91. From the things disputed thus far it is most clearly evident both that religion is necessary for man as an individual and for society, and that there is one true religion. But what is that true religion, since there exist in the world many religions disagreeing among themselves? In order that we may be able to answer this question, we must inquire into certain things concerning revealed religion; for since the principal division of religion is into revealed and natural religion, it must first be made known whether the one true religion is revealed, or whether we can be content with natural religion alone. Therefore let us begin from the possibility of revealed religion.
92. It would scarcely seem worthwhile to bring the possibility of revelation into question, since the fact itself of revelation is manifested by such evident signs, as will be clear below, that it is impossible for those considering them to deny its existence. Nevertheless, so many sophisms are heaped up by the impiety of the present day against the very possibility of revelation that we cannot in the least neglect this question.
93. First of all, it is useful to establish briefly the true idea of revelation. The documents of the Church on this matter are chiefly the following. The Vatican Council (Dei Filius, ch. 2) says: “The same holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from created things: for His invisible things, from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen. Nevertheless, it pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to the human race by another way, and that a supernatural one, as the Apostle says: ‘God, who at sundry times and in diverse manners formerly spoke to the fathers in the prophets, last of all, in these days, has spoken to us in the Son.’” And (ch. 4): “This also the perpetual consensus of the Catholic Church has held and holds: that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only in principle but also in object; in principle indeed, because in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by divine faith; but in object, because besides those things to which natural reason can attain, mysteries hidden in God are proposed to us for belief, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot become known. Wherefore the Apostle, who testifies that God was known by the gentiles through those things which were made, nevertheless, when discussing the grace and truth which was made through Jesus Christ, pronounces: ‘We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, which God predestined before the ages unto our glory, which none of the princes of this age knew; but God has revealed it to us by His Spirit; for the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.’ And the Only-begotten Himself confesses to the Father that He has hidden these things from the wise and prudent and has revealed them to little ones… For divine mysteries by their own nature so exceed the created intellect that, even when revelation has been handed down and accepted by faith, nevertheless they remain covered by the veil of faith itself and wrapped, as it were, in a certain darkness, as long as in this mortal life we are pilgrims away from the Lord; for we walk by faith and not by sight.” And (can. 2 on ch. 2): “If anyone shall say that it cannot happen, or is not expedient, that through divine revelation man be instructed about God and the worship to be offered to Him, let him be anathema.” - And (can. 1 on ch. 4): “If anyone shall say that in divine revelation no true and properly so-called mysteries are contained… let him be anathema.”
94. In order that these things may be understood, it should be observed that revelation, which according to the force of the word signifies the removal of a veil, properly imports “the manifestation of a hidden thing”; here, however, it is taken for “the manifestation of truth, whether that truth can or cannot be known from elsewhere.” Hence revelation can be human or divine, according as man or God is the one who manifests the truth. Here the question is about divine revelation.
95. But divine revelation, considered with respect to the principle and the means by which truth is manifested, is usually distinguished into natural and supernatural. Natural revelation consists in this: that God manifests Himself to us while, through the exercise of the intellectual powers which are in nature, we rise from created things to the knowledge of God and of other truths which can be drawn from them by the natural light. And this is the knowledge concerning which the Church teaches: “God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from created things; for His invisible things, from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen.” But supernatural revelation is that by which God Himself directly discloses truths to men; namely, it consists in the manifestation of truths made by God to one or more persons, not through the natural development of intelligence, but through the formal speech of God Himself. And this is that knowledge concerning which the Church teaches that it pleased divine “wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to the human race by another way, and that a supernatural one, as the Apostle says: ‘God, who at sundry times and in diverse manners formerly spoke to the fathers in the prophets; last of all, in these days, has spoken to us in the Son.’”
96. This supernatural divine revelation, which is revelation properly so called, insofar as it is considered on the part of God Himself revealing, we are accustomed to distinguish into immediate and mediate. That is, God is accustomed to address certain persons immediately, and thus to communicate truths to them immediately; then He uses these persons as His legates, who communicate the revealed truths to other men. To these latter, therefore, the revelation of God comes mediately.
97. Although it is not ours to determine the mode by which God speaks to men, nevertheless we can know various possible modes, according to which immediate revelation is distinguished into internal and external, or into sensitive, imaginative, and intellectual. For as St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 173, a. 2), “certain sensible forms are represented divinely to the mind of the prophet sometimes by means of the external sense, as Daniel saw the writing on the wall, as is read in Daniel 5; but sometimes through imaginary forms, either impressed wholly by God and not received through the sense, for example, if likenesses of colors were impressed in the imagination of someone born blind, or also divinely ordered from those things which have been received from the senses, as Jeremiah ‘saw a boiling pot from the face of the north,’ as is found in Jeremiah 1; or also by impressing intelligible species upon the mind itself, as is clear concerning those who receive infused knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon and the Apostles.” And (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 154), explaining these same things, he says: “Revelation takes place by a certain interior and intelligible light elevating the mind to perceive those things to which the intellect cannot reach by the natural light. For just as by the natural light the intellect is made certain concerning those things which it knows by that light, as concerning first principles, so concerning those things which it apprehends by supernatural light it has certainty. But this certainty is necessary in order that those things which are perceived by divine revelation may be proposed to others; for we shall not put forward to others with security matters concerning which we would not have certainty. But with the aforesaid light inwardly illuminating the mind, there are sometimes present in divine revelation certain external or internal aids of knowledge, such as some speech heard externally and sensibly, which is formed by divine power, or perceived through the imagination inwardly by God’s action; or also something seen bodily and externally, formed by God, or also described inwardly in the imagination. From these a man receives knowledge of divine things through the interior light impressed upon the mind. Hence aids of this sort without the interior light do not suffice for the knowledge of divine things, but the interior light suffices without them.”
98. Moreover, revelation of this sort, whether internal or external, as we have heard from the Vatican Council, is truly supernatural. For that is called supernatural which is not owed to nature (On God the Creator, n. 664 ff.); but that which exceeds the demand of nature is certainly not owed to nature. Now to human, that is, rational nature, it is indeed owed that it be able to arrive at truth; but for this nature has supplied means, namely the development and exercise of the intellectual powers, so that by inquiring and reasoning from creatures we rise to knowledge of the Creator. Therefore, that this knowledge is had through the immediate communication of God must be ascribed to grace. And so divine and supernatural revelation, with which alone we are concerned, can be described subjectively as “the manifestation of some truth made by God to man through internal or external speech, mediately or immediately”; but considered objectively, it is “the truth itself, or the complex of truths, manifested by a way not owed to the light of natural reason, or through the formal speech of God.” These notions must be completed by the things which we gave in the treatise On the Infused Virtues (n. 326 ff.), where especially the concept of formal speech is explained.
99. These things, then, concern the genuine character of revelation. Now a few things must be set forth concerning its object. In general, this is of a twofold order, as the Vatican Council teaches. For by revelation there can be manifested both “those things to which natural reason can attain,” and there can also be proposed “mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot become known.” Since there is a special difficulty concerning mysteries, it will help to explain their nature somewhat more carefully.
100. Mystery in general imports a hidden thing or truth. But things or truths can be hidden from us in many ways. For 1) some are hidden absolutely, others hidden in a certain respect. Those are called hidden absolutely which we can in no way attain by natural means; those are hidden in a certain respect which, although they cannot be known with certainty, are nevertheless known conjecturally by natural means, such as, for example, certain future free acts; or which cannot be known because of a defect of proposal, yet in such a way that there is some natural way of proposing them, such as, for example, the secrets of hearts, which nevertheless can be manifested to others by an external word. 2) Things or truths can be hidden per se or accidentally. Those are hidden per se for whose knowing powers are altogether lacking in nature; those are called accidentally hidden for whose knowing natural powers are by no means lacking, but which cannot be known because of a difficulty hindering the exercise of those powers, such as, for example, the number of the stars. 3) Things can be hidden with respect to existence, whether they are, or with respect to essence, what they are. Those truths are called hidden only with respect to existence which we cannot discover without revelation, but which, once revelation is supposed, we are able to understand, such as, for example, certain positive institutions, as the authority of the Roman Pontiff. But those are hidden with respect to essence whose intrinsic reason, why and how they are, we do not understand even after revelation. Therefore mysteries properly so called, which the Vatican Council teaches to be contained in divine revelation, are “truths absolutely and per se hidden both with respect to existence and with respect to essence”; namely, truths which “by their own nature so exceed the created intellect that, even when revelation has been handed down and accepted by faith, nevertheless they remain covered by the veil of faith itself and wrapped, as it were, in a certain darkness.”
101. From these things it is easy to understand what truth and what falsity lies hidden in that saying, as though in an axiom: “mysteries are incomprehensible.” Certainly, 1) they cannot be called incomprehensible insofar as the words by which they are enunciated have no meaning, and therefore arouse no perception in the mind. For they are enunciated in words employed by the common usage of men, so that by concepts, indeed not proper but analogical, we understand what is revealed and therefore what is proposed for belief. Thus, for example, when this proposition is enunciated: in God there is one nature, and there are three persons; certainly we understand the terms and the connection of agreement between subject and predicate, and therefore in some way we understand what is to be believed. 2) Hence it is that, once revelation is supposed, we plainly understand the existence of the mystery of one nature and three persons in God. 3) What, then, is it that is not comprehended in a mystery, even after revelation of its existence? It is its innermost nature, or the intrinsic reason by which the predicate belongs to the object, or differs from it. In the aforesaid mystery of the Trinity, for example, we do not know why and how the three persons are one God. The agreement of the predicate with the subject is established in the case from authority, but its intrinsic reason is not seen through. It is true that knowledge of this sort is imperfect; but “it is, with incomparable happiness, more excellent,” as St. Augustine teaches (On Genesis according to the Letter, book 5, n. 34), “to think piously of God from however small a particle, than to comprehend all those [created] things.” And St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 1, c. 5): “Concerning the noblest things, however imperfect a knowledge may be, it confers the greatest perfection upon the soul; and therefore, although human reason cannot fully grasp those things which are above reason, nevertheless much perfection is acquired for it if it at least holds them in some way by faith.”
102. The things which we have set forth thus far sufficiently disclose what revelation is according to the mind of the Church, and what she properly teaches when she defines that “revelation even of mysteries is possible.” Yet opposed to this doctrine is an error widely spread through the world in these times, which is usually called by the general term naturalism. Naturalists are so named because they too highly extol the powers of nature, or of human reason. For them human reason is fully sufficient for knowing all truths pertaining to religion; it is the sole source of these truths and the supreme norm of religion; no religion is approved except natural religion. Hence they reject every revelation, either because they judge it by no means necessary for the human race, but superfluous, or even because they proclaim it impossible. Some are accustomed to distinguish naturalism and rationalism, not because they differ essentially from one another, but because rationalism puts on a certain milder form, although it is no less injurious to Christianity. Naturalists, they say, admit only this: that God produced the universe of things and granted to men intellectual faculties through which He sufficiently provided for them, so that, using the powers of reason, from consideration of the universe they might acknowledge Him, acquire by their own labor the necessary religious cognitions, and perfect them more and more. But they deny every special direction of God in the business of religion. Rationalists, however, admit some special providential care directing both peoples and individual men in the business of religion. For, they say, God impels them to seek truth through the powers of their own reason; and by the arrangement of His providence He both offers to individuals occasions of instructing themselves and raises up men endowed with sharper genius, who teach others also the truths which they themselves have known better. “Universal revelation,” says Wegscheider (Institutions of Christian Dogmatic Theology, proleg., c. 1), “is that which is effected by the natural faculties of the mind and by the other aids of the whole nature of things, by which man is led to conceiving and cultivating knowledge of divine things. But particular revelation, and at the same time mediate, is that which is contained in the complex of things happening according to nature, by which, with God as author, certain men have been stirred up to know the true principles of religion, and, accommodated to the desires of peoples, to hand them on to others with remarkable success.”
103. Although some seeds of rationalism are already found in the middle ages among certain teachers, nevertheless, properly, insofar as it is a religious system, this doctrine draws its origin from the errors of the Protestants. This indeed could be shown historically and philosophically; but as witness of this matter we have the Vatican Council, which says at the beginning of the constitution Dei Filius: “For no one is ignorant that the heresies which the Fathers of Trent proscribed, while the divine magisterium of the Church was rejected and matters pertaining to religion were permitted to the private judgment of anyone whatever, were gradually dissolved into multiple sects; and with these dissenting and contending among themselves, all faith in Christ at length was weakened among not a few. And so the sacred Bible itself, which before had been asserted to be the sole source and judge of Christian doctrine, began no longer to be held as divine, indeed to be numbered among mythical fictions. Then there was born and spread far too widely through the world that doctrine of rationalism or naturalism, which, opposing Christian religion in all things as a supernatural institution, strives with the greatest zeal that, Christ, who alone is our Lord and Savior, having been excluded from human minds and from the life and morals of peoples, the reign of mere reason or nature, as they call it, may be established.” Compare On the Infused Virtues (n. 987).
104. And so the proper principle of the rationalists, from which they then infer many absurd consequences, is the sufficiency, and therefore the autonomy or independence, of reason. But as regards the present question: 1) Naturalists simply deny revelation. 2) Rationalists indeed seem to admit revelation, but only in name, since by the name of revelation they understand either knowledge through the natural development of natural faculties, or knowledge through a mind specially aroused by natural events. Therefore they reject supernatural divine revelation as described by us. 3) But both especially exclude all mysteries which surpass the grasp of human reason. 4) Finally, some attack the possibility of mediate revelation with peculiar arguments. Namely, they say that it is impossible for us to judge whether God has truly revealed to certain persons those things which are then transmitted to us by them; and hence that it is repugnant to divine wisdom to manifest His wills to us through other men. Thus, among others, Rousseau (Emile, Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar).
105. From these things it is easily plain what must be established in order that the Catholic doctrine concerning the possibility of revelation may be defended entire. Hence: Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. V. Divine revelation, or the manifestation of truth through a means not owed to nature, whether 1. immediate or 2. mediate, must be called possible. 3. Indeed it is evidently shown that not only truths to which natural reason can attain, but also mysteries, or truths absolutely and per se exceeding the grasp of reason, can be contained within the range of supernatural revelation.
106. The first part is proved. I. In the act of revealing, three things can be considered: God who reveals; man who receives revelation; and the objects themselves which are manifested. Therefore, if there were any repugnance in revelation, it would have to be sought either 1) on the side of God revealing, or 2) on the side of man receiving revelation, or 3) finally on the side of the things revealed. But none of these can be said. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the first part. 1) Indeed, why would God be said to be unable of Himself to reveal? Is it because He is ignorant of the truths to be revealed? That certainly is repugnant to His infinite knowledge. Is it because He lacks a means of manifesting the truths which He knows? That is repugnant to His infinite power. Finally, is it because He cannot Himself will to manifest truths? But God is unable to will only that which is repugnant to His attributes, to wisdom, holiness, etc.; and nothing of this kind is found in revelation, which rather can yield to the advantage of men and to the glory of God Himself. For if the manifestation of God through the light of reason procures these goods, why cannot the same goods be obtained when God manifests Himself in a supernatural mode? 2) These things are confirmed by rejecting the very reasons of repugnance which the rationalists assign. For first they say that God, by revealing, contradicts Himself, insofar as, since He has already given the natural light for knowing truths, He afterward wills that we know them through another means, namely through revelation. But this is nothing; for He could from eternity have willed that that twofold way of attaining truth should lie open. In this case there is no contradiction. In reality, he would contradict himself by revealing who acted otherwise than, or contrary to, what he had determined for himself beforehand. But God, by revealing, far from acting in a diverse or contrary mode, would act according as He had determined for Himself beforehand. Therefore, if He reveals, there is no contradiction in Him. Just as, therefore, from eternity God established the course of nature and the mode of natural knowledge, so also from eternity He decreed to communicate truths to man through supernatural revelation; and He harmoniously disposed this twofold order of both natural and supernatural knowledge. 3) Secondly, they say that it is unbecoming to the divine majesty that He should address such miserable creatures. But we are not always able to measure by our finite reason what becomes God or is unbecoming to Him. Indeed, in the case itself reason shows that it is by no means unbecoming to God to address men, especially in those matters which contribute to the due worship to be offered to Him, and to their good and happiness. It was not unbecoming to God to create man, and indeed for happiness; to care for him and to have providence over him. Therefore it is not unbecoming to Him to indicate to that same man a safe way by which he can arrive at the desired blessedness. The minor is proved as to the second part. For 1) man is endowed with the faculty of knowing and therefore is capable of knowing truth. But just as he can be instructed by other men, so much more can he be instructed by God Himself. Nor is there any doubt that man can become certainly conscious to himself of having obtained this divine instruction. For men are often accustomed to perceive the origin of their acquired cognitions, and they can affirm whether they learned this or that truth through oral instruction, or through a book, or through experience, or through rational reflection. Why, then, will man not be able to know certainly that he is being instructed by God Himself? Shall we say that every means is lacking to God Himself by which He may make us certain that He is speaking, when He Himself is the one who teaches us by formal speech? 2) But what the rationalists contend is absurd, namely that revelation is repugnant to the dignity of human reason. For if it is not unbecoming for man to be taught by man, why is it unbecoming for him to be taught by God, whose intellect is infinitely superior to every created intellect? From another side, the true dignity of human reason consists in the breadth and certainty of cognitions; but from revelation man learns many things which without revelation he would be ignorant of, and he is made certain concerning many things about which without revelation he would doubt. Compare the things said in the treatise On the Infused Virtues (nn. 1083-1085). The minor is proved as to the third part. For since truth is the object of the intellect, its manifestation is not repugnant to the nature of the intellect itself, but rather fitting to it. Whether the manifestation is made by God, or by man, by whom in fact we witness it being made; whether it is made only with respect to existence, or even with respect to essence, it will always be a certain manifestation of the truth itself, and therefore something congruent with its nature.
107. II. What man can do is to be attributed a fortiori to God, unless it involves imperfection. But man can manifest, and does manifest, his own thoughts to other men. Why, therefore, will God not be able to do so? Is it because this involves imperfection? But to be able to manifest concepts to other beings endowed with intelligence is the same as to be able to communicate something of one’s own knowledge, which certainly belongs to perfection. On the contrary, it belongs to imperfection not to be able to communicate it. Even among men, facility in communicating one’s own concepts is judged a gift of God. Is it not better that God be able to make His will known than that He be unable? Surely this latter position confines the omnipotence of God within limits.
108. III. History is witness that the idea of revelation made divinely in an extraordinary mode for teaching men is most ancient and flourished among nearly all peoples. In order to escape the force of this common sense and consensus, rationalists derive it from the ignorance and stupidity of peoples, who are said to have ascribed to the influence of Divinity all effects whose causes they did not know. But in truth: 1) unless there were already a common persuasion concerning immediate and extraordinary divine communications, a rude people would not easily have risen from some marvelous effect to the immediate influence of divinity. 2) Moreover, the idea or persuasion of peoples concerning some divine revelation is a historical fact whose cause and origin must be determined not through mere speculation and, as it were, a priori, but rather from authentic monuments. But the most ancient monuments, especially the books of Moses, show that revelation was made early by God, indeed already to the first parents. Therefore the universal persuasion concerning divine revelation having been made must be derived from the fact itself, the knowledge of which, although greatly corrupted here and there, was propagated to peoples at least through oral tradition. The second part is proved. I. That which belongs to men and involves no imperfection must certainly be attributed to God. But men can disclose their concepts and wills to others both by themselves and through others. Therefore.
109. II. If mediate revelation were repugnant, this would be either 1) because certain knowledge of its truth cannot be had, or 2) because it is liable to corruption; the difficulties of the adversaries are reduced almost to these points. But that repugnance can be established from neither head. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the first part. For this difficulty would obtain if it were shown that no means is available to God by which He can make authentic and credible the revelation made by Himself to someone, and manifested through this person to others. But the adversaries have never proved that this means is lacking to God; indeed, that there are many means of this sort will be shown when there is discussion of the marks of revelation. Therefore. Surely if an earthly king can provide certain and authentic signs of the mission entrusted to his legate, why shall we deny that the supreme king and lord can accomplish the same thing with respect to His herald? The minor is proved as to the second part. 1) For this difficulty would have force if it were shown that God cannot in any way prevent this corruption. But this is both repugnant to God’s omnipotence and would destroy all historical faith. Therefore. 2) If there were any force in this difficulty, immediate revelation, which we have already shown to be possible, would have to be called impossible a fortiori. In reality, as Perrone argues well (On Religion, part 1, prop. 2): “In the same way as men, entangled by desires, have abused the light of reason which shines upon all, and not a few have fallen into absurdities, so also they would abuse such a common revelation and would draw it down to give a fair appearance to every disgraceful thing, without ever being able to be accused of falsity. For individuals would affirm that they had received from God those things which would be nothing but delusions of their own mind, and there would be as many religions as heads, according as experience demonstrates to have happened in that which they themselves call primitive revelation. Wherefore this advantage also is had from mediate revelation, namely, that unity and agreement, which are the chief marks of true religion, arise from it, as also a public society and profession of men, and also a public bond of that society and profession. Otherwise, lest room be given to fraud, miracles and prophecies would have to be demanded from individuals; and how absurd that is, everyone sees.” Compare the treatise On the Infused Virtues (n. 975 ff.). 3) This difficulty vanishes completely in the Catholic Church, which acknowledges an authority divinely instituted for guarding the deposit of revelation infallibly.
110. The third part is proved. If the revelation of mysteries were impossible, this would be either 1) because there are no mysteries, or 2) because, even if there are, they cannot be manifested to us by God; for to these all the evasions of the adversaries are reduced. But neither can be said. Therefore. The minor is proved as to the first part. For 1) an intellect endowed with greater power and perspicacity can know more things than another intellect of an inferior order and keenness; this is plain even among men. For no one will say that the uneducated understand all those things which a wise man reaches, or that they look into the reasons of things equally perfectly. But the divine intellect by its perfection infinitely exceeds any created intellect. Therefore it understands more things and better than any created intellect. Therefore there are truths known to the divine intellect which nevertheless escape the created intellect; these we call mysteries. “For of two persons,” says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 1, c. 3), “of whom one intuits some thing more subtly by intellect than the other, the one whose intellect is higher understands many things which the other cannot grasp at all, as is plain in a rustic, who can in no way grasp the subtle considerations of philosophy. But the intellect of an angel exceeds the human intellect more than the intellect of the best philosopher exceeds the intellect of the rudest unlearned man… And much more does the divine intellect exceed the angelic than the angelic exceeds the human… Hence human reason does not suffice for grasping all things which an angel can grasp by natural knowledge, nor all things which an angel understands by his natural power.” 2) The same Angelic Doctor proposes another argument thus (loc. cit.): “Since the principle of the whole knowledge which reason perceives concerning some thing is the understanding of the substance of that thing itself, because, according to the doctrine of the Philosopher (Posterior Analytics II, text comm. 2), the principle of demonstration is what a thing is, it is necessary that the mode of those things which are known concerning that thing be according to the mode in which the substance of the thing is understood. Hence if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example of a stone or of a triangle, none of the intelligible aspects of that thing will exceed the faculty of human reason. This, however, does not happen for us concerning God. For the human intellect cannot by natural power attain to grasping His substance, since the knowledge of our intellect, according to the mode of the present life, begins from sense. And therefore those things which do not fall under sense cannot be grasped by the human intellect, except insofar as knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. But sensible things cannot lead our intellect to this, that the divine substance be seen in them as to what it is, since they are effects not equaling the power of the cause. Nevertheless, from sensible things our intellect is led into divine knowledge, so that it knows concerning God that He is, and other things of this kind, which must be attributed to the first principle. Therefore there are certain intelligible divine things which are accessible to human reason; but there are certain others which altogether exceed the power of human reason.” Hence Lactantius (Divine Institutes, book 3, c. 6): “Do not think that you know all things, which belongs to God; nor that you know nothing, which belongs to a beast. For there is something intermediate which belongs to man, that is, knowledge joined and tempered with ignorance.” 3) How many things there are even among created things, concerning whose existence one cannot doubt, while nevertheless their innermost nature remains hidden. If we cast our eyes upon the things which surround us, we plainly see phenomena, for example, of electricity, of magnetism, of the attraction of bodies, etc., concerning which experience itself makes us certain; but no one will assert that their innermost nature and cause are perfectly known by us, although outstanding minds through the long course of centuries, and especially in our own times, have applied their attention to explaining them. If we turn our eyes to ourselves, we find certain mysteries in ourselves; for no one thus far has perfectly known, as to the mode in which they happen, those things which pertain to the threefold life by which we enjoy existence, although each person certainly perceives that they happen. The confessions of philosophers on this matter are read everywhere; compare, if you wish, Hettinger (Apology of Christianity, vol. 1, diss. 2-10). Now if this happens in things which fall under the senses, a fortiori we shall find mysteries in God, whose essence we do not behold, and concerning whose perfections we have only analogical concepts taken from creatures. “For,” says the same holy Doctor (loc. cit.), “we are ignorant of very many properties of sensible things, and of those properties which we apprehend by sense, in many cases we cannot perfectly discover the reason. Therefore much more is human reason insufficient to investigate the reason of that most excellent substance, transcending all intelligible things.” The minor is proved as to the second part. For 1) we have proved universally the possibility of revelation; therefore even truths which surpass the power of human reason can be revealed. 2) In reality, the revelation of mysteries is chiefly attacked from this, that, as Christians admit, mysteries cannot be comprehended and are above reason. Hence the adversaries infer that, even if mysteries are revealed, nothing is understood by human reason, and therefore revelation of this sort is altogether useless. But this reason is of no moment. For once revelation of mysteries has been made, as we said (n. 100 ff.), they are understood with respect to existence; and although their innermost nature remains inaccessible, nevertheless, once revelation is supposed, we form some analogical idea of it. Hence the Vatican Council teaches: “Reason indeed, illuminated by faith, when it seeks diligently, piously, and soberly, obtains, God granting it, some understanding of the mysteries, and that most fruitful, both from the analogy of those things which it knows naturally, and from the connection of the mysteries themselves with one another and with the ultimate end of man.”
111. You will say I: Superintelligible truths seem to involve contradiction; for if something is superintelligible, it has no proportion with intellect. But truth is said by relation to intellect. Hence, since every being is true, if superintelligible truths, that is, mysteries, do not have the character of truth, they are really nothing, or they are not. For above intelligence there can be nothing except contradiction or nothing; indeed every being can be understood. Therefore superintelligible truths do not exist. I answer: Truths superintelligible beyond every intellect do indeed involve contradiction; for they would be truths and would not be. They would be, as is said; they would not be, because, exceeding every intelligence, they could not be in any intellect. But when we say that mysteries are superintelligible truths, we are speaking of the superintelligible not absolutely, but relatively to created intelligences and according to the natural order. Hence we say that those truths are known by the divine intellect, and by revelation are manifested to us in some way.
112. You will say II: But there is no truth superintelligible relative to the human intellect; therefore the difficulty stands. The antecedent is proved. The object of the human intellect is being itself; but besides being there is only nothing. Therefore. I answer by distinguishing: that the object of the human intellect is knowable being according to the mode and degree of human intellection, I concede; knowable according to a higher mode and degree, I subdistinguish: if a higher aid is added, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Thus, for example, in the present state we do not know God naturally except from creatures. But creatures neither represent all the divine perfections, nor are those perfections which they do represent represented with that perfection by which they are in God. Therefore, if we are left to the powers of nature alone, there are many things which we cannot know concerning God; nor do we have a proper concept, but an analogical one, of those things which we know concerning Him. From another side, the power of God is not confined to the order of creation, so that He can effect nothing above that order; but if He effects something above that order, it certainly cannot be gathered from that order. Therefore, for those not seeing God intuitively, this cannot be established except through the free manifestation of God, or revelation. But the deeper solution of this difficulty is sought from the things handed down in metaphysics concerning the mode of our cognition; compare, if you wish, what we said in the treatise On God the Creator, when treating of the object of angelic cognition and of the possibility of the intuitive vision.
113. You will say III: Those things which are above reason are not conformable to reason; but those things which are not conformable to reason are against reason, and therefore nothing, since things which are repugnant are not. Therefore mysteries, which are said to be above reason, really are not. I answer by distinguishing the major: Those things which are above reason are not conformable to reason, that is, they are not drawn from principles known by the natural light, I concede; that is, they are shown to be contrary to principles known by the natural light, I deny. We demonstrated in the treatise On the Virtues (nn. 1048-1050) that there is no conflict between reason and faith. Anyone sees that the whole difficulty is founded on a miserable equivocation. (1) Bayle had proposed the same objection, saying: “The most orthodox admit that we do not know the conformity of our mysteries with the principles of philosophy. It therefore seems to us that they are not conformable to our reason. Now, what seems to us not conformable to our reason seems to us contrary to our reason, just as what does not seem conformable to truth; and thus why should one not say equally both that the mysteries are against our weak reason and that they are above our weak reason?” And yet Leibniz answered (Discourse on the Conformity of Faith with Reason, n. 68): “I answer… that reason here is the chain of truths which we know by the natural light; and in this sense the received axiom is true, without any equivocation. Mysteries surpass our reason, for they contain truths which are not comprised in this chain