Article 1. Certain Notions Concerning Beatitude in General

583. After the fall of man and the ruin of the whole of human nature, the reparation through Christ is set forth; after this follows the treatment of grace, which Christ merited for us and which is communicated especially through the Sacraments. Finally, at the end, there is discussion of the end to which men arrive through the grace of Christ; and there too discourse is instituted concerning the most miserable lot of those who, abusing the grace of Christ, fall short of the end.

584. Yet there are not lacking those who slightly alter the aforesaid order, and immediately add the question concerning the last things of man to the question concerning the elevation of human nature to the supernatural state and concerning its fall. Perhaps they do this in order to place the whole treatment concerning man, as it were, under one view of the eye.

585. The present distribution of the treatises persuades us to imitate them, according to which, if the question concerning the Last Things were omitted here, there would be danger that it would never again return.

586. There are many things which are referred by some to the treatise on the Last Things, and yet others expound them in other treatises. The question, for example, concerning the intuitive vision is customarily treated partly in the treatise on God, where its fact, time, and inequality are asserted; partly in the treatise on man's elevation to the supernatural state, where the nature, possibility, and supernaturality of the intuitive vision are established. These and similar things we here pass over in silence, lest we discuss the same things twice.

587. But those very things which we undertake to discuss here, we shall touch only in that manner which uniquely suits both the narrowness of time and the other matters to be explained this year.

ARTICLE FIRST.

Certain notions concerning beatitude in general.

588. After handing down the definition of beatitude and its principal divisions, we shall taste a few things concerning objective and formal beatitude.

§ I.

The definition and division of beatitude.

589. The name of beatitude is taken first of all to signify the state in which the fullness of goods is possessed and the completion of all desires is had. Hence it is defined by Boethius (On the Consolation of Philosophy, book 3, prose 2) as "a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods"; by St. Augustine (Exposition on Psalm 2, no. 11) as "the sum and accumulation of all goods"; and by St. Gregory of Nyssa (On the Beatitudes, at the beginning) as "a certain comprehension of all those things which are understood in man, from which nothing is absent of those things which pertain to the desire and longing for goods." Hence also that saying of Apocalypse 7:16: "They shall no longer hunger nor thirst, nor shall the sun fall upon them, nor any heat"; and verse 17: "And God shall wipe away every tear from their eyes."

590. But more properly beatitude is defined as the highest good adequately satisfying the rational appetite. St. Thomas seems to signify this when, in I-II, question 2, article 8, he says that beatitude is "the perfect good which wholly quiets the appetite."

591. From this definition it is understood: 1. that although there are many goods in beatitude, and several operations by which they are possessed, nevertheless there is some highest good and some most perfect operation to which the rest are subservient; 2. that although each thing is in some way capable of beatitude, insofar as it can have a collection of goods perfect according to its nature, still only a creature endowed with intelligence or reason is capable of true beatitude, which requires conjunction with the truly highest good and consequently with the last end simply. Hence beatitude is also called the good satisfying the rational appetite; 3. that beatitude, properly accepted, can also be defined as the attainment of the last end. For beatitude denotes terminus and rest; but so long as man searches, he does not rest; so long as he has not arrived at the last end, he is still searching: "I follow, if in any way I may comprehend."

592. In beatitude two things can be considered: the object by which we are made blessed, and the attainment of the same. The former is called objective beatitude; the latter, formal beatitude. Yet both constitute one true beatitude, because one cannot beatify without the other. "Nevertheless it must be noted," says Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 1, chapter 1, no. 2), "that they are taken in two ways, namely for the extrinsic thing itself in which the highest good consists, and for its possession or union, by which it is joined to us. Both the thing itself, by whose possession and fruition we are blessed, and the possession and fruition itself of this thing are called the highest good and the last end. In a similar way, beatitude is taken for the thing itself by whose union we are made blessed, and for the union itself. The former is called by the Doctors objective beatitude, the latter formal beatitude. For since no extrinsic thing can be our good, or make us blessed, unless it is united to us and in some way affects us, both are necessarily required, namely the thing itself and its union with us; and both are called our beatitude and our highest good. Although the name of highest good more properly fits the thing itself, the name of beatitude fits the union and possession of the thing."

593. Beatitude is divided into essential and accidental. This division coincides with those things which we said a little earlier concerning beatitude taken for the state, and for the highest good, etc. For although many things concur for the perfect state of beatitude, nevertheless it is necessary that among them there be something highest to which the rest are referred, or from which they flow as from the first source, or in which they are eminently contained; because there cannot be a perfect aggregation of many things without some order of the many among themselves. Therefore that which is highest and perfect in that state is called the essence of beatitude; the rest are, as it were, its properties or accidents. Or: "although many goods are found in the blessed one, nevertheless not through all of them does he attain his supreme end, or attain it; therefore not all things equally pertain to beatitude, nor to the ratio of the last end; therefore beatitude signifies the ultimate perfection to which the rest are referred. Deservedly, the essence of beatitude is not said to consist in that whole collection, but in that which is supreme and last within it."

594. Yet it will be helpful to note here that among those things which are called accidents of beatitude, some are maximally intrinsic and inseparable from essential beatitude, while others are more extrinsic, as, for example, the glory of the body. Hence it is customary to say that beatitude properly consists in the soul and not in the body, and that the Saints are said to be simply blessed in their souls alone, although they now lack the goods which pertain to the body.

595. Beatitude is also divided into natural and supernatural. The first is that which belongs to rational nature considered according to itself, and which a rational creature can attain by the powers of nature alone and by the natural help of God. The other is that which plainly exceeds the powers and exigency of nature, and can be obtained only by the helps of grace. See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 4, sections 1 and 2).

§ II.

The objective beatitude of man.

596. St. Augustine reports (City of God, book 19, chapter 1) that "Marcus Varro, in the book on Philosophy, so diligently and subtly examined the great variety of dogmas that, by applying certain differences, he very easily arrived at two hundred eighty-eight sects - not those which already existed, but those which could exist."

597. But right reason itself teaches that God, and nothing besides God, can make man truly blessed. Since this is usually demonstrated in philosophy, it will suffice here to recall it briefly to mind. See St. Thomas, I-II, question 2; Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 1).

598. Therefore we say first: all created goods taken together cannot suffice to beatify man without God. This is clear, 1. from Scripture. The object of human beatitude must have the ratio of the last end and must perfectly satisfy man's appetite; but all created goods without God cannot furnish these things. Apocalypse 1:8: "I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end." Psalm 72:25-26: "What have I in heaven? and besides you what have I willed upon earth? ... God is the God of my heart, and God is my portion forever." Psalm 143:15: "Blessed is the people whose Lord is their God." Psalm 102:5: "Who fills your desire with good things." Psalm 16:15: "I shall be satisfied when your glory shall appear."

2. From the Fathers. St. Augustine (Confessions, book 13, chapter 8): "You sufficiently show how great you have made the rational creature, for whom nothing less than you suffices for blessed rest." And in Sermon 150, no. 7: "Now that three have been placed before our eyes, the Epicurean, the Stoic, and the Christian, let us ask each one. Say, Epicurean: what thing makes one blessed? He answers: pleasure of the body. Say, Stoic: virtue of the soul. Say, Christian: the gift of God." St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 21, in praise of Athanasius): "The highest summit of all intelligible things is God, in whom every desire rests and is fixed, nor is it carried further above him; for no mind, however philosophical and tending to the highest things and most curious, has or ever will have anything more sublime. For this is the extreme of all things to be awaited; when we have arrived at it, all speculation rests."

3. From reason. Beatitude is the highest good adequately satisfying the rational appetite; but the complex of all created goods without God cannot satisfy our appetite. Therefore.

The minor is proved. a) If all created goods were possessed, if this could happen, man would understand that they are not from himself, but from a first and necessary principle, which he would still desire to understand and possess. For in order that man be stirred by this desire, two things are required and suffice: that that principle be desirable and proportioned. But since it is the highest good, it is supremely desirable; and since it is that to which man is ordered (no. 91 and following), it must be proportioned. Therefore.

The minor is proved. b) From St. Thomas, I-II, question 2, article 8: "The object of the will, which is the human appetite, is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that nothing can quiet the will of man except universal good; and this is not found in any created thing, but only in God, because every creature has participated goodness." Defending this argument against Cajetan, Suarez observes: "since the object of the will is good, and that of the intellect is being, they plainly comprehend God under their objects, and thus they are in some way capable of God. Again, since God is the highest good and highest being, he is the principal part and principal object of these powers; therefore it cannot happen that man according to these powers should be made blessed in creatures alone without God, because that which is supreme and best in his capacity is lacking to him." See Suarez (same place, disputation 5, section 1).

599. From these things it plainly follows that God is the object of our beatitude; for since all other things besides him are in no way able to make us blessed, unless we wish to say that beatitude is impossible for us, which is repugnant, beatitude must be constituted in God. Moreover, the arguments brought forward also demonstrate this directly.

600. But here a doubt arises, whether God alone, without the companionship of other goods, is the sufficient object of our beatitude. The reason for doubting is that although God is the supreme good of man, nevertheless he is not man's only good; for besides God, in order to live conveniently, man needs both goods of the body and other goods of the soul besides the knowledge of God, because he naturally desires all goods. Therefore the appetite of man is not satisfied by God; therefore God alone is not the sufficient object of his beatitude."

601. In this matter it must be noted that it is one thing to speak of the proper good object by whose attainment we are blessed, and another thing to speak of those things which either are joined with that object, or are necessary on our part for attaining that object perfectly and so that it may produce in us all those effects which perfect beatitude requires. For not all things which are required in this way must be properly objects of essential beatitude, just as not all things which are necessary for the introduction or conservation of a form, nor even those things which follow it, pertain to the essential composite."

602. These things having been posited, we say: God alone is the object of our essential beatitude, and without the companionship of creatures he suffices for our beatitude. This is clear: 1. because "the end perfect simply is that which is always for its own sake and never for another; but happiness is such; but God alone is the perfect end, to be loved for his own sake, and all other things for his sake; therefore he alone is objective beatitude simply of human nature."

2. "God by himself alone is the highest good simply, and perfect conjunction with him, or attainment of him, is of itself maximally desirable and sufficient for the perfection of man, not only because every good is contained eminently in God, but also because he brings with himself whatever can be necessary for man's beatitude; therefore God alone is the essential object of our beatitude."

3. "God alone is the first principle of man; therefore he alone is also his last end; therefore man's beatitude stands in return to him and attainment of him."

4. "Christ the Lord, while on the way, was absolutely and simply blessed because of this vision and fruition, even though he was affected by many evils of punishment; and simply holy souls are absolutely blessed, although they lack bodies and consequently other goods of the body."

Hence it is read in Jeremiah 9:23-24: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, nor the strong in his strength, but let him glory in this, to know and understand me." And Psalm 143: "They have called the people blessed to whom these things belong; blessed is the people whose Lord is their God." And John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, etc." See Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 5, section 2), where you will also find the full testimonies of the Fathers indicated.

603. Benedict XII, in the Constitution Benedictus Deus, says: "We define that ... the souls of the Saints ... see the divine essence ... and that, thus seeing, they enjoy that same divine essence; and also that from such vision and fruition the souls of those who have already departed are truly blessed and have eternal life and rest."

604. In order that certain things may be separated from uncertain things, we shall note some points. Here the matter concerns supernatural beatitude. We have already said that formal beatitude is the very attainment of the beatifying object, God; or, as others speak, the very union with God, the object of our beatitude. Therefore it is asked what that attainment is, and in what that union consists.

605. Now, I. Some ancient Theologians placed our formal beatitude in the uncreated vision of God communicated and united to our mind. Since this opinion is now obsolete and less conformable to the aforesaid definition of Benedict XII, it is sufficient to observe against it that "if uncreated vision can be so communicated to the soul that the soul formally becomes seeing through it, then the other divine perfections also, such as power, wisdom, charity, mercy, justice, indeed even the Deity itself, will be able to be communicated to the same soul; so that the soul would be formally omnipotent through the omnipotence of God, wise through the wisdom of God, loving through the charity of God, merciful and just through the mercy and justice of God; indeed so that it itself would be God through the immediate union of Deity with the nature of the soul. All these things are absurd. For in this way the creature would be infinitely wise, infinitely loving, infinitely merciful, infinitely just. For although there would be a difference in the mode of having these perfections, because God has them through essence and the soul through gratuitous donation, nevertheless there would be no difference in the perfections themselves, and in both cases they would be entirely the same, and consequently would have an infinite formal effect." See Lessius (On the Highest Good, book 2, chapter 2), St. Thomas, I-II, question 3, article 1, and On Truth, question 20, article 1.

606. II. Others constituted formal beatitude in a certain entering-in of the divine essence into the essence of the soul. Namely, they primarily placed "our beatitude in a certain entering-in, by which the divine essence would so enter into the soul that the soul itself would be wholly transformed into God, so that it would not seem to be distinct from the divinity, but to be something one with it; just as iron is transformed into fire, so that nothing appears except fire. But from the essence of the soul they wished the divinity to be derived or to flow down to the powers, namely to the intellect, so that it might see God more clearly, and to the will, so that it might love more ardently. Hence it seems to constitute beatitude only secondarily in vision and love."

But against this opinion we object: a) that that entering-in does not occur through something uncreated, for in that way this opinion would fall back into the preceding opinion already rejected. Nor does it occur through some created gift infused into the essence of the soul. For "there is not infused into the blessed some new gift in the essence of the soul which they did not have on the way, but only the light of glory, which does not pertain to the essence of the soul insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is intellect. Therefore there is not given a new entering-in into the essence which is prior to the entering-in into the intellect." And if grace is said to be consummated in heaven, this does not mean that something "is added to it intrinsically in the very essence of the soul, where it is said to reside, but that it attains its end on account of which it was conferred from the beginning; this end is beatific vision and love. For the whole work of divine grace is completed and consummated in vision, love, and joy."

b) Nor, even if that new gift in the very essence of the soul were admitted, could the formal essence of beatitude be constituted in it. For beatitude, as will be clearer below, "is something vital, as being a certain vital sense and taste of divine goods; but that entering-in is not something vital, nor does it proceed from us, but from God alone." See Lessius (same place, chapter 3).

607. III. Therefore, with these excluded, it remains that formal beatitude be constituted either 1. in a habit, or 2. in an act, or 3. in both. Although there have not been lacking those who affirmed the first or the third, nevertheless it is now commonly admitted with St. Thomas that formal beatitude consists in some operation. For, a) as he teaches in I-II, question 3, article 2, reply 1, beatitude is life: "But this is eternal life." Yet it is not substantial life, insofar as it denotes man's substantial being, because man's being is not his beatitude, since this belongs to God alone; therefore it is accidental life. But perfect accidental life consists in operation. Therefore.

b) As the same holy Doctor teaches in the same article, beatitude is the ultimate perfection of man existing in him; but ultimate perfection is in act and not in habit, for habit is ordered to act as to its ultimate perfection. Therefore. With respect to this argument Suarez rightly notes: whatever may be the case concerning the philosophical question whether act is more perfect than habit, or conversely, it makes no difference to the ratio of beatitude, because it does not belong to the ratio of beatitude that it be the most perfect entity, but that it be the most perfect bond with the last end, and therefore that it be a perfect act in the mode of acting, so that of itself it does not leave potentiality for a further act in that order. See On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 6, section 2.

608. IV. But in the operation of which power does formal beatitude consist? In order that the true state of the question may be understood, we note: 1. that formal beatitude certainly cannot be constituted in the operation of some sensitive faculty. "For," says St. Thomas, I-II, question 3, article 3, "the beatitude of man consists essentially in his conjunction with the uncreated good, which is the last end, as was shown above, article 1 of this question, to which man cannot be joined through the operation of sense."

2. If the matter concerns those things which concur either for integrating or for constituting beatitude, then acts both of the intellect and of the will concerning God himself, the object of essential beatitude, are required for formal beatitude.

3. Yet what is asked here is in which act formal beatitude essentially consists. Setting aside opinions less probable and less common, there are especially three opinions on this matter. The first holds that formal beatitude essentially consists in vision alone, an act of the intellect; the second teaches that it consists in the vision and love of God, acts of the intellect and will; the third requires joy also for the essence of beatitude.

According to the first opinion, the whole essence of formal beatitude is constituted by the act of intuitive vision of God; love and fruition or joy proceed from the vision itself, but do not pertain to the essence of formal beatitude, in nearly the way that faculties spring forth from the soul and yet do not pertain to the essence of the soul or of man. If it is supposed that love and fruition are separated from vision, which nevertheless cannot happen at least by ordinary power - see Sylvius on I-II, question 4, article 1 - it must be said that the state of beatitude is not perfect, but that the essence of beatitude is perfect. Nor is it new, they say, for something to be essentially such but not perfectly such; just as a blind man and a child are essentially man, but not perfect. This is the common opinion of the Thomists; St. Thomas teaches it in I-II, question 3, article 4; Bellarmine, Becanus, Taparelli, and others subscribe to it.

But according to the opinion which Suarez especially defends, "the essence of formal beatitude first and principally consists in the clear vision of God, in which, as in source and root, the whole perfection of beatitude is contained"; "the love of charity and of divine friendship is simply necessary for man to be supernaturally perfectly blessed, and is absolutely to be said to belong to the essence of beatitude itself"; but neither the love of concupiscence, nor joy insofar as it is an act distinct from the love of friendship, belongs to the essence of beatitude. See On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 7, section 1, nos. 29, 31, 36, 42.

Finally Lessius teaches, and reports Molina, Valentia, and others, that besides vision and love, fruition also is required for the essence of formal beatitude; this fruition includes love and joy.

609. With these things briefly explained, we shall first establish what is certain; then we shall indicate what can be brought forward for each of the three proposed opinions.

§ IV.

On formal beatitude - the question is solved.

PROPOSITION XLIV. Formal beatitude, at least if it is considered with respect to its essence and integrity together, necessarily demands vision, love, and joy.

Recall the cited Constitution of Benedict XII.

Proof I. From Scripture. a) With respect to vision. John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." Psalm 16: "I shall be satisfied when your glory shall appear"; and Psalm 35: "In your light we shall see light." Psalm 83: "The God of gods shall be seen in Sion"; Psalm 90: "I shall show him my salvation." Matthew 5: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God"; and chapter 18: "Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father." John 14: "He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I shall love him and manifest myself to him." 1 Corinthians 13: "Now we see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face." 1 John 3: "Now we are sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is."

b) With respect to love and joy. 1 Corinthians 13: "Charity never falls away ... but the greater of these is charity." Psalm 35: "They shall be inebriated from the abundance of your house, and with the torrent of your pleasure you shall give them drink." Matthew 25: "Enter into the joy of your Lord." Luke 22: "That you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom." And Apocalypse 2: "To him who conquers I shall give to eat of the tree of life."

Proof II. From the Fathers. a) With respect to vision. St. Irenaeus (book 4, chapter 37) says of eternal life "which happens to each one from the fact that he sees God; for just as those who see light are within light and perceive its brightness, so also those who see God are within God, perceiving his brightness; and the brightness gives them life; therefore those who see God perceive life." St. Cyril of Alexandria (book 3 against Julian): "Nothing is more precious than the true contemplation of God, since this makes us participants of the highest beatitude"; and afterward: "The happiness of men is to have the highest contemplation." St. Augustine (On the Trinity, book 1, chapter 13): "That vision of God by which we shall contemplate the immutable and, to human eyes, invisible substance of God, which is promised to the saints alone, etc., is alone our highest good, for the sake of attaining which we are commanded to do whatever we do rightly."

b) With respect to love and joy. St. Augustine (On the Morals of the Church, book 1, chapter 3): "So far as I judge, neither can he be called blessed who does not have what he loves, whatever it may be; nor he who has what he loves, if it is harmful; nor he who does not love what he has, even if it is best." And (City of God, book 8, chapter 9): "No one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves; for even those who love things not to be loved do not think themselves blessed by loving, but by enjoying. Therefore whoever enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and highest good, who but the most miserable man would deny that he is blessed?" St. Gregory of Nyssa (On the Beatitudes): "In the usage of Scripture, to see signifies the same as to have; as that saying, may you see the goods of Jerusalem, is the same as may you find them. And, let the impious man be taken away lest he see the glory of God: by not seeing, the Prophet signifies not being a participant. Therefore he who sees God, through the fact that he sees, has obtained every good: life without end, incorruptible and eternal, immortal beatitude, a kingdom without end, continual gladness, true light, inaccessible glory, perpetual exultation, and finally every good."

Proof III. From reason. I shall bring forward here some of the arguments which Lessius brings forward to establish his own opinion, and which, even if they do not truly demonstrate that opinion, certainly prove our thesis.

a) "The perfection of the soul consists in assimilation with God, and therefore the highest perfection consists in the highest assimilation. Hence, since beatitude is the highest perfection, it demands the highest assimilation, according to that saying of 1 John 3: 'We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.' But bare and dry vision alone does not make the soul perfectly similar to God, but only from a quasi-half part, namely according to the intellect, not according to affection. Therefore."

b) "Beatitude consists in perfect vital union with God; but perfect union with him demands not only conjunction through the intellect, but also through affection, because the will touches God immediately no less than the intellect. For these two faculties are like two arms by which the soul embraces God and binds and holds him to itself. Therefore."

610. Now with respect to the three opinions related above, we say: 1. with Suarez (same place, disputation 7, section 1, no. 25): "It is not true that anything has been defined in this, namely, in the cited Constitution of the Council of Florence, concerning whether the essence of beatitude consists in one act or in several acts. For in the prior place the discourse is against the Beghards and Beguines, who asserted that man becomes blessed by his own nature and does not need the light of glory for this. Therefore this is what the Pontiff with the Council defines: that we need the light of glory in order that we may be elevated to that beatitude and may enjoy God. But whether beatitude is in vision, or in fruition, or in both, is irrelevant to that definition. In the later place, however, the definition is against the opinion which asserted that souls are not beatified until the day of judgment; but incidentally it is said there that souls are beatified by seeing and enjoying, which also is simply true, because in fact both are in the blessed, and he who has both is necessarily blessed, whether both belong to the essence or not."

2. All the opinions seem able to evade the force of the proofs which are sought from Scripture and the Fathers, by observing that where vision is asserted to be beatitude, it can be understood with love and joy, as other places bring forward; and where vision, love, and joy are posited, it can be understood that in fact all these are required, but perhaps not for the essence of beatitude.

3. The principal argument for the first opinion seems to be this. Formal beatitude essentially consists in the obtaining of the last end, which through it becomes proper to the one obtaining it. In reality man tends while on the way because he does not possess; he rests in the terminus because he possesses. But there is no act of the will which is formally the attainment of the last end. Therefore there is no act of the will which pertains to the essence of formal beatitude; and consequently it consists only in vision.

The minor is proved. An act of the will is either of aversion from evil, or prosecutive of good; here certainly there is no question of the first. But an act of prosecution either tends toward an absent good, and is desire; or is borne toward a present good, and is joy; or abstracts from presence and absence, and is simply love, or complacency. But none of these acts is formally attainment, the obtaining of the end. Therefore. In reality desire excludes possession; joy supposes it; complacency neither excludes nor necessarily includes it, but abstracts from it.

Hence concerning desire and joy St. Thomas teaches in I-II, question 3, article 4: "It is manifest that the very desire of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is motion toward the end. But delight comes to the will from the fact that the end is present; not, conversely, does something become present from the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore there must be something other than an act of the will through which the end itself becomes present to the will ... For from the beginning we will to attain the intelligible end; but we attain it through the fact that it becomes present to us through an act of the intellect; and then the will, delighted, rests in the end already obtained." But concerning love, or complacency, in Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 26, he says: "To love also cannot be the last end; for good is loved not only when it is had, but also when it is not had; for from love it is that the thing not had is sought by desire; and if love of a thing already had is more perfect, this is caused by the fact that the loved good is had. Therefore to have the good, which is the end, is one thing; to love is another, which before having is imperfect and after having is perfect." See for this opinion Sylvius, on the cited place of the Summa Theologiae, and Gotti (Treatise 1 on the last end, question 2, doubt 4).

4. The argument which Suarez almost solely presses for his own opinion is this: "because love does not concur, nor is it required in beatitude, only on account of vision, or as its condition, namely so that vision may be in some perfect state, but per se, as it is a certain perfect connection with the last end, ultimate in its own order, maximally desirable for its own sake, and formally bestowing some perfection with respect to the last end, which it immediately touches, which neither vision nor any other act confers, and without which man's ultimate perfection would be greatly diminished and, as it were, halved. And this is the reason which compels me to say that this love is not only necessary, but also belongs to the essence of this beatitude." See the same place, disputation 7, section 1.

5. We gave above some of the arguments which Lessius alleges for his own opinion; read the rest in him (On the Highest Good, book 2, chapter 5).