LatineEnglish
620. Doctrina catholica est, in beatis non posse esse culpam. "Firmissime tene," inquit S. Fulgentius (de fide ad Petrum), "et nullatenus dubites, omnem creaturam naturaliter mutabilem a Deo incommutabilem factam; nec tamen posse quemlibet sanctorum Angelorum in deterius mutari: quia sic acceperunt aeternam beatitudinem qua Deo stabiliter fruuntur, ut ea carere non possint."
620. It is Catholic doctrine that fault cannot exist in the blessed. "Hold most firmly," says St. Fulgentius (On Faith to Peter), "and in no way doubt that every creature, naturally mutable, was made immutable by God; and yet that no one of the holy Angels can be changed for the worse, because they received eternal beatitude, by which they stably enjoy God, in such a way that they cannot lack it."
621. Dupliciter autem contrarius error intelligi potest: primo, quod manente in Beatis beatitudine, possit in eis simul esse culpa. Secundo, quod possint quidem Beati peccare, ita tamen ut statim peccando beatitudinem amittant: et in hoc posteriori sensu videtur errasse Origenes."
621. But the contrary error can be understood in two ways: first, that while beatitude remains in the Blessed, fault could simultaneously exist in them; second, that the Blessed could indeed sin, yet in such a way that by sinning they would immediately lose beatitude. And in this latter sense Origen seems to have erred."
622. In primo sensu error facile refutatur. Nam a) Scriptura testatur neminem peccato inquinatum posse ingredi coelum; multo minus ergo postquam aliquis coelum ingressus est, si peccaverit, poterit ibi manere. Imo Scriptura directe peccatum quodcumque a beatitudine excludit. Ps. 14. vv. 1. 2.: "Domine quis habitabit in tabernaculo tuo, aut quis requiescet in monte sancto tuo?" Respondet v. 2. "Qui ingreditur sine macula, et operatur justitiam, etc." Hebr. 12. 14. "Pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum." Apoc. 22. 3. 4.: "Et omne maledictum non erit amplius: sed sedes Dei, et Agni in illa erunt, et servi ejus servient ei; et videbunt faciem ejus." Ps. 139.: "Habitabunt recti cum vultu tuo." - b) "Beatitudo consummata est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus, et ideo ab illo excluditur omne malum, et praecipue culpae. Tandem culpa, si sit mortalis, privat amicitia divina: si vero venialis, privat perfecta dilectione actuali, efficitque dignum poena: haec autem omnia repugnant statui beatitudinis."
622. In the first sense the error is easily refuted. For a) Scripture testifies that no one stained by sin can enter heaven; much less, therefore, after someone has entered heaven, if he should sin, will he be able to remain there. Indeed Scripture directly excludes any sin whatever from beatitude. Psalm 14, verses 1 and 2: "Lord, who shall dwell in your tabernacle, or who shall rest on your holy mountain?" Verse 2 responds: "He who enters without stain and works justice, etc." Hebrews 12:14: "Follow peace with all, and holiness, without which no one will see God." Apocalypse 22:3-4: "And every curse shall be no more; but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, and his servants shall serve him, and they shall see his face." Psalm 139: "The upright shall dwell with your countenance." b) "Consummate beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods, and therefore every evil, and especially the evil of fault, is excluded from it. Finally, fault, if it is mortal, deprives one of divine friendship; but if venial, deprives one of perfect actual love and makes one worthy of punishment. But all these things are repugnant to the state of beatitude."
623. Ut vero error in secundo sensu refutetur, et simul vera doctrina contraria plene et breviter exponatur, possumus hic distinguere tres quaestiones. Utrum de facto beati fiant impeccabiles, et ita numquam possint beatitudinem amittere. Utrum fiant impeccabiles ab intrinseco - quaenam sit vera radix hujus impeccabilitatis.
623. But in order that the error in the second sense be refuted, and at the same time the true contrary doctrine be fully and briefly explained, we can here distinguish three questions: whether in fact the blessed become impeccable, and thus can never lose beatitude; whether they become impeccable intrinsically; and what is the true root of this impeccability.
624. De prima quaestione vix necesse est aliquid dicere, cum jam probatum sit in art. praec., beatitudinem esse ab intrinseco perpetuam. Si quid autem utile additur, illud in solutione secundae quaestionis tradetur: si enim ibi ostenditur beatos esse ab intrinseco impeccabiles, hoc ipso ostenditur eos esse impeccabiles.
624. Concerning the first question, it is scarcely necessary to say anything, since it has already been proved in the preceding article that beatitude is intrinsically perpetual. But if anything useful is added, it will be handed down in the solution of the second question; for if it is shown there that the blessed are intrinsically impeccable, by that very fact it is shown that they are impeccable.
625. Quoad secundam igitur quaestionem, notandum est imprimis cum D. Thoma q. 24. de ver. a. 9., quod "aliquis potest confirmari in bono dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter, ita scilicet, quod habeat in se sufficiens suae firmitatis principium, quod omnino peccare non possit; et sic Beati sunt confirmati in bono ratione prius dicta. Alio modo dicuntur aliqui confirmati in bono per hoc, quod eis datur aliquod munus gratiae, quo ita inclinantur in bonum, quod non de facili possunt a bono deficere; non tamen per hoc ita retrahuntur a malo, quin omnino peccare non possint, nisi divina providentia custodiente ... et hoc modo aliqui in statu viae possunt confirmari in bono, et non primo."
625. Therefore, with respect to the second question, it must first be noted with St. Thomas, On Truth, question 24, article 9, that "someone can be confirmed in good in two ways. In one way simply, namely so that he has in himself a sufficient principle of his firmness, by which he cannot sin at all; and thus the Blessed are confirmed in good by the reason stated earlier. In another way some are said to be confirmed in good through the fact that some gift of grace is given to them, by which they are so inclined toward good that they cannot easily fall away from good; yet through this they are not so withdrawn from evil that they cannot sin at all, except by divine providence preserving them ... and in this way some in the state of the way can be confirmed in good, and not in the first way."
626. Sententia D. Thomae verior est, et communissima, non habet enim nisi paucos contradictores, quos refert Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 10. sect. 1. n. 4.) Principium autem firmitatis intrinsecum duplex distingui potest: principium quod, et quo. Primum est persona; et ratione talis principii Christus Dominus est impeccabilis ab intrinseco: nam cum ejus persona sit divina, non potest influere in operationem quae sit offensa Dei. Alterum est forma, qua operatur persona: anima rationalis (principium quo remotum); intellectus et voluntas (principium quo proximum). Ut ergo aliqua creatura fiat ab intrinseco impeccabilis secundum principium quo, oportet ut in alterutra, vel in utraque praedicta facultate intrinsece ponatur aliqua forma eas ita rectificans, ut non possint deficere peccando. Et hoc sensu dicuntur beati habere intrinsecum principium impeccabilitatis, et esse ab intrinseco impeccabiles.
626. The opinion of St. Thomas is truer and very common, for it has only a few contradictors, whom Suarez reports (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 10, section 1, no. 4). Now a twofold intrinsic principle of firmness can be distinguished: the principle which acts, and the principle by which it acts. The first is the person; and by reason of such a principle Christ the Lord is intrinsically impeccable, for since his person is divine, it cannot influence an operation which would be an offense against God. The other is the form by which the person operates: the rational soul, the remote principle by which, and the intellect and will, the proximate principle by which. Therefore, in order that some creature become intrinsically impeccable according to the principle by which, it is necessary that in one or the other, or in both, of the aforesaid faculties, some form be intrinsically placed, rectifying them in such a way that they cannot fail by sinning. And in this sense the blessed are said to have an intrinsic principle of impeccability and to be intrinsically impeccable.
627. Sed jam quaeritur, quaenam sit illa intrinseca forma addita intellectui vel voluntati beatorum, qua fiunt impeccabiles: est tertia proposita quaestio, de radice hujus impeccabilitatis. Qua in re sciendum est, quod juxta aliquos radix impeccabilitatis est visio intuitiva, non ut est visio solius Dei, sed quatenus per illam videt beatus in Verbo omnes res et actiones ad se pertinentes, et omnes circumstantias, quae possunt voluntatem rectam efficere, et ad malum inclinare. Alii autem dicunt visionem quidem Dei praecise quatenus summum bonum est, esse sufficientem ad hanc impeccabilitatem, non tamen immediate per seipsum, sed mediante amore: itaque visio necessitat ad amandum, et amor ad non peccandum, et hoc modo visio est tota radix hujus impeccabilitatis. - Alii denique tenent "ipsam visionem per se ratione sui objecti, nempe summae bonitatis divinae, esse sufficiens principium ad excludendum omne peccatum, et potestatem peccandi." Unde si contingat Deum suspendere concursum ad actum amoris manente visione, haec satis est ad necessario cavendum omne peccatum.
627. But now it is asked what that intrinsic form is, added to the intellect or will of the blessed, by which they become impeccable. This is the third proposed question, concerning the root of this impeccability. In this matter it must be known that according to some, the root of impeccability is the intuitive vision, not as it is the vision of God alone, but insofar as through it the blessed one sees in the Word all things and actions pertaining to himself, and all circumstances which can make the will right and incline it to evil. But others say that the vision of God precisely insofar as he is the highest good is indeed sufficient for this impeccability, yet not immediately through itself, but by means of love. Thus vision necessitates one to love, and love necessitates one not to sin, and in this way vision is the whole root of this impeccability. Finally, others hold that "the vision itself, by itself by reason of its object, namely of the highest divine goodness, is a sufficient principle for excluding every sin and the power of sinning." Hence if it should happen that God suspended concurrence for the act of love while vision remained, this vision is sufficient for necessarily avoiding every sin.
628. D. Thomas in diversis locis, quae accurate recenset Suarez, probans beatos esse impeccabiles, plures affert rationes, in quibus modo unam modo aliam ex praedictis tribus sententiis tradere videtur. - Ut ejus mens, quae verissima est, intelligatur; notamus quod unaquaeque ex tribus radicibus impeccabilitatis, juxta tres relatas sententias, potest assignari vel solum ut sufficiens, vel etiam ut excludens caeteras: primo modo defendi possunt illae sententiae; minime vero secundo modo. Si autem tum visio Dei prout est visio solius Dei, tum visio Dei prout est etiam visio eorum quae possunt rectam facere voluntatem, tum amor Dei assignantur ut intrinseca impeccabilitatis principia; patet, quod radix caeterorum sit visio Dei prout est visio solius Dei, ex ea enim oritur et visio aliorum objectorum, et amor Dei. Itaque D. Thomas assignat tres illas impeccabilitatis radices ut sufficientes, sed unam assignando non excludit alias, quamvis primariam esse dicat visionem Dei solius.
628. St. Thomas, in various places which Suarez accurately reviews, when proving that the blessed are impeccable, brings forward several reasons, in which he seems now to hand down one, now another, of the three aforesaid opinions. In order that his mind, which is very true, may be understood, we note that each of the three roots of impeccability, according to the three related opinions, can be assigned either only as sufficient, or also as excluding the others. In the first way those opinions can be defended, but by no means in the second way. But if both the vision of God insofar as it is the vision of God alone, and the vision of God insofar as it is also the vision of those things which can make the will right, and the love of God are assigned as intrinsic principles of impeccability, it is clear that the root of the others is the vision of God insofar as it is the vision of God alone; for from it arise both the vision of other objects and the love of God. Therefore St. Thomas assigns those three roots of impeccability as sufficient, but in assigning one he does not exclude the others, although he says that the vision of God alone is primary.
629. Ex argumentis, quae allaturi sumus pro thesi mox statuenda, dum diversae impeccabilitatis radices ostenduntur - ostenditur simul impeccabilitatem in Beatis esse ab intrinseco - et factum ipsum impeccabilitatis demonstratur. Quae omnia simul complectimur, ut necessariae brevitatis habeatur ratio.
629. From the arguments which we are going to bring forward for the thesis soon to be established, while the different roots of impeccability are shown, it is at the same time shown that impeccability in the Blessed is intrinsic, and the very fact of impeccability is demonstrated. We include all these things together, so that account may be taken of necessary brevity.
630. Dicimus igitur:
PROP. XLVI. Beati in coelis constituuntur ab intrinseco impeccabiles.
Prob. I. Visio, qua beati vident non solum Deum, sed in eo res, actiones et circumstantias ad se pertinentes, quae voluntatem rectificant, est quid intrinsecum beatis. Atqui hujusmodi visio facit beatos impeccabiles. Ergo.
Prob. min. Ex D. Thoma, qui (c. g. l. 4. c. 92.) ait: "peccatum in voluntate non accidit sine aliquali ignorantia intellectus; nihil enim volumus, nisi bonum verum, vel apparens. Propter quod dicitur Proverb. 14. 'Errant, qui operantur malum.' Et Philosophus 3. Ethicorum dicit, quod, 'omnis malus est ignorans:' sed anima, quae est vere beata, nullo modo potest esse ignorans, cum in Deo omnia videat, quae pertinent ad suam perfectionem; nullo igitur modo potest malam voluntatem habere, praecipue cum illa Dei visio semper sit in actu." - Et (de ver. q. 24. a. 8.): "divinam essentiam videntes cognoscent, ipsum Deum esse finem maxime amandum: cognoscent etiam omnia, quae ei uniunt, vel quae ab eo disjungunt in particulari, cognoscentes Deum non solum in se, sed ut est ratio aliorum. Et hac cognitionis claritate in tantum mens roborabitur, quod in inferioribus viribus nullus motus insurgere poterit, nisi secundum regulam rationis." Sed de vi hujus argumenti vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 10. sect. 1. nn. 6-8.)
Prob. II. Amor charitatis, quo beati diligunt Deum, est illis intrinsecus. Atqui amor ille facit beatos impeccabiles. Ergo.
Prob. min. a) Ex Patribus. S. Greg. (Mor. l. 5. c. 27.), ait: "Ecce qui serviunt ei non sunt stabiles: Angelica natura ex semetipsa mutabilis est, quam mutabilitatem vincit per hoc, quod ei, qui semper idem est, vinculis amoris colligatur." S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad litt. l. 2. c. 36.): "Sancti Angeli illam incommutabilitatis substantiam ita concipiunt, ut visione, atque amore eam praeponant omnibus, et secundum eam judicent de omnibus, et in eam dirigantur ut agantur, et ex ea dirigant quidquid agant." - Et (de civ. Dei l. 14. c. 9.): "Ubi amor boni immutabilis est, profecto si dici potest mali cavendi timor securus est." Alia Patrum testimonia indicat Suarez (l. c. n. 10.)
Prob. min. b) D. Thomas (c. g. l. 4. c. 70.) ait: "ex hoc voluntas immutabilis redditur quod totaliter impletur, ita quod non habet quo divertat ab eo in quo est firmata; impletio autem voluntatis non competit homini nisi ut finem ultimum attingenti." Quam rationem pluribus illustrat Lessius (de sum. bon. l. 2. c. 22.) Ita, ex. gr., n. 175. ait: "Bonum quo majus est, eo magis trahit voluntatem in sui amorem, si clare cognoscatur, ut experientia docet. Qui enim amat honores, longe aliter trahitur proposita dignitate regia, quam magistratu unius oppiduli: qui opes, longe aliter afficitur lucro centum millium, quam decem assium. Imo bonum terrenum, quando videtur ingens, ita mentem trahit, ut vix sui sit compos, nec possit se ab ejus amore cohibere. Si ergo bonum sit infinitum, in quo tota boni plenitudo contineatur, infinite illam trahet; ita ut nullo modo possit resistere, quantumvis sit perfecta et sublimis, sive (quod idem est) ut non possit impetum amoris, quo in illud fertur, cohibere." - Addit Suarez ex D. Thoma (c. g. l. 4. c. 92.): "Cuicumque sufficit quod habet, non quaerit aliquid extra illud: sed videnti Deum sufficit Deus, et hoc videtur per ipsam visionem alioqui per illam non fieret beatus: ergo nihil potest velle extra Deum, id est, quod non sit Deus, vel ad Deum non pertineat, ac sit referibile in ipsum. Ac fere in idem redit quod in tertia ratione ibidem ait, Deum necessario videri sub ratione boni completi, in quo appetitus conquiescit."
Prob. III. Visio Divinae essentiae, seu solius Dei, est beatis intrinseca. Atqui haec visio facit illos ab intrinseco impeccabiles. Ergo.
Prob. min. a) "Per illam visionem," inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 17.), "in tanta aestimatione et pretio habetur Deus, et bonitas ejus, ut judicetur esse bonum omnibus praeferendum, nihilque esse amandum, quod ab illo faciat quoquo modo avertere voluntatem, quodque non sit conforme et consentaneum illi: et hoc significavit Anselmus supra, dicens Angelos beatos non posse peccare, quia vident nihil plus velle posse, quam id, quod sunt adepti."
b) "Illud bonum adeptum divinum, et visio ejus, tanta efficacia convertere ad se totam animam, et attentionem ejus, ut ex vi illius numquam possint converti ad volendum aliquid, quod non sit prius regulatum ab eis cum divina bonitate, an sit illud consentaneum sibi, necne, quia ut dixit Augustinus, tractans illud psalm. 35.: 'Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae,' cum accepta fuerit illa ineffabilis visio, perit quodammodo humana mens, et fit divina: atque ita inebriatur ab ubertate domus Dei, et ideo in omnibus quae amat, respicit Deum ipsum, et confert quidquid amandum est cum bonitate ejus, ut illud tantum amet, quod est illi consentaneum."
Prob. IV. Ut melius innotescat visionem Dei non solum mediante charitate actuali esse radicem impeccabilitatis, sed etiam per seipsam, dicimus: licet daremus Deum alicui concedere lumen gloriae et visionem intuitivam, non vero amorem, quatenus, ex. gr., suspenderet influxum necessarium ad illum; non posset tamen concedere visionem sine exigentia amoris et necessarii ad illum influxus. Atqui posita visione cum hac exigentia, sed sine actuali charitate, adhuc Beati essent impeccabiles. Ergo.
Prob. maj. Nec de potentia absoluta potest Deus rem facere sine ejus essentia: nequit, ex. gr., hominem creare, quin ei det essentiam hominis. Atqui exigentia amoris Dei pertinet ad essentiam visionis intuitivae, sicut exigentia visionis intuitivae pertinet ad essentiam gratiae sanctificantis: eorum enim quae sunt alicui debita est aliqua exigentia, quae in eo non est quid realiter distinctum ab ipsa ejus essentia. Ergo.
Prob. min. Certum est apud omnes quod cum actuali amore Dei nequit consistere peccatum. Unde: quando subjectum exigit aliquid, si in eo inveniatur oppositum, hoc non ipsi, sed agenti extrinseco tribuitur; sicut si ignis, qui exigit calefacere, frigefaciat, hoc non tribuitur igni: et idem dicendum de iis omnibus, quae per miraculum contingunt, et quae tribuuntur Deo agenti praeter exigentiam naturae. Cum ergo in eo, qui habet lumen gloriae et visionem Dei intuitivam, sit exigentia amoris Dei actualis, si hic impediatur, et sic sequatur peccatum, peccatum est tribuendum ipsi Deo: quod omnino repugnat. Vid. Suarez (l. c. n. 21.)
PROP. XLVI. Beati in coelis constituuntur ab intrinseco impeccabiles.
Prob. I. Visio, qua beati vident non solum Deum, sed in eo res, actiones et circumstantias ad se pertinentes, quae voluntatem rectificant, est quid intrinsecum beatis. Atqui hujusmodi visio facit beatos impeccabiles. Ergo.
Prob. min. Ex D. Thoma, qui (c. g. l. 4. c. 92.) ait: "peccatum in voluntate non accidit sine aliquali ignorantia intellectus; nihil enim volumus, nisi bonum verum, vel apparens. Propter quod dicitur Proverb. 14. 'Errant, qui operantur malum.' Et Philosophus 3. Ethicorum dicit, quod, 'omnis malus est ignorans:' sed anima, quae est vere beata, nullo modo potest esse ignorans, cum in Deo omnia videat, quae pertinent ad suam perfectionem; nullo igitur modo potest malam voluntatem habere, praecipue cum illa Dei visio semper sit in actu." - Et (de ver. q. 24. a. 8.): "divinam essentiam videntes cognoscent, ipsum Deum esse finem maxime amandum: cognoscent etiam omnia, quae ei uniunt, vel quae ab eo disjungunt in particulari, cognoscentes Deum non solum in se, sed ut est ratio aliorum. Et hac cognitionis claritate in tantum mens roborabitur, quod in inferioribus viribus nullus motus insurgere poterit, nisi secundum regulam rationis." Sed de vi hujus argumenti vid. Suarez (de ult. fin. hom. disp. 10. sect. 1. nn. 6-8.)
Prob. II. Amor charitatis, quo beati diligunt Deum, est illis intrinsecus. Atqui amor ille facit beatos impeccabiles. Ergo.
Prob. min. a) Ex Patribus. S. Greg. (Mor. l. 5. c. 27.), ait: "Ecce qui serviunt ei non sunt stabiles: Angelica natura ex semetipsa mutabilis est, quam mutabilitatem vincit per hoc, quod ei, qui semper idem est, vinculis amoris colligatur." S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad litt. l. 2. c. 36.): "Sancti Angeli illam incommutabilitatis substantiam ita concipiunt, ut visione, atque amore eam praeponant omnibus, et secundum eam judicent de omnibus, et in eam dirigantur ut agantur, et ex ea dirigant quidquid agant." - Et (de civ. Dei l. 14. c. 9.): "Ubi amor boni immutabilis est, profecto si dici potest mali cavendi timor securus est." Alia Patrum testimonia indicat Suarez (l. c. n. 10.)
Prob. min. b) D. Thomas (c. g. l. 4. c. 70.) ait: "ex hoc voluntas immutabilis redditur quod totaliter impletur, ita quod non habet quo divertat ab eo in quo est firmata; impletio autem voluntatis non competit homini nisi ut finem ultimum attingenti." Quam rationem pluribus illustrat Lessius (de sum. bon. l. 2. c. 22.) Ita, ex. gr., n. 175. ait: "Bonum quo majus est, eo magis trahit voluntatem in sui amorem, si clare cognoscatur, ut experientia docet. Qui enim amat honores, longe aliter trahitur proposita dignitate regia, quam magistratu unius oppiduli: qui opes, longe aliter afficitur lucro centum millium, quam decem assium. Imo bonum terrenum, quando videtur ingens, ita mentem trahit, ut vix sui sit compos, nec possit se ab ejus amore cohibere. Si ergo bonum sit infinitum, in quo tota boni plenitudo contineatur, infinite illam trahet; ita ut nullo modo possit resistere, quantumvis sit perfecta et sublimis, sive (quod idem est) ut non possit impetum amoris, quo in illud fertur, cohibere." - Addit Suarez ex D. Thoma (c. g. l. 4. c. 92.): "Cuicumque sufficit quod habet, non quaerit aliquid extra illud: sed videnti Deum sufficit Deus, et hoc videtur per ipsam visionem alioqui per illam non fieret beatus: ergo nihil potest velle extra Deum, id est, quod non sit Deus, vel ad Deum non pertineat, ac sit referibile in ipsum. Ac fere in idem redit quod in tertia ratione ibidem ait, Deum necessario videri sub ratione boni completi, in quo appetitus conquiescit."
Prob. III. Visio Divinae essentiae, seu solius Dei, est beatis intrinseca. Atqui haec visio facit illos ab intrinseco impeccabiles. Ergo.
Prob. min. a) "Per illam visionem," inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 17.), "in tanta aestimatione et pretio habetur Deus, et bonitas ejus, ut judicetur esse bonum omnibus praeferendum, nihilque esse amandum, quod ab illo faciat quoquo modo avertere voluntatem, quodque non sit conforme et consentaneum illi: et hoc significavit Anselmus supra, dicens Angelos beatos non posse peccare, quia vident nihil plus velle posse, quam id, quod sunt adepti."
b) "Illud bonum adeptum divinum, et visio ejus, tanta efficacia convertere ad se totam animam, et attentionem ejus, ut ex vi illius numquam possint converti ad volendum aliquid, quod non sit prius regulatum ab eis cum divina bonitate, an sit illud consentaneum sibi, necne, quia ut dixit Augustinus, tractans illud psalm. 35.: 'Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae,' cum accepta fuerit illa ineffabilis visio, perit quodammodo humana mens, et fit divina: atque ita inebriatur ab ubertate domus Dei, et ideo in omnibus quae amat, respicit Deum ipsum, et confert quidquid amandum est cum bonitate ejus, ut illud tantum amet, quod est illi consentaneum."
Prob. IV. Ut melius innotescat visionem Dei non solum mediante charitate actuali esse radicem impeccabilitatis, sed etiam per seipsam, dicimus: licet daremus Deum alicui concedere lumen gloriae et visionem intuitivam, non vero amorem, quatenus, ex. gr., suspenderet influxum necessarium ad illum; non posset tamen concedere visionem sine exigentia amoris et necessarii ad illum influxus. Atqui posita visione cum hac exigentia, sed sine actuali charitate, adhuc Beati essent impeccabiles. Ergo.
Prob. maj. Nec de potentia absoluta potest Deus rem facere sine ejus essentia: nequit, ex. gr., hominem creare, quin ei det essentiam hominis. Atqui exigentia amoris Dei pertinet ad essentiam visionis intuitivae, sicut exigentia visionis intuitivae pertinet ad essentiam gratiae sanctificantis: eorum enim quae sunt alicui debita est aliqua exigentia, quae in eo non est quid realiter distinctum ab ipsa ejus essentia. Ergo.
Prob. min. Certum est apud omnes quod cum actuali amore Dei nequit consistere peccatum. Unde: quando subjectum exigit aliquid, si in eo inveniatur oppositum, hoc non ipsi, sed agenti extrinseco tribuitur; sicut si ignis, qui exigit calefacere, frigefaciat, hoc non tribuitur igni: et idem dicendum de iis omnibus, quae per miraculum contingunt, et quae tribuuntur Deo agenti praeter exigentiam naturae. Cum ergo in eo, qui habet lumen gloriae et visionem Dei intuitivam, sit exigentia amoris Dei actualis, si hic impediatur, et sic sequatur peccatum, peccatum est tribuendum ipsi Deo: quod omnino repugnat. Vid. Suarez (l. c. n. 21.)
630. Therefore we say:
PROPOSITION XLVI. The Blessed in heaven are constituted intrinsically impeccable.
Proof I. The vision by which the blessed see not only God, but in him the things, actions, and circumstances pertaining to themselves which rectify the will, is something intrinsic to the blessed. But vision of this kind makes the blessed impeccable. Therefore.
The minor is proved from St. Thomas, who says (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 92): "Sin in the will does not occur without some ignorance of the intellect; for we will nothing except true or apparent good. On account of this Proverbs 14 says, 'They err who work evil.' And the Philosopher says in book 3 of the Ethics that 'every evil man is ignorant.' But the soul which is truly blessed can in no way be ignorant, since it sees in God all things which pertain to its perfection. Therefore in no way can it have an evil will, especially since that vision of God is always in act." And in On Truth, question 24, article 8: "Those seeing the divine essence will know that God himself is the end to be loved most of all. They will also know in particular all things which unite to him or separate from him, knowing God not only in himself but as he is the ratio of other things. And by this clarity of knowledge the mind will be strengthened so greatly that in the lower powers no movement will be able to arise except according to the rule of reason." But on the force of this argument see Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 10, section 1, nos. 6-8).
Proof II. The love of charity by which the blessed love God is intrinsic to them. But that love makes the blessed impeccable. Therefore.
The minor is proved. a) From the Fathers. St. Gregory (Moralia, book 5, chapter 27) says: "Behold, those who serve him are not stable: Angelic nature is mutable from itself, and it conquers this mutability through the fact that it is bound by the bonds of love to him who is always the same." St. Augustine (On Genesis Literally, book 2, chapter 36): "The holy Angels so receive that substance of immutability by vision and love that they prefer it to all things, and according to it they judge concerning all things, and toward it they are directed so as to be acted, and from it they direct whatever they do." And (City of God, book 14, chapter 9): "Where the love of immutable good is, surely, if it can be so called, the fear of avoiding evil is secure." Suarez indicates other testimonies of the Fathers in the same place, no. 10.
The minor is proved. b) St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 70) says: "From this the will is rendered immutable, that it is totally filled, so that it has nowhere to turn aside from that in which it has been made firm; but the filling of the will does not belong to man except as attaining the last end." Lessius illustrates this argument at greater length (On the Highest Good, book 2, chapter 22). Thus, for example, no. 175, he says: "The greater a good is, the more it draws the will into love of itself, if it is clearly known, as experience teaches. For one who loves honors is drawn very differently when a royal dignity is proposed than by the magistracy of one small town; one who loves wealth is affected very differently by a gain of one hundred thousand than by ten pennies. Indeed an earthly good, when it seems immense, so draws the mind that it is scarcely master of itself and cannot restrain itself from love of it. Therefore if the good is infinite, in which the whole fullness of good is contained, it will draw it infinitely, so that it can in no way resist, however perfect and sublime it may be; or, what is the same, so that it cannot restrain the impulse of love by which it is borne into it." Suarez adds from St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 92): "Whoever is satisfied by what he has does not seek something outside it; but God suffices for one seeing God, and this is seen through the vision itself, otherwise he would not be made blessed through it. Therefore he can will nothing outside God, that is, nothing which is not God, or which does not pertain to God and is not referable to him. And almost to the same point returns what he says there in the third argument, that God is necessarily seen under the ratio of complete good, in which the appetite rests."
Proof III. The vision of the divine essence, or of God alone, is intrinsic to the blessed. But this vision makes them intrinsically impeccable. Therefore.
The minor is proved. a) "Through that vision," says Suarez (same place, no. 17), "God and his goodness are held in such great estimation and value that he is judged to be the good to be preferred to all things, and that nothing is to be loved which would in any way cause the will to be turned away from him, and which would not be conformed and fitting to him. And Anselm signified this above, saying that the blessed Angels cannot sin because they see that nothing more can be willed than that which they have attained."
b) "That divine good attained, and the vision of it, convert the whole soul and its attention to itself with such efficacy that, by force of it, they can never be turned toward willing something which has not first been regulated by them with divine goodness, whether that thing is fitting to it or not. For, as Augustine said when treating that Psalm 35, 'They shall be inebriated from the abundance of your house,' when that ineffable vision has been received, the human mind in some way perishes and becomes divine; and thus it is inebriated from the abundance of the house of God, and therefore in all things which it loves, it looks to God himself and compares whatever is to be loved with his goodness, so that it loves only that which is fitting to him."
Proof IV. In order that it may be better known that the vision of God is the root of impeccability not only by means of actual charity, but also through itself, we say: even if we were to grant that God gives someone the light of glory and intuitive vision, but not love, insofar as, for example, he suspended the influx necessary for it, nevertheless he could not grant vision without the exigency of love and of the influx necessary for it. But with vision posited along with this exigency, yet without actual charity, the Blessed would still be impeccable. Therefore.
The major is proved. Not even by absolute power can God make a thing without its essence; for example, he cannot create a man without giving him the essence of man. But the exigency of the love of God pertains to the essence of intuitive vision, just as the exigency of intuitive vision pertains to the essence of sanctifying grace; for of those things which are owed to something, there is some exigency, which in it is not something really distinct from its very essence. Therefore.
The minor is proved. It is certain among all that sin cannot consist together with actual love of God. Hence, when a subject demands something, if the opposite is found in it, this is attributed not to the subject itself, but to an extrinsic agent; just as if fire, which demands to heat, should make cold, this is not attributed to fire. And the same must be said concerning all those things which happen through miracle and which are attributed to God acting beyond the exigency of nature. Therefore, since in one who has the light of glory and the intuitive vision of God there is the exigency of actual love of God, if this is impeded and sin thus follows, the sin must be attributed to God himself, which is altogether repugnant. See Suarez, same place, no. 21.
PROPOSITION XLVI. The Blessed in heaven are constituted intrinsically impeccable.
Proof I. The vision by which the blessed see not only God, but in him the things, actions, and circumstances pertaining to themselves which rectify the will, is something intrinsic to the blessed. But vision of this kind makes the blessed impeccable. Therefore.
The minor is proved from St. Thomas, who says (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 92): "Sin in the will does not occur without some ignorance of the intellect; for we will nothing except true or apparent good. On account of this Proverbs 14 says, 'They err who work evil.' And the Philosopher says in book 3 of the Ethics that 'every evil man is ignorant.' But the soul which is truly blessed can in no way be ignorant, since it sees in God all things which pertain to its perfection. Therefore in no way can it have an evil will, especially since that vision of God is always in act." And in On Truth, question 24, article 8: "Those seeing the divine essence will know that God himself is the end to be loved most of all. They will also know in particular all things which unite to him or separate from him, knowing God not only in himself but as he is the ratio of other things. And by this clarity of knowledge the mind will be strengthened so greatly that in the lower powers no movement will be able to arise except according to the rule of reason." But on the force of this argument see Suarez (On the Ultimate End of Man, disputation 10, section 1, nos. 6-8).
Proof II. The love of charity by which the blessed love God is intrinsic to them. But that love makes the blessed impeccable. Therefore.
The minor is proved. a) From the Fathers. St. Gregory (Moralia, book 5, chapter 27) says: "Behold, those who serve him are not stable: Angelic nature is mutable from itself, and it conquers this mutability through the fact that it is bound by the bonds of love to him who is always the same." St. Augustine (On Genesis Literally, book 2, chapter 36): "The holy Angels so receive that substance of immutability by vision and love that they prefer it to all things, and according to it they judge concerning all things, and toward it they are directed so as to be acted, and from it they direct whatever they do." And (City of God, book 14, chapter 9): "Where the love of immutable good is, surely, if it can be so called, the fear of avoiding evil is secure." Suarez indicates other testimonies of the Fathers in the same place, no. 10.
The minor is proved. b) St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 70) says: "From this the will is rendered immutable, that it is totally filled, so that it has nowhere to turn aside from that in which it has been made firm; but the filling of the will does not belong to man except as attaining the last end." Lessius illustrates this argument at greater length (On the Highest Good, book 2, chapter 22). Thus, for example, no. 175, he says: "The greater a good is, the more it draws the will into love of itself, if it is clearly known, as experience teaches. For one who loves honors is drawn very differently when a royal dignity is proposed than by the magistracy of one small town; one who loves wealth is affected very differently by a gain of one hundred thousand than by ten pennies. Indeed an earthly good, when it seems immense, so draws the mind that it is scarcely master of itself and cannot restrain itself from love of it. Therefore if the good is infinite, in which the whole fullness of good is contained, it will draw it infinitely, so that it can in no way resist, however perfect and sublime it may be; or, what is the same, so that it cannot restrain the impulse of love by which it is borne into it." Suarez adds from St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 92): "Whoever is satisfied by what he has does not seek something outside it; but God suffices for one seeing God, and this is seen through the vision itself, otherwise he would not be made blessed through it. Therefore he can will nothing outside God, that is, nothing which is not God, or which does not pertain to God and is not referable to him. And almost to the same point returns what he says there in the third argument, that God is necessarily seen under the ratio of complete good, in which the appetite rests."
Proof III. The vision of the divine essence, or of God alone, is intrinsic to the blessed. But this vision makes them intrinsically impeccable. Therefore.
The minor is proved. a) "Through that vision," says Suarez (same place, no. 17), "God and his goodness are held in such great estimation and value that he is judged to be the good to be preferred to all things, and that nothing is to be loved which would in any way cause the will to be turned away from him, and which would not be conformed and fitting to him. And Anselm signified this above, saying that the blessed Angels cannot sin because they see that nothing more can be willed than that which they have attained."
b) "That divine good attained, and the vision of it, convert the whole soul and its attention to itself with such efficacy that, by force of it, they can never be turned toward willing something which has not first been regulated by them with divine goodness, whether that thing is fitting to it or not. For, as Augustine said when treating that Psalm 35, 'They shall be inebriated from the abundance of your house,' when that ineffable vision has been received, the human mind in some way perishes and becomes divine; and thus it is inebriated from the abundance of the house of God, and therefore in all things which it loves, it looks to God himself and compares whatever is to be loved with his goodness, so that it loves only that which is fitting to him."
Proof IV. In order that it may be better known that the vision of God is the root of impeccability not only by means of actual charity, but also through itself, we say: even if we were to grant that God gives someone the light of glory and intuitive vision, but not love, insofar as, for example, he suspended the influx necessary for it, nevertheless he could not grant vision without the exigency of love and of the influx necessary for it. But with vision posited along with this exigency, yet without actual charity, the Blessed would still be impeccable. Therefore.
The major is proved. Not even by absolute power can God make a thing without its essence; for example, he cannot create a man without giving him the essence of man. But the exigency of the love of God pertains to the essence of intuitive vision, just as the exigency of intuitive vision pertains to the essence of sanctifying grace; for of those things which are owed to something, there is some exigency, which in it is not something really distinct from its very essence. Therefore.
The minor is proved. It is certain among all that sin cannot consist together with actual love of God. Hence, when a subject demands something, if the opposite is found in it, this is attributed not to the subject itself, but to an extrinsic agent; just as if fire, which demands to heat, should make cold, this is not attributed to fire. And the same must be said concerning all those things which happen through miracle and which are attributed to God acting beyond the exigency of nature. Therefore, since in one who has the light of glory and the intuitive vision of God there is the exigency of actual love of God, if this is impeded and sin thus follows, the sin must be attributed to God himself, which is altogether repugnant. See Suarez, same place, no. 21.