30. There have not been lacking, nor are there lacking, men who, although they acknowledge the necessity of religion for the individual man, nevertheless deny it for society; indeed, they judge that it exercises no salutary influence upon society. They think, namely, that society can stand safe without religion, and that a commonwealth, although atheistic and bound together by no bond of religion, can be ruled and governed securely. They have fashioned the absurd and impious hypothesis of an atheist leading a virtuous life, attracted by the beauty of virtue alone and by the approval of his own conscience. They have said that the end of civil society, which they placed in mutual concord and peace among citizens, can be obtained without religion, from natural honesty alone.
31. What these men had dreamed, a certain Robert Owen, born in the village of England whose name is Newton, in the preceding century attempted to bring into act. Gifted with talent and endowed with rather notable efficacy in acting, he applied his mind much to the reading of books, and especially to industry. Imbued with the ideas of impious philosophism, he undertook to found and establish a society without religion, solicitous only for material goods and the enjoyment of bodily things. But truly, by the most disastrous outcome which befell a society of this sort, he was compelled to desist from his proposal. 18 DISP. I. ON RELIGION IN GENERAL.
32. The true origin of this error lies hidden in the philosophical atheism of the last century. For since unbelievers wished to strip man of religion, at first they attempted to accomplish this directly and with all their strength. But when the matter by no means yielded to their desires, they endeavored to attain the same end by an indirect way. And so they undertook to separate religion from the public administration of affairs, with this design indeed: that, once religion had been removed from the governing part, the whole of society would at last stand without religion. For they foolishly persuaded themselves that religion would be torn out by the roots from the hearts of all if public profession of religion once ceased.
33. But in the present time they proclaim not only that religion is by no means necessary, indeed that it is useless to society; but in addition they contend that neglect of social religion is especially conducive to the good of society. Wherefore the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX (Encyclical Quanta cura, December 8, 1864) proscribed this proposition, the first in order: “The best constitution of public society and civil progress altogether require that human society be constituted and governed with no respect had for religion, as if it did not exist, or at least with no distinction made between the true religion and false religions.”
34. Indeed, in the same encyclical the most wise Pontiff briefly indicates the worst consequences of this impious principle. “For,” he says, “where religion has been removed from civil society and the doctrine and authority of divine revelation repudiated, even the genuine notion of justice and human right itself is darkened by shadows and lost, and material force is substituted in place of true justice and legitimate right. From this it is clear why some, with the most certain principles of sound reason entirely neglected and set aside, dare to shout that the will of the people, manifested by what they call public opinion or in some other way, constitutes the supreme law, freed from every divine and human right, and that in the political order accomplished facts, by the very fact that they have been accomplished, have the force of right.”
35. As is plain to the reader, the Supreme Pontiff teaches that these evils follow both - 1) from religion being neglected; and 2) from revealed religion being neglected. But we leave this second point to be treated below, for we are not yet dealing with revelation. These things, therefore, having been set down beforehand, Section II. The proposed question is solved. PROP. II. - Religion, which is the sole foundation of right and justice, is so necessary to civil society that society cannot stand safe without it. Therefore those who attempt to introduce political atheism substitute material force for true justice and legitimate right; and, under the appearance of civil progress, they are truly contriving the ruin of society.
36. Proof I. Civil society cannot stand safe without the duties of justice, fidelity, mutual love, and so forth. But these duties cannot stand safe without religion. Therefore civil society cannot stand safe without religion. Proof of the minor. - 1) Those duties cannot stand safe without true moral necessity, or obligation. But when religion is removed, every moral obligation collapses, as we have said (n. 26). Therefore. - In truth, just as the existence of God the Creator necessarily brings with it the duties of religion, so the denial of religion leads directly to atheism. But if you deny that God exists, you must also deny the existence of the eternal law; for this is nothing other than the highest and supreme account of the governance of all things, existing in the divine mind, moving and directing all things to their due end. But when the eternal law is removed, any law whatever is immediately destroyed; for every law is derived from the eternal law, and from it has all its force of obliging. And again, when every law is removed, every obligation is removed. Therefore, when religion is removed, every obligation is removed. But anyone sees that society cannot stand without moral order, just as it cannot stand among brute animals, in whom moral order cannot have a place. 2) Those duties of justice, fidelity, mutual love, and so forth cannot stand safe without a sufficient sanction. But when religion is removed, a sufficient sanction is lacking. For it is impossible that all good and virtuous citizens should receive rewards from society, and the wicked, punishments. For a) often the honorable actions of the good remain unknown to men, or at least do not come to public notice in such a way that they become known to the administrator of the commonwealth. More numerous are the acts which are performed privately than those which are performed publicly; yet it cannot be denied that from good acts, even private ones, very many goods accrue to the community. b) Even granted that all honorable actions are known by the governor of society, they are often subject to the envy of others, attacked by calumnies, and thus merits are depressed. Hence it happens very often that the good themselves prefer to be unknown rather than known. Conversely, many among depraved men escape punishments either by money, or by frauds, or by plots, and by other deceitful means. Therefore not all the good are presented with reward, nor are all the wicked struck with punishments. Therefore, when religion has been removed, citizens lack an effective means by which they may be drawn to the observance of laws and restrained from transgressing them. c) Surely punishments sanctioned by laws scarcely suffice where religion flourishes; what, then, would it be without religion? Especially, once religion has been removed from the midst, who will set the end of society for himself in the public good rather than in private good? Who will prefer common peace and concord to his own utility? What could restrain the rulers themselves? For they are not subject, at least coercively, to the law made by themselves. Wherefore Tully wrote (On the Laws, book 1, n. 15): “But if justice is obedience to written laws and the institutions of peoples, and if, as the same men say, all things are to be measured by utility, then he who thinks that this matter will be profitable to himself will neglect the laws and break through them, if he can. Thus it happens that there is no justice at all, if it is not by nature; and that which is established on account of utility is overturned by another utility.” d) Without religion, there is no trust in witnesses; and yet an oath has always been held as the most efficacious means for binding faith and ending controversies. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16): “Men swear by one greater than themselves, and the end of all their controversy, for confirmation, is an oath.” And Cicero (On Duties, book 3, c. 31): “Our ancestors wished no bond to be tighter for binding faith than an oath. The laws in the Twelve Tables indicate this, the sacred laws indicate it, treaties indicate it, by which faith is bound even with an enemy; the examinations and censures of the censors indicate it, who judged concerning no matter more diligently than concerning an oath.” And (On the Laws, book 2, c. 7): “Who would deny, when he understands how many things are confirmed by oath, how great for safety are the religious sanctions of treaties? How many has fear of divine punishment called back from crime, and how holy is the society of citizens among themselves, when the immortal gods are interposed both as judges and as witnesses?” - e) Hence all the ancient lawgivers, such as Pythagoras, Solon, Lycurgus, Anacharsis, and so forth, established religion as the foundation of civil institutions and as the most efficacious means by which they would be observed.
37. II. The principal foundation upon which rests the moral necessity, for the individual man, of professing religion is his essential dependence upon God, as we have said (n. 20). But the same reason holds also for society, since it too was originally instituted by God for the good of man. Therefore. Explanation of the minor. We can consider two elements in society, namely the authority which presides and the multitude which is subject to it. Now he who has authority, or the superior, depends upon God not only as he is a man, but also as he is a superior; therefore also as superior he ought to profess his free dependence upon God, that is, religion. But if, acting as superior, he professes this dependence, the multitude ought to follow his impulse, or obey him; and the multitude, acting insofar as it is moved by the superior, truly exercises a social operation. Therefore a social profession of religion must be admitted. Hence St. Augustine (Epistle 185, otherwise 50, to Boniface) says: “He serves God in one way because he is a man, in another because he is also a king. Because he is a man, he serves Him by living faithfully; but because he is also a king, he serves Him by sanctioning with suitable rigor laws that command just things and prohibit contrary things: just as Hezekiah served by destroying groves and temples of idols, and those high places which had been constructed against the precepts of God… just as the King of the Ninevites served by compelling the whole city to placate the Lord… just as Nebuchadnezzar served by prohibiting all those placed in his kingdom from blaspheming God by a terrible law.”
38. III. Civil society cannot stand safe unless authority directs and moves the multitude to pursue the common good. But it cannot perform this without religion. Therefore. The proof of the minor is first plain from what was said in the first argument; for when religion is removed, the moral force for efficaciously moving the multitude is lacking. But further: 1) The chief good is moral rectitude and virtue; but, when religion is removed, moral rectitude and virtue are destroyed; therefore. 2) Things which are from nature are ordered; but order cannot be had unless lower things are subjected to higher things. And thus the proximate end of civil society ought to be subjected to the ultimate end, which is the attainment of God Himself. Indeed, without this subordination authority could promote the immediate end in such a way that it would harm the ultimate end; in which case that end would cease to be a good, and would rather be an evil. But, when religion has been removed, authority cannot promote the proper end of civil society with this subordination to the ultimate end. Therefore.
39. This argument is taken from St. Thomas (On the Governance of Rulers, book 1, c. 14), where he says: “To govern is to lead that which is governed fittingly to its due end… but the same judgment must be made concerning the end of the whole multitude and of one man… Now the ultimate end of a gathered multitude seems to be to live according to virtue. For men are gathered together for this purpose, that they may live well together, which each one living individually could not attain. But the good life is according to virtue. Therefore the virtuous life is the end of the human gathering… If indeed this end could be reached by the power of human nature, it would be necessary that it belong to the office of the king to direct men to this end. For we suppose him to be called king to whom the highest governance in human affairs is committed.” And in chapter 15: “But just as the life by which men live well here is ordered, as to an end, to the blessed life which we hope for in heaven, so whatever particular goods are procured through man, whether riches, or profits, or health, or eloquence, or learning, are ordered to the good of the multitude as to an end. Therefore if, as has been said, he who has care of the ultimate end ought to preside over those who have care of things ordered to the end, and to direct them by his command, it becomes manifest from what has been said that the king, just as he ought to be subject to the dominion and rule which is administered through the office of the priesthood, so he ought to preside over all human offices and order them by the command of his governance. But whoever is charged with perfecting something which is ordered to another as to an end ought to attend to this: that his work be congruent with the end.”
40. Hence St. Augustine also writes (Against Cresconius, book 3, 57): “In this kings, as is divinely commanded them, serve God insofar as they are kings, if in their kingdom they command good things and prohibit evil things, not only those things which pertain to human society, but also those which pertain to divine religion. In vain do you say: let me be left to free choice. For why do you not proclaim that men should be left to free choice in murders and rapes and in any other crimes and shameful deeds? Yet that all these things be restrained by just laws is most useful and most salutary.”
41. IV. In order that it may be better seen that political atheism substitutes material force for legitimate right and leads into the ruin of society, it will be useful to renew the argument in this way: without justice, as we have said, society cannot stand safe; but, when religion is removed, justice cannot stand safe. For justice must bring it about that to each one his right is rendered; therefore where right fails, justice also fails. But no right can be conceived without religion. For right is “an inviolable moral power of doing or obtaining something, or by force of which others remain obligated toward us.” Therefore right in one person supposes obligation in another; otherwise it would be empty and illusory. Hence these two are said to be correlatives. But what power can there be in man, when God has been removed, from whom all things proceed? If there is no right of God over man, whom He created (and this, moreover, is what the impious who deny religion contend), what right of man can there be? What moral necessity can there be in others not to violate our right, if the origin of obligation is found in religion alone?
42. Therefore material force is substituted for the corrupted notion of right, unless society is at once utterly overturned. For there is no society where there is not unity in a multitude: “A commonwealth,” says Cicero (On the Republic, book 3), “is the affair of a people; but a people is not every gathering of a multitude, but is a gathering associated by consensus concerning right and by communion of utility.” But the principle of unity is authority, which has force for reducing a multitude into unity insofar as it has the right of commanding. When right has been removed, nothing remains except physical force for holding the multitude in unity. For if a compact is imagined, this compact itself has no force unless it first be established concerning the moral obligation of faithfully observing it. Compare Liberatore (The Church and the State, c. 2, art. 2).
43. SCHOLION. Since worship is nothing other than the exercise of religion, those things which demonstrate the necessity of religion also establish that worship is necessary. Yet for searching more deeply into the nature of worship, it will be useful to add a few things; a few, I say, because these matters are usually treated in moral philosophy.
44. And first, just as, as we have said (n. 8), religion can be taken for a special virtue, or in a broader sense, so worship is either taken generally for any honorable act tending of itself toward God, the ultimate end, and His glory; or properly and formally for an act of service exhibited to God on account of His excellence. Now St. Thomas notes (II-II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2): “that by the same act man serves God and worships Him; for worship regards the excellence of God, to whom reverence is owed, but service regards the subjection of man, who by his condition is obligated to exhibit reverence to God. And all acts which are attributed to religion pertain to these two, because through all of them man protests the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, either by exhibiting something to Him, or also by assuming something divine.”
45. But although worship can be exhibited to others besides God, since even in others some participated excellence can shine forth, nevertheless, since God’s excellence is supreme and unparticipated (n. 7), the worship which is exhibited to Him is altogether of another and higher account. “Since servant is said in relation to lord,” says St. Thomas (II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 3), “it is necessary that where there is a proper and special account of dominion, there there be a special and proper account of service. But it is manifest that dominion belongs to God according to a certain proper and singular account, because, namely, He made all things and because He holds the highest principality in all things; and therefore a special account of service is owed to Him.” Hence also the worship exhibited to God is given a special name. For while the worship of the saints is called dulia, the worship of the Blessed Virgin, who stands forth among the saints, is called hyperdulia; the worship of God is properly called latria. “Latria,” says St. Augustine (City of God, book 10, c. 1), “according to the usage by which those who established for us the divine utterances spoke, is called that service which pertains to worshiping God, either always or so frequently as to be almost always.”
46. Now integral worship includes acts of a threefold order, namely of the mind, of the heart, and of the body. The first two kinds, since they pertain to the soul, constitute internal worship; but the third makes external worship. And so internal worship is “reverence and service exhibited to God by acts which remain in the soul”; but external worship is “the sensible expression and manifestation of internal worship.” From this definition of external worship it is immediately plain that it must not be separated from internal worship; for one who performs acts of religion outwardly which do not at all agree with the internal acts is called not religious, but a hypocrite. Hence St. Thomas (I-II, q. 101, a. 2) says: “There is a twofold worship of God, interior and exterior. For since man is composed of soul and body, both must be applied to worshiping God; namely, so that the soul may worship with interior worship, and the body with exterior worship. Hence it is said in Psalm 83:3: ‘My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.’ And just as the body is ordered to God through the soul, so exterior worship is ordered to interior worship. Now interior worship consists in this, that the soul be joined to God through intellect and affection. And therefore, according as the intellect and affection of the one worshiping God are rightly joined to God in diverse ways, according to this the exterior acts of man are applied to the worship of God in diverse ways.”
47. Now external worship can be considered either in relation to the individual, and is called private external worship; or in relation to society, and is called public external worship. Hence private worship is that which a man exhibits to God in his own name. But public worship is not so called properly because it is exhibited publicly (private worship itself can be exercised in a public place), but because, with the minds and vows of the members joined together, God is honored in the name of society itself. Now the rites of public worship are in some way determined by God Himself. Hence, as St. Thomas teaches (III, q. 60, a. 5), before the written law “it was determined for them by an interior instinct by what sensible things they should make use for the worship of God”; in the Mosaic law a determinate public worship by which the Jews should worship Him was revealed by God; but in the Christian law certain things were determined by Christ, while in the rest the power of determining worship was given by Him to the Church.
48. These things having been touched upon concerning the nature of worship, anyone sees that the necessity of internal worship is clearly drawn from the arguments already given (n. 19 ff.); for if they prove anything, they show at least the necessity of this worship. Nor is there need here to demonstrate again the necessity of public or social worship; for this is sufficiently established from the arguments proposed above (n. 35 ff.). Surely, if the total dependence of individuals brings it about that they ought to serve God, is not society itself, a certain moral being, ordered by God? If benefits received by any individual whatsoever demand feelings of gratitude toward the benefactor, does not God confer very many benefits upon society, as society? If a society has received some signal benefit, it does not think that it has satisfied its duty unless, through delegates or the foremost men of the people, in the name of society itself, it gives thanks; should not a like account be had of benefits received from God? Hence among all nations some public worship has always flourished and does flourish: there exist priests, rites, sacrifices, and some signs which show public worship common to all; so that even pagan philosophers, who often mocked superstitious ceremonies in their heart, nevertheless confessed that the gods must be worshiped together with the people. It remains, therefore, that we add a few things concerning the necessity of external worship, even private worship.
49. Cardinal Toletus briefly shows this necessity in this way (on II-II, q. 84, a. 7): 1) External worship is necessary by reason of itself. For a) since man consists of soul and body, the whole of which is from God, it is fitting that he worship God by both parts; and just as the soul sins with the body, so by both it ought to worship God; and just as the body also will receive reward in the resurrection, so, etc. - b) We owe so much to God that we cannot in any way repay it. Therefore it is fitting that we serve Him in all possible ways, according to that saying: My bones have rejoiced in God. c) All other virtues have their exterior acts; therefore much more does religion, which is more excellent. d) Since men ought to love one another with fraternal charity, they need exterior worship which is common and known to all. On the contrary, once ceremonies are removed, each one withdraws into his own way. 2) External worship is necessary by reason of internal worship. For a) these exterior things contribute much to spiritual instruction; and therefore Christ gave us sensible sacraments, so that through them we might be instructed concerning the effect of the sacraments in the soul. b) It helps to excite the will to devotion, if someone is nevertheless disposed. c) It helps memory, for we retain things best through some exterior things. - d) It completes the perfection of spiritual things, that is, it causes them to be esteemed much more highly, as experience teaches; but spiritual things become cheapened where these things are not had. - Compare St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 119).
50. You will say I, with Thomasius: God does not need external worship, both because He is supremely rich and because He looks into the innermost feelings of the soul. Therefore external worship is not to be exhibited. The response is: the objection labors under a false supposition; for it supposes that the necessity of external worship is founded in God’s need, whereas the arguments brought forward show something else. St. Thomas had already taught (II-II, q. 81, a. 7): “We exhibit reverence and honor to God, not on account of Himself, because He is full of glory from Himself, and nothing can be added to Him by a creature, but on account of ourselves, because namely through this, that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; and in this its perfection consists. For any thing whatever is perfected by this, that it is subjected to its superior, just as the body by this, that it is vivified by the soul, and the air by this, that it is illuminated by the sun. But the human mind needs, in order that it be joined to God, the guidance of sensible things, because ‘the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through those things which have been made,’ as the Apostle says in Romans 1:20. And therefore in divine worship it is necessary to use some bodily things, so that by them, as by certain signs, the mind of man may be excited to spiritual acts by which it is joined to God. And therefore religion has interior acts as principal, and as pertaining to religion through themselves; but exterior acts as secondary, and ordered to interior acts.”
51. You will say II, with Kant, because he rubs up again the old little objection against prayer (in Oischinger, Encyclopedic Dictionary, t. 19, p. 473): at least no prayer is needed; for the omniscient God does not need us to set forth our necessities to Him. The response is: St. Thomas had also answered this objection, teaching (II-II, q. 83, a. 2, corpus): “By divine providence it is disposed not only what effects are to come about, but also from what causes and in what order they are to proceed. But among other causes, human acts are also causes of certain things. Hence men must do certain things, not so that by their acts they may change the divine disposition, but so that by their acts they may fulfill certain effects according to the order disposed by God; and it is the same also in natural causes. And the like is also true of prayer; for we do not pray for this reason, that we may change the divine disposition, but that we may obtain that which God has disposed to be fulfilled through prayers, namely, so that men by asking may deserve to receive what almighty God disposed before the ages 28 DISP. I. ON RELIGION IN GENERAL. to give before the ages.” And in reply to the first objection he adds: “It is not necessary that we offer prayers to God in order that we may manifest to Him our needs or desires, but so that we ourselves may consider that in these things recourse must be had to divine help.”
52. You will say III. It is read in John 4:23: “The hour comes, and now is, when true adorers will adore the Father in spirit and in truth.” I respond: 1) indirectly. These words cannot exclude external worship, since Scripture does not contradict Scripture. Now Christ Himself adored the Father with external worship both in the Temple and in the Garden, where, having bent His knees and having fallen upon His face, He prayed; He taught the Apostles to pray, and after the Ascension they went to the temple at the ninth hour of prayer, and “they were persevering unanimously in prayer,” etc. 2) Directly, with Toletus: “I answer that Christ there taught the Samaritan woman two things. One is that that adoration was going to cease which took place both in Jerusalem and on that mountain; for she had tacitly asked which adoration was better. The other is that that adoration was to be transformed into a certain spiritual adoration; and it is not repugnant to this that it take place in a place or in a temple, and with our exterior ceremonies. For all this is still spiritual adoration; for our ceremonies are assumed for a twofold reason: first, because they are effects of an abundance of internal devotion; second, to excite internal devotion. But this does not remove the spirituality of adoration. Just as the exterior confession of faith is spiritual, although it is made by the voice, so also is praising God with the mouth, as Christ did: ‘I confess to Thee, Father,’ etc. In this, therefore, our ceremonies differ from Jewish ceremonies: that the Jewish ceremonies were assumed on account of those very ceremonies, insofar as they were figures of future mysteries; and this is what Christ wished to say to the Samaritan woman.” Besides, the impious do not acknowledge the authority of Scripture; and the Reformers themselves would be condemned by its authority, for they use external worship. But discussion of these matters will return where we treat of the visibility of the Church.