LatineEnglish
551. Plura de effectibus peccati originalis in altera vita disputari solent inter Theologos. Nos certa a probabilibus secernentes, illa auctoritate Ecclesiae statuemus, haec probatas communioresque sententias afferentes attingemus.
551. Many things concerning the effects of original sin in the other life are usually disputed among theologians. Distinguishing the certain from the probable, we shall establish the former by the authority of the Church, and touch upon the latter by bringing forward approved and more common opinions.
552. Ac imprimis non agitur hic de adultis, qui originali simul et actuali peccato inquinati ex hac vita decedunt. Agitur de parvulis, qui sine baptismo, antequam ad usum rationis pervenerint, moriuntur. Eadem autem est ratio de iis, qui parvulis comparantur, ex. gr., perpetuo amentes.
552. And first of all, the question here is not about adults who depart from this life stained at once by original and actual sin. It concerns little children who die without baptism before they have arrived at the use of reason. The same account applies to those who are compared to little children, for example, the perpetually insane.
553. De fide est parvulos, qui sine baptismo moriuntur excludi a vita aeterna, seu a felicitate supernaturali quae in visione intuitiva Dei consistit. Hoc non semel definivit Ecclesia. Sic Patres Synodi Carthaginensis et Milevitanae, anno 416., contrario errore profligato, Epistolam Synodicam dederunt Innocentio I., qui (in Ep. ad Milevit. n. 5.) anno 417. rescripsit: "Illud vero, quod eos vestra Fraternitas asserit praedicasse: parvulos aeternae vitae praemiis etiam sine baptismatis gratia posse donari, perfatuum est ... Qui autem hanc (vitam aeternam) eis sine regeneratione defendunt, videntur mihi ipsum baptismum velle cassare; cum praedicant eos habere, quod in eos creditur nonnisi baptismate conferendum." - Conc. Trident. sess. 5. can. 4. "Si quis parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, etiamsi fuerint a baptizatis parentibus orti; aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerationis lavacro necesse sit expiari ad vitam aeternam consequendam ... anathema sit." - Clarissima et generalissima est Christi Domini sententia Joan. 3.: "Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto non potest introire in regnum Dei." - Certe parvuli omnes contrahunt peccatum originale, ac proinde privantur gratia sanctificante: sine gratia sanctificante, quae est vestis nuptialis, impossibile est admitti in regnum coelorum. Vid. Bellarm. (de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. l. 6. c. 2.)
553. It is of faith that little children who die without baptism are excluded from eternal life, or from supernatural happiness, which consists in the intuitive vision of God. The Church has defined this more than once. Thus the Fathers of the Synod of Carthage and of Milevis, in the year 416, after the contrary error had been defeated, gave a Synodical Letter to Innocent I, who, in the year 417, wrote back (Letter to Milevis, no. 5): "But that which your Fraternity asserts they preached, that little children can be given the rewards of eternal life even without the grace of baptism, is utterly foolish ... But those who defend this (eternal life) for them without regeneration seem to me to wish to nullify baptism itself, since they proclaim that they have that which is believed to be conferred upon them only by baptism." The Council of Trent, session 5, canon 4: "If anyone denies that little children newly born from their mothers' wombs are to be baptized, even if they have been born from baptized parents; or says that they are indeed baptized for the remission of sins, but draw nothing of original sin from Adam which must be expiated by the laver of regeneration in order to obtain eternal life ... let him be anathema." Most clear and most general is the sentence of Christ the Lord in John 3: "Unless one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God." Certainly all little children contract original sin, and consequently are deprived of sanctifying grace; without sanctifying grace, which is the wedding garment, it is impossible to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven. See Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 6, chapter 2).
554. His in tuto positis, tres praecipue quaestiones agitari solent inter Theologos. Prima est: utrum parvuli puniantur poena sensus? - Altera: utrum parvuli dolorem et tristitiam patiantur de sua exclusione a beatitudine supernaturali? - Tertia: utrum parvuli mortui sine baptismo beatitudinem quamdam naturalem habeant.
§ I.
De poena sensus.
§ I.
De poena sensus.
554. With these points placed safely, three principal questions are usually discussed among theologians. The first is whether little children are punished with the pain of sense. The second: whether little children suffer pain and sadness over their exclusion from supernatural beatitude. The third: whether little children who have died without baptism have a certain natural beatitude.
§ I.
On the pain of sense.
§ I.
On the pain of sense.
555. Quoad 1am quaestionem, plures inter Patres Latinos asseruisse videntur parvulos sine baptismo decedentes puniendos esse poena sensus, licet mitissima. Vid. de Rubeis (de peccato orig. c. 75.) Praesertim vero in hac fuit sententia S. Augustinus, qui tamen postea incertus de ea factus, scripsit (de lib. arbi. l. 3. c. 29.): "Respondetur ... superfluo quaeri de meritis ejus, qui nihil meruerit. (De parvulis res agitur.) Non enim metuendum est, ne vita esse potuerit media quaedam inter recte factum, atque peccatum: et sententia judicis media esse non possit inter praemium, atque supplicium." - E contra inter Patres Graecos communis fuit contraria sententia, quae tuto defendi posse ostenditur ex cens. 16. in Bulla Auctorem Fidei: "Doctrina, quae velut fabulam Pelagianam explodit locum illum inferorum (quem limbi puerorum nomine fideles passim designant), in quo animae decedentium cum sola originali culpa poena damni citra poenam ignis puniantur; perinde ac si hoc ipso quod, qui poenam ignis removent, inducerent locum illum et statum medium expertem culpae et poenae inter regnum Dei, et damnationem aeternam, qualem fabulabantur Pelagiani; falsa, temeraria, in scholas catholicas injuriosa."
555. With respect to the first question, many among the Latin Fathers seem to have asserted that little children dying without baptism are to be punished with the pain of sense, although a very mild one. See de Rubeis (On Original Sin, chapter 75). Especially, however, St. Augustine was of this opinion, though later, having become uncertain about it, he wrote (On Free Choice, book 3, chapter 29): "The answer is ... that it is superfluous to ask about the merits of one who has merited nothing. The matter concerns little children. For one need not fear that there could have been a certain middle life between right deed and sin, and yet that the sentence of the judge cannot be middle between reward and punishment." On the contrary, among the Greek Fathers the contrary opinion was common, and that it can safely be defended is shown from censure 16 in the bull Auctorem Fidei: "The doctrine which rejects as a Pelagian fable that place of the lower regions, which the faithful everywhere designate by the name limbo of children, in which the souls of those departing with original fault alone are punished with the pain of loss apart from the punishment of fire; as if by this very fact those who remove the punishment of fire were introducing that place and a middle state free from fault and punishment between the kingdom of God and eternal damnation, such as the Pelagians used to imagine, is false, rash, injurious to Catholic schools."
556. Communissima deinde in scholis facta est sententia parvulos cum solo peccato originali decedentes non puniri poena sensus.
Prob. ex D. Thoma, quem caeteri sequuntur. a) Dicitur Apoc. 18. 7.: "Quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit: tantum date illi tormentum et luctum." Ex quo arguit D. Thomas: "Acerbitas poenae sensibilis delectationi culpae respondet, Apocal. 18. Sed in peccato originali non est aliqua delectatio, sicut nec operatio: delectatio enim operationem sequitur. Ergo peccato originali non debetur poena sensibilis."
b) Juxta S. Augustinum, parvulorum poena est omnium mitissima. Ex quo D. Thomas: "Sed hoc non esset, si sensibili poena torquerentur: quia poena ignis inferni est gravissima." Ita 2. sent. dist. 23. q. 2. a. 1.
c) S. Bernardus (serm. 3. de Resur.), ait: "Quid enim odit, aut punit Deus praeter propriam voluntatem? Cesset voluntas propria et infernus non erit. In quem enim ignis ille desaeviet, nisi in propriam voluntatem?" - Ex quo D. Thomas: "Sed originale peccatum non est peccatum propriae voluntatis, immo consequitur ex voluntate aliena: ergo peccato, originali non debetur poena sensus." - Affert etiam auctoritatem Innocentii II. qui (Extra de Bapt. c. Majores) ait: "Praeterea poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei: actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus." Ita q. 5. de malo a. 2.
d) "Hoc videtur esse rationabile, addit, propter tria. Quia persona quaelibet est alicujus naturae suppositum: et ideo ad ea quae sunt naturae, per se, et immediate ordinatur; ad ea vero quae sunt supra naturam, ordinatur mediante natura. Quod ergo detrimentum aliquod patiatur aliqua persona in his quae sunt supra naturam, potest contingere vel ex vitio naturae, vel ex vitio personae. Quod autem detrimentum patiatur in his quae sunt naturae, hoc non videtur posse contingere, nisi propter vitium aliquod personae. Peccatum originale est vitium naturae: peccatum actuale est vitium personae. Gratia autem, et visio divina sunt supra naturam. Et ideo privatio gratiae, et carentia visionis divinae debentur alicui personae non solum propter actuale peccatum, sed etiam propter originale. Poena autem sensus opponitur integritati naturae, et bonae ejus habitudini: et ideo poena sensus non debetur alicui, nisi propter peccatum actuale."
e) "Poena proportionatur culpae; et ideo peccato actuali mortali, in quo invenitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, et conversio ad bonum commutabile, debetur poena damni, scilicet carentia visionis divinae, respondens aversioni; et poena sensus, respondens conversioni. Sed in peccato originali non conversio, sed sola aversio, seu aliquid aversioni respondens invenitur: scilicet destitutio animae a justitia originali; (idest non aversio quaedam instar actus, sed sola originalis justitiae privatio instar cujusdam habitus). Et ideo peccato originali non debetur poena sensus, sed solum poena damni, scilicet carentia visionis divinae." Ita in 4. sent. dist. 47. q. 1. a. 3.
f) Ibidem S. Doctor tertiam affert rationem, quam sic exponit Bellarminus (op. cit. c. 4.): "Propter habitualem carentiam virtutum, et habitualem pronitatem ad vitia, nemo puniri solet poena positiva, ac sensibili, sed solum propter culpam actualem, non enim suspenduntur a magistratu, qui carent habitu justitiae; vel qui proni sunt ad furta, sed qui re ipsa furantur: possunt tamen qui carent virtutibus, et e contrario proni sunt ad mala, rejici tamquam indigni ab aliqua dignitate adipiscenda: at peccatum originis est culpa solum habitualis; sunt enim infantes propter id peccatum habitualiter proni ad concupiscendum contra rationem; igitur rejici possunt tamquam indigni a coelesti beatitudine adeunda, non tamen puniri debent supplicio ignis, et sulphuris, quae sunt poenae sensibiles, ac positivae."
Prob. ex D. Thoma, quem caeteri sequuntur. a) Dicitur Apoc. 18. 7.: "Quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit: tantum date illi tormentum et luctum." Ex quo arguit D. Thomas: "Acerbitas poenae sensibilis delectationi culpae respondet, Apocal. 18. Sed in peccato originali non est aliqua delectatio, sicut nec operatio: delectatio enim operationem sequitur. Ergo peccato originali non debetur poena sensibilis."
b) Juxta S. Augustinum, parvulorum poena est omnium mitissima. Ex quo D. Thomas: "Sed hoc non esset, si sensibili poena torquerentur: quia poena ignis inferni est gravissima." Ita 2. sent. dist. 23. q. 2. a. 1.
c) S. Bernardus (serm. 3. de Resur.), ait: "Quid enim odit, aut punit Deus praeter propriam voluntatem? Cesset voluntas propria et infernus non erit. In quem enim ignis ille desaeviet, nisi in propriam voluntatem?" - Ex quo D. Thomas: "Sed originale peccatum non est peccatum propriae voluntatis, immo consequitur ex voluntate aliena: ergo peccato, originali non debetur poena sensus." - Affert etiam auctoritatem Innocentii II. qui (Extra de Bapt. c. Majores) ait: "Praeterea poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei: actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus." Ita q. 5. de malo a. 2.
d) "Hoc videtur esse rationabile, addit, propter tria. Quia persona quaelibet est alicujus naturae suppositum: et ideo ad ea quae sunt naturae, per se, et immediate ordinatur; ad ea vero quae sunt supra naturam, ordinatur mediante natura. Quod ergo detrimentum aliquod patiatur aliqua persona in his quae sunt supra naturam, potest contingere vel ex vitio naturae, vel ex vitio personae. Quod autem detrimentum patiatur in his quae sunt naturae, hoc non videtur posse contingere, nisi propter vitium aliquod personae. Peccatum originale est vitium naturae: peccatum actuale est vitium personae. Gratia autem, et visio divina sunt supra naturam. Et ideo privatio gratiae, et carentia visionis divinae debentur alicui personae non solum propter actuale peccatum, sed etiam propter originale. Poena autem sensus opponitur integritati naturae, et bonae ejus habitudini: et ideo poena sensus non debetur alicui, nisi propter peccatum actuale."
e) "Poena proportionatur culpae; et ideo peccato actuali mortali, in quo invenitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, et conversio ad bonum commutabile, debetur poena damni, scilicet carentia visionis divinae, respondens aversioni; et poena sensus, respondens conversioni. Sed in peccato originali non conversio, sed sola aversio, seu aliquid aversioni respondens invenitur: scilicet destitutio animae a justitia originali; (idest non aversio quaedam instar actus, sed sola originalis justitiae privatio instar cujusdam habitus). Et ideo peccato originali non debetur poena sensus, sed solum poena damni, scilicet carentia visionis divinae." Ita in 4. sent. dist. 47. q. 1. a. 3.
f) Ibidem S. Doctor tertiam affert rationem, quam sic exponit Bellarminus (op. cit. c. 4.): "Propter habitualem carentiam virtutum, et habitualem pronitatem ad vitia, nemo puniri solet poena positiva, ac sensibili, sed solum propter culpam actualem, non enim suspenduntur a magistratu, qui carent habitu justitiae; vel qui proni sunt ad furta, sed qui re ipsa furantur: possunt tamen qui carent virtutibus, et e contrario proni sunt ad mala, rejici tamquam indigni ab aliqua dignitate adipiscenda: at peccatum originis est culpa solum habitualis; sunt enim infantes propter id peccatum habitualiter proni ad concupiscendum contra rationem; igitur rejici possunt tamquam indigni a coelesti beatitudine adeunda, non tamen puniri debent supplicio ignis, et sulphuris, quae sunt poenae sensibiles, ac positivae."
556. Thereafter the opinion became most common in the schools that little children departing with original sin alone are not punished with the pain of sense.
Proof from St. Thomas, whom the others follow. a) Revelation 18:7 says: "As much as she glorified herself and was in delights, so much torment and mourning give to her." From this St. Thomas argues: "The bitterness of sensible punishment corresponds to the delight of fault, Revelation 18. But in original sin there is no delight, just as there is no operation; for delight follows operation. Therefore sensible punishment is not owed to original sin."
b) According to St. Augustine, the punishment of little children is the mildest of all. From this St. Thomas says: "But this would not be so if they were tormented with sensible punishment, because the punishment of the fire of hell is most grave." Thus 2 Sentences, distinction 23, question 2, article 1.
c) St. Bernard (Sermon 3 on the Resurrection) says: "For what does God hate or punish except one's own will? Let one's own will cease and hell will not exist. Against what, then, will that fire rage except against one's own will?" From this St. Thomas says: "But original sin is not the sin of one's own will; rather, it follows from another's will. Therefore the pain of sense is not owed to original sin." He also brings forward the authority of Innocent II, who says (Extra, De Baptismo, chapter Majores): "Furthermore, the punishment of original sin is the lack of the vision of God; but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of perpetual Gehenna." Thus De Malo, question 5, article 2.
d) "This seems reasonable," he adds, "for three reasons. Because any person is the supposit of some nature; and therefore he is ordered to those things which belong to nature through himself and immediately, but to those things which are above nature through the mediation of nature. Therefore, that some person should suffer some detriment in those things which are above nature can happen either from a vice of nature or from a vice of the person. But that he should suffer detriment in those things which belong to nature does not seem able to happen except on account of some vice of the person. Original sin is a vice of nature; actual sin is a vice of the person. But grace and the divine vision are above nature. And therefore the privation of grace and the lack of the divine vision are owed to some person not only on account of actual sin, but also on account of original sin. But the pain of sense is opposed to the integrity of nature and to its good disposition; and therefore the pain of sense is not owed to anyone except on account of actual sin."
e) "Punishment is proportioned to fault; and therefore to mortal actual sin, in which there is aversion from the unchangeable good and conversion to a changeable good, there is owed the pain of loss, namely the lack of the divine vision, corresponding to aversion, and the pain of sense, corresponding to conversion. But in original sin there is not conversion, but only aversion, or something corresponding to aversion, namely the destitution of the soul from original justice, that is, not some aversion after the manner of an act, but only the privation of original justice after the manner of a certain habit. And therefore to original sin there is not owed the pain of sense, but only the pain of loss, namely the lack of the divine vision." Thus in 4 Sentences, distinction 47, question 1, article 3.
f) In the same place the holy Doctor brings forward a third reason, which Bellarmine explains thus (cited work, chapter 4): "On account of the habitual lack of virtues and habitual proneness to vices, no one is usually punished with a positive and sensible punishment, but only on account of actual fault. For those who lack the habit of justice, or who are prone to theft, are not hanged by the magistrate, but those who steal in actual fact are. Nevertheless those who lack virtues and, on the contrary, are prone to evils can be rejected as unworthy of attaining some dignity. But the sin of origin is only habitual fault; for infants, on account of that sin, are habitually prone to desiring against reason. Therefore they can be rejected as unworthy of attaining heavenly beatitude, but they ought not to be punished with the torment of fire and sulfur, which are sensible and positive punishments."
Proof from St. Thomas, whom the others follow. a) Revelation 18:7 says: "As much as she glorified herself and was in delights, so much torment and mourning give to her." From this St. Thomas argues: "The bitterness of sensible punishment corresponds to the delight of fault, Revelation 18. But in original sin there is no delight, just as there is no operation; for delight follows operation. Therefore sensible punishment is not owed to original sin."
b) According to St. Augustine, the punishment of little children is the mildest of all. From this St. Thomas says: "But this would not be so if they were tormented with sensible punishment, because the punishment of the fire of hell is most grave." Thus 2 Sentences, distinction 23, question 2, article 1.
c) St. Bernard (Sermon 3 on the Resurrection) says: "For what does God hate or punish except one's own will? Let one's own will cease and hell will not exist. Against what, then, will that fire rage except against one's own will?" From this St. Thomas says: "But original sin is not the sin of one's own will; rather, it follows from another's will. Therefore the pain of sense is not owed to original sin." He also brings forward the authority of Innocent II, who says (Extra, De Baptismo, chapter Majores): "Furthermore, the punishment of original sin is the lack of the vision of God; but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of perpetual Gehenna." Thus De Malo, question 5, article 2.
d) "This seems reasonable," he adds, "for three reasons. Because any person is the supposit of some nature; and therefore he is ordered to those things which belong to nature through himself and immediately, but to those things which are above nature through the mediation of nature. Therefore, that some person should suffer some detriment in those things which are above nature can happen either from a vice of nature or from a vice of the person. But that he should suffer detriment in those things which belong to nature does not seem able to happen except on account of some vice of the person. Original sin is a vice of nature; actual sin is a vice of the person. But grace and the divine vision are above nature. And therefore the privation of grace and the lack of the divine vision are owed to some person not only on account of actual sin, but also on account of original sin. But the pain of sense is opposed to the integrity of nature and to its good disposition; and therefore the pain of sense is not owed to anyone except on account of actual sin."
e) "Punishment is proportioned to fault; and therefore to mortal actual sin, in which there is aversion from the unchangeable good and conversion to a changeable good, there is owed the pain of loss, namely the lack of the divine vision, corresponding to aversion, and the pain of sense, corresponding to conversion. But in original sin there is not conversion, but only aversion, or something corresponding to aversion, namely the destitution of the soul from original justice, that is, not some aversion after the manner of an act, but only the privation of original justice after the manner of a certain habit. And therefore to original sin there is not owed the pain of sense, but only the pain of loss, namely the lack of the divine vision." Thus in 4 Sentences, distinction 47, question 1, article 3.
f) In the same place the holy Doctor brings forward a third reason, which Bellarmine explains thus (cited work, chapter 4): "On account of the habitual lack of virtues and habitual proneness to vices, no one is usually punished with a positive and sensible punishment, but only on account of actual fault. For those who lack the habit of justice, or who are prone to theft, are not hanged by the magistrate, but those who steal in actual fact are. Nevertheless those who lack virtues and, on the contrary, are prone to evils can be rejected as unworthy of attaining some dignity. But the sin of origin is only habitual fault; for infants, on account of that sin, are habitually prone to desiring against reason. Therefore they can be rejected as unworthy of attaining heavenly beatitude, but they ought not to be punished with the torment of fire and sulfur, which are sensible and positive punishments."
557. Objicit sibi D. Thomas (2. sent. l. c.): "Gravius puniuntur peccata post hanc vitam, quam in ista vita: ubi est misericordiae locus. Sed in hac vita respondet originali peccato poena sensibilis, pueri enim qui solum originalem culpam habent, multas poenas sensibiles sustinent, nec injuste. Ergo et post hanc vitam poena sensibilis eis debetur."
Respondet tamen ad 3.: "Non est eadem ratio de poena sensibili ante mortem, et post mortem. Ante mortem poena sensibilis consequitur virtute naturae agentis: sive sit poena sensibilis interior, ut febris, vel aliquid hujusmodi: sive etiam poena sensibilis exterior, ut ustio, et aliquid hujusmodi. Sed post mortem nihil agit virtute naturae, sed secundum justitiae divinae ordinem tantum: sive in animam separatam, in quam constat quod ignis naturaliter agere non potest: sive etiam in corpus post resurrectionem: quia tunc omnis actio naturalis cessabit."
Respondet tamen ad 3.: "Non est eadem ratio de poena sensibili ante mortem, et post mortem. Ante mortem poena sensibilis consequitur virtute naturae agentis: sive sit poena sensibilis interior, ut febris, vel aliquid hujusmodi: sive etiam poena sensibilis exterior, ut ustio, et aliquid hujusmodi. Sed post mortem nihil agit virtute naturae, sed secundum justitiae divinae ordinem tantum: sive in animam separatam, in quam constat quod ignis naturaliter agere non potest: sive etiam in corpus post resurrectionem: quia tunc omnis actio naturalis cessabit."
557. St. Thomas objects to himself (2 Sentences, same place): "Sins are punished more gravely after this life than in this life, where there is a place for mercy. But in this life sensible punishment corresponds to original sin, for children who have only original fault sustain many sensible punishments, and not unjustly. Therefore also after this life sensible punishment is owed to them."
Nevertheless he answers in reply 3: "The account of sensible punishment before death and after death is not the same. Before death sensible punishment follows by the power of acting nature, whether it is an interior sensible punishment, such as fever or something of this sort, or also an exterior sensible punishment, such as burning or something of this sort. But after death nothing acts by the power of nature, but only according to the order of divine justice, whether upon the separated soul, upon which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or also upon the body after the resurrection, because then every natural action will cease."
Nevertheless he answers in reply 3: "The account of sensible punishment before death and after death is not the same. Before death sensible punishment follows by the power of acting nature, whether it is an interior sensible punishment, such as fever or something of this sort, or also an exterior sensible punishment, such as burning or something of this sort. But after death nothing acts by the power of nature, but only according to the order of divine justice, whether upon the separated soul, upon which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or also upon the body after the resurrection, because then every natural action will cease."
558. Quoad 2am quaestionem, non desunt graves Theologi, qui tenent parvulos passuros esse internum animi dolorem ex poena damni. Concedunt tamen hunc dolorem levissimum futurum. "Tum quod," inquit Bellarminus (l. c. cap. 6.), "dispositionem ad beatitudinem non nisi remotissimam habuerint; tum quod intelligent non propria negligentia, se tantum bonum amisisse, unde etiam verme conscientiae carebunt; tum quod delicias, neque coelestes, neque terrenas unquam gustaverint. Facile enim iis bonis caremus, quibus nunquam assuevimus; tum denique quod videbunt plurimos esse in eodem gehennae carcere se multo infeliciores, ad quorum sortem ipsi quoque pertinere potuissent, si diutius sibi vivere contigisset; quare S. Augustinus multis in locis affirmat, parvulos sine Baptismo decedentes in damnatione omnium mitissima futuros."
558. With respect to the second question, there are serious theologians who hold that little children will suffer an internal pain of soul from the pain of loss. Nevertheless they concede that this pain will be very slight. "Both because," says Bellarmine (same place, chapter 6), "they had only the most remote disposition to beatitude; and because they will understand that they lost so great a good not by their own negligence, whence they will also lack the worm of conscience; and because they never tasted delights, neither heavenly nor earthly. For we easily lack those goods to which we have never become accustomed; and finally because they will see that very many in the same prison of Gehenna are much more unhappy than they, to whose lot they themselves also could have belonged if it had happened that they lived longer. For this reason St. Augustine affirms in many places that little children dying without Baptism will be in the mildest damnation of all."
559. Valde tamen communior est inter Scholasticos cum D. Thoma, S. Bonaventura, Suarez, etc., sententia, quae nullam animi tristitiam parvulos ex privatione visionis intuitivae passuros esse statuit.
Prob. a) "Si pueri non baptizati, post mortem dolorem interiorem habeant: aut dolebunt de culpa, aut de poena. Si de culpa: cum a culpa illa ulterius emundari non possint, dolor ille erit in desperationem inducens. Sed talis dolor in damnatis est vermis conscientiae: ergo pueri vermem conscientiae habebunt; et sic non esset eorum poena mitissima."
Si de poena: "Talis dolor parvus esse non potest de tanti boni amissione, et praecipue sine spe recuperationis: unde poena eorum non esset mitissima. Deinde eadem ratione, qua dolore sensibili, et exterius affligente non puniuntur, etiam dolorem interiorem non sentient. Quia dolor poenae delectationi culpae respondet: unde delectatione remota a culpa originali, omnis dolor ab ejus poena excluditur."
b) "Ratio recta non patitur, ut aliquis perturbetur de eo, quod in ipso non fuit ut vitaretur: propter quod Seneca probat, quod perturbatio in sapientem non cadit. Sed in pueris est recta ratio, nullo actuali peccato obliquata. Ergo non turbabuntur de hoc, quod talem poenam sustinent, quam vitare nullo modo potuerunt." Vid. etiam (n. 400. d).
Dices: Fuerunt pueri illi proportionati "ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quamvis non per actionem propriam, tamen per actionem aliorum, quia potuerunt ab aliis baptizari; sicut et multi pueri ejusdem conditionis baptizati, vitam aeternam consequuti sunt."
Resp. D. Thomas: "Hoc est superexcedentis gratiae, ut aliquis sine actu proprio praemietur: unde defectus talis gratiae non magis tristitiam causat pueris decedentibus non baptizatis, quam in sapientibus hoc quod in eis multae gratiae non fiunt, quae in aliis similibus factae sunt." Ita in 2. sent. dist. 33.
c) "Dicamus quod animae puerorum naturali quidem cognitione non carent, qualis debetur animae separatae secundum suam naturam; sed carent supernaturali cognitione, quae hic in nobis per fidem plantatur; eo quod neque hic fidem habuerunt actu, nec sacramentum fidei susceperunt ... Pertinet vero ad naturalem conditionem, quod anima sciat se propter beatitudinem creatam: et quod beatitudo consistit in adeptione boni perfecti. Sed quod illud perfectum bonum, ad quod homo factus est, sit illa gloria quam Sancti possident, est supra cognitionem naturalem. Unde Apostolus dicit: 'quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se.' Et postea subdit: 'Nobis autem revelavit Deus per Spiritum suum' ... Et ideo (conclusio est Sancti Thomae) se privari tali bono, animae puerorum non cognoscunt: et propter hoc non dolent: sed hoc, quod per naturam habent, sine dolore possident." Ita q. 5. de malo, art. 3. ubi juverit etiam obj. cum respons. consulere.
d) Aliam affert rationem S. Bonaventura. "Scribit enim homines illos simul consideraturos beatitudinem, quam amiserunt; et poenas aliorum damnatorum, quas evaserunt; et quamquam prior consideratio dolorem, posterior gaudium adferre possit, tamen ita unam temperandam per aliam, ut consideratio amissae beatitudinis, impeditura sit gaudium de evasione poenarum, et consideratio evasionis poenarum, impeditura sit dolorem de privatione beatitudinis, atque ita futurum, ut illi neque tristentur unquam, neque laetentur."
§ III.
De bonis, quibus parvuli sine baptismo decedentes fruuntur.
Prob. a) "Si pueri non baptizati, post mortem dolorem interiorem habeant: aut dolebunt de culpa, aut de poena. Si de culpa: cum a culpa illa ulterius emundari non possint, dolor ille erit in desperationem inducens. Sed talis dolor in damnatis est vermis conscientiae: ergo pueri vermem conscientiae habebunt; et sic non esset eorum poena mitissima."
Si de poena: "Talis dolor parvus esse non potest de tanti boni amissione, et praecipue sine spe recuperationis: unde poena eorum non esset mitissima. Deinde eadem ratione, qua dolore sensibili, et exterius affligente non puniuntur, etiam dolorem interiorem non sentient. Quia dolor poenae delectationi culpae respondet: unde delectatione remota a culpa originali, omnis dolor ab ejus poena excluditur."
b) "Ratio recta non patitur, ut aliquis perturbetur de eo, quod in ipso non fuit ut vitaretur: propter quod Seneca probat, quod perturbatio in sapientem non cadit. Sed in pueris est recta ratio, nullo actuali peccato obliquata. Ergo non turbabuntur de hoc, quod talem poenam sustinent, quam vitare nullo modo potuerunt." Vid. etiam (n. 400. d).
Dices: Fuerunt pueri illi proportionati "ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quamvis non per actionem propriam, tamen per actionem aliorum, quia potuerunt ab aliis baptizari; sicut et multi pueri ejusdem conditionis baptizati, vitam aeternam consequuti sunt."
Resp. D. Thomas: "Hoc est superexcedentis gratiae, ut aliquis sine actu proprio praemietur: unde defectus talis gratiae non magis tristitiam causat pueris decedentibus non baptizatis, quam in sapientibus hoc quod in eis multae gratiae non fiunt, quae in aliis similibus factae sunt." Ita in 2. sent. dist. 33.
c) "Dicamus quod animae puerorum naturali quidem cognitione non carent, qualis debetur animae separatae secundum suam naturam; sed carent supernaturali cognitione, quae hic in nobis per fidem plantatur; eo quod neque hic fidem habuerunt actu, nec sacramentum fidei susceperunt ... Pertinet vero ad naturalem conditionem, quod anima sciat se propter beatitudinem creatam: et quod beatitudo consistit in adeptione boni perfecti. Sed quod illud perfectum bonum, ad quod homo factus est, sit illa gloria quam Sancti possident, est supra cognitionem naturalem. Unde Apostolus dicit: 'quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se.' Et postea subdit: 'Nobis autem revelavit Deus per Spiritum suum' ... Et ideo (conclusio est Sancti Thomae) se privari tali bono, animae puerorum non cognoscunt: et propter hoc non dolent: sed hoc, quod per naturam habent, sine dolore possident." Ita q. 5. de malo, art. 3. ubi juverit etiam obj. cum respons. consulere.
d) Aliam affert rationem S. Bonaventura. "Scribit enim homines illos simul consideraturos beatitudinem, quam amiserunt; et poenas aliorum damnatorum, quas evaserunt; et quamquam prior consideratio dolorem, posterior gaudium adferre possit, tamen ita unam temperandam per aliam, ut consideratio amissae beatitudinis, impeditura sit gaudium de evasione poenarum, et consideratio evasionis poenarum, impeditura sit dolorem de privatione beatitudinis, atque ita futurum, ut illi neque tristentur unquam, neque laetentur."
§ III.
De bonis, quibus parvuli sine baptismo decedentes fruuntur.
559. Nevertheless, far more common among the Scholastics, with St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Suarez, and others, is the opinion which establishes that little children will suffer no sadness of soul from the privation of the intuitive vision.
Proof. a) "If children not baptized have interior pain after death, either they will grieve over fault or over punishment. If over fault, since they cannot be cleansed further from that fault, that pain will induce despair. But such pain in the damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore children will have the worm of conscience; and thus their punishment would not be the mildest."
If over punishment: "Such pain cannot be small over the loss of so great a good, and especially without hope of recovery; hence their punishment would not be the mildest. Then, by the same reason by which they are not punished by sensible pain afflicting them exteriorly, they will also not feel interior pain. For the pain of punishment corresponds to the delight of fault; hence, when delight has been removed from original fault, every pain is excluded from its punishment."
b) "Right reason does not allow that someone be disturbed over that which was not in him to avoid; for this reason Seneca proves that disturbance does not fall upon the wise man. But in children there is right reason, made oblique by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be disturbed over this, that they sustain such a punishment, which they could in no way avoid." See also no. 400.d.
You will say: Those children were proportioned "to attaining eternal life, although not through their own action, nevertheless through the action of others, because they could have been baptized by others; just as many children of the same condition, having been baptized, attained eternal life."
St. Thomas answers: "This belongs to superabounding grace, that someone be rewarded without his own act; hence the defect of such grace causes no more sadness in children dying not baptized than, in the wise, the fact that many graces are not done in them which have been done in others similar to them." Thus in 2 Sentences, distinction 33.
c) "Let us say that the souls of children indeed do not lack natural cognition, such as is owed to the separated soul according to its nature; but they lack supernatural cognition, which here in us is planted through faith, because here they neither had faith in act nor received the sacrament of faith ... But it pertains to the natural condition that the soul know that it was created for beatitude, and that beatitude consists in the attainment of the perfect good. But that that perfect good for which man was made is that glory which the Saints possess is above natural cognition. Hence the Apostle says: 'what eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love him.' And afterward he adds: 'But God has revealed them to us through his Spirit' ... And therefore," and this is St. Thomas's conclusion, "the souls of children do not know that they are deprived of such a good; and on account of this they do not grieve; but that which they have through nature, they possess without pain." Thus De Malo, question 5, article 3, where it will also be useful to consult the objections with the replies.
d) St. Bonaventure brings forward another reason. "For he writes that those human beings will consider at the same time the beatitude which they lost and the punishments of the other damned which they escaped; and although the former consideration can bring pain, the latter joy, nevertheless one will be so tempered by the other that the consideration of lost beatitude will impede joy over escape from punishments, and the consideration of escape from punishments will impede pain over the privation of beatitude; and thus it will be that they will neither ever be saddened nor rejoice."
§ III.
On the goods which little children dying without baptism enjoy.
Proof. a) "If children not baptized have interior pain after death, either they will grieve over fault or over punishment. If over fault, since they cannot be cleansed further from that fault, that pain will induce despair. But such pain in the damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore children will have the worm of conscience; and thus their punishment would not be the mildest."
If over punishment: "Such pain cannot be small over the loss of so great a good, and especially without hope of recovery; hence their punishment would not be the mildest. Then, by the same reason by which they are not punished by sensible pain afflicting them exteriorly, they will also not feel interior pain. For the pain of punishment corresponds to the delight of fault; hence, when delight has been removed from original fault, every pain is excluded from its punishment."
b) "Right reason does not allow that someone be disturbed over that which was not in him to avoid; for this reason Seneca proves that disturbance does not fall upon the wise man. But in children there is right reason, made oblique by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be disturbed over this, that they sustain such a punishment, which they could in no way avoid." See also no. 400.d.
You will say: Those children were proportioned "to attaining eternal life, although not through their own action, nevertheless through the action of others, because they could have been baptized by others; just as many children of the same condition, having been baptized, attained eternal life."
St. Thomas answers: "This belongs to superabounding grace, that someone be rewarded without his own act; hence the defect of such grace causes no more sadness in children dying not baptized than, in the wise, the fact that many graces are not done in them which have been done in others similar to them." Thus in 2 Sentences, distinction 33.
c) "Let us say that the souls of children indeed do not lack natural cognition, such as is owed to the separated soul according to its nature; but they lack supernatural cognition, which here in us is planted through faith, because here they neither had faith in act nor received the sacrament of faith ... But it pertains to the natural condition that the soul know that it was created for beatitude, and that beatitude consists in the attainment of the perfect good. But that that perfect good for which man was made is that glory which the Saints possess is above natural cognition. Hence the Apostle says: 'what eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love him.' And afterward he adds: 'But God has revealed them to us through his Spirit' ... And therefore," and this is St. Thomas's conclusion, "the souls of children do not know that they are deprived of such a good; and on account of this they do not grieve; but that which they have through nature, they possess without pain." Thus De Malo, question 5, article 3, where it will also be useful to consult the objections with the replies.
d) St. Bonaventure brings forward another reason. "For he writes that those human beings will consider at the same time the beatitude which they lost and the punishments of the other damned which they escaped; and although the former consideration can bring pain, the latter joy, nevertheless one will be so tempered by the other that the consideration of lost beatitude will impede joy over escape from punishments, and the consideration of escape from punishments will impede pain over the privation of beatitude; and thus it will be that they will neither ever be saddened nor rejoice."
§ III.
On the goods which little children dying without baptism enjoy.
560. Ut inutiles quaestiones vitentur, aliqua imprimis adnotabimus, in quibus omnes convenire debent. Ac 1. Pelagiani attribuebant parvulis vitam beatam extra regnum caelorum, liberam a morte peccati: in hoc a S. Augustino damnantur. Theologi autem, qui naturalem beatitudinem parvulis tribuunt, non excludunt certe mortem peccati.
2. Pelagiani adstruentes statum quendam medium inter vitam aeternam et damnationem aeternam, tribuebant parvulis vitam aeternam extra regnum caelorum. Distinguebant autem vitam aeternam a regno coelorum in eo, ut videtur, quod in vita aeterna esset visio intuitiva Dei absque consortio Christi et Sanctorum; in regno caelorum haberetur eadem visio intuitiva cum Christo et Sanctis. Theologi tribuentes parvulis naturalem beatitudinem certe eos omnino excludunt a visione intuitiva Dei.
3. Certum est etiam parvulos destinatos fuisse ad finem supernaturalem, eorum etiam salutem sincere Deum voluisse, Christum etiam pro illis mortuum esse. In praesenti enim providentiae ordine dici nequit dari duos fines, naturalem et supernaturalem, ad quorum primum destinati sint parvuli cum solo originali peccato morientes, ad alterum vero adulti; sed omnes ad unum eumdemque supernaturalem finem destinati sunt. Hinc dici nequit quod parvuli decedentes sine baptismo assequuti sunt suum finem, - quod sunt in statu beatitudinis - debet potius dici eos esse in statu damnationis, sive quia sunt in statu peccati, sive quia a suo fine excluduntur.
4. Status igitur parvulorum nunc decedentium sine baptismo, si comparetur cum sorte parvulorum in pura natura, nequit certe dici esse formaliter idem. Quaestio ergo unice versatur in eo, utrum duo illi status sint materialiter idem; seu utrum parvuli, qui nunc decedunt cum solo peccato originali gaudeant bonis illis naturalibus, quibus parvuli gauderent in statu purae naturae.
2. Pelagiani adstruentes statum quendam medium inter vitam aeternam et damnationem aeternam, tribuebant parvulis vitam aeternam extra regnum caelorum. Distinguebant autem vitam aeternam a regno coelorum in eo, ut videtur, quod in vita aeterna esset visio intuitiva Dei absque consortio Christi et Sanctorum; in regno caelorum haberetur eadem visio intuitiva cum Christo et Sanctis. Theologi tribuentes parvulis naturalem beatitudinem certe eos omnino excludunt a visione intuitiva Dei.
3. Certum est etiam parvulos destinatos fuisse ad finem supernaturalem, eorum etiam salutem sincere Deum voluisse, Christum etiam pro illis mortuum esse. In praesenti enim providentiae ordine dici nequit dari duos fines, naturalem et supernaturalem, ad quorum primum destinati sint parvuli cum solo originali peccato morientes, ad alterum vero adulti; sed omnes ad unum eumdemque supernaturalem finem destinati sunt. Hinc dici nequit quod parvuli decedentes sine baptismo assequuti sunt suum finem, - quod sunt in statu beatitudinis - debet potius dici eos esse in statu damnationis, sive quia sunt in statu peccati, sive quia a suo fine excluduntur.
4. Status igitur parvulorum nunc decedentium sine baptismo, si comparetur cum sorte parvulorum in pura natura, nequit certe dici esse formaliter idem. Quaestio ergo unice versatur in eo, utrum duo illi status sint materialiter idem; seu utrum parvuli, qui nunc decedunt cum solo peccato originali gaudeant bonis illis naturalibus, quibus parvuli gauderent in statu purae naturae.
560. In order that useless questions may be avoided, we shall first note some points on which all ought to agree. 1. The Pelagians attributed to little children a blessed life outside the kingdom of heaven, free from the death of sin; in this they are condemned by St. Augustine. But theologians who attribute natural beatitude to little children certainly do not exclude the death of sin.
2. The Pelagians, constructing a certain middle state between eternal life and eternal damnation, attributed to little children eternal life outside the kingdom of heaven. But they distinguished eternal life from the kingdom of heaven in this, as it seems, that in eternal life there would be the intuitive vision of God without the fellowship of Christ and the Saints; in the kingdom of heaven the same intuitive vision would be had with Christ and the Saints. Theologians who attribute natural beatitude to little children certainly exclude them altogether from the intuitive vision of God.
3. It is also certain that little children were destined for the supernatural end, that God sincerely willed their salvation also, and that Christ died for them also. For in the present order of providence it cannot be said that there are two ends, natural and supernatural, to the first of which little children dying with original sin alone are destined, and to the other adults are destined; rather, all are destined to one and the same supernatural end. Hence it cannot be said that little children dying without baptism attained their end, or that they are in a state of beatitude. It must rather be said that they are in a state of damnation, either because they are in a state of sin or because they are excluded from their end.
4. Therefore the state of little children now dying without baptism, if it is compared with the lot of little children in pure nature, certainly cannot be said to be formally the same. Therefore the question turns only on this: whether those two states are materially the same; or whether little children who now die with original sin alone enjoy those natural goods which little children would enjoy in the state of pure nature.
2. The Pelagians, constructing a certain middle state between eternal life and eternal damnation, attributed to little children eternal life outside the kingdom of heaven. But they distinguished eternal life from the kingdom of heaven in this, as it seems, that in eternal life there would be the intuitive vision of God without the fellowship of Christ and the Saints; in the kingdom of heaven the same intuitive vision would be had with Christ and the Saints. Theologians who attribute natural beatitude to little children certainly exclude them altogether from the intuitive vision of God.
3. It is also certain that little children were destined for the supernatural end, that God sincerely willed their salvation also, and that Christ died for them also. For in the present order of providence it cannot be said that there are two ends, natural and supernatural, to the first of which little children dying with original sin alone are destined, and to the other adults are destined; rather, all are destined to one and the same supernatural end. Hence it cannot be said that little children dying without baptism attained their end, or that they are in a state of beatitude. It must rather be said that they are in a state of damnation, either because they are in a state of sin or because they are excluded from their end.
4. Therefore the state of little children now dying without baptism, if it is compared with the lot of little children in pure nature, certainly cannot be said to be formally the same. Therefore the question turns only on this: whether those two states are materially the same; or whether little children who now die with original sin alone enjoy those natural goods which little children would enjoy in the state of pure nature.
561. Quamvis non pauci Theologi illud negent; alii tamen affirmant cum D. Thoma, Suarez, Lessio, etc.
561. Although not a few theologians deny this, nevertheless others affirm it with St. Thomas, Suarez, Lessius, and others.
562. Revera D. Thomas a) quoad animas parvulorum docet q. 5. de malo art. 3. ad 4.: "Quod pueri in originali decedentes, sunt quidem separati a Deo perpetuo, quantum ad amissionem gloriae quam ignorant; non quantum ad participationem naturalium bonorum, quae cognoscunt," - Et in 2. sent. dist. 33. q. 2. art. 2., ait: "Quamvis pueri non baptizati sint separati a Deo, quantum ad illam conjunctionem, quae est per gloriam; non tamen ab eo penitus separati sunt. Imo ipsi conjunguntur per participationem naturalium bonorum et ita etiam de ipso gaudere poterunt, naturali cognitione, et dilectione."
b) Quoad corpus parvulorum, in 2. sent. l. c. art. 1.: "Corpora puerorum non erunt impassibilia, defectu potentiae ad patiendum in ipsis; sed defectu exterioris agentis in ipsa; quia post resurrectionem nullum corpus erit agens in alterum, praecipue ad corruptionem inducendam per actionem naturae: sed erit actio tantum ad puniendum ex ordine divinae justitiae. Unde illa corpora poenam non patientur: quibus poena sensibilis ex divina justitia non debetur. Corpora autem Sanctorum erunt impassibilia, quia deficiet in eis potentia ad patiendum: et ideo impassibilitas erit in eis dos, non in pueris."
c) Est principium saepe a S. Doctore inculcatum, per peccatum originale spoliari seu privari hominem bonis gratuitis, sive supernaturalibus sive praeternaturalibus; non vero debitis, seu naturalibus.
b) Quoad corpus parvulorum, in 2. sent. l. c. art. 1.: "Corpora puerorum non erunt impassibilia, defectu potentiae ad patiendum in ipsis; sed defectu exterioris agentis in ipsa; quia post resurrectionem nullum corpus erit agens in alterum, praecipue ad corruptionem inducendam per actionem naturae: sed erit actio tantum ad puniendum ex ordine divinae justitiae. Unde illa corpora poenam non patientur: quibus poena sensibilis ex divina justitia non debetur. Corpora autem Sanctorum erunt impassibilia, quia deficiet in eis potentia ad patiendum: et ideo impassibilitas erit in eis dos, non in pueris."
c) Est principium saepe a S. Doctore inculcatum, per peccatum originale spoliari seu privari hominem bonis gratuitis, sive supernaturalibus sive praeternaturalibus; non vero debitis, seu naturalibus.
562. In reality, St. Thomas a) with respect to the souls of little children teaches in De Malo, question 5, article 3, reply 4: "That children dying in original sin are indeed perpetually separated from God with respect to the loss of glory, of which they are ignorant, but not with respect to participation in natural goods, which they know." And in 2 Sentences, distinction 33, question 2, article 2, he says: "Although children not baptized are separated from God with respect to that conjunction which is through glory, nevertheless they are not altogether separated from him. Indeed, they are joined to him through participation in natural goods, and so they will also be able to rejoice in him by natural cognition and love."
b) With respect to the body of little children, in 2 Sentences, same place, article 1: "The bodies of children will not be impassible by a defect of potency for suffering in them, but by a defect of an exterior agent upon them, because after the resurrection no body will be an agent upon another, especially for inducing corruption by the action of nature. Rather, there will be action only for punishing according to the order of divine justice. Hence those bodies will not suffer punishment, since sensible punishment is not owed to them from divine justice. But the bodies of the Saints will be impassible because the potency for suffering will be lacking in them; and therefore impassibility will be a dowry in them, not in children."
c) It is a principle often inculcated by the holy Doctor that through original sin man is stripped or deprived of gratuitous goods, whether supernatural or preternatural, but not of goods owed, or natural goods.
b) With respect to the body of little children, in 2 Sentences, same place, article 1: "The bodies of children will not be impassible by a defect of potency for suffering in them, but by a defect of an exterior agent upon them, because after the resurrection no body will be an agent upon another, especially for inducing corruption by the action of nature. Rather, there will be action only for punishing according to the order of divine justice. Hence those bodies will not suffer punishment, since sensible punishment is not owed to them from divine justice. But the bodies of the Saints will be impassible because the potency for suffering will be lacking in them; and therefore impassibility will be a dowry in them, not in children."
c) It is a principle often inculcated by the holy Doctor that through original sin man is stripped or deprived of gratuitous goods, whether supernatural or preternatural, but not of goods owed, or natural goods.
563. Suarez vero a) (de vitiis et pecc. disp. 9. sect. 2. n. 18.) docet peccatum originale in nobis esse simile peccato Adami, quatenus peccatum dicit aversionem a Deo; sed non quatenus peccatum dicit conversionem ad creaturas, quae fuit illi personalis.
b) Et n. 21. inquit: "Infero peccatum originale in essentia sua non includere aversionem a Deo fine ultimo naturae, sed solum ut est finis ultimus gratiae. Quod patet ex dictis, quia peccatum hoc non privat aliqua perfectione naturali; conversio autem ad Deum, ut finem naturae, naturalis est. Confirmatur, quia parvuli, qui decesserunt in solo peccato originali, sine dubio diligunt Deum super omnia, ut finem naturae; habent ergo illum pro ultimo fine."
c) Tandem, sect. 6. n. 6., ait: "Infero fore, ut illi parvuli tunc veram Dei cognitionem naturalem, et amorem ejus super omnia, atque adeo reliquas naturales virtutes, et corpora impassibilia, non per intrinsecam dispositionem, sed ex Providentia Dei, et ipsorum, quia debent esse aeterna. Unde non indigebunt cibo, neque potu, quia omnis alteratio tunc cessabit, Deo ita providente; itaque neque patientur rebellionem carnis, neque interiorem, neque exteriorem pugnam; quia etiam haec esset poena sensibilis, et omnia haec pertinent ad viam, illi vero sunt suo modo in termino; atque in his fere conveniunt Theologi."
b) Et n. 21. inquit: "Infero peccatum originale in essentia sua non includere aversionem a Deo fine ultimo naturae, sed solum ut est finis ultimus gratiae. Quod patet ex dictis, quia peccatum hoc non privat aliqua perfectione naturali; conversio autem ad Deum, ut finem naturae, naturalis est. Confirmatur, quia parvuli, qui decesserunt in solo peccato originali, sine dubio diligunt Deum super omnia, ut finem naturae; habent ergo illum pro ultimo fine."
c) Tandem, sect. 6. n. 6., ait: "Infero fore, ut illi parvuli tunc veram Dei cognitionem naturalem, et amorem ejus super omnia, atque adeo reliquas naturales virtutes, et corpora impassibilia, non per intrinsecam dispositionem, sed ex Providentia Dei, et ipsorum, quia debent esse aeterna. Unde non indigebunt cibo, neque potu, quia omnis alteratio tunc cessabit, Deo ita providente; itaque neque patientur rebellionem carnis, neque interiorem, neque exteriorem pugnam; quia etiam haec esset poena sensibilis, et omnia haec pertinent ad viam, illi vero sunt suo modo in termino; atque in his fere conveniunt Theologi."
563. Suarez, however, a) (On Vices and Sins, disputation 9, section 2, no. 18) teaches that original sin in us is similar to Adam's sin insofar as sin signifies aversion from God, but not insofar as sin signifies conversion to creatures, which was personal to him.
b) And in no. 21 he says: "I infer that original sin in its essence does not include aversion from God as the ultimate end of nature, but only as he is the ultimate end of grace. This is clear from what has been said, because this sin does not deprive one of any natural perfection; but conversion to God as the end of nature is natural. This is confirmed because little children who have died in original sin alone undoubtedly love God above all things as the end of nature; therefore they have him as ultimate end."
c) Finally, section 6, no. 6, he says: "I infer that those little children will then have true natural cognition of God, and love of him above all things, and therefore the remaining natural virtues, and impassible bodies, not through an intrinsic disposition, but from God's providence, and their own, because they ought to be eternal. Hence they will not need food or drink, because all alteration will then cease, with God so providing; and so they will suffer neither rebellion of the flesh, nor interior or exterior struggle, because this also would be sensible punishment, and all these things pertain to the way, whereas they are in their own way at the terminus; and in these things theologians almost agree."
b) And in no. 21 he says: "I infer that original sin in its essence does not include aversion from God as the ultimate end of nature, but only as he is the ultimate end of grace. This is clear from what has been said, because this sin does not deprive one of any natural perfection; but conversion to God as the end of nature is natural. This is confirmed because little children who have died in original sin alone undoubtedly love God above all things as the end of nature; therefore they have him as ultimate end."
c) Finally, section 6, no. 6, he says: "I infer that those little children will then have true natural cognition of God, and love of him above all things, and therefore the remaining natural virtues, and impassible bodies, not through an intrinsic disposition, but from God's providence, and their own, because they ought to be eternal. Hence they will not need food or drink, because all alteration will then cease, with God so providing; and so they will suffer neither rebellion of the flesh, nor interior or exterior struggle, because this also would be sensible punishment, and all these things pertain to the way, whereas they are in their own way at the terminus; and in these things theologians almost agree."
564. Quare, quidquid aliqui dixerint, merito notat Petrus de Godoy, Oxomensis Episcopus (1. 2. q. 83. Tract. 4. disp. 38. §. 8.) hanc sententiam, de naturali beatitudine parvulorum nullam mereri censuram. "Moveor," inquit 1. "auctoritate Doctorum, qui praefatam sententiam tuentur, quibus alii Moderniores adhaerent: quos omnes contra fidem errasse, nonnisi urgentissimo fundamento licet asserere. 2. Quia omnia, quae in favorem verae sententiae (oppositae, quam ipse tenet) ex Scriptura, et Conciliis petuntur, si quis velit cum beatitudine naturali componere, et de sola carentia felicitatis supernaturalis perfectae explicare; non poterit evidenter convinci. Ergo illam defendentes sententiam, neque haeresis, neque erroris contra fidem possunt notari. Alias pro illa plurium Antiquorum, et Recentium stat auctoritas, nec rationes verisimiles desunt: ergo temeritatis nota nequeunt censeri. Denique non potest negari, esse valde probabile: infantes, sine baptismo morientes, Deum naturae auctorem perfecte cognoscituros, et naturali dilectione amaturos: cum id satis indicet divus Thomas, et concedant plures non ignobiles Theologi, nec alii impossibile censeant." - Qui plura cupit de tota hac quaestione, consulat De Rubeis (de pecc. orig. capp. 72-76.)
564. Therefore, whatever some may have said, Peter de Godoy, Bishop of Osma, rightly notes (I-II, question 83, tract 4, disputation 38, §8) that this opinion concerning the natural beatitude of little children merits no censure. "I am moved," he says, first, "by the authority of the Doctors who defend the aforesaid opinion, to whom other more modern writers adhere; it is lawful to assert that all these erred against faith only on the most urgent foundation. Second, because all the things which are sought from Scripture and Councils in favor of the true opinion, the opposite one which he himself holds, if someone wishes to compose them with natural beatitude and to explain them only of the lack of perfected supernatural happiness, he will not be able to be evidently refuted. Therefore those defending that opinion cannot be marked either with heresy or error against faith. Besides, the authority of many ancients and recent writers stands for it, and plausible reasons are not lacking; therefore they cannot be judged with the note of rashness. Finally, it cannot be denied that it is very probable that infants dying without baptism will perfectly know God the author of nature and love him with natural love, since St. Thomas sufficiently indicates this, and several not undistinguished theologians concede it, nor do others judge it impossible." Whoever desires more on this whole question should consult de Rubeis (On Original Sin, chapters 72-76).