53. The things which we have disputed thus far sufficiently show the necessity of some religion, whether in relation to the individual man or to society; and therefore they sufficiently overthrow the impious system concerning absolute indifference in religious matters. But, as we indicated (n. 16), besides the absolute indifferentists there are others, milder, who are also customarily called relative indifferentists; against these we now begin to fight. Their error consists in this: although they acknowledge the necessity of some worship toward God, “nevertheless they hold that various religions are equally good and useful, and that in any one of them man can be saved.” The roots of this error seem chiefly to be: 1) rationalism, which, too greatly extolling the force and rights of each man’s private reason, attributes to it a sort of supreme judgment concerning the truth or falsity of religion; but since men differ greatly among themselves, they reduce religion to a kind of system. - 2) Ignorance or obstinate denial of the true foundation of the obligation of professing religion; once this has been removed, they teach that religion must be accommodated to the character of the climate and to the customs of peoples. Therefore one and the same religion cannot be everywhere and always.
54. A twofold relative indifferentism must be distinguished: one universal, the other particular. The first includes all religions which are in the world, and proclaims them equally good and useful for eternal salvation. The other admits that some religion in the world is true and that the others are false; but because any given religion has its own sects, into which it is divided, it judges that there is no essential distinction between the religion and its sects. Thus one who admits the Christian religion as true, by force of indifferentism, judges that each person can be saved in his own sect, or that all Christian sects are useful for obtaining eternal salvation. The refutation of particular indifferentism is sought both from what was said in the treatise On the Virtues (disp. 2, a. 7; and disp. 4, a. 3), and from what must be said when the discussion will be about the Church; therefore we scarcely touch here upon those things which directly attack it.
55. Moreover, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX often denounced this deadly error. Thus, in the encyclical letter Qui pluribus (November 9, 1846), after enumerating various errors, he adds: “To this belongs that horrible system, and one most opposed even to the natural light of reason itself, concerning the indifference of any religion whatever; by this system those crafty deceivers, after removing every distinction between virtue and vice, truth and error, moral rectitude and baseness, invent that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever, just as if there could ever be any sharing of justice with iniquity, or fellowship of light with darkness, and agreement of Christ with Belial.” And in the encyclical letter Singulari quidem (March 17, 1856), after he reproved absolute indifferentism, he adds: “From that most base form of indifferentism, indeed, there is not very far distant that system concerning the indifference of religions, erupted from darkness, by which men alienated from the truth, adversaries of the true confession, forgetful of their own salvation, teaching things mutually opposed, and never having a settled judgment, admit no distinction among the diverse professions of faith, mix peace indiscriminately with all, and contend that the harbor of eternal life lies open to all from any religion whatever. For it is of no concern to them, although they treat different matters, so long as they conspire to overthrow the one truth.” And in the allocution Maxima quidem (June 9, 1862): “Since, however,” he says, “they dare perversely to derive all truths of religion from the native force of human reason, they then attribute to each man a certain, as it were, primary right, by which he can freely think and speak about religion, and exhibit to God that honor and worship which, according to his own pleasure, he thinks better.”
56. Hence we have the following propositions condemned in the Syllabus: 15. “It is free for each man to embrace and profess that religion which, led by the light of reason, he shall have thought true.” 16. “Men can find the way of eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever, and can attain eternal salvation.” 18. “Protestantism is nothing other than a diverse form of the same true Christian religion, in which it is given to please God equally as in the Catholic Church.”
57. Tolerantism, or religious tolerance, differs little or in no way from relative indifferentism; yet it is twofold: religious tolerance properly so called, or dogmatic tolerance, and political or civil tolerance. The first is “the express or tacit profession of the truth of all religions and all sects, by which, namely, each person holds that all religions or sects are equally true and good, and therefore all are equally salutary for man.” The other is “a disposition of laws by which the public exercise of worship is permitted, or even equal protection is promised to the external profession of any religion whatsoever.” As anyone sees, dogmatic tolerance is the same thing as relative indifferentism.
58. But the same error is also usually proposed under the name of liberty of conscience, or liberty of worship; and it is useful to explain these formulas briefly. For Tacitus had already observed in his time (Histories, book 4, c. 73) that “liberty and specious names are often put forward as a pretext, and no one has ever desired another’s servitude and domination for himself without making use of those same words.” And so - 1) liberty is wrongly confused with independence; for liberty exists even in creatures which, as we have said, are intrinsically and essentially dependent. Nor can conscience be called independent, since by its nature it is subject to the law which it applies to particular cases. See what we said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues (nn. 1020-1023). - 2) Liberty properly expresses exemption from necessity and from force; hence it comes about that one who is free has it in his power to determine himself to one thing or another, or has the faculty of choosing. If there is some intrinsic principle determining the will to one thing, liberty from necessity ceases, which is liberty properly so called; if the principle determining to one thing is extrinsic and contrary to the inclination of the subject, liberty from coercion ceases. Both of these kinds of liberty are called physical. - 3) If the extrinsic force binding the will to one thing is not physical but moral, such as law is, the will is said to lack moral liberty, or to be obligated to do or omit something, although it is physically free for either option.
59. Here it must be noted that a principle determining the will antecedently to one thing, or obligating it, can determine or obligate it according to the right tendency of the subject; and this is the true perfection of liberty. Or it can determine or obligate it against that tendency; and this is the imperfection of liberty. For the perfection of liberty, like that of any being, consists in the attainment of the object toward which it naturally tends. But liberty is not some faculty distinct in us; rather it is radically the intellect and formally the will itself. Therefore the object toward which it naturally tends, and by which it is fitted to be perfected, is the very same as that toward which intellect and will tend. But the object of the intellect is the true; the object of the will is the good. Therefore liberty of pursuing the true and the good is its perfection; on the contrary, liberty of pursuing the false and evil is its imperfection. Hence God, Christ the Lord, and the blessed in heaven lack the faculty of choosing evil; and from this their liberty is more perfect than ours. In like manner, a law impeding the pursuit of truth, moral rectitude, and so forth, is contrary to true liberty, or to its perfection; but a law directing us to pursue the true and the good is an aid of liberty, promoting its true perfection. But it suffices to have touched upon these things for our matter, since they are usually handed down in metaphysics.
60. Therefore, these things having been set down beforehand, it is asked what they understand by the name of liberty who proclaim liberty of conscience and of worship. (1) “It does not pertain to the account of free choice,” says St. Thomas (II Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2), “that it should stand indeterminately toward good or toward evil; because free choice is ordered in itself to the good, since the good is the object of the will, nor does it tend toward evil except on account of some defect… And therefore where free choice is most perfect, there it cannot tend toward evil, because it cannot be imperfect. But this pertains to liberty of choice: that it can do some action or not do it; and this belongs to God. For the good things which He does, He can not do, and yet He cannot do evil.” Compare also De Veritate, q. 22, a. 6. St. Augustine had gone before him, who wrote (Unfinished Work, book 1, c. 103): “You are going to say, as I see, that God is pressed by necessity so that He cannot sin, who certainly neither can will nor does will to be able to sin. But rather, if it must be called necessity by which something must either be or come about, that is an altogether most blessed necessity by which it is necessary to live happily; and in that same life it is necessary not to die, it is necessary not to be changed for the worse. By this necessity, if even it must be called necessity, the blessed are not pressed down, but enjoy; for us, however, it is future, not present.” We recited these things in the treatise On Grace, explaining the true concept of liberty; but they are repeated here not without fruit, for liberals, while they proclaim liberty, seem by no means to grasp its true notion and perfection. Certainly, 1) they are not treating of liberty from necessity; for who denies this liberty, which we most wretchedly behold with our eyes, of professing any religion whatever? - 2) Therefore they assert a certain moral liberty, namely exemption from law; and if indeed it is exemption from every law, even natural and divine, liberty of worship is one and the same error as relative indifferentism or dogmatic tolerance. 3) But if they assert exemption only from human law, whether ecclesiastical or civil, then the error of liberalism is had.
61. Therefore liberals (for followers of this system are called so by an abuse of the word) hold: 1) that there is in any man whatever, with respect to society, both civil and ecclesiastical, a right of professing the religion which he wishes; and therefore that the authority, whether civil or ecclesiastical, which would take away or diminish liberty of worship acts unjustly. - 2) Indeed, they add that liberty of worship, or political tolerance, is good in itself and of itself redounds to the good of society; and therefore it must be conceded absolutely and not only hypothetically, that is, with no account taken of the conditions in which some society is situated. - 3) Yet there are not lacking those who, mitigating this error, teach that although liberty of worship is to be conceded only hypothetically, nevertheless the present condition of the times is such that it is no longer expedient anywhere for the Catholic religion to be held as the sole religion of the State.
62. But what the Church thinks concerning liberalism is clear from the cited encyclical Quanta cura (December 8, 1864), where the Supreme Pontiff says: “From this false idea of social governance, they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most destructive to the Catholic Church and to the salvation of souls, called a delirium by Our predecessor Gregory XVI of happy memory, namely that liberty of conscience and of worship is the proper right of every man, which ought to be proclaimed and asserted by law in every rightly constituted society, and that there is in citizens a right to every kind of liberty, to be restrained by no ecclesiastical or civil authority, by which they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare whatever concepts they have. But while they rashly affirm this, they do not think and consider that they are proclaiming the liberty of perdition.” Hence we have the third proposition in order condemned in the same encyclical, which is as follows: “Liberty of conscience and of worship is the proper right of every man, which ought to be proclaimed and asserted by law in every rightly constituted society, and there is in citizens a right to every kind of liberty, to be restrained by no ecclesiastical or civil authority, by which they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare whatever concepts they have, whether by voice, or by print, or in another way.” To this also pertain the following propositions condemned in the Syllabus, namely 77: “In this our age, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion be held as the sole religion of the State, all other forms of worship whatsoever being excluded.” 78: “Hence it has laudably been provided by law in certain regions of Catholic name that men immigrating there are permitted to have the public exercise of each one’s own worship.” 79: “For indeed, it is false that civil liberty of every worship, and likewise the full power attributed to all of manifesting openly and publicly any opinions and thoughts whatever, conduces to more easily corrupting the morals and minds of peoples and to propagating the plague of indifferentism.”
63. But truly, if the Church rejects the system of liberalism, she nevertheless acknowledges that some civil society can sometimes be situated in such circumstances that political tolerance not only can but even ought to be admitted; in which case it would be admitted hypothetically, that is, with those circumstances presupposed, but not absolutely. Cardinal Tarquini rightly warns, however (Institutions of Public Ecclesiastical Law, 4th ed., p. 67, note): “Nothing in this matter is to be decided without consulting the Supreme Pontiff, both because it concerns a most grave case regarding the state of the Church, about which only the Supreme Pontiff can judge, and because this civil tolerance is in itself prohibited by ecclesiastical laws.”
64. But to one asking how liberty of worship, which in itself is illicit, can sometimes be conceded and ought to be conceded, the response is given with Cardinal Tarquini: “For a twofold reason, setting aside positive law, it is illicit: because it is wrong to cooperate with the superstition of heterodox persons; and because it is wrong to expose Catholics to the danger of seduction. From this it follows that, in order to make it morally permissible, those conditions are necessary which are commonly handed down by theologians for making cooperation with another’s sin morally permissible, and for licitly exposing oneself to the occasion or danger of sin.”
65. St. Thomas explains the matter in this way (II-II, q. 10, a. 11): “Human government is derived from divine government, and ought to imitate it. But God, although He is omnipotent and supremely good, permits some evils to happen in the universe, which He could prohibit, lest, if they were removed, greater goods would be taken away, or even worse evils would follow. Therefore also in human government those who preside rightly tolerate some evils, lest some goods be impeded, or even lest some worse evils be incurred, as Augustine says in book 2 of On Order, chapter 4, around the middle: ‘Remove prostitutes from human affairs, and you will disturb all things with lusts…’ But the rites of other unbelievers, which bring nothing of truth or utility, are not to be tolerated in any way, unless perhaps for avoiding some evil, namely for avoiding scandal or dissension which could arise from this, or an impediment to the salvation of those who, being tolerated in this way, are gradually converted to the faith. For on account of this, too, the Church has sometimes tolerated the rites of heretics and pagans, when there was a great multitude of unbelievers.”
66. Becanus summed up the true doctrine integrally (On the Theological Virtues, c. 16, q. 4, a. 2), saying: “Concerning this matter it must be established thus: - 1) that liberty of religion is altogether illicit and repugnant to a divine precept; - 2) that it is harmful to the commonwealth; - 3) that it ought not to be commanded, approved, or introduced by any prince or magistrate, but rather, in every way, if it can conveniently be done, impeded and driven out; - 4) but if it cannot conveniently be impeded except with greater damage or some evil to the commonwealth, it can be tolerated for a time; - 5) and if it is tolerated in this way and brought into an agreement, faith must be kept. This is the opinion of Catholics.” And he proves the last assertion thus (n. 11): “Faith must be kept in every licit and honorable agreement; but it is licit and honorable to tolerate liberty of religion in order to avoid a greater evil, and a Catholic prince can licitly and honorably make an agreement concerning tolerating it. Therefore, if he makes an agreement, he ought to keep faith.”
67. Therefore by these things we have sketched the doctrine of the Church and the errors contrary to it. It remains that we vindicate that doctrine, at least as to its principal heads. For the sake of clarity, we have done this in distinct sections, rejecting - 1) dogmatic tolerance, and then 2) establishing the true doctrine concerning civil tolerance. Hence: Section II. Dogmatic tolerance is rejected. PROP. III. There is one true religion, which all men are bound to embrace and profess; and therefore the system concerning dogmatic tolerance is impious and absurd, by which to each person is attributed the right of thinking and speaking freely about religion, and of exhibiting to God that worship which, according to the variety of regions and peoples, or according to each one’s own pleasure, he judges better.
68. Proof I. From the notion of religion handed down above (art. 1), it is clear that three things can be considered in religion, namely: 1) God, to whom worship and service are owed; 2) the rational creature, or man, paying to God the debts of religion; 3) the moral bond joining man to God. But from whatever head the matter is considered, religion is only one. Therefore. Proof of the minor as to the first part. For 1) as reason itself shows, God is not and cannot be anything except one; therefore, as far as He is concerned, the worship owed to Him is only one; and therefore there can be only one true religion. - 2) Worship is owed to God, even in the order of nature, because He is in Himself of supreme excellence, the first principle and ultimate end; but God is such always and everywhere in relation to all men. Therefore no worship except one is always and everywhere owed to Him by all men. 3) God, as Supreme Lord, has the right not only that He be worshiped, but that He be worshiped in the way in which He Himself wills. Therefore if, acting above nature, He Himself reveals this way, He is to be worshiped in that way. But God has revealed only one way in which He is to be worshiped, or one religion (this is clear against heretics, who admit Christian revelation, from those things which are handed down elsewhere concerning the unity of the Church and the unity of faith; against others, from the contradiction among various religions, of which we shall speak shortly). Therefore. Proof of the minor as to the second part. The foundation of religion on man’s part must be placed, as we have said, in the very essential and total dependence of his nature upon God. Therefore, where there is one nature in species and the same dependence, there also will be one and the same religion. Wherefore, since nature is one in species in all men, of whatever time and place, all everywhere and always are bound to the same services of gratitude, subjection, and piety toward God. This reason holds even if some religion above nature is supposed; for just as God has the right to be worshiped in the way in which He wills, so man’s duty is to satisfy that right. Therefore, if it is proved, as we said a little before, that the revealed religion which God proposes to all is one, all men are bound to embrace and profess that religion. Proof of the minor as to the third part. The bond joining man to God arises from God’s right and from those things which are essential to human nature, and corresponds to these. Therefore, if from the side of God and of man religion is one, it will also be one from the side of the bond joining man to God. For a greater understanding both of this part of the minor and of the whole argument, it is useful first to distinguish absolute duties of religion from hypothetical ones. Absolute duties are considered in the order of the rational creature to God, with attention paid only to God’s perfection and man’s nature. But that order is necessarily expressed by certain truths (theoretical religion), from which certain general duties (practical religion) of man toward God flow of themselves. Truths and duties of this sort, since they are absolutely founded in the very essences of things, are necessarily the same for all men. But hypothetical duties can depend upon a hypothesis which affects all men, as, for example, would be the hypothesis of a public and universal revelation; and these duties also are common to all. Otherwise the absolute duties themselves would fail. Suppose that anyone could, according to his pleasure, embrace or reject revelation, perform or neglect the worship which it dictates: the absolute duty of adhering to the highest Truth, of obeying the supreme Lord, is destroyed; and this certainly pertains to the essential and absolute dependence of the rational creature upon God. Hypothetical duties, once the hypothesis has been verified, pass over into absolute duties. But if the hypothesis is particular, particular duties of religion follow. Thus, for example, someone by a vow which he has made can be bound to render something to God to which other men are not bound. Apply these things to the manner of manifesting internal worship: if some manner has been determined by God for all, all ought to agree in it; but as to other manners, the suitability of means to the end, and fidelity in the expression of truth, suffice, nor is it an obstacle if those manners are materially diverse. 38 DISP. I. ON RELIGION IN GENERAL. has been determined by God, all ought to agree in it; but as to other ways, the suitability of the means to the end and fidelity in the expression of truth are sufficient, nor is it an obstacle if those ways are materially diverse.
69. II. Religion is truth and justice: truth indeed proceeding from God, whether as author of nature or as author of the supernatural order, determining the relations of man to Him; justice, because it inclines one to render to God what is due to Him. But truth is one, and on the contrary error is manifold; justice also is one, for something cannot at the same time be due and not due to God. Therefore.
70. In truth, the religions which are in the world are contradictorily opposed to one another; but from contradictories, only one can be true. Otherwise it would be true that the true God is only one, as monotheists hold; and it would be true that there are many true gods, as polytheists wish. It would be true that only natural religion is to be admitted, as rationalists teach; and at the same time it would be true that revealed religion is to be admitted. It would be true that Muhammad is the greatest of the Prophets, as the Muslims persuade themselves; and that he is a solemn deceiver, as all Christians and Hebrews hold him to be. Likewise, it would be true that Jesus Christ, or the Messiah foretold by the prophets, has come, as Christians profess; and it would also be true that He has not yet come, as the Hebrews think; that Jesus Christ Himself is true man and true God, as Catholics and almost all Christians believe; and that He is a mere creature, as the Arians once blasphemed, and as their followers, the Socinians, now blaspheme; that Jesus Christ founded one visible Church outside which there is no salvation; and that men can be saved outside the Church, etc. Imagine that religion must be accommodated to the character and customs of different regions. Therefore at Rome, for example, Christ must be believed to be the Son of God and adored; among the Jews, He must be believed to be an impostor and crucified; among the Turks, He must be believed to be the precursor of Muhammad and abjured!
71. You will say I: Judaism and Christianity are two opposed religions, as is said in the argument itself; and nevertheless Christians judge that Judaism in its own time was the true religion, just as now Christianity is true. I respond: Judaism and Christianity are not two diverse and opposed religions as to essence, but are only one and the same, inasmuch as their object is the same, namely Christ. But diversity and opposition exist only as to state and form. For Judaism rightly believed that Christ was going to come; whereas now, on the contrary, Christians rightly believe that He came long ago. Likewise, the moral precepts of the law have been confirmed in the Christian law; but the ceremonial precepts, since they were figures of Christ and of His Church, were rightly used so long as the reality had not yet come. Now, however, they would be badly used, since they would signify that Christ is still going to come. But concerning these things somewhat more fully when the discussion will be about the Institution of the Church.
72. You will say II: Many among the Protestant sects hold that men can attain salvation in any of them, provided they retain faith in Christ. Therefore not all religions are so opposed to one another that man can arrive at eternal life only in one. The response is: 1) Although the Protestant sects may seem to have this mutual tolerance, nevertheless all are equally hostile to the Catholic Church; and this confirms the truth of the latter. For since truth is one and error manifold (because there are many ways by which turning away from the true happens, and many modes by which it is attacked), it necessarily follows that all errors are opposed to truth, and that that revealed religion is true to which all opposed religions are opposed. - 2) Once the truth of the Christian religion has been admitted, it is easily shown that its faith ought to be one, that there is one Church in which all ought to profess it, and therefore one religion. 3) If Protestants truly think that anyone can be saved equally in any of their sects, why are they divided and subdivided day by day? If faith in Christ is enough, why do they exclude and attack the Catholic Church? 4) Finally, if it were considered that the Protestant sects are not mutually opposed, though nevertheless they are opposed to all other religions existing in the world, it would follow only that it is indifferent to belong to any one of them, which we seem able to concede to them without inconvenience; but it would by no means follow that it is indifferent to profess one of them or another religion, namely the Catholic.
73. III. Once the principle concerning the unity of true religion has been established, the foundation of dogmatic tolerance collapses. Nevertheless, it will be useful to attack it more directly. And first, if the matter is with heretics who retain Christian revelation, it is enough here to transcribe what Becanus briefly hands down (loc. cit., n. 3): “Certainly,” he says, “in the Gospel there are many things from which it is established that Christ commanded one faith and prohibited a varied and manifold one. First, He wished there to be only one Church, one fold, one baptism. But these things cannot stand without unity of faith. Second, He wished His disciples to beware of false Prophets; but in a manifold religion it is necessary that some be true Prophets, others false. Therefore, if these latter are to be excluded, one faith is to be retained, and a varied faith rejected. Third, He wished His Church to be perpetual, against which all the powers of hell cannot prevail; but it cannot be perpetual if there is not one faith of all, as He Himself testifies: ‘Every kingdom divided against itself will be made desolate’ (Luke 11:17). The Apostle confirms this in express words, Romans 16:17: ‘But I beseech you, brethren, to mark those who make dissensions and offenses contrary to the doctrine which you have learned, and avoid them.’ Galatians 1:8: ‘Although we, or an Angel from heaven, should preach to you besides what we have preached to you, let him be anathema.’”
74. IV. But generally against all relative indifferentists we can argue thus: man is bound by the debt of religion toward God, and therefore - 1) to render service and servitude to Him as to his Author; - 2) to tend toward Him as to his ultimate end; - 3) to exhibit honor and reverence to Him as infinitely excellent (nn. 19-24). But once dogmatic tolerance has been admitted, man could not exhibit these duties to God. Therefore. Proof of the minor as to the first part. 1) In order that a servant exhibit due servitude to his lord, he ought to exhibit to him those duties which the lord wills; therefore, in order that man exhibit due servitude and service to God, he ought to worship Him in the way in which God Himself wills. But the indifferentism which we oppose establishes the contrary principle; it teaches that man can profess any religion whatever according to his own pleasure. Therefore. 2) In truth, as we have often already indicated, this belongs to man neither from the nature of the thing nor from God’s concession: not from the nature of the thing, for in itself the right of determining the way of exhibiting service belongs to the lord; nor from God’s concession, for who will say that mutually opposed religions honor God equally? Do truth and error, virtue and vice, honor God equally? Proof of the minor as to the second part. 1) Those who run by opposed roads cannot all arrive at the same terminus. But, once indifferentism has been admitted, men run by opposed roads, since the various religions existing in the world are opposed to one another. Therefore. 2) Man cannot attain his ultimate end unless he tends rightly toward it, fulfilling all the duties by which he is bound, and especially the duties toward God, which are the principal ones. But, once indifferentism has been admitted, men would not fulfill their duties toward God, for they would not exhibit to Him due service and servitude. Therefore. Proof of the minor as to the third part. 1) He cannot exhibit honor to God who professes those things which are repugnant to the divine attributes; for these things are rather injurious to God. But indifferentists profess those things which are repugnant to the divine attributes, since they profess that God is delighted by falsehood and truth, which is repugnant to God’s veracity; they profess that evil and good equally please God, which is repugnant to divine holiness, etc. These things indeed follow if we keep in mind that true religion is both theoretical and practical (nn. 11 ff.), and that various religions are mutually opposed. 2) Surely, what would be the root of indifference? Does the indifferentist think that all religions are true? Then he would be insane, thinking that contradictories are simultaneously true. For he would admit these and similar things: that Christ is mere man and that Christ is God; that the Roman Pontiff is the vicar of Christ and that the same man is Antichrist, etc. Does he judge that one religion is true? Then he would be a hypocrite by approving all the rest equally. Finally, does he judge that none is true, but all are false? Then he would be impious toward God, harmful to society, and a hypocrite if he practiced any religion. See the objections in Perrone (On True Religion, part II, prop. 12). Section III. The true doctrine concerning civil tolerance is established. PROP. IV. 1. Unity in the true religion of itself conduces very greatly to the true good of civil society; 2. and the supreme authority has the right and duty of preserving and promoting it; 3. if, however, more serious evils should sometimes be feared from it, plurality of worships can be tolerated in order to avoid them. Therefore civil or political tolerance can be admitted not absolutely, but only hypothetically.
75. Proof of the first part. I. Society, as St. Augustine rightly said, is “a harmonious multitude of men.” Therefore the greater the concord of the members among themselves, and of the multitude with authority, the more perfect society itself will be. But from religious unity greater concord is had. Therefore unity of religion of itself conduces to the true good of society.
76. In truth, unless there is an operation by which the members of society pursue some common good with joined powers, there is no social operation, nor can society itself stand. But society is among men; therefore social operation ought to be human. Human operation, however, ought to proceed from the will, and the will does not act except with the light of the intellect going before. Therefore unless there is a joining of wills and intellects, there will be no human social operation, nor will external social operation itself be able to stand safe, at least for a long time. Now intellects are joined only by knowledge of the same truth, just as union among wills consists in love of the same good; but religion teaches the highest truth and the highest good, and those things which lead to it. Therefore unless there is unity in religion, unity of minds, wills, and external operation will be lacking; the proper perfection of society will be lacking. Nor can it be said that the external operation of civil society does not depend upon religious truths. For religion orders to the ultimate end, and therefore to true perfection and happiness (nn. 22, 23); to the ultimate end and to the love of happiness all things are subordinated. Religion is the principal bond by which men are joined, for it is the source and origin of every obligation (nn. 26 ff.); therefore the influence of religion upon social operation is very great.
77. II. It is useful to propose nearly the same argument in a slightly different way, so that its force may be better perceived. Where unity of minds is lacking, or where disagreement of souls is present, there is the seed of disturbance. But where there is plurality of worships, or where unity of religion is lacking, unity of minds is lacking. Therefore where unity of religion is lacking, the seed of disturbance is present. But disturbance is an evil of society, tending toward its dissolution. Therefore.
78. In truth, 1) it is in the very nature of the human mind that, possessing truth, it wishes to propagate it; all the more because truth communicated to others is not lost, but increased. And the more ardent is the love of propagating truth, the greater the importance of that truth is and the more certainly it is possessed. “As to the moral change,” says Guizot (History of Civilization, lecture 1), “which takes place in man when he acquires an idea… what is the need which takes possession of him? It is the need to make his sentiment pass into the external world,” etc. But religious truth is of the greatest importance, as we have already often said; therefore the ardor for propagating it is greatest. But where there are several religions, they are indeed opposed to one another (nn. 75 ff.); if therefore each person wishes to propagate his own and persuade others of it, what disagreement of souls will not arise from this? 2) It is implanted in the human will, tending by its nature toward the good, that when it can do so without loss to itself, it desires to share that good with others. And that desire is more fervent the more highly the good which is possessed is valued. Indeed, it is man’s duty toward others that he should wish for them the good which he wishes for himself, and, insofar as he can, procure it also for others. But the good to which religion orders is the highest good, on which eternal happiness depends; therefore the tendency of the human will to procure it for others also is greatest. (1) Hence Proudhon himself (Confessions of a Revolutionary) said: “It is surprising that at the foundation of every politics we always find theology.” And Donoso Cortes (Essay on Catholicism, book 1, ch. 1) adds: “What is surprising is the astonishment expressed by these words. Is not theology the science of God, the ocean which contains and embraces all the sciences, as God is the ocean which embraces all things?” But where plurality of religions is present, each person opens to others the road which he himself follows for arriving at the highest good; but those roads are opposed to one another. Therefore. “Let there be as an example,” says Becanus (On the Theological Virtues, c. 15, q. 6, n. 7), “the discord between Isaac and Ishmael in the family of Abraham; between Jacob and Laban in Mesopotamia; between Moses and his wife Zipporah, while they were setting out for Egypt. How, then, can peace and concord be hoped for in a whole kingdom, province, or city, where there is the greatest discord of religion and faith? Julian the Apostate once saw this, who, when he wished to disturb and overthrow the Church of Christians, introduced liberty and variety of doctrines. Ammianus reports this, and from him Lipsius, in the book against the Dialogist concerning one religion.” 3) Each person tends toward this: that he may free himself and the society of which he is a member from evils, even material evils, and may preserve his right, even as to material goods, safe and sound. But the most efficacious means of all for obtaining this is religion, upon which every moral obligation depends, and which alone firmly teaches the sanction which alone avails to keep men in duty (n. 36). Therefore each person ought to take care that religion remain intact. But which religion? If each person is permitted to profess the religion which he himself wishes, what security can we take from this? The followers of Muhammad, for example, think that they act holily and meritoriously if they betray Christians, despoil them of goods, and slaughter them! 4) Nor can these evils be avoided by saying that the civil authority can urge the principles of natural religion and punish those things which disturb public peace. For a) absolute civil tolerance is already restricted to revealed religion alone; and therefore atheism, pantheism, materialism, etc., would have to be proscribed. For what security is there if the existence of a spiritual nature, and hence of freedom, immortality, etc., is denied? b) The principal reasons by which they strive to establish this absolute tolerance are that the debt of religion is owed only to God, to whom alone an account must be rendered; that civil authority cannot impose on others a truth which it does not possess infallibly, etc. But if reasons of this sort prove anything, they are equally valid for natural religion. c) In order that there be security in the exercise of justice, fidelity, and so forth, it is not enough that only the supreme principles of natural religion be retained; but it is required that the consequences more closely regarding practice be equally admitted; and this, as we shall show below, is morally impossible without revelation. d) Since the absolute tolerantists defend their system in the name of liberty, does it not seem to contradict liberty more that men should be driven to put forth an external operation which conflicts with their principles, than to help them profess true principles? “For what is liberty?” says Tully (Paradox V). “The power of living as you will. Who, therefore, lives as he wills except he who follows right things, who rejoices in duty, for whom the path of living has been considered and foreseen; who obeys laws not because of fear, but follows and cherishes them because he judges this to be especially salutary; who says nothing, does nothing, finally thinks nothing, except willingly and freely; whose every plan and all the affairs which he manages proceed from himself and are borne back to the same; nor is there anything which has more power with him than his own will and judgment; to whom indeed even fortune herself, which is said to have the greatest force, yields, just as the wise poet said: ‘For each, it is fashioned by his own character.’ Therefore this falls to the wise man alone, that he do nothing unwillingly, nothing with grief, nothing under compulsion. Although this matter would need to be discussed in many words, nevertheless this is both brief and must be confessed: no one is free unless he is so disposed. Therefore all the wicked are slaves.” 5) Hence even politicians, although from false principles, have confessed that unity of religion conduces to the true good of society. Thus, for example, Machiavelli (The Mind of a Man of State, book 1, c. 12, Section 4) says: “Those princes and republics which wish to maintain themselves uncorrupted must, above every other thing, maintain uncorrupted the ceremonies of religion and always hold them in veneration. For no greater sign can be had of the ruin of a province than to see divine worship despised.” So also Rogier (Journal des Debats, April 17, 1844): “In good politics,” he says, “is it not preferable to reunite into one body the diverse members of a country rather than perpetuate their division? A political body becomes a nation only insofar as it has a national soul.” Compare Bergier (Theological Dictionary, s.v. Tolerance), where he reports testimonies of philosophers of all nations.
79. Proof of the second part. I. Society itself has the right and duty of professing and promoting the true religion (nn. 37 ff.). But true religion is one (nn. 74 ff.). Therefore it has the right and duty of professing and promoting the one religion. Now right is a moral power, and therefore according to right reason; therefore there cannot be given a right to profess false religions. Likewise, there cannot be given a duty of pursuing evil; but all religions except the one true religion are evil.
80. II. The supreme authority is bound to promote the true good of society; but unity in the true religion contributes especially to the good of society. Therefore it is bound to promote and preserve this unity.
81. III. Civil authority is bound to protect the rights of subjects, and especially to defend the weak against unjust attacks by the stronger. But it would not do this if, in a society already possessing unity in the true religion, it permitted and protected plurality of worships. Therefore. - In truth, 1) what public vice does in the practical order, error does in the speculative order, which finally descends also to practice. But public vice is a scandal inducing the ruin of others, etc. 2) Just as abuse of force can have a place in the material order, so also in the moral order. Wherefore those who excel by greater talent, learning, and eloquence can easily harm the ignorant or the less educated by abusing these gifts. Therefore, just as society ought to protect the weaker against the more powerful who abuse their force in the material order, so also in the moral order. But it does not do this if, where unity in the true religion flourishes, it is permitted that each person be able to propagate false worships. Therefore it is plain how deservedly the Supreme Pontiff called this absolute tolerance the liberty of perdition.
82. IV. Against Catholic liberals the authorities of the Fathers can be added; since the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, in the cited encyclical Quanta cura, says: “Contrary to the doctrine of the sacred Scriptures, of the Church, and of the holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert” that the best condition of society is that “in which the government does not acknowledge the duty of restraining, by established penalties, violators of the Catholic religion, except insofar as public peace demands.” In truth, St. Augustine (Epistle 185, otherwise 50) writes: “When kings were not yet serving the Lord, but were still meditating vain things against the Lord and against His Christ, then impieties certainly could not be prohibited by laws, but were rather practiced… But after that began to be fulfilled which is written, ‘And all the kings of the earth shall adore Him, all nations shall serve Him,’ what man of sober mind would say to kings: Do not care in your kingdom by whom the Church of your Lord is attacked; let it not pertain to you in your kingdom who wishes to be religious or sacrilegious? To whom it cannot be said: Let it not pertain to you in your kingdom who wishes to be chaste or unchaste. Or is it a lighter matter for the soul not to keep faith with God than for a woman not to keep faith with her husband?” St. Gregory the Great (book 2, ep. 11) says: “For this purpose power over all men has been given from heaven to the piety of our lords, that those who desire good things may be aided, that the way of the heavens may lie more widely open, that the earthly kingdom may serve the heavenly kingdom.” St. Leo the Great, writing to Turibius, says: “That severity has profited ecclesiastical gentleness, which, although content with priestly judgment, shrinks from bloody punishments, yet is aided by the severe constitutions of Christian princes, while those who fear bodily punishment sometimes have recourse to a spiritual remedy.”
83. The thesis as to the third part does not need to be proved, both because it is attacked by no one, and because it is clear from what has been said (nn. 72 ff.). - Compare what Taparelli solidly and eloquently discusses concerning this whole question (Natural Right, vol. 1, disp. 4, c. 4, a. 2). Section IV. Difficulties are answered.
84. You will say I: Civil authority has no right of preserving or promoting unity in the true religion; therefore political tolerance must be admitted absolutely. Proof of the antecedent. Religion is a voluntary and free dependence upon God (n. 9); but such dependence necessarily supposes the adherence of the intellect to truth (n. 12). Therefore one who cannot preserve and promote unity in truth also has no right of preserving and promoting the unity of true religion. But civil authority certainly cannot do this, since it is not infallible, and the right of commanding others to give adherence of intellect cannot be understood without infallibility. Therefore. It is answered: 1) There are certain truths pertaining to religion which are evident by the natural light, and which according to nature itself are absolutely necessary for preserving order in civil society: such, for example, is the Providence of God, which repays reward to the good and punishment to the wicked; the immortality of the soul, the existence of liberty, etc. According to the order of nature, society has the right and the duty of prohibiting anything from being put forward against those truths, since it has the right and duty both of preserving itself and of providing for the good of its members. 2) But that unity in the true religion, especially positive or supernatural religion, and therefore the perfection of society, cannot be obtained without infallible authority can be regarded as an indication that God did not create man for the natural order alone, but directed the natural order to the supernatural. For as St. Thomas says (II-II, q. 2, a. 3), “the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in that which belongs to it according to nature, but also in that which is attributed to it from a certain supernatural participation in the divine goodness.” Wherefore, if God had left man without revelation and infallible authority, and had not provided in another way for the unity of which we speak, in that hypothesis such unity would have been impossible; but no one is bound to the impossible. Yet from this it does not follow that, once revelation and infallible authority have been given by God’s goodness, and therefore once the possibility of obtaining unity in religion has been given, it still remains at one’s discretion either to tend toward the perfection of society by promoting unity of religion, or to neglect it. In this case there would be no excuse on the side of inability. 3) If divine revelation and infallible authority exist, as we proved in the treatise On the Virtues (disp. 4, arts. 7 and 8), that authority is obligatory. But not only individual men, but society itself must profess the true religion (nn. 37-57). Therefore civil society itself must both embrace the religion revealed by God and be subject to infallible authority in those things which pertain to religion. Once, however, revealed religion has been accepted and infallible authority acknowledged, civil power would promote unity in religion not by prescribing, by its own authority, what must be believed, but by urging the obligation introduced by infallible authority. 4) Now below we shall prove that revelation has been made; that the Christian revelation is true; and that in the true Christian revelation there is infallible authority. Therefore now unity of the true religion both can and must be promoted through the mediation of this authority. Let us suppose, then, that the members, morally at least all of them, of some civil society are also members of the Catholic Church, and thus that the society itself pertains to the Catholic religion. From the proofs given in the thesis, the supreme authority of this society is bound to preserve Catholic unity. Taparelli explains all these things very beautifully (loc. cit., nn. 876-891).
85. You will say II: Civil society is altogether different from religious society, that is, from the Church, and has temporal happiness as its end; whereas the end of religious society is eternal happiness. But rights and duties are taken from the end, and those two societies ought not to be confused. Therefore civil society can do nothing in those matters which pertain to religion; and hence it has neither the right nor the duty of promoting unity. I answer by distinguishing: that the civil society of Catholics is distinct from religious society, or from the Church, I concede; that it is separated from it, I deny. Likewise, that the end of civil society is temporal happiness proximately and directly, I concede; ultimately and indirectly, I deny (n. 39). Compare also Cardinal Tarquini (Public Ecclesiastical Law, p. 47, 6th ed.). Since, in the hypothesis with which we are dealing, the members of civil and ecclesiastical society are the same, these two societies cannot be separated, but they are distinct, just as in man soul and body are distinct parts of him, yet not separated. Hence, just as the body must serve the soul, to which it is subject, and its operations, so civil society must assist religious society in its own way. The theologians everywhere have used this comparison: St. Thomas (II-II, q. 60, a. 6, ad 3); Suarez (On Laws, book 4, c. 9); Bellarmine, who (On the Roman Pontiff, book 5, c. 6), after citing the authorities of the Fathers, writes thus: “For as spirit and flesh stand in man, so those two powers stand in the Church. For flesh and spirit are, as it were, two commonwealths, which can be found both separated and joined. The flesh has sense and appetite, to which corresponding acts and proportionate objects answer, and the immediate end of all these is the health and good constitution of the body. The spirit has intellect and will, and proportionate acts and objects, and as its end the health and perfection of the soul. Flesh without spirit is found in brute animals; spirit without flesh is found in angels. “From this it is plain that neither is precisely for the sake of the other. Flesh joined to spirit is also found in man; there, because they make one person, they necessarily have subordination and connection. For the flesh is subject, the spirit presides; and although the spirit does not mix itself into the actions of the flesh, but allows it to exercise all its actions as it exercises them in brute animals, nevertheless, when those actions hinder the end of the spirit itself, the spirit commands the flesh and chastises it, and, if there is need, imposes fasts and other afflictions, even with some harm and weakening of the body itself; and it compels the tongue not to speak, the eyes not to see, etc. In like manner, if some operation of the flesh, and even death itself, is necessary for obtaining the end of the spirit, the spirit can command the flesh to expose itself and its own things, as we see in the martyrs. “So entirely the political power has its own princes, laws, judgments, etc., and likewise the ecclesiastical power has its own bishops, canons, judgments. The former has temporal peace as its end; the latter, eternal salvation. They are sometimes found separated, as formerly in the time of the Apostles; sometimes joined, as now. But when they are joined, they make one body, and therefore they must be connected, and the inferior must be subject and subordinated to the superior. And so the spiritual power does not mix itself into temporal affairs, but allows all things to proceed as before they were joined, provided that they do not hinder the spiritual end or are not necessary for attaining it. But if any such thing happens, the spiritual power can and must coerce the temporal by every reason and way which shall seem necessary for that purpose.”
86. You will say III: If civil society, possessing the true religion, has the right and duty of preserving and promoting unity of religion insofar as this promotes external peace and national unity, then a heterodox society also would have the same right and duty with respect to a false religion. But we reject this in a heterodox commonwealth; therefore we seem to use, as they say, a double measure. It is answered: 1) This objection falsely supposes that the same right belongs to truth and to error, whereas, on the contrary, no right can be attributed to error. For right is moral power, and therefore according to reason; and error is contrary to reason. 2) It is also falsely supposed that the only, or at least the principal, reason for promoting unity in the true religion is the external peace and tranquillity of civil society; whereas the principal reason is the obligation, with respect to individuals and societies, of professing the one true religion (n. 37), and consequently of hindering, “according as it shall have been possible,” whatever stands opposed to it. When it is a question of false religion, that saying must rather be repeated: “I came not to send peace, but a sword”; for national dissension is a lesser evil than perseverance in error concerning religion, on which eternal salvation depends. 3) In this objection, as Tarquini rightly notes (op. cit., p. 68), “it is supposed that the same rights belong to error as to truth, at least under this title, that it does not think itself to be such; which is just as false as if someone were to say that the same rights belong to the insane, at least under this title, that they do not think themselves such, as belong to those of sound mind. But in this matter a threefold respect must be distinguished: the first in relation to the conscience of the Church, the second in relation to the conscience of heterodox persons, the third in relation to the thing itself, as it ought to be judged by some outsider. “As regards the Church, she is certain, not so much by her own opinion as by divine testimonies, that truth is in herself alone, and error in the other pseudo-religions, and that this pertains to an article of faith, against which she can do nothing. Hence for her there is no double measure, but the eternal law remains firm, which gives dominion to truth over error, and denies that there can be any participation of justice with iniquity, or any fellowship of light with darkness (2 Cor. 6:14). “As regards the heterodox, insofar as they remain in good faith, they will be in the same legal condition as the insane, to whom nothing is imputed from those things which they do in insanity. “Finally, as regards the thing itself, it has such marks that, at least in the external forum, no fair-minded person ought not to acknowledge the rights of the Church. For whatever may be the case concerning the internal good faith of heterodox persons, certainly this can be proved externally to no fair-minded person. For either they seriously, and with a right will, attend to the motives of credibility of the Catholic Church and to the marks of falsity of their own sect, or they do not attend, or they are unwilling to attend seriously and with a right will. If they in no way attend, or do not attend duly, since their ignorance is either gross or even affected, it cannot coexist with good faith. But if they do attend duly, much less will it be possible to admit that they persist in their error with good faith… Whatever, therefore, may be the internal state of each heterodox person, concerning which God will judge, externally surely no fair-minded person will be able to judge that they are in good faith; whence every appearance of the accusation objected vanishes, that the Church uses a double measure. Yet not even in the hypothesis of their good faith would she use such a measure, since the true relation between herself and them, as has been said, would be the same as that which exists between the sane and the insane who think themselves sane.”
87. You will say IV: If liberty of worships is granted, and the faculty of propagating diverse religious doctrines, no evil, and no slight advantage, will come from it. For truth has a stronger force than error, and virtue attracts more than vice; and truth and virtue, being disputed from every side and shining with a clearer light, will dissipate the darkness of errors and vices. It is answered: 1) Truth and virtue objectively and in themselves have greater force than error and vice; but not likewise subjectively, and as regards us. This is manifest to those who have faith from the things which faith teaches concerning the effects of original sin; to others it is clear at least from experience. For “the bewitching of vanity” (Wis. 4:12) “obscures good things, and the inconstancy of concupiscence perverts the understanding”; to which corresponds that saying: “I see the better things and approve them, but I follow the worse.” Hence also St. Bernard (On Consideration, book 5, c. 1) says: “Where we are is the valley of tears, in which sensuality reigns and consideration is in exile; in which indeed the bodily sense freely and with power puts itself forth, but the spiritual eye, entangled, grows dark.” 2) A kind of common sense confirms this truth. For if the proposed reason proved anything, it would equally show that liberty must be granted for every disgraceful crime. Yet in every rightly constituted society, the law takes notice of certain public offenses. Hence what we reported above from St. Augustine (n. 40) must be repeated here: “In vain do you say: I should be left to free choice (as regards religious matters). For why do you not proclaim that, in murders and in acts of debauchery and in any other crimes and disgraceful acts, men must be left to free choice? Yet that all these things be repressed by just laws is most useful and most salutary.” 3) If any force were present in the argument to which we are responding, ought it not to be transferred to domestic society itself? Virtue and truth have a stronger force than vice and error; therefore parents, with no prudent care applied, will allow sons and daughters to read any books at all, even against faith and morals; to avoid no one’s conversation and company; to go to any place whatever, etc. But not even those whom we are opposing conduct themselves in this way.
88. You will say V: God Himself leaves us liberty of professing the religion which we wish. How, then, will human authority compel us to retain one religion determinately? I answer by distinguishing: God leaves us physical liberty, concerning which there is no question, I concede; moral liberty, concerning which alone the matter is being discussed, I deny (nn. 65-67). Certainly, as is plain from what has been disputed above, God established a law by which we are bound to profess the true religion; and authority constituted by God, as it is said (Rom. 13:4), “is God’s minister… an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil.” Hence St. Leo the Great (Epistle 75), writing to the Emperor Leo, says: “You ought constantly to attend to the fact that royal power has been entrusted to you not only for the government of the world, but especially for the protection of the Church.”
89. You will say VI: If political tolerance is denied, the peace and tranquillity of civil society is disturbed; therefore it must be granted. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: of itself, I deny, as is plain from the demonstration of the thesis; accidentally, I subdistinguish: and then political tolerance would have to be granted hypothetically as a lesser evil, let it pass; absolutely, as good in itself, I deny. “The Author On the Government of Princes (book 1, c. 15),” says Tarquini (op. cit., p. 66), “removes every fear, where, in declaring this duty of princes, he adds that natural condition: ‘according as it shall have been possible.’ Wherefore account must be taken of the circumstances of the commonwealth; if these are of such a kind that they prevent that thing from being furnished, that tolerance must be employed which is not rarely employed also in permitting other evil deeds, yet in such a way that the prince conduct himself negatively and passively; but he positively approves nothing that is contrary to the good of the Church.”
90. You will say VII: Political intolerance in the matter of religion seems rather to alienate the minds of men from the true religion; for it is apprehended as a base domination, which is established by terror rather than by doctrine. It is answered with St. Augustine (Epistle 92, otherwise 48, to Vincentius): “But these things do not benefit some, you say. Is medicine therefore to be neglected because the disease of some is incurable? You attend only to those who are so hardened that they do not receive even this discipline. For concerning such persons it is written: ‘In vain have I struck your children; they have not received discipline.’ Yet I think that they were struck out of love, not hatred. But you ought also to attend to the very many concerning whose salvation we rejoice. For if they were terrified and not taught, it would seem like a base domination. Again, if they were taught and not terrified, hardened by the age of custom, they would be moved more sluggishly to take up the way of salvation; since many, whom we know well, when a reason had been given to them and the truth had been manifested by divine testimonies, answered that they desired to pass into the communion of the Catholic Church, but that they feared the enmities of wicked men… But when saving doctrine was joined to useful terror… we rejoice, as I said, concerning the salvation of many who bless God with us, because, when He fulfilled His promise by which He promised that the kings of the earth would serve Christ, He thus healed the weak.” And below: “And yet you fear lest, when you are compelled to unity by imperial laws, the name of God be blasphemed longer by Jews and pagans; as if the Jews did not know how the first people Israel wished even by war to destroy those two and a half tribes which had received lands beyond the Jordan, when they thought that those tribes were separating themselves from the unity of their people. But pagans rather cannot blaspheme on account of the laws which Christian emperors have passed against worshippers of idols; and yet from them many have been corrected and converted to the living and true God, and are converted daily.” - Compare the excellent things which Liberatore writes concerning this controversy (The Church and the State, ch. 1, arts. 4-7).