Article 6. The Harmony of Reason with the Dogma Concerning the Propagation of Original Sin — On God the Creator

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547. Post ea quae hactenus disputata sunt, possumus nos paucis ab hac quaestione expedire. Ac imprimis, cum, ex dictis constet apertissime dogma de peccato originali esse divinitus revelatum; hoc per se sufficit, ut certi simus nihil illud continere, quod rectae rationi repugnet. Etenim, ut docuit Conc. Vat. (Const. Dei Filius, cap. 4.) "etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest: cum idem Deus, qui mysteria revelat et fidem infundit, animo humano rationis lumen indiderit; Deus autem negare se ipsum non possit, nec verum vero unquam contradicere."

547. After the things that have been disputed thus far, we can free ourselves from this question in a few words. And first of all, since from what has been said it is most openly evident that the dogma concerning original sin has been divinely revealed, this of itself suffices for us to be certain that it contains nothing which is contrary to right reason. For, as the Vatican Council taught (Dei Filius, chapter 4), "although faith is above reason, nevertheless there can never be any true dissension between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has placed the light of reason in the human mind; but God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth."

548. Praeterea si omnes difficultates, contra dogma de originali peccato ex principiis rationis petitae, sufficienter solvuntur, nequit certe dici illud cum principiis rationis pugnare. Ex iis autem quae diximus tum de natura peccati originalis, tum de ratione ejus propagationis, difficultates praecipuas jam solvimus, et caeteris omnibus potest unusquisque satisfacere.

548. Moreover, if all the difficulties drawn from the principles of reason against the dogma concerning original sin are sufficiently solved, it certainly cannot be said to conflict with the principles of reason. But from the things which we have said both concerning the nature of original sin and concerning the manner of its propagation, we have already solved the principal difficulties, and each person can satisfy all the rest.

549. Asseruit tamen Wegscheider (Inst. Theol. §. 117.): "Nec benignitas Dei concedere potest, ut per unius hominis peccatum universa hominum natura corrumpatur et depravetur; nec sapientia pati, ut opus ab initio praestantissimis instructum dotibus, paullo post ob causam levissimam in plane aliam deterioremque conditionem transformetur; nec justitia Dei admittit, ut innocentes ob peccatum alienum eo puniantur, quod ipsis necessitas peccandi imponatur."

549. Nevertheless Wegscheider asserted (Institutions of Theology, §117): "Nor can the goodness of God grant that through the sin of one man the whole nature of human beings should be corrupted and depraved; nor can his wisdom allow that a work furnished from the beginning with the most excellent endowments should a little later, on account of a very slight cause, be transformed into an entirely other and worse condition; nor does the justice of God admit that innocents be punished on account of another's sin by this, that a necessity of sinning is imposed upon them."

550. Operae ergo pretium erit hic breviter ostendere, quod

PROP. XLII. Tantum abest ut dogma de peccato originali cum divinis attributis pugnet, ut cum iisdem apprime convenire ostendi possit.

Prob. I. Cum iis, qui revelationem respuunt, melius arguitur ex effectibus peccati originalis. Unde: si consideremus miserias tum animi tum corporis, quibus humanum genus subjacet, experientia omnes docet quod revelatio divina tradit: Job. 14. 1.: "Homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens tempore, repletur multis miseriis." - Eccli. 40. 1.: "Jugum grave super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae." - Quaestio potest esse de causa horum malorum, sed non de eorundem existentia. Atqui explicatio hujus facti, quam revelatio exhibet in dogmate de peccato originali, apprime convenit cum divinis attributis; reliquae vero, quae extra et contra revelationem assignantur vel sunt omnino absurdae, vel minus perfectam (si dici fas est) divinorum attributorum ideam exhibent. Ergo.

Prob. min. a) Quod homo tot malis subjiciatur propter peccatum, nihil habet quod Dei justitiae, sanctitati etc. detrahat: hoc autem docet fides. Qui e contra extra revelationem causam malorum inquirere voluerunt, in absurdissimas abiere sententias. - Alii cum Platone censuerunt homines nunc puniri propter peccata ab eorum anima commissis antequam uniretur corpori. Alii cum Pythagora admiserunt transmigrationem animarum. - Manichaei cum Zoroastre hominem a principio malo vel productum, vel saltem corruptum dixere. - Tullius ipse naturam accusavit, quam benignam caeterorum animantium matrem, hominis vero novercam dixit. - Inter recentiores, alii communem humanae naturae pronitatem ad malum a pravis exemplis aut a mala educatione repetunt. Kant eamdem universalem ad malum propensionem abusui libertatis uniuscujusque tribuit etc. Quae omnia falsa aut etiam absurda facile demonstrantur; ac proinde de his omnibus Philosophis dici potest quod S. Augustinus (l. 4. cont. Julian. c. 12.) de Tullio dixit: "Rem vidit, causam nescivit; latebat eum, cur esset grave jugum super filios Adami, quia Ss. Litteris non eruditus ignorabat peccatum originale."

b) Dicent fortasse haec omnia mala consequi ipsam limitatam humanae naturae conditionem. Atqui, subsumimus, si nihil est quod cum divinis attributis pugnet, in eo quod humana natura absque peccato tot miseriis sit obnoxia; a fortiori nihil erit contra divina attributa si iisdem subjiciatur propter peccatum, uti per se patet. Unde merito scripsit Muratori (l. 3. de ingen. moder. c. 1.): "Quidquid Pelagiani adferre possunt pro tuenda justitia ac bonitate divina in hypothesi sua, illud ad eandem tuendam in hypothesi Catholicorum inservit. Quidquid vero Catholici pro sua habent, non aeque a Pelagianis pro sua opinione usurpari potest. Facilius enim Catholici justitiam ac bonitatem Dei sartam nobis tectamque exhibent, tot humanae naturae miseriis non a primaeva institutione et voluntate Dei boni, sed a primorum parentum culpa derivatis, quam si talem, qualis nunc est, naturam ab initio creatam affirment. Et hoc sinceri sagacesque viri non intelligere nequeunt."

c) Hinc factum est, ut etiam Patres ad suadendum dogma de peccato originali usi sint argumento ex vitae miseriis ducto, quamvis seclusa revelatione nonnisi conjecturam praeberet. Vid. (n. 412.) Sic, ex. gr., S. Augustinus (l. 4. cont. Julian. c. 16.), ait: "Ecce circumstat sensus tuos miseria generis humani. Homo es, humani nihil abs te alienum puta: et in iis quae non pateris, compatere patientibus. Quamvis et ipse, quantalibet terrena felicitate praepollens, nullum sine bello intestino diem ducis, si tamen quod profiteris, implere conaris. Sed ... parvuli quot, et quanta mala patiuntur? In quibus vanitatibus, cruciatibus, erroribus, terroribus crescunt? Deinde jam grandes, etiam Deo servientes, tentat error ut decipiat, tentat maeror ut sternat, tentat typhus ut extollat. Et quis explicet omnia festinanter, quibus gravatur jugum super filios Adam? ... Quid igitur restat, nisi ut causa istorum malorum sit aut iniquitas, vel impotentia Dei, aut poena primi veterisque peccati? Sed quia nec injustus, nec impotens est Deus: restat, quod non vis, sed cogeris fateri, quod grave jugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium, non fuisset, nisi delicti originalis meritum praecessisset." Vid. de Rubeis (de pecc. orig. cc. 42-44.)

Prob. II. Quoad justitiam. Justitia Dei, inquiunt, non admittit ut innocentes ob peccatum alienum puniantur. At vero meminisse debemus, juxta doctrinam catholicam, peccatum actuale fuisse solius Adami: peccatum habituale inesse proprium unicuique nostrum. Vid. (pag. 511. obj. 3.) - Unum peccare, et omnes constitui peccatores, juxta doctrinam catholicam, significat caput committere actum peccati, omnia membra privari gratia sanctificante; et omnes puniri significat omnes subjici doloribus, infirmitati, morti, rebellioni concupiscentiae, etc.

Unde: si qua esset hac in re repugnantia cum divina justitia, repeti ea posset vel ex eo, quod Deus ea omnia dona contulit hominibus in Adamo sub conditione, ut hic illa servaret vel ex eo, quod conditione non servata, iisdem donis Deus spoliavit humanam naturam. Atqui ex neutro capite repeti potest ulla repugnantia cum justitia divina. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. Probavimus in praecedente disputatione omnia illa dona esse humanae naturae indebita: ergo quemadmodum, salva justitia, poterat illa Deus conferre vel denegare humanae naturae; ita poterat eadem conferre sub conditione, quae ipsi placeret. Vid. (n. 403. seqq.)

Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Dona, quae alteri gratuito conceduntur sub aliqua conditione servanda, justissime auferuntur, si conditio non servetur; atqui, Adamo peccante, jam servata non fuit conditio, sub qua dona illa erant nobis communicanda. Ergo.

Unde S. Anselmus (de cons. virg. et pecc. orig. c. 18.), ait: "Si quis vir et uxor ejus ad magnam quandam possessionem et dignitatem nullo suo merito, sed gratia solum provecti simul crimen grave inexcusabiliter committunt, et pro eo juste dejiciuntur et in servitutem rediguntur; quis dicet filios, quos post damnationem generant, non debere eidem subjacere servituti, sed potius ad bona, quae parentes juste perdiderunt, gratis debere restitui? - Tales sunt primi parentes et filii eorum, quos juste pro culpa sua de beatitudine in miseriam damnati in eodem generant exilio." Et D. Thomas (Comp. Theol. cap. 195.): "Quia ista poena non est, nisi subtractio eorum, quae supernaturaliter primo homini divinitus sunt concessa, per ipsum in alios derivanda: unde aliis non debebantur, nisi quatenus per primum parentem in eos erant transitura. Sicut si Rex det feudum militi, transiturum per ipsum ad haeredes; si miles contra Regem peccat, et feudum mereatur amittere, non potest postmodum ad ejus haeredes devenire."

Prob. III. Quoad sapientiam. a) Si quid Dei sapientia postulat in operibus ad extra, illud est ut media accommodet fini, quem ipse praestituit: at quis unquam demonstravit permissionem peccati Adae cum effectibus, qui inde pro Adamo et tota ejus posteritate consequuntur, fini, quem sibi Deus praestituit, repugnare?

b) Quando Deus finem rebus convenientem assignat, et media subministrat ad illum consequendum, secundum rerum exigentiam; salva certe est divina Sapientia. Atqui admisso dogmate de peccato originali, haec omnia certe verificantur. Etenim Deus non modo praestituerat homini finem illi proportionatum, sed ex magna liberalitate, ejus naturam superantem - sufficientibus instruxerat mediis ad illum assequendum. Salvam reliquit hominis libertatem qua homo abutens, omnia perdidit: num divina Sapientia exigit ut auferatur ab homine libertas? aut ut talibus homo instruatur mediis ut certo et infallibiliter suum ultimum finem attingat? - Sed, aiunt, ob levissimam causam opus ab initio praestantissimum in pessimum est transformatum? Verum ratio ipsa docet offensam Dei, peccatum, esse gravissimum omnium malorum, imo unicum verum malum.

Prob. IV. Simili modo ratiocinandum est de divina bonitate, quam sicut libere Deus communicat ad extra, sic libere communicat eo gradu, quo vult. - Caeterum qui semel intellexerit, quam fides simul et ratio tradunt, doctrinam, quod nempe finis ultimus creationis non est creaturae intelligentis felicitas, sed gloria Dei extrinseca (vid. n. 104.); haud difficile sibi persuadebit, dogma de peccato originali non modo nihil continere, quod divinis attributis contradicat, verum etiam (attento praesertim praestantissimo Redemptionis opere) divina attributa, divinamque gloriam in clarissima luce collocare. Unde Ecclesia canere potuit: "O felix culpa!"

550. Therefore it will be worthwhile here to show briefly that:

PROPOSITION XLII. So far is the dogma concerning original sin from conflicting with the divine attributes, that it can be shown to agree with them very fittingly.

Proof I. With those who reject revelation, argument is better made from the effects of original sin. Hence, if we consider the miseries of both soul and body to which the human race is subject, experience teaches everyone what divine revelation hands down: Job 14:1: "Man born of woman, living for a brief time, is filled with many miseries." Ecclesiasticus 40:1: "A heavy yoke is upon the children of Adam from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb until the day of burial." The question can be about the cause of these evils, but not about their existence. But the explanation of this fact which revelation presents in the dogma concerning original sin agrees very fittingly with the divine attributes; the other explanations, however, which are assigned outside and against revelation, are either altogether absurd, or present a less perfect idea, if it is lawful to say so, of the divine attributes. Therefore.

The minor is proved. a) That man is subject to so many evils on account of sin has nothing that detracts from God's justice, holiness, and so forth; but this is what faith teaches. Those who, on the contrary, wished to seek the cause of evils outside revelation, went off into the most absurd opinions. Some, with Plato, judged that human beings are now punished on account of sins committed by their souls before they were united to the body. Others, with Pythagoras, admitted the transmigration of souls. The Manichaeans, with Zoroaster, said that man was either produced or at least corrupted by an evil principle. Tullius himself accused nature, which he called the kindly mother of the other living beings but the stepmother of man. Among more recent writers, some derive the common proneness of human nature to evil from depraved examples or from bad education. Kant attributes the same universal propensity to evil to each person's abuse of liberty, and so forth. All these things are easily shown to be false or even absurd; and consequently it can be said of all these philosophers what St. Augustine said of Tullius (Against Julian, book 4, chapter 12): "He saw the thing, he did not know the cause; it was hidden from him why there was a heavy yoke upon the children of Adam, because, not instructed in the Sacred Scriptures, he was ignorant of original sin."

b) Perhaps they will say that all these evils follow upon the limited condition itself of human nature. But we subsume: if there is nothing that conflicts with the divine attributes in the fact that human nature without sin is subject to so many miseries, a fortiori there will be nothing against the divine attributes if it is subjected to the same miseries on account of sin, as is evident of itself. Hence Muratori rightly wrote (On the Moderate Governance of Ingenuity, book 3, chapter 1): "Whatever the Pelagians can bring forward for defending divine justice and goodness in their hypothesis serves for defending the same in the hypothesis of the Catholics. But whatever the Catholics have for their own hypothesis cannot equally be used by the Pelagians for their opinion. For the Catholics more easily exhibit to us the justice and goodness of God safe and sound, with so many miseries of human nature derived not from the primeval institution and will of the good God, but from the fault of the first parents, than if they affirm that nature, such as it now is, was created from the beginning. And sincere and sagacious men cannot fail to understand this."

c) Hence it happened that even the Fathers, in persuading the dogma concerning original sin, used an argument drawn from the miseries of life, although apart from revelation it would offer only a conjecture. See no. 412. Thus, for example, St. Augustine (Against Julian, book 4, chapter 16) says: "Behold, the misery of the human race surrounds your senses. You are a man; think nothing human alien from you, and in those things which you do not suffer, have compassion for those who suffer. Although even you yourself, however much you excel in earthly happiness, lead no day without an internal war, if nevertheless you try to fulfill what you profess. But ... how many and how great evils do little children suffer? In what vanities, torments, errors, and terrors do they grow? Then, when already grown, even serving God, error tempts so that it may deceive, sorrow tempts so that it may cast down, pride tempts so that it may lift up. And who could quickly explain all the things by which the yoke upon the children of Adam is weighed down? ... What remains, then, except that the cause of these evils is either God's iniquity or impotence, or the punishment of the first and ancient sin? But because God is neither unjust nor impotent, there remains what you do not wish, but are compelled, to confess: that the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb until the day of burial into the mother of all would not have existed unless the merit of original fault had preceded." See de Rubeis (On Original Sin, chapters 42-44).

Proof II. With respect to justice. They say that the justice of God does not admit that innocents be punished on account of another's sin. But in truth we must remember that, according to Catholic doctrine, actual sin belonged to Adam alone; habitual sin is in each one of us as his own. See page 511, objection 3. According to Catholic doctrine, for one to sin and for all to be constituted sinners means that the head commits the act of sin and all the members are deprived of sanctifying grace; and for all to be punished means that all are subjected to sorrows, infirmity, death, the rebellion of concupiscence, and so forth.

Hence, if there were any repugnance in this matter with divine justice, it could be drawn either from the fact that God conferred all those gifts on human beings in Adam under the condition that Adam preserve them, or from the fact that, when the condition was not preserved, God stripped human nature of those same gifts. But from neither head can any repugnance with divine justice be drawn. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. We proved in the preceding disputation that all those gifts were not owed to human nature. Therefore, just as, with justice preserved, God could confer them upon human nature or deny them to it, so he could confer the same under whatever condition pleased him. See no. 403ff.

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. Gifts which are gratuitously granted to another under some condition to be preserved are most justly taken away if the condition is not preserved. But when Adam sinned, the condition under which those gifts were to be communicated to us was no longer preserved. Therefore.

Hence St. Anselm (On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, chapter 18) says: "If some man and his wife, advanced to some great possession and dignity by no merit of their own but only by grace, together commit a grave crime inexcusably, and for it are justly cast down and reduced to servitude, who will say that the children whom they generate after condemnation ought not to be subject to the same servitude, but rather ought freely to be restored to the goods which the parents justly lost? Such are the first parents and their children, whom, justly condemned for their own fault from beatitude into misery, they generate in the same exile." And St. Thomas (Compendium of Theology, chapter 195): "Because this punishment is nothing except the withdrawal of those things which were divinely and supernaturally granted to the first man, to be derived through him into others; hence they were not owed to others except insofar as they were going to pass into them through the first parent. It is as if a king gave a fief to a soldier, to pass through him to his heirs; if the soldier sins against the king and deserves to lose the fief, it cannot afterward come to his heirs."

Proof III. With respect to wisdom. a) If God's wisdom requires anything in works ad extra, it is that he accommodate means to the end which he himself has established. But who has ever demonstrated that the permission of Adam's sin, together with the effects which follow from it for Adam and all his posterity, conflicts with the end which God established for himself?

b) When God assigns a fitting end to things and supplies means for attaining it according to the exigency of things, divine Wisdom is certainly preserved. But once the dogma concerning original sin is admitted, all these things are certainly verified. For God not only established for man an end proportioned to him, but, from great liberality, one surpassing his nature; and he furnished him with sufficient means for attaining it. He left man's liberty preserved, and man, abusing it, lost everything. Does divine Wisdom require that liberty be taken away from man? Or that man be furnished with such means that he certainly and infallibly attain his ultimate end? But, they say, on account of a very slight cause a work most excellent from the beginning was transformed into the worst condition. Yet reason itself teaches that an offense against God, sin, is the gravest of all evils, indeed the only true evil.

Proof IV. One must reason in a similar way concerning divine goodness, which, just as God freely communicates ad extra, so he freely communicates in the degree that he wills. Besides, whoever once understands the doctrine which faith and reason together hand down, namely that the ultimate end of creation is not the happiness of the intelligent creature but God's extrinsic glory (see no. 104), will not have difficulty persuading himself that the dogma concerning original sin not only contains nothing that contradicts the divine attributes, but also, especially with attention to the most excellent work of Redemption, places the divine attributes and divine glory in the clearest light. Hence the Church could sing: "O happy fault!"