Article 8. On the Effects of Original Sin in This Life

565. In this article we shall first set forth the things which pertain to Catholic doctrine and must be held by all; then we shall briefly touch upon some question which can be discussed among Catholics.

§ I.

A brief account of the effects of original sin in this life.

566. The Pelagians, denying according to their principles (see nos. 210 and 239) the propagation of original sin, consequently cannot acknowledge any effect of it. Therefore when they consider the evils of the present life, some, especially the concupiscence of the flesh, they number among the goods of nature; others they concede to be evils, but establish that they are the sequel of nature, not the punishment of sin. Since it has already been proved that man was elevated to the state of original justice, in which he was free from the pains, troubles, and evils of this life, and that he fell from this state through sin, the Pelagians, as regards the present matter, have been sufficiently refuted.

567. On the contrary, the Innovators, and those who followed them, establishing that the gifts of original justice were owed to human nature (see no. 211), consequently teach that human nature was intrinsically vitiated and corrupted through sin, so that free choice is utterly extinguished; so that man cannot not sin; so that without the grace of the Redeemer he cannot know anything true, do anything good, not even in the natural order, and so forth. Their perverse principle was refuted where we proved that the gifts of original justice were not owed to human nature; but the false inferences must be refuted one by one in the treatise on grace.

568. Therefore here we intend only to hand down a positive and brief exposition of Catholic doctrine concerning the effects of original sin in this life. This is contained, first, in the Second Council of Orange, which teaches in canon 1 that "through the offense of Adam's prevarication the whole man, that is, according to body and soul, was changed for the worse"; in canon 13 that "the judgment of the will was weakened in the first man"; and in canon 25 that "free choice was attenuated and inclined." Second, in the Council of Trent, which in session 5, canon 1, among other things, teaches that "the whole Adam, through that offense of prevarication, was changed for the worse according to body and soul"; and in session 6, chapter 1, teaches that through Adam's sin "free choice was by no means extinguished in us, although weakened and inclined in its powers." Third, there is the axiom received in the schools: "through Adam's sin man was stripped of gratuitous things and wounded in natural things."

569. Here it must be noted, first, what Cardinal Pallavicino reports (History of the Council of Trent, book 8, chapter 13), speaking of the words of the decree on justification: "In them free choice was by no means extinguished, though weakened and inclined in its powers." Previously it was said that human choice was wounded. Some wished this to be deleted; others wished that, to explain the matter, there be added, "the gratuitous gifts having been withdrawn"; for in the rest, they said, the natural freedom of willing or not willing was present in man just as before. Nevertheless it was answered by selected Fathers that the Master of the Sentences had taught that man was wounded in endowments due to nature and stripped of those surpassing nature; and that St. Augustine had counted difficulty in acting honorably among the detriments of original guilt. Afterward, in place of the word "wounded," "attenuated" and "inclined" were inserted, words which can equally be adapted to all the opinions of the Scholastics.

Second, scarcely anything similar to that axiom, "man was stripped of gratuitous things and wounded in natural things," is found among the Fathers. Venerable Bede, who proposed it on Luke 10, is speaking of actual sins, not of original sin. Therefore, in order that we may attain the true sense of those words in which we said Catholic doctrine concerning the effects of original sin is contained, the volumes of the Doctors must be consulted.

570. And so St. Thomas, I-II, question 85, article 1, observes: "The good of human nature can be spoken of in three ways: first, the very principles of nature, from which nature itself is constituted, and the properties caused from them, such as the powers of the soul and other things of this sort. Second, because man from nature has an inclination to virtue, as was held above, question 64, article 1; and this very inclination to virtue is a certain good of nature. In a third way, the gift of original justice, which was conferred in the first man upon the whole of human nature, can be called a good of nature. Therefore the first good of nature is neither taken away nor diminished by sin. But the third good of nature is totally taken away by the sin of the first parent. But the middle good of nature, namely the natural inclination itself to virtue, is diminished by sin."

571. Since the other points are sufficiently clear, here only the account must be explained by which the natural inclination to virtue is said to be diminished. St. Thomas himself explains this in article 3, saying: "Through original justice, reason perfectly contained the lower powers of the soul; and reason itself was perfected by God, being subject to him. But this original justice was withdrawn through the sin of the first parent, as was already said, question 81, article 2. And therefore all the powers of the soul remain in some way destitute of their proper order, by which they are naturally ordered to virtue; and this destitution itself is called the wounding of nature. Now there are four powers of the soul which can be subjects of virtues, as was said above, question 74: namely reason, in which there is prudence; the will, in which there is justice; the irascible power, in which there is fortitude; and the concupiscible power, in which there is temperance. Therefore insofar as reason is destitute of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is destitute of order to the good, there is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible power is destitute of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and insofar as concupiscence is destitute of order to the delightful moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence." A fifth wound could be added, which consists in the infirmities and death of the body; but about this there is no difficulty.

572. To one asking how these wounds were inflicted on human nature, or how its inclination to virtue was diminished, St. Thomas answers by first observing, often, but see I-II, question 85, article 2, reply 1, that the intrinsic diminution of some good, or of the powers of some thing, can happen in two ways: either through the withdrawal of some perfection, whether total removal or remission, or through the addition of some impediment. Then he teaches, I-II, question 82, article 1, reply 3, that "from original sin there follows some inclination into an inordinate act, not directly, but indirectly, namely through the removal of what was prohibiting, that is, original justice, which was prohibiting inordinate motions." Therefore, just as in the state of original justice, sanctifying grace, directly ordering the soul to God as supernatural end, was the root of the other gifts by which order was constituted in all the parts and faculties of man, and therefore perfect inclination to virtue, so, when sanctifying grace was lost through sin, the other gifts of justice were lost; by their removal there is said to have been induced an inclination to evil, or a diminished inclination to virtue. Just as original sin formally consists in the privation of sanctifying grace, so its effects are contained in the privation of the other gifts of original justice.

573. To one asking again why through the withdrawal of the gifts of original justice, which are superadded to human nature, this nature is said to be wounded, Suarez answers from St. Thomas (Prolegomena 4 on grace, chapter 8, no. 19): "The account of the metaphor is clear from what has been said; for original justice constituted peace and union among man's appetites. This union was dissolved through sin when justice was removed, and thus a wound was made in nature, just as happens in the body through the dissolution of continuity."

574. To one asking further why man is said to have been wounded in natural things through sin, since the gifts of original justice were not owed, Suarez answers (the place just cited): "Man was injured in natural things, not because the gift lost had been natural, but because it was removing a natural defect or assisting it."

575. To one asking why, then, "in natural things" is opposed to "gratuitous things," for man is said to have been "stripped of gratuitous things, wounded in natural things," the answer is: so that sanctifying grace, which is supernatural, may be distinguished from the other gifts, which are preternatural. But the preternatural, insofar as it is opposed to the supernatural, can be called natural. See no. 238, third consequence. In reality, "by that agreement of the natural faculties, which in the state of original justice was obtained through the preternatural gifts, man is only freed from the imperfections and difficulties which impede the attainment of the natural end and the observation of natural law. He is by no means elevated above himself in such a way that he can also tend toward another higher end and produce acts corresponding to it. By those gifts are covered the imperfections which arise from human nature as composed of mind and body, and by which, consequently, man is inferior to the Angels; but by grace he is raised with the Angels themselves to a certain divine dignity and order. By those gifts only the lower parts, faculties, and appetitions of human nature are conformed to supreme reason beyond their own natural mode; but by grace the supreme part of reason itself is elevated, so that, made a sharer of the divine nature and imbued with divine virtue, it lives divinely, and is united, subjected, and conformed to God not only as Creator but also as Father." See also no. 234.

576. Finally, to one asking why free choice is called attenuated, weakened, and inclined, the answer is first: just as through original sin man was deprived of sanctifying grace and of right to the supernatural end, and consequently lost freedom or the power of producing any supernatural work, prescinding from the grace of the Savior, so, when man was stripped of the preternatural gifts through the same sin, his freedom or power of producing naturally good works was diminished; for from the loss of these gifts there arose difficulty in the exercise of natural virtue.

Second answer. But once grace has been recovered through the redemption of Christ, the other gifts of original justice are not restored to us; and consequently, although, helped by grace, we can do supernatural works, nevertheless not without difficulty and struggle. Hence "a twofold supernatural subjection to God must be distinguished. One is that by which lower reason is so subject to God through higher reason that there is nothing in reason which conflicts with the law of God and impedes its observation. The other is that by which higher reason itself is so subject to God that it obeys him not only for those works which it can naturally desire, but also for those toward which it cannot tend of itself, so that it allows itself to be elevated by God above itself and by his virtue is borne toward a supernatural end. This twofold subjection is likewise a twofold freedom. The former is the freedom of peace, by which we are freed from impediments to good operation; the latter is the freedom of the sons of God, by which we are freed from the condition of a servant, by which we are transferred into the unity and fellowship of the Lord himself, and now obey him as sons." These things indeed are according to the mind of St. Thomas in 2 Sentences, distinction 20, question 2, article 3, and De Malo, question 5, article 1. Hence Suarez rightly says (Prolegomena 4 to the treatise on grace, chapter 8, no. 15): "The freedom of the will was not intrinsically injured in any other way concerning the operation of good, except because it was deprived of charity and of virtues inclining to good. Likewise on the part of the intellect freedom was diminished, as it were in its root, insofar as the mind of man was deprived of wisdom and prudence. But accidentally freedom was injured on the part of concupiscence, which, left to itself and with the bridle of justice removed, made the use of liberty much more difficult for resisting evil and following good."

577. From the things said in the preceding section it is clear: 1. that through the sin of origin ignorance has arisen in the intellect; malice, or proneness to evil, in the will; proclivity in the concupiscible power toward pursuing sensible goods short of and against the order of reason; weakness in the irascible power for undertaking arduous things and overcoming difficulties. For an accurate description of these wounds from the Fathers, see Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 6, chapters 9-15). 2. That these wounds certainly have been inflicted through the withdrawal of the gifts of original justice. 3. That consequently man is weaker for doing good in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of original justice, if Adam had persevered in it.

578. But here the question arises whether man has been made weaker only through the withdrawal of the gifts of original justice, or also through injury to those things which are owed to his nature; and consequently whether he is weaker in the state of fallen nature than he would be not only in the state of original justice, but also in the state of pure nature.

579. Now it could be understood in two ways that man has been made weaker in the exercise of virtue through injury to those things which pertain to his nature: intrinsically or extrinsically. Intrinsically, if the proper perfection of the natural powers or faculties, which are intrinsic to man and by which man must do good, has been diminished, or if through sin some positive quality intrinsic to man has been induced by which he is more inclined to evil. But extrinsically, through the mere diminution of extrinsic help or the withdrawal of some extrinsic defense. The prior mode can still be considered in two ways: either with respect to the general divine concurrence which every secondary cause needs in order to act, or with respect to God's special providence and governance, which is especially necessary for the rational creature. For although free will is the active and proximate cause of its acts, nevertheless it must act under the universal providence and governance of causes, and especially of the first cause; and insofar as it is an indifferent and free cause, it is judged to need this help in a peculiar way, as we shall see. But the latter mode can also be useful, because a finite and free cause can be impeded by many extrinsic things; and therefore, if extrinsic impediments are multiplied, or if the causes removing them are diminished, from this head man can be made weaker for acting, even if his internal powers have not been diminished."

580. Therefore it is asked whether man, either intrinsically or extrinsically, is weaker in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature. The theologians of the school called Augustinian, together with some Thomists, affirm this. "Nevertheless," says Suarez (same place, chapter 8, no. 5), "the common and true opinion is that the natural powers of man or of free choice, with respect to the degree or perfection which they would have had in the state of pure nature, have not been diminished in fallen nature by the force of original sin alone, but only with respect to the strength and integrity which they received from original justice. This without doubt is the opinion of St. Thomas and the common opinion of the ancient theologians." And this certainly is the opinion of Molina, de Valentia, Bellarmine, and the common opinion of the theologians of the Society.

581. Therefore with these let it be:

PROPOSITION XLIII. Man is neither, 1. intrinsically, nor, 2. extrinsically, weaker for doing good in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature.

Proof of the first part. I. a) The Fathers teach that man, stripped by sin of the garment of supernatural gifts, nevertheless retained those things which pertain to him as man. But in the state of pure nature man would have had nothing other than that which pertains to his nature. Therefore man has not been made intrinsically weaker in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature.

The antecedent is proved. St. John Chrysostom, explaining the words "Adam, where are you?" in the homily on the Cross, says: "Not because God is ignorant, but because after the persuasion of the devil, who had promised him deity, and found nakedness, he says to him, 'Where are you?' That is, from what dignity to what disgrace have you been brought down? Because you ate of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, you remained man." St. Prosper (Against the Collator, chapter 19) says: "Human nature, in the first prevarication, lost neither substance nor will, but the light and beauty of the virtues of which it was stripped by the fraud of the envious one." Suarez indicates other testimonies of the Fathers.

b) St. Thomas often uses the commonly admitted principle, "after sin, natural things remained intact." Thus, for example, I, question 95, article 1, he says: "It is manifest that that subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin, since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius says in chapter 14 of On the Divine Names, part 4, lecture 19." Nor can it be said that St. Thomas, by "natural things remained intact," understood only the first good, which is to be, to live, and to understand, as he seems to explain in I-II, question 85, article 1, reply 1. For "in the cited place, in the First Part, he expressly speaks of that good which consisted in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower appetite to the higher, and he proves that it was not natural because otherwise it would have remained after sin, according to the opinion of Dionysius. Therefore he understands that rule of every good of nature. And the same argument can be made concerning any good in which human nature is said to be diminished through sin, namely by inferring that it is not owed to nature; for if it had been owed, it would have remained, according to the rule of Dionysius ... And thus the Scholastics commonly understood and followed that axiom. And besides, there is not a greater reason concerning life itself and the power of understanding than concerning any other power of naturally operating." St. Thomas also teaches, as we saw, I-II, question 82, article 1, reply 3, that "from original sin there follows an inclination to evil through the removal of what was prohibiting, that is, of original justice." And I-II, question 87, article 7, he teaches that through original sin man was left to his own nature. And in 2 Sentences, distinction 31, question 1, article 1: "Because this, namely rectitude through the gifts of original justice, had been conferred gratuitously, therefore it was justly withdrawn through the ingratitude of disobedience. Hence it happened that, when the first man sinned, human nature, which was in him, was left to itself, so that it would consist according to the condition of its own principles."

You will say: St. Thomas, I-II, question 85, article 1, says that man's natural inclination to virtue is diminished by sin. Therefore.

I answer: In that article he asks concerning sin in general, whether it diminishes the good of nature. But he immediately explains the diminution of the second good of nature, namely inclination to virtue, concerning actual sin, saying, "for through human acts there is produced an inclination to similar acts." But when treating original sin, he explains that inclination to evil only through the removal of what was prohibiting, or through the withdrawal of the gifts of original justice. Hence, when treating original sin in I-II, question 85, article 3, he says: "the very destitution of the gifts of original justice is called the wounding of nature."

Proof II. From reason. Intrinsic diminution of virtue cannot occur except either through intrinsic diminution of the perfection of the faculties, or through the addition of some positive quality inclining to evil. But through original sin no diminution of virtue has occurred in either way, if the withdrawal of original justice is excepted, as is clear. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. Neither the substance of the soul, nor the intellect, nor the will, nor the other natural faculties can be diminished in themselves through withdrawal, because they are indivisible and cannot be remitted. Nor can this happen in some form intrinsically inhering in them, because in pure natural things there is no such form in the substance of the soul or in its potencies. See Suarez (same place, chapter 8, no. 9).

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. Original sin consists in mere privation; therefore it cannot effect some positive quality inclining to evil. Hence we excluded that morbid quality.

Confirmation: "Even actual mortal sin, if it left nothing positive after itself, would not make the operation of virtue more difficult. This is explained in the example posited above, of a man created in pure natural things and afterward sinning mortally only once. For if, after that sin had passed, it left no habit in the will or in the appetite, no evil positive disposition, nor in the intellect or imagination any species or memory of the past sin which could afterward excite affection, then in no way would the good of nature, with respect to the powers of operating natural good, be diminished or made more difficult through that sin once committed; because a past sin, if it has left no evil disposition, cannot stand in the way of anything or place an impediment." Suarez (same place, nos. 11 and 13).

Proof of the second part. "If the intrinsic faculty of fallen man and of pure man for moral works is the same, then also on God's part the mode of providence is equal, and consequently the faculty as if proximate, and as subject to God's providence, will be equal. The latter consequence is evident."

"But the former is proved because God does not punish sin, even original sin, by denying natural providence to man. For that axiom of the theologians placed above, that natural things remained intact after sin, is no more true of intrinsic natural things on the part of man than of natural or connatural things on the part of divine providence, because these preserve proportion among themselves; nor does God, on account of sin, leave nature without concurrence proportioned and owed to such a nature. And it is confirmed first: for although sin of itself is worthy of such and such a punishment, nevertheless in fact not every possible inconvenience of nature is a punishment of sin, but this depends on the law of God and his free will, assigning such and such a punishment for fault. For God could justly reduce the sinner to nothing, or strike him with death as soon as he sins, or deprive him of the use of reason, or of the habit of faith, even if the sin is not contrary to it but only demeritorious of it; and nevertheless, according to the ordinary law, these are not punishments corresponding to sins, because God has not assigned them." Suarez (Prolegomena 4 to the treatise on grace, chapter 9, nos. 6 and 7).

Confirmation: "Those things which depend on God's free disposition and cannot be investigated from effects cannot be affirmed without weighty authority." But there is no authority for affirming that man is extrinsically weaker in the state of fallen nature than he would have been in the state of pure nature. For they argue only, first, from the sayings of the Fathers who, interpreting the parable of the man left half-alive in Luke 10, explain it of man after original sin, or in the state of fallen nature; second, from the fact that, as we saw, man is said to have been wounded in natural things, free choice is said to have been attenuated, and so forth. But these things are said of the present state compared with the state of original justice, not with the state of pure nature. Therefore.

582. Therefore we conclude with Suarez (same place, chapter 8, no. 20): "Man in the state of pure nature would have had the same lack of the garment of justice which fallen man now has, and consequently the same nakedness. But because in the state of pure nature he would always have had it, he would not be called denuded, but nude; now, however, he is called denuded because he was once clothed. And similarly now he is said to be deprived, both for the same reason and also because he is judged to have a proximate capacity for that justice, according to the institution of divine providence. But in pure nature he could only be said to lack or not have justice, as if through simple negation and remote capacity. Thus also then he would indeed have the same dissolution or division among the appetites; but that would not have had the ratio of a wound, because he never had the contrary union and, as it were, coupling. But a wound properly implies relation to a preceding union. For it signifies the term of wounding, and wounding does not occur except through an action by which things that had previously been united are dissolved. And the same account holds for the metaphor of the half-alive man. For on account of wounds man is called wounded and left half-alive, because that word 'left' also declares that man previously had a fuller and healthier life, which through fault and the subsequent wounds he so lost that he is said to have been left half-alive. This would have no place in a man created in pure natural things, because neither would that perfection of life have preceded in him, nor sin by force of that state. This is manifestly clear in the mortality of the body, which certainly is not greater in fallen nature than in pure nature, and nevertheless now has the ratio of a wound; and by reason of it man can be said to have been left half-alive, even in bodily life, because, as Gregory said, life under such a burden of corruption ought rather to be called death than life. But in pure nature it would neither have the ratio of a wound, nor could man be said, on account of inflicted blows, to have been left half-alive, but rather to have been created half-alive, or something similar." But it will be useful to read the cited chapters 8 and 9 in full.