were done in an instant which nature does over a long time. This also is evidently possible, unless we wish to say either that God cannot effect what His creature effects, or that an agent through the command of will cannot immediately effect what he wills. c) Sometimes a miracle is properly against the laws of nature, insofar as, for example, the effect is impeded which, according to the ordinary course, nature ought to produce. But this also is easily shown to be possible. For once some essence is posited, only this is absolutely necessary: namely, that it have the demand for such powers, but not that it actually have them, if the powers themselves are really distinguished from it; and a fortiori it is not absolutely necessary that those same powers exercise their power actually. For in order that they proceed into act certain conditions are required, which are contingent; and therefore, when these are removed, the effect can be lacking, while the substances and their powers remain intact. Therefore, in whatever way miracle is considered, from the side of the order and laws of nature, nothing prevents it from being able to be performed.
200. From the side of God, the possibility of miracle is demonstrated still more easily. For it is not repugnant: 1) to the perfection of divine knowledge, as though God had not foreseen the suspension of order which is had through miracle; nor to the immutability of the divine will, as though God afterwards wills what He did not will before. For we said (n. 180) that a miracle does not happen outside divine preordination. 2) Nor is it repugnant to God’s justice and holiness, as though by derogating from the order of nature God removes the order of created things to Himself; for we saw that this order, certainly essential, always remains (n. 185). Nor is it repugnant to God’s wisdom, as though God, by performing a miracle, corrects a defect of the laws of nature, just as a human artisan is sometimes forced to correct the defects of a machine constructed by him. For the laws of nature are perfect in their own order, and plainly suffice for manifesting the divine perfections in that degree which God intends. Hence the end of miracles is not the preservation of the laws and order of nature, as we shall immediately say. But these are all the things which, from the side of God, the adversaries object against the possibility of miracle. It is no wonder, therefore, if Bayle himself (Dictionary, art. Spinoza, note B) pronounced the difficulties of Spinoza and others against the possibility of miracle to be nothing but a play on words.
201. III. Explaining these things, St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 99) writes excellently: “For the order implanted in things by God is according to that which usually happens in things, but not everywhere, or according to that which is always. For many natural causes produce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; for sometimes, although in fewer cases, it happens otherwise, either because of a defect in the power of the agent, or because of the indisposition of matter, or because of some stronger agent, as when nature generates a sixth finger in a man. But not on account of this does the order of providence fail or change; for this very thing, that the natural order instituted according to those things which happen usually sometimes fails, is subject to divine providence. Therefore, if through some created power it can happen that the natural order is changed from that which is usual to that which is rare, without change of divine providence, much more can divine power sometimes do something, without prejudice to its providence, outside the order implanted by God in natural things. For this very thing sometimes serves for the manifestation of His power; for in no way can it be better manifested that all nature is subject to the divine will than from this, that sometimes He Himself operates something outside the order of nature. From this it is plain that the order of things proceeded from Him, and not through necessity of nature, but through free will. “Nor should this reason be reputed frivolous, that God does something in nature for this purpose, that He may manifest Himself to human minds, since above (c. 17) it was shown that all corporeal creatures are ordered to intellectual nature in some way as to an end. But the end of intellectual nature itself is divine knowledge, as was shown above. Therefore it is not marvelous if, in order to furnish knowledge of God to intellectual nature, some change is made in corporeal substance.” (1) St. Augustine had already written (On John, tract. 24, n. 1): “The miracles which the Lord Jesus Christ did are indeed divine works, and from visible things they admonish the human mind to understand God. For because He is not such a substance as can be seen by the eyes, and His miracles by which He rules the whole world and administers all nature have grown cheap by constant occurrence, so that almost no one deigns to attend to the marvelous and stupendous works of God in any grain of seed whatever, according to His mercy He reserved for Himself certain things which He would do at an opportune time outside the usual course and order of nature, so that those to whom daily things had grown cheap might be astonished by seeing things not greater, but unusual. For the governance of the whole world is a greater miracle than the feeding of thousands of men from five loaves; and yet no one wonders at the former; men wonder at the latter, not because it is greater, but because it is rare.”
202. IV. So far is miracle from conflicting with the divine attributes, that the infinite perfection of God altogether claims for itself the power of performing it. We have sufficiently indicated this in the preceding arguments, but now it is useful to establish it directly. Indeed: 1) The divine intellect claims this power for itself. For since the divine intellect is infinite, it is not confined to this order which we perceive in things; otherwise, since this order is finite, that intellect also would be finite. Hence God knows many other orders. “The order of things,” says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 99), “flows forth from God into things according as it has been thought beforehand in His intellect, just as we see in human affairs that the ruler of a city imposes upon all an order premeditated within himself. But the divine intellect is not determined to this order from necessity, as though it could understand no other order, since even we can apprehend another order by the intellect. For it can be understood by us that God formed man from the earth without seed. Therefore God can operate, outside inferior causes, the effect proper to those causes.” 2) Again, divine wisdom claims this power for itself. For “the order,” says St. Thomas (I, q. 25, a. 5), “implanted in things by divine wisdom, in which the notion of justice consists, as was said above (q. 21, a. 2), does not equal divine wisdom, so that divine wisdom would be limited to this order. But it is manifest that the whole reason of the order which a wise maker imposes on things made by him is taken from the end. Therefore, when the end is proportioned to the things made for the sake of the end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to some determinate order. But divine goodness is an end disproportionately exceeding created things. Hence divine wisdom is not determined to some order of things such that another course of things could not flow forth. Hence it must be said simply that God can do other things than those which He does.” 3) Divine goodness claims the same power for itself. For, “although the order implanted in things by divine providence represents divine goodness in its own way,” says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 99), “nevertheless it does not represent it perfectly, since the goodness of the creature does not reach equality with divine goodness. But what is not perfectly represented by some copy can again, besides this, be represented in another way. But the representation of divine goodness in things is the end of the production of things by God, as was shown above (c. 20). Therefore the divine will is not determined to this order of causes and effects, so that it could not will to produce some effect in lower things immediately without other causes.” 4) Divine power claims it for itself. For a) the power of God is greater than the power of nature, since the latter is finite and the former infinite. But unless God could produce some effect exceeding the powers of nature, there would not be greater power in Him than there is in nature. Therefore He can produce it. But, as we said and proved, by the name of miracle we understand an effect exceeding the powers and order of the whole of nature. Therefore God can produce it. as we said and proved, by the name of miracle we understand an effect exceeding the powers and order of the whole of nature. Therefore God can produce it. b) “The higher some active power is,” says St. Thomas (On Power, q. 6, a. 1, ad 18), “the more it can produce the same thing into a higher effect… and from this it is that some thing is in potency to diverse things according to its relation to diverse agents. Hence nothing prevents created nature from being in potency to some things to be done by divine power which an inferior power cannot do. And this is called the potency of obedience, according to which any creature obeys the Creator.” c) An agent not operating by necessity of nature can immediately produce the proper effect of an inferior subordinated agent, just as a skilled sculptor can produce the statues of one less skilled. But God, acting ad extra, does not operate by necessity of nature, and all created causes are subordinated to Him. Therefore God can immediately, that is, without those causes, produce their proper effects. But this is a miracle. “For in this,” St. Thomas teaches (Contra Gentiles, book 3, n. 49), “an agent according to necessity of nature differs from an agent according to will: that from an agent according to necessity of nature an effect cannot follow except according to the mode of the active power. Hence an agent which is of the greatest power cannot immediately produce some small effect, but produces an effect proportioned to its own power; in which, however, sometimes a lesser power than in the cause is found, and thus through many intermediaries some small effect proceeds, tending from the supreme cause. But in an agent through will it is not so; for an agent through will can at once, without an intermediary, produce any effect whatever which does not exceed its power. For the most perfect artisan can make a work such as an imperfect artisan makes. But God operates through will, and not through necessity of nature, as was shown above (book 1, c. 23). Therefore He can immediately, without second causes, make the lesser effects which are made through inferior causes.”