Article 5. On the Manner in which the First Parent's Sin is Handed on Into Posterity

517. This question always seemed very difficult to St. Augustine, who says (On the Morals of the Catholic Church, book 1, chapter 22, no. 40): "Nothing is more known for preaching than original sin; nothing is more hidden for understanding." And (On Marriage and Concupiscence, book 1, chapter 19, no. 2) he says: "For that what has been remitted in the parent is drawn in the offspring happens in marvelous ways indeed; but nevertheless it happens ... And because it is not investigated by an easy reason, nor explained by speech, it is not believed by unbelievers."

518. Yet since Julian abused these words of Augustine, as if he had said that it could be explained by no reason, the same holy Doctor, defending himself (Against Julian, book 6, chapter 5, no. 11), says: "As if I had said that it cannot be comprehended by reason nor explained by speech, while you remove from it what I said: not by an easy reason or speech. One thing is 'by none,' which you say; another is 'not by an easy one,' which I said. In this, what else do you appear to be except calumnious? But even if it were investigated by no reason and explained by no speech, nevertheless that would be true which from ancient times is preached by truthful Catholic faith and believed throughout the whole Church."

519. In order to provide at once for brevity and clarity, we reduce everything to three heads: how the sin of one man could constitute all as sinners; how the sin of one man, committed by will, can be voluntary for all; and what is the cause which, as it were, communicates Adam's sin to individual human beings.

Sect. I.

How the sin of one man could infect all.

520. St. Thomas illuminates this question wonderfully in several places: I-II, question 81, article 1; 2 Sentences, distinction 31, article 1; and especially De Malo, question 4, article 1, where he has the following: "It must be considered that a singular human being can be considered in two ways: in one way, according as he is a certain singular person; in another way, according as he is part of some college. In both ways some act can pertain to him. For that act which he does by his own judgment and through himself pertains to him insofar as he is a singular person. But insofar as he is part of a college, some act can pertain to him which he does not do through himself nor by his own judgment, but which is done by the whole college, or by many of the college, or by the prince of the college; just as that which the prince does is said to be done by the city. For a college of human beings of this sort is reckoned as if one man, so that diverse human beings constituted in diverse offices are as if diverse members of one natural body. Thus, therefore, the whole multitude of human beings receiving human nature from the first parent must be considered as one college, or rather as one body of one man. In this multitude each human being, even Adam himself, can be considered either as a singular person or as some member of this multitude, which is derived from one by natural origin. Now it must be considered that in his institution there had been given divinely to the first man a certain supernatural gift, namely original justice, through which reason was subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. But this gift had not been given to the first man as a singular person only, but as to a certain principle of the whole of human nature, so that it would be derived from him by origin into his descendants. But this received gift the first man, sinning through free choice, lost in the same tenor in which it had been given to him, namely for himself and for his whole posterity. Therefore the defect of this gift follows upon his whole posterity."

521. In order that we may understand this doctrine better, it must be noted that when the law, "Do not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," is said to have been given to Adam, not only as he was a singular person, but also as he was head of the whole of human nature, this can be understood in two ways. Either insofar as that law bound even his descendants in their own persons, each one in his own time; or insofar as it bound Adam in such a way that if he alone transgressed the aforesaid law, all his descendants would be deprived of justice and would thus be born in sin.

522. That this law was imposed in Adam upon all his descendants in the first way Suarez proves with the common opinion (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 21, no. 17): "Both because that precept, although it was immediately revealed to Adam alone, included Eve; therefore this is a sign that it was not imposed only on the person of Adam, nor only with a view to him, but was given for human beings dwelling in Paradise and with a view to that state. For by this reason it included Eve. Also because at the same time God said to Adam, Eat of every tree of Paradise, and, Do not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; but the prior permission, or, as many think, precept, was perpetual, and Adam's descendants could use it, or even ought to use it, if the state of innocence had endured; therefore also the second, for it was pronounced in the same manner and tenor ... Likewise the reason of the law, namely the protestation of divine subjection and obedience, was perpetual, and fitting no less for the children than for the parents."

523. But that the same law was also imposed in Adam upon all his descendants in the second way is clear from the fact that all human beings are born in sin, not because each one by his own personal act eats of the forbidden tree, but because Adam ate: "by the disobedience of one many are constituted sinners." Therefore Adam is called the juridical head of the whole human race, the principle of nature representing the whole human race. This second way must be explained.

524. And first, all agree that this law did not have this force of binding merely as a law, precisely considered, imposed on the community of human beings; rather, there had to be a positive institution from the peculiar will of God. "It is proved first (Suarez, same place, no. 22), because from the nature of the thing a law given to parents, even if it is given as a true law and as enduring perpetually, in no way binds children until they are begotten and are capable of the precept, as is clear in all other divine and human laws, except this one. Therefore, in order that this law should have such force, a peculiar institution and will of God was necessary. And this is declared further in this same law. For if Adam had not eaten of the tree of knowledge, and consequently the state of innocence had persevered, and later Cain, Adam's son, had eaten of that fruit, Enoch his son would in no way have sinned in him, nor would he have been deprived of justice on that account. Therefore this is a sign that that law by its own force did not bind children in their parents, but only in their own persons and in their own times. Therefore, that that law bound descendants otherwise in Adam was not from the nature of the law alone, but from the peculiar will and institution of God."

525. But theologians do not agree equally concerning the nature of that special positive institution. For some explain it through an express and formal compact; others through an implicit and virtual compact; others through a simple law constituted by God and binding Adam without his prior consent.

526. De Rubeis explains the first and second opinion thus (On Original Sin, chapter 61): "Some imagine an express compact, with the consent of each party, namely of God and of the first man, by which it was established that, if that first man observed the precept given to him, his descendants would be born with original justice; but if he transgressed the law, they would come into the world with the privation of original justice. Others judge that a divine decree is sufficient, by which God established that original justice would be bestowed on Adam for himself and for his descendants, provided that he remained in it and was obedient to the supreme divine Legislator. Nevertheless they say that this decree of God had to become known to Adam, so that it could at least be called an implicit compact."

527. But those who defend the third opinion, which is now common, although they deny that Adam's consent was in any way necessary, and consequently that a revelation had to be made to him concerning the divine decree by which, if he sinned, all would be constituted sinners, nevertheless concede that it seems more probable that Adam had that revelation for other reasons. "One is," says Suarez (same place, no. 29), "so that Adam could recognize and estimate the greatness of the benefit conferred on him by God; for a benefit in itself perpetual and conferred for the whole of posterity is much greater than a merely personal benefit, even if it is conferred under some honorable, prudent condition. Secondly, it was also fitting that the same condition under which the benefit was made should become known to him, so that the parent himself might be rendered more vigilant and cautious in guarding the deposit. Thirdly, this also was very fitting, so that Adam himself, in his own person and will, might be more gravely bound to keeping that precept, and so that the transgression of the precept, if it were to happen, would be more voluntary and less excusable. For these reasons I am of the opinion that those words of God, 'On whatever day you sin, you shall die the death,' were understood by Adam in the sense in which they were said by God, and consequently that Adam understood that, if he sinned, all his descendants would lose immortality, and consequently also grace and innocence, which was the foundation of that state."

528. Therefore the whole question turns on this: whether Adam was constituted juridical head of the whole human race, for the gifts of original justice either to be preserved or to be lost, also by his own consent, or by the will of God alone.

529. We say that this was done by the will of God alone. For it must be said to have been done by the will of God alone if the will of God alone suffices for it, and it is in no way proved that Adam's consent was also employed. But the will of God alone suffices, and Adam's consent is in no way proved. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. a) "The will of God of itself is sufficient for inducing every possible obligation without the consent of him upon whom he wishes to impose it. Hence just as by that precept he could bind all human beings, present and future, not by asking consent from them, but by exacting it, so also he could bind the whole nature in Adam, not waiting for consent or voluntary acceptance, even through the will of Adam, but by exacting, or absolutely and efficaciously imposing the obligation." b) "In order that the children of Adam would be born in grace and justice if Adam himself did not sin, the efficacious decree of the divine will establishing this sufficed, even if Adam did not have knowledge of such a decree, as seems self-evident. Therefore, also contrariwise, in order that Adam by sinning should lose justice and grace not only for himself, but also for his descendants, the same decree of God establishing this could suffice, even if it had been unknown to Adam. For the account of opposites is the same. But then the descendants also would sin in the will of the parent, and on account of it would become hateful and hostile to God through the privation of grace and justice; therefore they would be comprehended under the precept in the first parent, even if the parent himself had been ignorant of this mode of comprehension." Thus Suarez (same place, nos. 24 and 28). If it is kept before one's eyes that all the gifts of original justice are not owed to human nature, the force of these arguments will easily become known.

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. From what was just said it follows that the very nature of the thing did not require Adam's consent; therefore if it was employed, this must be evident from some other positive special institution of God, or from revelation. But it is in no way proved from revelation. For the testimonies adduced, whether from Scripture or from St. Augustine, either are not to the point, because they treat an entirely different law from the law imposed on Adam in Paradise, or indeed treat this law, but in no way establish that it was not only a law but also a compact, as the adversaries understand it. See de Rubeis (cited work, chapter 61, no. 2), and Suarez (same place, nos. 25 and 26). Besides, this will be confirmed from what is to be said in the following section.

Hence Dominic Soto rightly says (On Nature and Grace, book 1, chapter 9): "Nor must it be thought, as some imagine, that a compact intervened between God and Adam, so that when he first sinned, nature would be stripped of those heavenly gifts, and that in this way he gave consent in the name of the whole human race; and that for this reason, when he sinned, the whole race sinned. For it is a fable. For what need did God have of Adam's consent? For Scripture is manifest that there was one command, that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge; by this command, apart from his consent, God could bind the whole nature as its Lord by right of creation, just as the laws of a legitimate prince which in the present mode would be issued to a city would be understood as imposed in perpetuity on all citizens. Yet as punishment for transgression God threatened death, by which also the privation of justice is designated. Therefore, since Adam then was the whole nature, there was no cruelty or harshness in God if, when nature sinned, he stripped it of those supernatural gifts with which he had adorned it from mere liberality. It is as if a prince were to grant a very ample privilege to a city so long as it did not commit a certain crime; but if it did the contrary, then indeed the city would remain perpetually offensive and hateful to him."

530. From these things it is clear why the sin of the one Adam infects the whole human race, and why, on the contrary, Adam's repentance did not restore his descendants to grace. "In retraction," say the Salmanticenses (tract 13, disputation 14, doubt 3, section 7), "Adam no longer bore the office of head (juridical and moral), since he lost that dignity by sinning; but he repented only insofar as he was a particular person, and he blotted out the aforesaid sin precisely as it was his personal fault. But insofar as it concerned his descendants and human nature contained in Adam, it remained unretracted and undeleted." This St. Thomas had already taught (on Romans, chapter 5, lecture 3), saying: "Although Adam's (personal) sin was blotted out through his repentance, nevertheless his repentance could not blot out the sin of his descendants, because his repentance was through a personal act, which did not extend beyond his person."

531. First of all, two things are certain in this matter. The first is that the ratio of the voluntary pertains to the very essence of sin, and consequently must in some way be found in original sin, which is true sin. Hence proposition 46 was condemned in Baius, which runs thus: "The voluntary does not pertain to the ratio and definition of sin; nor is it a question of definition, but of cause and origin, whether every sin ought to be voluntary." And St. Augustine (On True Religion, chapter 14) says: "But if this defect, which is called sin, were to occupy someone unwillingly like a fever, the punishment which follows the sinner and which is called damnation would rightly seem unjust. But now sin is so far a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin if it is not voluntary; and indeed this is so manifest that no small number of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned, dissents from it."

532. The other certain point is that original sin does not have the ratio of the voluntary from the habitual will of the little child, but from the relation which it implies to the will of Adam. Hence propositions 47 and 48 were condemned in Baius: "Therefore the sin of origin truly has the ratio of sin without any relation and respect to the will from which it has its origin." "The sin of origin is voluntary by the habitual will of the little child, and habitually dominates the little child, because he does not bear the contrary choice of the will."

533. With these points placed safely, the question among theologians is whether original sin is voluntary only relatively and mediately by reason of the will of the head, or also by the will of the little child, insofar as his will, as they say, morally included in the will of Adam, committed the very act of sin when Adam sinned.

534. Those who admit a compact, whether formal or virtual, infer from this that "the wills of all Adam's descendants were, by right of supreme dominion, placed by God in the one will of Adam. From this, both the observance of the precept, if Adam had obeyed, and the violation of the same precept, into which he would have fallen by his own will, would have had to be imputed also to his descendants according to moral estimation. Hence it can now easily be understood how the privation of original justice could have been voluntary for Adam's descendants; and how that which in Adam was called his habitual sin is sin, original in his descendants. Finally, in this sense the Apostle Paul wrote, and the Fathers of the Church teach, that all of us human beings who descend from Adam through generation sinned in Adam."

535. To others, however, that first ratio of the voluntary in original sin seems sufficient, and no other is to be required. Subscribing to these, we say:

PROPOSITION XLI. Original sin is not voluntary by the proper and personal will of the little child, but relatively and mediately by reason of the will of Adam, juridical head of the human race.

Proof I. From authority. 1. St. Augustine seems altogether to deny that little children sin by their own and personal will. For a) (City of God, book 16, chapter 27) he says: "all little children, not according to the property of their own life, but according to the common origin of the human race, all in that one man dissipated the Testament of God, in whom all sinned."

b) (Unfinished Work, book 4, nos. 104-105) Julian had objected: "If all were that one man, how did all sin through his evil will, since all those whom you say were in him could have sinned by their own will ... Therefore little children had a will not only before they were born, but before their great-grandfathers were begotten; and they used the choice of election before their substances were founded." Certainly, if the holy Doctor had admitted that little children sinned by their own and personal will, insofar as it was morally included in Adam's will, he ought to have answered that to his adversary. Nevertheless he answered: "This is not said (that in whom all sinned) on account of the choice of individuals, but on account of the origin of the seed, whence all were going to be. According to this origin all were in that one man; and all these were that one man, who as yet were none in themselves." He confirms this answer by the example of Levi, who according to seminal origin is said to have been in the loins of Abraham, adding: "He neither willed nor refused to be tithed, since no will of his existed when, according to his own substance, he himself did not yet exist; and nevertheless, according to the ratio of seed, it was said neither falsely nor vainly that he was there and was tithed." Hence he concludes: "Thus, therefore, all who, not yet born, could do nothing good or evil through their own wills, could sin in one man, in whom they were by the ratio of seed, when he by his own will sinned that great sin, and in himself vitiated, changed, and made liable human nature, except for one man, who indeed was begotten from that seed, but not by seminal ratio."

c) Since the holy Doctor had said, "sin is so far a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin unless it is voluntary," explaining these words (Retractations, book 1, chapter 13), he says: "And that which is called original sin in little children is not absurdly called voluntary, because what was done by the first will has been made voluntary through inheritance."

2. St. Anselm not only expressly said that "infants lack that justice, not because they themselves abandoned it, but because another abandoned it" (no. 505); but moreover, making a comparison between the sin of Adam and that of little children (On the Conception of the Virgin, chapter 23), he has the following: "That Adam ate, nature required, because it had been so created as to require this. But that he ate of the forbidden tree, this was done not by the natural will, but by the personal, that is, by his own; nevertheless what the person did, he did not do without nature. For the person was what was called Adam; the nature was what was called man. Therefore the person made the nature sinful, because when Adam sinned, man sinned ... Similarly, the reverse happens in infants. Namely, that there is not in them the justice which they ought to have, this was not done by their personal will, as in Adam, but by natural need, which nature itself received from Adam. For in Adam, outside whom there was nothing of that nature, it was stripped of the justice which it had. Thus the person stripped nature in Adam, and nature, having become needy, made all persons whom it procreates from itself sinful and unjust by the same need."

3. St. Thomas a) constantly taught that original sin derives the ratio of the voluntary from the first principle, to which it is referred as effect to cause, and that in us it is voluntary by nature, not by person. Besides the places reported above, in 2 Sentences, distinction 30, question 1, article 2, he teaches that the privation of sanctifying grace "has in each human being the ratio of fault from this, that such a defect was introduced through the will of the principle of nature, that is, of the first man." In De Malo, question 4, article 1, he says: "Therefore, if this defect, derived by origin into this human being in this way, is considered according as this man is a certain singular person, then a defect of this sort cannot have the ratio of fault, for the ratio of fault requires that it be voluntary. But if this begotten man is considered as a certain member of the whole human nature propagated from the first parent, as if all human beings were one man, then it has the ratio of fault on account of its voluntary principle, which is the actual sin of the first man."

b) Since through repentance a sin committed by one's own will ought properly to be retracted, St. Thomas teaches, III, question 84, article 2, reply 3: "Repentance concerning original sin is neither principally so, because this sacrament is not ordered against it, but rather baptism is; nor even properly so, because original sin was not performed by our will, except perhaps insofar as Adam's will is reckoned as ours, according to the mode of speaking by which the Apostle says in Romans 5:12, 'In whom all sinned.' Nevertheless, insofar as repentance is broadly taken for any detestation whatever of a past thing, repentance can be said concerning original sin."

c) Hence also in De Malo, question 5, article 1, reply 9, he says: "Venial sin, compared with original sin, is in some way less. For venial sin, compared with this person or that one, has more of the ratio of sin than original sin does, because venial sin is a voluntary sin of the will of this person, but original sin is not. But original sin, compared to nature, is graver, because it deprives nature of a greater good than venial sin deprives the person, namely the good of grace. And for this reason the lack of the divine vision is owed to it, because the divine vision is not reached except through grace, which venial sin does not exclude."

Proof II. According to the adversaries, original sin would be voluntary for little children by their own and personal will insofar as God, by the force of his supreme dominion, included their wills in the will of Adam. But neither is it established that this was done, nor, if it had been done, would it seem to explain by this that original sin is voluntary for little children by their own and personal will. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the first part. Although St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and others, explaining that statement of the Apostle, "in whom all sinned," constantly teach that "we all were in Adam," that "all were that one man," and so forth, nevertheless they never explain these things by an inclusion of our will in the will of Adam, but by the origin of seed, by the unity of nature, which, when Adam sinned, existed in him alone, by that institution by which God constituted Adam juridical head of the whole human race, and so forth. But the adversaries have no other foundation from authority for their opinion. Recall the cited places of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and see de Rubeis (cited work, chapters 61 and 66).

The minor is proved with respect to the second part. However much that inclusion of the wills of Adam's descendants in his will is constructed, it will always remain true that a will which in no way exists can do nothing, and consequently nothing by reason of itself can be voluntary to it. But even if that inclusion of our wills in the will of Adam is admitted, when he sinned, our wills in no way existed. Therefore.

You will say: "Republics or princes can include the wills of subjects in the will of one person with respect to certain civil acts and effects which do not exceed their dominion and jurisdiction; as is clear in wards, whose will by civil law is placed in the will of their guardians. Why, therefore, could not the supreme Deity do something similar, since he has the wills of human beings more in his power than they themselves have their own?"

I answer: Although the will of wards, for example, is said in some way, by the prince's prescription, to be placed in the will of their guardians, nevertheless that whole business consists in civil and external acts and effects. Here the question is properly about fault, and about descendants of human beings who fall into fault, as we have already explained. But the examples brought forward do not seem to prove that, for contracting fault, the wills of those who do not exist can be bound to the one will of someone.

Proof III. The ratio of the voluntary which is required and sufficient in habitual sin is that which it has through relation to actual sin. But from what has been said, original sin in us has the ratio of habitual sin, and it has relation to the actual transgression of Adam. Therefore the ratio of the voluntary which is required and sufficient for original sin in us is that which it has from relation to Adam's actual sin. Otherwise the difference handed down by all between sin of nature and sin of person, between original and personal sin, would scarcely be understood.

You will say: According to the Apostle in Romans 5, all sinned in Adam, "in whom all sinned." But all could not have sinned in Adam unless the wills of all had been included in the one will of Adam, which morally before God was reckoned the will of the whole nature. Therefore.

I answer by distinguishing the major. All sinned in Adam by contracting sin, namely habitual sin, I concede; by committing sin, namely actual sin, I deny. Hence Suarez (On Vices and Sins, disputation 9, section 2), although he seems to admit that our wills were included in Adam's will, nevertheless explaining himself (no. 33), says: "It must be said that properly and simply the little child does not sin, because the very verb 'to sin' manifestly indicates actual sin; but he must be said to be generated in sin, or to be born in it, just as one who has once sinned is no longer said to sin, although he remains in sin. You will say, in Romans 5 it is held, 'All sinned in Adam.' Likewise the little child in that instant becomes a sinner; therefore he sins. The answer is that he does not become a sinner by committing, but by contracting sin. Paul, however, does not say simply that we sin, but with an addition and in the past tense, that we sinned in Adam; hence afterward he simply adds, 'many are constituted sinners.'"

536. According to the established opinion, it will not be difficult to solve the objections which are usually drawn against the propagation of original sin from the ratio of the voluntary or free, which ought to be in any sin whatever. And so:

Objection I. It belongs to the ratio of sin that it be voluntary and free; but in little children, before the use of reason, there is nothing which can be of this sort; therefore.

I answer by distinguishing the major. It belongs to the ratio of actual sin that it be voluntary and free, I concede. It belongs to the ratio of habitual sin, I distinguish: that it be voluntary and free through order to an act of one's own will or of another's, I concede; of one's own will, I again distinguish: if it is personal sin, I concede; if it is original sin, I deny. The answer is clear from what has been said.

You insist: But it belongs to the ratio even of original sin that in each one it be voluntary by one's own and personal will; therefore. Proof: It belongs to the ratio of the voluntary that it be from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end. But if original sin in little children were voluntary through order to Adam's act, it would not be from an intrinsic principle, since Adam's will is extrinsic to little children. Therefore.

I answer by denying the subsumed proposition; and to the proof I distinguish the major. It belongs to the ratio of the voluntary that it be from an intrinsic principle of the person or of the nature, I concede; of the person, I subdistinguish: if it is a personal sin or act, I concede; if it is original sin, I deny. Therefore, although original sin is voluntary only mediately and relatively by reason of Adam's will, nevertheless from this it by no means follows that it is voluntary by merely extrinsic denomination. For Adam's will is indeed extrinsic to the person of the little child, but not to his nature, since it is the will of the principle of nature and of the juridical head of the whole human race. This is St. Thomas's solution; in De Malo, question 4, article 1, to the same difficulty proposed to him, he answers in reply 4: "if it is referred to the person, it does not have the ratio of the voluntary; but if it is referred to nature, thus it has the ratio of the voluntary. And in this way rebuke and punishment are owed to it." And in the same place, reply 5, more clearly: "A defect contracted through origin indeed has the ratio of something existing from another, extrinsically disposed, if it is referred to the person, namely to the singular person of Adam; but not if it is referred to nature, and also to Adam himself as principle of nature: for thus it is as if from an intrinsic principle."

Objection II. The voluntary free thing is that which is in the power of him to whom it is said to be voluntary, so that it be or not be. But it is not in the power of little children that original sin be or not be in them. Therefore.

I answer by distinguishing the major. The voluntary in act, I concede; in habit, I distinguish: if the habit has its origin from a personal act, I concede; if it has its origin from the will of the head, I again distinguish: it must be in the power of the head, I concede; it must be in the power of each individual, I deny. Certainly what is voluntary and free by personal will ought to be in the power of the person, so that it be or not be; but what is voluntary and free by the will of the head alone ought not to be in the power of any member whatever, but in the power of the head himself. This also is St. Thomas's answer; he says (2 Sentences, distinction 31, article 1): "The ratio of fault comes from this, that what was freely conferred on Adam, namely original justice, was not conferred on him personally, but insofar as he had such a nature, namely so that all in whom such a nature received from him would be found would possess such a gift. And therefore, with the propagation of flesh, that original justice also would have been propagated. Therefore it was in the power of nature that such justice should always be preserved in it. But through the will of the person existing in the nature, it was brought about that this was lost; and therefore this defect, compared to nature, has the ratio of fault in all in whom the same nature is found, received from the sinning person."

537. In order to answer the proposed question, we can consider four things: the little children who contract sin; the parents by whom they are generated; Adam, in whom all sinned; and God, who creates the soul.

538. Now, just as it is certain from what has been said that little children do not become sinners by their own and personal will, and consequently are not the cause of their own sin, so likewise it is certain that the cause of their sin is Adam, the juridical head of the whole human race, who by transgressing the law stripped the whole of human nature of justice. Therefore, when Julian objected, "The one who is born does not sin; the one who begot him does not sin; the one who founded him does not sin; through what cracks, then, do you imagine sin entered?" St. Augustine answered (On Marriage and Concupiscence, book 2, chapter 28): "Why do you seek a hidden crack, when you have the widest open door? Through one man, says the Apostle, sin entered into this world." And in chapter 26: "The voluntary sin of the first man is the cause of original sin." Certainly sin cannot have any cause except a will deficient from right order; in original sin there is no will deficient from right order except the will of Adam, with respect to which the privation of sanctifying grace is voluntary in his descendants. Therefore. God elevated the whole of human nature in Adam to supernatural justice; but the communication of this justice to the individual members of this nature depended upon Adam's obedience as upon a condition. He who violated the condition was the cause why all were deprived of justice, and consequently was the cause of the sin which consists in the privation of justice.

539. But the difficulty perhaps arises from this, that since the act of Adam has now passed, and Adam does not now flow into the production of human beings, the proximate and immediate cause communicating sin to little children is sought.

540. Yet this difficulty is easily met by observing that original sin does not need a physical efficient cause which effects it by a real and proper action. For original sin, as we saw, is not formally something positive, but a defect or privation; and not such a privation as comes about through the real expulsion of some preexisting form, as it was in Adam, but through the non-infusion of grace. Hence one must not seek a cause which produces or communicates something, but rather the cause why something is not produced or communicated; and the Apostle designated this cause by the phrase "through one man." See Suarez (On Vices and Sins, disputation 9, section 3).

541. You will say: if this is so, why is original sin said to be produced or contracted through generation? I answer: "Original sin is not the sin of this person except insofar as this person receives nature from the first parent; hence it is also called sin of nature, according to Ephesians 2:3: 'We were by nature children of wrath.'" Now we do not receive nature from the first parent except through generation; therefore in this sense original sin is rightly said to be contracted through generation.

542. You will say: this answer does not seem sufficient. For St. Augustine (Against Julian, book 5, chapter 3) says: "Certainly either both (soul and body) are drawn vitiated from man, or one is corrupted in the other as in a vitiated vessel; where the hidden justice of the divine law is included. But which of these is true, I more gladly learn than say, lest I dare to teach what I do not know." But no vice can be admitted in the soul, which is created by God; therefore there seems to be some vice, a morbid quality, in the body, which is generated by the parents.

I answer, first: We have already shown (494ff.) that no evil quality can be admitted in the body which communicates the sin of the soul. We add here with Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and Sin, book 4, chapter 12): "It cannot be understood how flesh, which is body, infects the soul, which is spirit. Then the stain of the flesh cannot properly be sin, especially before the rational soul accedes; therefore, even if the flesh were to infect the soul, it would still not infect it with the contagion of sin. Besides, it is certain that in Adam vice was first in the soul rather than in the flesh, and passed from the soul to the flesh, not from the flesh to the soul: 'From the soul,' says St. Augustine, book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, 'elation began, and from there consent to transgressing the precept; then the flesh was made the flesh of sin, etc.' Why, therefore, in the children of Adam, to whom the inheritance of the same sin has devolved, should the same order not be preserved?"

I answer, second, with the same Bellarmine (cited place, book 5, chapter 15): "The soul is rightly said to be corrupted in the body as in a vitiated vessel, not because there is in the flesh a positive quality from which in turn another quality arises in the soul, but because the soul does not begin to have sin except when it is infused into the body; for then it first begins to be a human being, a child of Adam. Since the soul, as prior by nature, is understood to be created by God, it has nothing to do with Adam, and by this fact does not communicate in his sin; but when it begins to dwell in a body generated from Adam, and to make one supposit with that very body, then, as we have explained more fully above, it contracts the sin of origin. But the body generated from Adam, even before animation, is called a corrupt vessel because, by the force of such generation, there is owed to it that it be subject to death and to various passions."

543. You will say: the given explanation does not seem to be according to the mind of St. Augustine. For the holy Doctor very often teaches that not concupiscence properly, but libido, ardor, and the vice of concupiscence is the cause of original sin in us. Thus, for example (On Marriage and Concupiscence, book 1, chapter 24, no. 27), he says: "When it comes to the work of generating, that lawful and honorable intercourse itself cannot be without the ardor of libido. From this concupiscence of the flesh, whatever offspring is born is bound to original sin." And (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 2, no. 42): "Shameful libido ... Behold from what original sin is drawn."

I answer, first: Certainly libido cannot be said to be properly the cause of propagating sin. For a) if someone were created from nothing such as we are born, which we showed above can happen, he would neither have original sin nor transmit it into descendants, as the Council of Trent establishes in session 6, chapter 3, where it says that only those who are begotten from the seed of Adam can draw the sin of origin. Yet such a one would not lack concupiscence and the ardor of libido, as is known from the things we taught above. Therefore it is not properly the vice of the flesh which infects the soul and casts sin into descendants.

b) Furthermore, if two human beings, a man and a woman born from Adam, by a singular privilege of God were to generate without libido, they would nevertheless transmit sin into their children, because the children of these parents would truly be children of Adam and would have sinned in him in whom all sinned, Romans 5; nor would the personal grace of the proximate parents be transmitted into them. Therefore the libido of those generating is not the cause of original sin.

c) Finally, add that if libido were the cause of sin, the one who was conceived with greater libido would draw greater sin. This is manifestly false, since the sin of origin is equal in all human beings.

I answer, second: When St. Augustine so often repeats that it is not generation but libido which transmits sin, he does not wish to signify that actual libido itself is the true cause of original sin, which we have shown a little earlier to be absurd; rather, he wished to indicate that the cause of original sin is not propagation simply, for even in paradise there would have been propagation, where nevertheless there would not have been sin, but propagation from a corrupted nature, of which the most certain sign is the ardor of libido, without which ardor not even the holiest spouses are accustomed to generate. Thus Bellarmine (cited work, book 4, chapter 12). And St. Thomas, faithful interpreter of St. Augustine, in De Malo, question 4, article 6, teaches: "actual libido, which is in intercourse, is the sign of habitual concupiscence, which is related materially in original sin ... Hence when Augustine said that it transmits sin, he put the sign for the thing signified."

544. You will say: If original sin were transmitted through generation, at least marriage would be evil, since it would be a cause of sin.

I answer: St. Augustine responded to this difficulty in the two books On Marriage and Concupiscence, where, among other things, in chapter 26 he says: "Marriage was instituted as a cause of generating, not of sinning; on account of which that is the blessing of marriages from God: 'Increase and multiply and fill the earth.' But the sin which is drawn from it by those being born does not pertain to marriage, but to the evil which befell human beings, by whose conjunction marriages exist ... Therefore the evil does not come to marriages from their institution, which is blessed, but from this, that through one man sin entered into the world, etc." Therefore here we must recall the principle according to which it is lawful to posit a cause good in itself for a good effect, even if from it there follows another evil effect which is not intended. Hence St. Augustine (Against Julian, book 3, chapter 24), responding to the same difficulty, says: "You can say this also to God himself, not because he creates human beings drawing original sin, since you deny that, but because he feeds and clothes innumerable impious people, even those whom he knows will remain in that very impiety."

545. You will say: Since sin is in the soul, and the soul is immediately from God through creation, if all were born infected with sin, would God not seem to be the author of sin? See no. 184, note.

I answer: Since original sin is not something positive, but a privation, it does not require on God's part any action by which it is, as it were, made in the soul which he creates. But the cause why God, when creating the soul, does not infuse sanctifying grace is, as we have seen, the sin of Adam, who did not preserve the condition under which God had established that justice was to be communicated to us. St. Thomas gives a deeper solution of this difficulty, 2 Sentences, distinction 32, question 2, article 1: "Although creation and infusion are simultaneous, nevertheless with respect to the soul they differ, because creation is spoken of according to respect to the principle from which the soul alone is; but infusion is spoken of according to respect to two things, namely to the principle from which it proceeds and to the matter which it perfects. Therefore when it is said, the soul is stained by creation, that ablative can denote the relation of some cause. And in this way it is false, because the creation of the soul is not the cause that it is stained; for the soul has nothing from creation which is not from God. Or it can denote concomitance; and in this way it is true, because while it is created, it is stained; from which, however, it does not follow that God is the author of the stain. But when it is said, the soul is stained by infusion, if the ablative designates concomitance, it is absolutely true. But if it denotes the relation of a cause, this is twofold: for either infusion is understood to be the cause of the stain on the part of the principle from which; and in this way it is false. Or on the part of the term to which; and in this way it is true."

546. But you will ask: therefore is the soul created good by God?

I answer with St. Bonaventure (2 Sentences, distinction 32): "When it is asked what kind of soul God made with respect to goodness and malice, this can be understood in two ways: either with respect to goodness of nature, or with respect to goodness of morals. If with respect to goodness of nature, then it must be conceded that he made the soul good, and it is still good. If with respect to goodness of morals, then it must be said that God made it neither good nor evil. For he did not make it good, because he did not give that goodness to the soul, since infection stood in the way on the part of the body to which the soul was united in the same instant in which it was created. He did not make it evil, because although the soul is evil from the instant of its creation, this nevertheless is not from God creating, but from the flesh infecting."