LatineEnglish
611. Imprimis, si de facto agatur, de fide est beatitudinem esse perpetuam; in Symbolo enim profitemur credere "vitam aeternam." Unde Matth. 25. 46. legitur: "Et ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum: justi autem in vitam aeternam." - Quamvis autem vox aeternum saepe significet in Sacris litteris solum diuturnam durationem; in citato tamen testimonio significare durationem sine fine, patet ex intelligentia Ecclesiae et Patrum - ex proprietate verbi saepe repetiti, et in re tanti momenti, quae continet praecipuam Dei promissionem - ex aliis Scripturae locis. Sic, ex. gr., Apoc. 3. dicitur: "Foras non egredietur amplius." - 1. Thess. 4.: "Sic semper cum Domino erimus." - 1. Pet. 1., dicitur haereditas illa (beatitudo) "incorruptibilis, incontaminata, immarcescibilis;" et 5. dicitur "immarcescibilis gloriae corona."
611. First, if the matter is considered as a fact, it is of faith that beatitude is perpetual; for in the Creed we profess that we believe "life eternal." Hence Matthew 25:46 reads: "And these shall go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life." Although the word eternal often signifies in Sacred Scripture only a long duration, nevertheless in the cited testimony it signifies duration without end. This is clear from the understanding of the Church and the Fathers, from the property of the word often repeated and in a matter of such importance, which contains the chief promise of God, and from other places of Scripture. Thus, for example, Apocalypse 3 says: "He shall not go out any more." 1 Thessalonians 4: "Thus we shall always be with the Lord." In 1 Peter 1, that inheritance, beatitude, is called "incorruptible, undefiled, unfading"; and in chapter 5 it is called "the unfading crown of glory."
612. Jamvero cum status beatitudinis plures comprehendat perfectiones, statuto facto de perpetuitate ejus durationis, quaeritur de modo, quo diversis illis perfectionibus perpetuitas sit tribuenda. Et dicimus 1. in beatitudine est perfectio quasi privativa, quae consistit in carentia omnis mali tam culpae, quam poenae: haec perpetuo durabit eodem modo absque ulla mutatione. Vid. Apoc. 7. 21. 29.
2. Est in beatitudine perfectio positiva, quae considerari potest vel in actu primo, vel in actu secundo. - In actu primo "perpetuo durabit eadem numero, et in individuo immutabilis, sic enim durabit gratia, lumen gloriae, et similes proprietates, quia in his maxime consistit perpetuitas hujus status, nec mutantur, nec amittuntur, nisi per peccatum. Item de perfectionibus corporum, quae consistunt veluti in actu primo, dicitur 1. ad Corinth. quod 'surgit corpus in incorruptionem;' ergo multo magis id verum est de perfectionibus animae."
3. Quoad actum secundum vero, distinguendae sunt essentiales beatitudinis perfectiones ab accidentalibus. - In actibus secundis, in quibus consistit essentialis beatitudo, vel qui cum illa habent intrinsecam connexionem "erit perpetuitas et immutabilitas in ipsismet actibus, etiam in individuo semper manentibus, absque ulla mutatione, quae in illis fiat: et hoc modo intelligenda est proprie aeternitas illius vitae, et sic dicuntur Angeli 'semper videre faciem Patris,' et de illo gaudio dicitur: 'Gaudium vestrum nemo tollet a vobis:' et supra, disp. 9., ostendi hos actus esse necessarios: ergo iidem numero semper perseverant, nec possunt augeri, vel diminui."
4. Perfectiones vero accidentales in actu secundo consideratae "suo quidem modo erunt perpetuae, non tamen ita, ut eaedem numero perseverent, quia nihil est, quod necessitet beatos ad habendos semper eosdem numero actus considerationis, aut gaudii circa bona creata: erit ergo in his perpetuitas quoad duo, primum, quia semper erit in potestate beati habere hujusmodi gaudia, et actus prout sibi placuerit, nam semper conservat principia illorum per modum actus primi, quo sua voluntate uti potest. Secundo quoad quandam perpetuam vicissitudinem horum actuum, et gaudiorum, quia a cogitatione unius rei transibunt ad cogitationem alterius, etc." Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 14. sect. 1.)
2. Est in beatitudine perfectio positiva, quae considerari potest vel in actu primo, vel in actu secundo. - In actu primo "perpetuo durabit eadem numero, et in individuo immutabilis, sic enim durabit gratia, lumen gloriae, et similes proprietates, quia in his maxime consistit perpetuitas hujus status, nec mutantur, nec amittuntur, nisi per peccatum. Item de perfectionibus corporum, quae consistunt veluti in actu primo, dicitur 1. ad Corinth. quod 'surgit corpus in incorruptionem;' ergo multo magis id verum est de perfectionibus animae."
3. Quoad actum secundum vero, distinguendae sunt essentiales beatitudinis perfectiones ab accidentalibus. - In actibus secundis, in quibus consistit essentialis beatitudo, vel qui cum illa habent intrinsecam connexionem "erit perpetuitas et immutabilitas in ipsismet actibus, etiam in individuo semper manentibus, absque ulla mutatione, quae in illis fiat: et hoc modo intelligenda est proprie aeternitas illius vitae, et sic dicuntur Angeli 'semper videre faciem Patris,' et de illo gaudio dicitur: 'Gaudium vestrum nemo tollet a vobis:' et supra, disp. 9., ostendi hos actus esse necessarios: ergo iidem numero semper perseverant, nec possunt augeri, vel diminui."
4. Perfectiones vero accidentales in actu secundo consideratae "suo quidem modo erunt perpetuae, non tamen ita, ut eaedem numero perseverent, quia nihil est, quod necessitet beatos ad habendos semper eosdem numero actus considerationis, aut gaudii circa bona creata: erit ergo in his perpetuitas quoad duo, primum, quia semper erit in potestate beati habere hujusmodi gaudia, et actus prout sibi placuerit, nam semper conservat principia illorum per modum actus primi, quo sua voluntate uti potest. Secundo quoad quandam perpetuam vicissitudinem horum actuum, et gaudiorum, quia a cogitatione unius rei transibunt ad cogitationem alterius, etc." Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 14. sect. 1.)
612. Now since the state of beatitude comprehends several perfections, once the fact of the perpetuity of its duration has been established, the question is asked about the mode in which perpetuity is to be attributed to those different perfections. And we say: 1. in beatitude there is a quasi-privative perfection, which consists in the lack of every evil, both of fault and of punishment. This will endure perpetually in the same mode without any change. See Apocalypse 7, 21, 29.
2. There is in beatitude a positive perfection, which can be considered either in first act or in second act. In first act, "it will endure perpetually the same in number and immutable in the individual; for thus grace, the light of glory, and similar properties will endure, because in these especially consists the perpetuity of this state, and they are neither changed nor lost except through sin. Likewise concerning the perfections of bodies, which consist as it were in first act, it is said in 1 Corinthians that 'the body rises in incorruption'; therefore much more is this true concerning the perfections of the soul."
3. With respect to second act, however, the essential perfections of beatitude must be distinguished from the accidental perfections. "In the second acts in which essential beatitude consists, or which have an intrinsic connection with it, there will be perpetuity and immutability in the acts themselves, even as they always remain the same in number in the individual, without any change occurring in them. And in this way the eternity of that life is properly to be understood; and thus the Angels are said 'always to see the face of the Father,' and concerning that joy it is said, 'Your joy no one shall take from you.' And above, in disputation 9, I showed that these acts are necessary; therefore they always persevere the same in number and cannot be increased or diminished."
4. But accidental perfections considered in second act "will indeed be perpetual in their own way, yet not in such a way that the same acts in number persevere, because there is nothing which necessitates the blessed to have always the same acts in number of consideration or of joy concerning created goods. Therefore in these there will be perpetuity in two respects: first, because it will always be in the power of the blessed one to have joys and acts of this kind as it shall please him, for he always preserves the principles of them by way of first act, by which he can use his will; second, with respect to a certain perpetual succession of these acts and joys, because they will pass from the thought of one thing to the thought of another, etc." See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 14, section 1).
2. There is in beatitude a positive perfection, which can be considered either in first act or in second act. In first act, "it will endure perpetually the same in number and immutable in the individual; for thus grace, the light of glory, and similar properties will endure, because in these especially consists the perpetuity of this state, and they are neither changed nor lost except through sin. Likewise concerning the perfections of bodies, which consist as it were in first act, it is said in 1 Corinthians that 'the body rises in incorruption'; therefore much more is this true concerning the perfections of the soul."
3. With respect to second act, however, the essential perfections of beatitude must be distinguished from the accidental perfections. "In the second acts in which essential beatitude consists, or which have an intrinsic connection with it, there will be perpetuity and immutability in the acts themselves, even as they always remain the same in number in the individual, without any change occurring in them. And in this way the eternity of that life is properly to be understood; and thus the Angels are said 'always to see the face of the Father,' and concerning that joy it is said, 'Your joy no one shall take from you.' And above, in disputation 9, I showed that these acts are necessary; therefore they always persevere the same in number and cannot be increased or diminished."
4. But accidental perfections considered in second act "will indeed be perpetual in their own way, yet not in such a way that the same acts in number persevere, because there is nothing which necessitates the blessed to have always the same acts in number of consideration or of joy concerning created goods. Therefore in these there will be perpetuity in two respects: first, because it will always be in the power of the blessed one to have joys and acts of this kind as it shall please him, for he always preserves the principles of them by way of first act, by which he can use his will; second, with respect to a certain perpetual succession of these acts and joys, because they will pass from the thought of one thing to the thought of another, etc." See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 14, section 1).
613. Quaestio, quae superest, est de natura perpetuitatis, quae beatitudini tribuenda est: quaeritur nempe utrum beatitudo sit natura sua et ab intrinseco incorruptibilis, vel solum ex extrinseca et libera Dei providentia.
613. The question which remains concerns the nature of the perpetuity which is to be attributed to beatitude. Namely, it is asked whether beatitude is by its nature and intrinsically incorruptible, or only by the extrinsic and free providence of God.
614. Ut intelligatur status quaestionis, breviter notamus corruptibile et incorruptibile dici respectu causae, a qua aliquid corrumpi potest vel non. Triplex autem causa potest hic considerari: causa intrinseca, respectu cujus aliquid dicitur intrinsece corruptibile, si habeat in se ipso, in sua ipsa natura elementa dissolutionis et corruptionis. - Causa extrinseca creata, respectu cujus aliquid dicitur corruptibile, si ab aliquo naturali agente destrui aut corrumpi possit. - Causa denique increata, Deus.
614. In order that the state of the question may be understood, we briefly note that corruptible and incorruptible are said with respect to the cause by which something can or cannot be corrupted. Now a threefold cause can be considered here: an intrinsic cause, with respect to which something is called intrinsically corruptible if it has in itself, in its very nature, elements of dissolution and corruption; an extrinsic created cause, with respect to which something is called corruptible if it can be destroyed or corrupted by some natural agent; and finally the uncreated cause, God.
615. Jamvero quod dicitur natura sua perpetuum, ab intrinseco incorruptibile, excludit quamcumque causam corruptionis intrinsecam et quamlibet creatam causam, a qua corrumpi possit. Si vero comparetur ad causam increatam, Deum; distinguendum est inter potentiam Dei ordinariam et absolutam. Ut aliquid dicatur natura sua incorruptibile, requiritur ut a Deo, juxta suam potentiam ordinariam agente, corrumpi nequeat: incorruptibilitas enim certe excludit intrinsecam corruptionis causam; et Deus de potentia ordinaria agit secundum propriam rerum naturam et exigentiam. Si autem agatur de potentia Dei absoluta, nulla creatura dici potest incorruptibilis, quatenus nec de potentia Dei absoluta destrui aut annihilari potest: "hoc modo," inquit Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 14. sect. 2. n. 7.), "concedo posse lumen (gloriae) corrumpi, sicut posset etiam Deus corrumpere coelum, seu annihilare Angelum; id autem non satis est, ut res dicatur natura sua corruptibilis." Vid. etiam 1. p. q. 50. a. 5. ad 3.; et q. 75. a. 6. ad 2.
615. Now what is called perpetual by its nature, intrinsically incorruptible, excludes any intrinsic cause of corruption and any created cause by which it can be corrupted. But if it is compared to the uncreated cause, God, one must distinguish between God's ordinary and absolute power. In order that something be called incorruptible by its nature, it is required that it cannot be corrupted by God acting according to his ordinary power; for incorruptibility certainly excludes an intrinsic cause of corruption, and God by ordinary power acts according to the proper nature and exigency of things. But if the question concerns God's absolute power, no creature can be called incorruptible in the sense that it cannot be destroyed or annihilated even by God's absolute power. "In this way," says Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 14, section 2, no. 7), "I grant that the light of glory can be corrupted, just as God could also corrupt heaven or annihilate an Angel; but that is not sufficient for a thing to be called corruptible by its nature." See also I, question 50, article 5, reply 3, and question 75, article 6, reply 2.
616. Beatitudo igitur natura sua perpetua dicitur, quatenus nullam habet intrinsecam corruptionis causam - quatenus nulla est causa creata, a qua corrumpi possit - quatenus nec Deus de potentia ordinaria potest illam corrumpere - quamvis id possit de potentia absoluta. "Si beatitudo hominis vel Angeli," inquit Lessius (de sum. bon. l. 3. c. 9. n. 114.) "comparetur ad Deum, sic haud dubie natura sua est corruptibilis; sicut et omnis creatura, etiam coeli et Angeli. Talis enim est naturae ut a Deo corrumpi et destrui possit: estque haec corruptibilitas illi intrinseca. Hoc modo sancti Patres passim dicunt nullam creaturam natura sua esse incorruptibilem, sed sola Dei voluntate et gratia, qui dignatur illam conservare. Ratio est, quia cum sit ex nihilo, et ex se nihil, assidue pendet ex libero Dei influxu, quo dat illi totum suum esse, et illud assidue conservat: sicut pondus quod quis e terra sursum attraxit, et tenet in aere, assidue pendet a manu tenentis: et sicut imago in speculo pendet ab objecto."
616. Therefore beatitude is called perpetual by its nature insofar as it has no intrinsic cause of corruption; insofar as there is no created cause by which it can be corrupted; and insofar as not even God by ordinary power can corrupt it, although he could do so by absolute power. "If the beatitude of man or Angel," says Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 3, chapter 9, no. 114), "is compared to God, then undoubtedly by its nature it is corruptible, just as every creature is, even the heavens and Angels. For it is of such a nature that it can be corrupted and destroyed by God; and this corruptibility is intrinsic to it. In this way the holy Fathers everywhere say that no creature is incorruptible by its nature, but only by the will and grace of God, who deigns to preserve it. The reason is that, since it is from nothing and of itself nothing, it continually depends on the free influx of God, by which he gives it its whole being and continually preserves it, just as a weight which someone has drawn upward from the ground and holds in the air continually depends on the hand of the one holding it, and just as an image in a mirror depends on the object."
617. Duo ultimo notanda sunt. 1. Supposita divina ordinatione, qua Deus statuit beatitudinem fore sempiternam, et "nostro merito, ut nunc est; non posset Deus etiam de potentia absoluta privare beatum beatitudine et haec est certa securitas beatorum, quia sciunt non posse Deum esse injustum, nec negare seipsum." Suarez (l. c. sect. 1. n. 6.)
2. Quamvis perpetuitas beatitudinis ab intrinseco magis directe probetur excludendo singulas corruptionis causas, quae, ex dictis, excludendae sunt ut aliquid dicatur natura sua incorruptibile; sufficit tamen ostendere beatitudinem talem esse natura sua, ut postulet perpetuam durationem: ex hoc enim facile deducitur, nec ullam habere intrinsecam corruptionis causam, nec ab ulla creata causa, aut a Deo ipso de potentia ordinaria destrui posse.
2. Quamvis perpetuitas beatitudinis ab intrinseco magis directe probetur excludendo singulas corruptionis causas, quae, ex dictis, excludendae sunt ut aliquid dicatur natura sua incorruptibile; sufficit tamen ostendere beatitudinem talem esse natura sua, ut postulet perpetuam durationem: ex hoc enim facile deducitur, nec ullam habere intrinsecam corruptionis causam, nec ab ulla creata causa, aut a Deo ipso de potentia ordinaria destrui posse.
617. Two things are to be noted last. 1. Given the divine ordination by which God has established that beatitude will be eternal, and "given our merit, as it now stands, God could not even by absolute power deprive a blessed one of beatitude; and this is the certain security of the blessed, because they know that God cannot be unjust or deny himself." Suarez, same place, section 1, no. 6.
2. Although the perpetuity of beatitude from within is proved more directly by excluding the individual causes of corruption which, from what has been said, must be excluded in order that something be called incorruptible by its nature, nevertheless it suffices to show that beatitude is by its nature such that it demands perpetual duration. For from this it is easily deduced both that it has no intrinsic cause of corruption, and that it cannot be destroyed by any created cause or by God himself according to ordinary power.
2. Although the perpetuity of beatitude from within is proved more directly by excluding the individual causes of corruption which, from what has been said, must be excluded in order that something be called incorruptible by its nature, nevertheless it suffices to show that beatitude is by its nature such that it demands perpetual duration. For from this it is easily deduced both that it has no intrinsic cause of corruption, and that it cannot be destroyed by any created cause or by God himself according to ordinary power.
618. His positis sciendum est, quod "quidam ausi sunt," inquit Suarez (l. c. sect. 2. n. 2.), "ita loqui, ut dicerent illam beatitudinem esse corruptibilem natura sua. Quae opinio improbabilis omnino est, nam in re nihil potest fere dicere diversum a caeteris auctoribus, et in modo loquendi aliena est a tota antiquitate, et a modo loquendi etiam Scripturae et Sanctorum."
618. These things having been posited, one must know that "some have dared," says Suarez (same place, section 2, no. 2), "to speak in such a way that they said that beatitude is corruptible by its nature. This opinion is altogether improbable, for in reality it can say almost nothing different from the other authors, and in its manner of speaking it is alien to the whole of antiquity and to the manner of speaking even of Scripture and of the Saints."
619. Unde dicimus:
PROP. XLV. Beatitudo perfecta est natura sua et ab intrinseco perpetua.
Prob. I. Argumento D. Thomae 1. 2. q. 5. a. 4., quod sic proponi potest. Beatitudo perfecta natura sua postulat durationem sine fine; ergo est ab intrinseco et natura sua perpetua.
Prob. antec. Beatitudo perfecta est natura sua bonum adaequate satiativum appetitus rationalis; atqui talis non esset natura sua, si natura sua non postularet durationem sine termino. Ergo.
Prob. min. Si natura sua non postularet durationem sine termino, bonum in quo ponitur beatitudo per se amitti posset; atqui si hoc amitti posset, jam beatitudo non esset bonum adaequate satiativum appetitus rationalis. Ergo.
Prob. haec minor. Si bonum illud amitti posset vel 1. Beatus id novit vel 2. ignorat et putat non posse amitti - vel 3. negative se habet, neutrum judicando.
Si 1um, "non potest esse beatus, quia semper erit anxius, et ingenti maerore afficietur, quod amissurus sit tantum bonum. Quo enim plus amat bonum suum quod possidet, eo plus dolet quando cogitat se illud amissurum: sicut patet in illis qui bonum suum collocant in rebus hujus vitae, qui magno moerore afficiuntur dum cogitant de morte, qua omnia ista perdent."
Si 2um, et sic etiam non est beatus; tum quia beatitudo omne malum excludere debet: error autem est malum intellectus; tum quia gaudium ejus principale falso nititur fundamento. "Praecipuum enim gaudium Beatorum nascitur ex eo, quod possessio boni credatur fore sempiterna; sicut praecipua afflictio damnatorum est, quod videant mala sua fore perpetua. Quare si hoc falsum est, fundamentum gaudii falsum est, ac proinde non potest hominem vere beatum efficere: error enim circa ipsum beatitudinis fundamentum maxime repugnat beatitudini."
Si 3um, "In primis id fieri non potest tanto tempore. Magnus enim esset stupor, numquam cogitari an possessio summi boni sit futura aeterna, an temporalis. Deinde eo etiam tempore, quo de neutro cogitaret, non esset perfecte beatus: tum quia non apprehenderet suum bonum ut aeternum, ex qua tamen apprehensione nascitur praecipuum gaudium: tum quia etiam si animus ejus actu non sit inquietus, eo quod non cogitet de amissione futura: tamen inquietudinis et maeroris radicem in se habet, quam simul atque animadvertit, necessario tristabitur, nempe se posse suum bonum amittere."
Dices: "Ad rationem beatitudinis non requiritur exclusio omnis tristitiae, ut patet in Christo Domino: ergo etiam non requiritur, ut omnis moeror vel timor amittendae beatitudinis excludatur."
Resp. "Etsi ratio beatitudinis non postulet ut actu omnem maerorem excludat, tamen postulat ut bonum illud in quo consistit, ex se sit sufficiens excludere omnem maerorem, adeo ut reipsa id praestiturum sit, nisi divinitus impediatur. Tantum enim est illud bonum, ut carentia aliorum bonorum nihili aestimetur modo ipsum salvum remaneat. Visio vero Dei quae solum ad tempus est duratura, vel quam ipse videns timet amittere, non est sufficiens ut excludat omnem maerorem."
Prob. II. Licet in beatitudine sint visio, amor, gaudium; ita tamen se habent amor et gaudium respectu visionis, ut ab ea pendeant, et ea posita, necessario sequantur. - Visio autem pendet ab intellectu, a lumine gloriae, a divino influxu. - De intellectu, facultate spirituali, nulla hic potest esse quaestio; divinus influxus, de potentia ordinaria, datur secundum rei exigentiam: quaestio reducitur ad lumen gloriae. - Quare si probetur hoc esse ab intrinseco incorruptibile, hoc ipso probatur beatitudinem esse natura sua perpetuam. Unde:
Id dicendum est natura sua incorruptibile, quod nec habet principium intrinsecum corruptionis - nec extrinsecum creatum, seu contrarium - nec potest desinere per suspensionem divini influxus de potentia Dei ordinaria. Atqui tale est lumen gloriae. Ergo.
Prob. min. quoad 1am partem: nullum habet intrinsecum corruptionis principium. Nam a) lumen illud est spirituale, sicut subjectum in quo est (intellectus) est spirituale. - b) Lumen illud est suprema quaedam participatio et imago luminis increati, quo Deus seipsum videt. Unde si Angelicae substantiae, et anima rationalis, cum sint imago Dei, nullum habent intrinsecum corruptionis principium; a fortiori hoc dicendum est de illo lumine.
Prob. min. quoad 2am partem: non habet principium extrinsecum creatum, seu contrarium, a quo corrumpi possit. Nam a) "mens Deo conjuncta (per illud lumen)," inquit D. Th. art. cit., "super omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab hujusmodi conjunctione nullum aliud agens potest ipsam excludere." - b) Quod non habeat contrarium "patet," inquit Suarez (l. c. sect. 2. n. 4.), "quia hoc in universum commune est omni lumini in suo ordine perfecto." - c) Error qui aliquo modo ei repugnat, non potest obesse, quia mens eo ipso quod lumine gloriae illustratur, nullius erroris est capax; "visio enim illa sic perficit subjectum, ut reddat illud omnino incapax erroris sibi contrarii, nec versantur proprie circa idem subjectum, ut idem; quia error respicit subjectum quatenus naturaliter perfici potest aut deficere; visio autem elevat subjectum, et altiori modo perficit secundum capacitatem obedientialem ejus." - Suarez l. c. - d) Quod si loquamur de causa morali corruptionis, haec est solum peccatum: peccatum autem est impossibile in vidente Deum intuitive, ut deinde probabitur.
Prob. min. quoad 3am partem: non potest de potentia ordinaria desinere per suspensionem divini influxus. Influxus enim rerum naturae proportionatus, et hinc debitus nequit de potentia ordinaria auferri; atqui intellectus illustratus lumine gloriae in coelis, non habens ullum intrinsecum aut extrinsecum creatum corruptionis principium, exigit semper esse. Ergo.
Concludimus argumento S. Augustini, quod etiam secundo loco exponit D. Thomas l. c. "Quid enim," inquit (de civ. Dei l. 12. c. 20.), "illa beatitudine falsius, atque fallacius, ubi nos futuros miseros, aut in tanta veritatis luce nesciamus, aut in summa felicitatis arce timeamus? Si enim venturam ibi calamitatem ignoraturi sumus, peritior est hic nostra miseria, ubi venturam beatitudinem novimus. Si autem nos illic clades imminens non latebit, beatius tempora transigit anima misera, quibus transactis ad beatitudinem sublevetur, quam beata, quibus transactis, in miseriam resolvatur. Atque ita spes nostrae infelicitatis est felix, et felicitatis infelix. Unde fit, ut quia hic mala praesentia patimur, ibi metuimus imminentia; verius semper miseri, quam beati aliquando esse possimus."
Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 14.) - Lessium (de sum. bon. l. 3. c. 9.) - Sylvium (in cit. art. D. Thomae.)
PROP. XLV. Beatitudo perfecta est natura sua et ab intrinseco perpetua.
Prob. I. Argumento D. Thomae 1. 2. q. 5. a. 4., quod sic proponi potest. Beatitudo perfecta natura sua postulat durationem sine fine; ergo est ab intrinseco et natura sua perpetua.
Prob. antec. Beatitudo perfecta est natura sua bonum adaequate satiativum appetitus rationalis; atqui talis non esset natura sua, si natura sua non postularet durationem sine termino. Ergo.
Prob. min. Si natura sua non postularet durationem sine termino, bonum in quo ponitur beatitudo per se amitti posset; atqui si hoc amitti posset, jam beatitudo non esset bonum adaequate satiativum appetitus rationalis. Ergo.
Prob. haec minor. Si bonum illud amitti posset vel 1. Beatus id novit vel 2. ignorat et putat non posse amitti - vel 3. negative se habet, neutrum judicando.
Si 1um, "non potest esse beatus, quia semper erit anxius, et ingenti maerore afficietur, quod amissurus sit tantum bonum. Quo enim plus amat bonum suum quod possidet, eo plus dolet quando cogitat se illud amissurum: sicut patet in illis qui bonum suum collocant in rebus hujus vitae, qui magno moerore afficiuntur dum cogitant de morte, qua omnia ista perdent."
Si 2um, et sic etiam non est beatus; tum quia beatitudo omne malum excludere debet: error autem est malum intellectus; tum quia gaudium ejus principale falso nititur fundamento. "Praecipuum enim gaudium Beatorum nascitur ex eo, quod possessio boni credatur fore sempiterna; sicut praecipua afflictio damnatorum est, quod videant mala sua fore perpetua. Quare si hoc falsum est, fundamentum gaudii falsum est, ac proinde non potest hominem vere beatum efficere: error enim circa ipsum beatitudinis fundamentum maxime repugnat beatitudini."
Si 3um, "In primis id fieri non potest tanto tempore. Magnus enim esset stupor, numquam cogitari an possessio summi boni sit futura aeterna, an temporalis. Deinde eo etiam tempore, quo de neutro cogitaret, non esset perfecte beatus: tum quia non apprehenderet suum bonum ut aeternum, ex qua tamen apprehensione nascitur praecipuum gaudium: tum quia etiam si animus ejus actu non sit inquietus, eo quod non cogitet de amissione futura: tamen inquietudinis et maeroris radicem in se habet, quam simul atque animadvertit, necessario tristabitur, nempe se posse suum bonum amittere."
Dices: "Ad rationem beatitudinis non requiritur exclusio omnis tristitiae, ut patet in Christo Domino: ergo etiam non requiritur, ut omnis moeror vel timor amittendae beatitudinis excludatur."
Resp. "Etsi ratio beatitudinis non postulet ut actu omnem maerorem excludat, tamen postulat ut bonum illud in quo consistit, ex se sit sufficiens excludere omnem maerorem, adeo ut reipsa id praestiturum sit, nisi divinitus impediatur. Tantum enim est illud bonum, ut carentia aliorum bonorum nihili aestimetur modo ipsum salvum remaneat. Visio vero Dei quae solum ad tempus est duratura, vel quam ipse videns timet amittere, non est sufficiens ut excludat omnem maerorem."
Prob. II. Licet in beatitudine sint visio, amor, gaudium; ita tamen se habent amor et gaudium respectu visionis, ut ab ea pendeant, et ea posita, necessario sequantur. - Visio autem pendet ab intellectu, a lumine gloriae, a divino influxu. - De intellectu, facultate spirituali, nulla hic potest esse quaestio; divinus influxus, de potentia ordinaria, datur secundum rei exigentiam: quaestio reducitur ad lumen gloriae. - Quare si probetur hoc esse ab intrinseco incorruptibile, hoc ipso probatur beatitudinem esse natura sua perpetuam. Unde:
Id dicendum est natura sua incorruptibile, quod nec habet principium intrinsecum corruptionis - nec extrinsecum creatum, seu contrarium - nec potest desinere per suspensionem divini influxus de potentia Dei ordinaria. Atqui tale est lumen gloriae. Ergo.
Prob. min. quoad 1am partem: nullum habet intrinsecum corruptionis principium. Nam a) lumen illud est spirituale, sicut subjectum in quo est (intellectus) est spirituale. - b) Lumen illud est suprema quaedam participatio et imago luminis increati, quo Deus seipsum videt. Unde si Angelicae substantiae, et anima rationalis, cum sint imago Dei, nullum habent intrinsecum corruptionis principium; a fortiori hoc dicendum est de illo lumine.
Prob. min. quoad 2am partem: non habet principium extrinsecum creatum, seu contrarium, a quo corrumpi possit. Nam a) "mens Deo conjuncta (per illud lumen)," inquit D. Th. art. cit., "super omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab hujusmodi conjunctione nullum aliud agens potest ipsam excludere." - b) Quod non habeat contrarium "patet," inquit Suarez (l. c. sect. 2. n. 4.), "quia hoc in universum commune est omni lumini in suo ordine perfecto." - c) Error qui aliquo modo ei repugnat, non potest obesse, quia mens eo ipso quod lumine gloriae illustratur, nullius erroris est capax; "visio enim illa sic perficit subjectum, ut reddat illud omnino incapax erroris sibi contrarii, nec versantur proprie circa idem subjectum, ut idem; quia error respicit subjectum quatenus naturaliter perfici potest aut deficere; visio autem elevat subjectum, et altiori modo perficit secundum capacitatem obedientialem ejus." - Suarez l. c. - d) Quod si loquamur de causa morali corruptionis, haec est solum peccatum: peccatum autem est impossibile in vidente Deum intuitive, ut deinde probabitur.
Prob. min. quoad 3am partem: non potest de potentia ordinaria desinere per suspensionem divini influxus. Influxus enim rerum naturae proportionatus, et hinc debitus nequit de potentia ordinaria auferri; atqui intellectus illustratus lumine gloriae in coelis, non habens ullum intrinsecum aut extrinsecum creatum corruptionis principium, exigit semper esse. Ergo.
Concludimus argumento S. Augustini, quod etiam secundo loco exponit D. Thomas l. c. "Quid enim," inquit (de civ. Dei l. 12. c. 20.), "illa beatitudine falsius, atque fallacius, ubi nos futuros miseros, aut in tanta veritatis luce nesciamus, aut in summa felicitatis arce timeamus? Si enim venturam ibi calamitatem ignoraturi sumus, peritior est hic nostra miseria, ubi venturam beatitudinem novimus. Si autem nos illic clades imminens non latebit, beatius tempora transigit anima misera, quibus transactis ad beatitudinem sublevetur, quam beata, quibus transactis, in miseriam resolvatur. Atque ita spes nostrae infelicitatis est felix, et felicitatis infelix. Unde fit, ut quia hic mala praesentia patimur, ibi metuimus imminentia; verius semper miseri, quam beati aliquando esse possimus."
Vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 14.) - Lessium (de sum. bon. l. 3. c. 9.) - Sylvium (in cit. art. D. Thomae.)
619. Hence we say:
PROPOSITION XLV. Perfect beatitude is by its nature and intrinsically perpetual.
Proof I. From the argument of St. Thomas, I-II, question 5, article 4, which can be set forth thus. Perfect beatitude by its nature demands duration without end; therefore it is intrinsically and by its nature perpetual.
The antecedent is proved. Perfect beatitude is by its nature a good adequately satisfying the rational appetite; but it would not be such by its nature if by its nature it did not demand duration without terminus. Therefore.
The minor is proved. If by its nature it did not demand duration without terminus, the good in which beatitude is placed could of itself be lost; but if this could be lost, beatitude would no longer be the good adequately satisfying the rational appetite. Therefore.
This minor is proved. If that good could be lost, either 1. the blessed one knows this, or 2. he is ignorant of it and thinks it cannot be lost, or 3. he stands negatively, judging neither.
If the first, "he cannot be blessed, because he will always be anxious and will be affected with great sorrow that he is going to lose so great a good. For the more he loves the good which he possesses, the more he grieves when he thinks that he is going to lose it, as is clear in those who place their good in the things of this life, who are affected with great sorrow when they think of death, by which they will lose all those things."
If the second, and thus he also is not blessed: both because beatitude must exclude every evil, and error is an evil of the intellect; and because his principal joy rests upon a false foundation. "For the chief joy of the blessed arises from this, that the possession of the good is believed to be eternal, just as the chief affliction of the damned is that they see that their evils will be perpetual. Therefore, if this is false, the foundation of joy is false, and accordingly it cannot make a man truly blessed; for error concerning the very foundation of beatitude is especially repugnant to beatitude."
If the third, "in the first place, this cannot happen for so long a time. For it would be great stupor never to think whether the possession of the highest good is going to be eternal or temporal. Then, even at the time when he would think of neither, he would not be perfectly blessed: both because he would not apprehend his good as eternal, from which apprehension, nevertheless, the principal joy arises; and because even if his soul were not actually restless, because he was not thinking about future loss, nevertheless he would have within himself the root of restlessness and sorrow, which, as soon as he noticed it, would necessarily make him sad, namely that he could lose his good."
You will say: "For the ratio of beatitude, the exclusion of every sadness is not required, as is clear in Christ the Lord; therefore neither is it required that every sorrow or fear of losing beatitude be excluded."
I answer: "Although the ratio of beatitude does not demand that it actually exclude every sorrow, nevertheless it demands that that good in which it consists be of itself sufficient to exclude every sorrow, so that in reality it will accomplish this unless it is divinely impeded. For that good is so great that the lack of other goods is esteemed as nothing, provided that it remains safe. But the vision of God which is going to last only for a time, or which the one seeing fears to lose, is not sufficient to exclude every sorrow."
Proof II. Although in beatitude there are vision, love, and joy, nevertheless love and joy are related to vision in such a way that they depend on it, and once it is posited, they necessarily follow. But vision depends on the intellect, on the light of glory, and on divine influx. Concerning the intellect, a spiritual faculty, there can be no question here; divine influx, by ordinary power, is given according to the exigency of the thing. The question is reduced to the light of glory. Therefore, if it is proved that this is intrinsically incorruptible, by that very fact it is proved that beatitude is by its nature perpetual. Hence:
That must be called incorruptible by its nature which neither has an intrinsic principle of corruption, nor a created extrinsic principle, or contrary, nor can cease through suspension of divine influx by God's ordinary power. But such is the light of glory. Therefore.
The minor is proved with respect to the first part: it has no intrinsic principle of corruption. For a) that light is spiritual, just as the subject in which it exists, the intellect, is spiritual. b) That light is a certain supreme participation and image of the uncreated light by which God sees himself. Hence if Angelic substances and the rational soul, since they are the image of God, have no intrinsic principle of corruption, this must be said a fortiori of that light.
The minor is proved with respect to the second part: it does not have a created extrinsic principle, or contrary, by which it can be corrupted. For a) "the mind joined to God through that light," says St. Thomas in the cited article, "is elevated above all other things; and thus no other agent can exclude it from such conjunction." b) That it has no contrary "is clear," says Suarez (same place, section 2, no. 4), "because this is universally common to every light perfect in its own order." c) Error, which is repugnant to it in some way, cannot harm it, because the mind, by the very fact that it is illumined by the light of glory, is capable of no error; "for that vision so perfects the subject that it renders it altogether incapable of error contrary to itself, nor are they properly concerned with the same subject as the same; because error regards the subject insofar as it can be naturally perfected or fail, but vision elevates the subject and perfects it in a higher mode according to its obediential capacity." Suarez, same place. d) But if we speak of the moral cause of corruption, this is only sin; and sin is impossible in one seeing God intuitively, as will be proved below.
The minor is proved with respect to the third part: it cannot cease by ordinary power through suspension of divine influx. For an influx proportioned to the nature of things, and hence owed, cannot be taken away by ordinary power; but an intellect illumined by the light of glory in heaven, having no intrinsic or extrinsic created principle of corruption, demands always to be. Therefore.
We conclude with the argument of St. Augustine, which St. Thomas also expounds in the second place in the same article. "For what," he says (City of God, book 12, chapter 20), "could be more false and fallacious than that beatitude in which, in so great a light of truth, we either do not know that we shall be miserable, or in the height of happiness fear it? For if we are going to be ignorant there of the calamity to come, our misery here is more knowing, where we know the beatitude to come. But if the threatening disaster will not be hidden from us there, a miserable soul passes time more blessedly when, after those times have passed, it is lifted up to beatitude, than a blessed soul does when, after those times have passed, it is dissolved into misery. And thus the hope of our unhappiness is happy, and the hope of happiness unhappy. Hence it follows that, because here we suffer present evils, and there we fear imminent ones, we can more truly always be miserable than ever be blessed."
See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 14), Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 3, chapter 9), and Sylvius on the cited article of St. Thomas.
PROPOSITION XLV. Perfect beatitude is by its nature and intrinsically perpetual.
Proof I. From the argument of St. Thomas, I-II, question 5, article 4, which can be set forth thus. Perfect beatitude by its nature demands duration without end; therefore it is intrinsically and by its nature perpetual.
The antecedent is proved. Perfect beatitude is by its nature a good adequately satisfying the rational appetite; but it would not be such by its nature if by its nature it did not demand duration without terminus. Therefore.
The minor is proved. If by its nature it did not demand duration without terminus, the good in which beatitude is placed could of itself be lost; but if this could be lost, beatitude would no longer be the good adequately satisfying the rational appetite. Therefore.
This minor is proved. If that good could be lost, either 1. the blessed one knows this, or 2. he is ignorant of it and thinks it cannot be lost, or 3. he stands negatively, judging neither.
If the first, "he cannot be blessed, because he will always be anxious and will be affected with great sorrow that he is going to lose so great a good. For the more he loves the good which he possesses, the more he grieves when he thinks that he is going to lose it, as is clear in those who place their good in the things of this life, who are affected with great sorrow when they think of death, by which they will lose all those things."
If the second, and thus he also is not blessed: both because beatitude must exclude every evil, and error is an evil of the intellect; and because his principal joy rests upon a false foundation. "For the chief joy of the blessed arises from this, that the possession of the good is believed to be eternal, just as the chief affliction of the damned is that they see that their evils will be perpetual. Therefore, if this is false, the foundation of joy is false, and accordingly it cannot make a man truly blessed; for error concerning the very foundation of beatitude is especially repugnant to beatitude."
If the third, "in the first place, this cannot happen for so long a time. For it would be great stupor never to think whether the possession of the highest good is going to be eternal or temporal. Then, even at the time when he would think of neither, he would not be perfectly blessed: both because he would not apprehend his good as eternal, from which apprehension, nevertheless, the principal joy arises; and because even if his soul were not actually restless, because he was not thinking about future loss, nevertheless he would have within himself the root of restlessness and sorrow, which, as soon as he noticed it, would necessarily make him sad, namely that he could lose his good."
You will say: "For the ratio of beatitude, the exclusion of every sadness is not required, as is clear in Christ the Lord; therefore neither is it required that every sorrow or fear of losing beatitude be excluded."
I answer: "Although the ratio of beatitude does not demand that it actually exclude every sorrow, nevertheless it demands that that good in which it consists be of itself sufficient to exclude every sorrow, so that in reality it will accomplish this unless it is divinely impeded. For that good is so great that the lack of other goods is esteemed as nothing, provided that it remains safe. But the vision of God which is going to last only for a time, or which the one seeing fears to lose, is not sufficient to exclude every sorrow."
Proof II. Although in beatitude there are vision, love, and joy, nevertheless love and joy are related to vision in such a way that they depend on it, and once it is posited, they necessarily follow. But vision depends on the intellect, on the light of glory, and on divine influx. Concerning the intellect, a spiritual faculty, there can be no question here; divine influx, by ordinary power, is given according to the exigency of the thing. The question is reduced to the light of glory. Therefore, if it is proved that this is intrinsically incorruptible, by that very fact it is proved that beatitude is by its nature perpetual. Hence:
That must be called incorruptible by its nature which neither has an intrinsic principle of corruption, nor a created extrinsic principle, or contrary, nor can cease through suspension of divine influx by God's ordinary power. But such is the light of glory. Therefore.
The minor is proved with respect to the first part: it has no intrinsic principle of corruption. For a) that light is spiritual, just as the subject in which it exists, the intellect, is spiritual. b) That light is a certain supreme participation and image of the uncreated light by which God sees himself. Hence if Angelic substances and the rational soul, since they are the image of God, have no intrinsic principle of corruption, this must be said a fortiori of that light.
The minor is proved with respect to the second part: it does not have a created extrinsic principle, or contrary, by which it can be corrupted. For a) "the mind joined to God through that light," says St. Thomas in the cited article, "is elevated above all other things; and thus no other agent can exclude it from such conjunction." b) That it has no contrary "is clear," says Suarez (same place, section 2, no. 4), "because this is universally common to every light perfect in its own order." c) Error, which is repugnant to it in some way, cannot harm it, because the mind, by the very fact that it is illumined by the light of glory, is capable of no error; "for that vision so perfects the subject that it renders it altogether incapable of error contrary to itself, nor are they properly concerned with the same subject as the same; because error regards the subject insofar as it can be naturally perfected or fail, but vision elevates the subject and perfects it in a higher mode according to its obediential capacity." Suarez, same place. d) But if we speak of the moral cause of corruption, this is only sin; and sin is impossible in one seeing God intuitively, as will be proved below.
The minor is proved with respect to the third part: it cannot cease by ordinary power through suspension of divine influx. For an influx proportioned to the nature of things, and hence owed, cannot be taken away by ordinary power; but an intellect illumined by the light of glory in heaven, having no intrinsic or extrinsic created principle of corruption, demands always to be. Therefore.
We conclude with the argument of St. Augustine, which St. Thomas also expounds in the second place in the same article. "For what," he says (City of God, book 12, chapter 20), "could be more false and fallacious than that beatitude in which, in so great a light of truth, we either do not know that we shall be miserable, or in the height of happiness fear it? For if we are going to be ignorant there of the calamity to come, our misery here is more knowing, where we know the beatitude to come. But if the threatening disaster will not be hidden from us there, a miserable soul passes time more blessedly when, after those times have passed, it is lifted up to beatitude, than a blessed soul does when, after those times have passed, it is dissolved into misery. And thus the hope of our unhappiness is happy, and the hope of happiness unhappy. Hence it follows that, because here we suffer present evils, and there we fear imminent ones, we can more truly always be miserable than ever be blessed."
See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 14), Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 3, chapter 9), and Sylvius on the cited article of St. Thomas.