Article 4. On the Nature of Original Sin

483. The existence of original sin and the exemption of the Blessed Virgin Mary having been established, we must discuss the nature of original sin. In order that we may proceed in due order, we shall first briefly refute the false opinions concerning this matter; then we shall endeavor accurately to set forth and confirm the true one.

§ I.

The false opinions are rejected.

484. In former times there were many false opinions concerning the nature of original sin. Since some of these are now obsolete, it will suffice to report and refute a few principal ones, all the more because, once the truth has then been set forth, it will be easy from it to refute all contrary opinions.

485. It will be useful to note in advance that, although in the Council of Trent, according to Cardinal Pallavicino (book 7, chapter 10, no. 3), the Legates or Presidents wished the Fathers to be warned "that nothing should be determined as certain concerning the nature itself of original fault," about which, according to the same witness (same place, chapter 8), there had been discussion among the Fathers and theologians in the preceding general Congregations, nevertheless many things were defined which contribute greatly to illustrating the nature of original fault.

486. These are: 1. Session V, chapter 2: Adam, through the sin of disobedience, transmitted into the whole human race not only death and the punishment of the body, but also sin, which is the death of the soul. 2. Canon 3: this sin is one by origin and is in each person as his own. 3. Canon 4: this same sin is drawn from Adam and is contracted by generation. 4. Canon 5: through Baptism the guilt of original sin is remitted, and the whole of that which has the true and proper ratio of sin is taken away. Concupiscence, however, remains in the baptized; it cannot harm those who do not consent.

487. From these points we at once gather two things. The first is this: every opinion concerning the nature of original sin which contradicts even one of the aforesaid defined heads of doctrine is to be rejected entirely. The second is this: for safeguarding Catholic dogma, it is sufficient to establish such an opinion concerning the nature of original fault as fully accords with the heads of doctrine defined by the Church. Therefore if there is some difficulty of the rationalists which has as its foundation not so much the Church's doctrine as the private opinion of some theologian, it can be passed over without any danger to the faith.

The most absurd heresy of Illyricus.

488. The absurd opinion of Illyricus concerning the nature of original sin is contained in these propositions. The sin of origin is a substance, not a quality, or a ratio, or anything of that kind. The sin of origin is nothing other than the substantial image of the devil. Through the sin of the first man the rational soul was wholly corrupted substantially and transformed from the image of God into the image of the devil, so that, just as in a dead man the substantial form of the corpse is in the place of the soul, so after Adam's sin there is in the soul a certain most hideous substantial form in place of that which had been there before. This mutation cannot properly be called generation or creation, but transformation, of the sort that occurs when wine is turned into vinegar.

489. Luther seems to have taught the same error, although his disciples try to excuse him. For on the words, "Then the eyes of both were opened" (Commentary on Genesis, chapter 3), he says: "See what follows from that opinion, if we hold that original justice was not of nature, but a certain superfluous, superadded gift. Just as you posit that justice was not of the essence of man, will it not likewise follow that the sin which succeeded it is not of the essence of man?" See Bellarmine, On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 5, chapter 2.

490. But this error is easily refuted. For, first, St. John says: "All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made" (John 1). And St. Paul adds: "Every creature of God is good" (1 Timothy 4). From these two passages it evidently follows that no substance or nature is evil, and therefore neither is it sin. For since by the agreement of all sin is evil, if that same sin were a substance, either not every substance would have been made by God, which is contrary to the Gospel, or not every creature of God would be good, which is contrary to the Apostle.

Nor is it valid to say that a substance of this sort has been made evil through transformation, and therefore is not created by God but produced by a secondary cause. "In the same way," says Illyricus, "little women know how to turn milk into cheese or butter, and to change wine into vinegar, and yet they neither are called nor are creators."

For, passing over other points, these examples have nothing to do with the matter, since milk and wine are things naturally capable of transmutation; and therefore it ought not seem strange if, once natural causes have been applied by a human being, they are easily transmuted. But spiritual substances, such as rational souls and angels, are not naturally corruptible or substantially mutable, since they lack matter; and therefore God alone can found them from nothing or reduce them to nothing.

2. The paradox of Illyricus destroys the creed of faith from the foundations. For a) the first article is: "I believe in one God." But the madness of Illyricus makes as many gods as there are minds remaining in original justice. For just as original sin pertains to the substance of man after the fall of Adam, according to Illyricus's opinion, so also original justice pertains to the substance of man before that fall. But because it is proper to God alone to be just not from an accidental gift, but substantially, as St. Gregory teaches in homily 14 on the Gospels, it follows that the minds of the first human beings before the fall would have been certain gods, and that even now there are as many gods in heaven as there are angels endowed with original justice. For they are all substantially just and good.

b) The same first article teaches that "one God is the creator of all things." But if Illyricus's opinion were true, God would not be the creator of human souls, but the devil would be, which is the heresy of Manichaeus. For after the fall of Adam the very substance of the human soul is sin, according to Illyricus's opinion; but God is not the author of sin, the devil is, as Illyricus himself admits.

c) It conflicts with the articles of faith concerning the Incarnation, since "his flesh was not of another nature," says St. Leo in epistle 11 to Julian, "than ours, nor was a soul breathed into him by another principle than into other human beings, though it excelled not by diversity of kind, but by loftiness of virtue." But according to Illyricus's opinion our soul is sin; therefore either Christ assumed sin into the unity of his person, than which nothing more absurd can be imagined, or he did not have a soul of the same nature as ours, which, as we have said, is manifestly contrary to the creed of faith.

d) It conflicts with the article of faith concerning the resurrection. For the same substance of man which now exists, and which ceases to be through death, will not rise again. For this whole substance, according to Illyricus's opinion, is sin, and sin undoubtedly will not rise again. Therefore another substance will be produced, and by this very fact there will not be a true resurrection, but a new production. For resurrection is only of that which has fallen.

3. The same error is refuted from the clearest testimonies of the Fathers. St. Basil, in the oration That God Is Not the Author of Evils, says: "Do not imagine that there is some proper substance of evil. For malice is not something subsisting." St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the oration on Holy Baptism, says: "Believe that there is no essence of evil, neither subsisting through itself nor created by God." St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron, book 1, chapter 8, says: "Certainly malice is not substantial, but accidental." And a little later he affirms that it is the pestiferous heresy of Valentinus, Marcion, and Manichaeus that malice is a substance. St. Augustine, Confessions, book 7, chapter 12, says: "That evil which I was asking whence it was, is not a substance, because if it were a substance, it would be good." And in the explanation of Psalm 73 he says: "I asked what iniquity was, and I did not find a substance, but a perversity of the will turned away from the highest substance, you, O God, toward the lowest things." And in the book against Julian, chapter 3, he says: "We do not resist the Manichaeans unless we maintain that evils have arisen only from goods, and that these evils are not a substance, but vices of created substances." Let it suffice for us to have touched upon so manifest a heresy. Whoever desires more should go to Bellarmine (same place, chapters 2 and 3), from whom we have copied almost everything.

491. Not a few among the Lutherans do not distinguish the sin of origin from actual sin. From this it would follow that little children are by no means infected with original sin. Therefore this error is refuted sufficiently and more than sufficiently from the things which we have discussed concerning the propagation of original sin into all. See Bellarmine (same place, chapter 4).

492. Nevertheless the common error of both Lutherans and Calvinists in this matter is that original sin properly consists in the corruption of nature, or concupiscence; and since this remains after baptism, they say that sin remains, although it is not imputed to believers. The testimonies themselves of Luther and Calvin can be seen in Bellarmine (same place, chapter 5). We shall be content to report the words of the Calvinist Amesius (in Vitus Ebermannus, Bellarminian Vindications), who says (book 5, chapter 5): "The question is whether the corruption of nature (the mortality of the body, and the ignorance and weakness of the soul, and the difficulty of doing good), and especially concupiscence, such as is found even in the baptized and justified, is properly sin. The Papists deny it; we affirm it." And in chapter 7: "Only the ordination to punishment is taken away in the remission of sin, but not the worthiness. The proximate foundation of that actual ordination is the justice of God, pursuing sin with vengeance; and this foundation, after the grace of remission in Christ, does not remain." And below: "When God remits, he does not judge that sin does not exist; but by grace he judges that it is not to be pursued with vengeance."

493. But this error also, which was condemned in the Council of Trent, session 5, canon 5, is easily refuted. For, first, St. James says in chapter 1: "Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence. Then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been consummated, generates death." "We see four things distinguished by the Apostle: concupiscence, that is, the power of appetition prone to evil, and its three motions: suggestion, delectation, and consent. For theologians call these motions by these names after Gregory, homily 16 on the Gospels, and Bede in his commentary on this passage. Suggestion is that first apprehension of a delightful thing, which draws away and entices the soul; and if it draws the soul to delectation with some imperfect consent, the second motion follows. Of this James says, concupiscence, when it has conceived, that is, when it has enticed, brings forth sin. Finally, if suggestion joined with delectation draws to perfect consent, the third motion exists, of which the Apostle says, sin, when it has been consummated, generates death. For by 'consummated' one must not understand only a sin of deed, but any sin whatever to which the full assent of the will has acceded. For there can be no doubt that the desire of adultery, if it is voluntary, generates death, since the Lord says in Matthew 5: 'Whoever looks at a woman so as to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.' And the same account holds for other similar cases. Therefore Blessed James does not call concupiscence, that is, the prone power, and its first motion, sin. The imperfect offspring, that is, delectation not fully deliberated, he calls sin, but not mortal sin; finally, the perfect offspring, that is, desire with full consent, he defines to be plainly mortal sin.

Hence St. Augustine, Against Julian, book 6, chapter 15, no. 41, says: "But when the Apostle James says, each one is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and enticed; then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin: certainly in these words the offspring is distinguished from the one giving birth. For concupiscence is the one giving birth; sin is the offspring. But concupiscence does not give birth unless it has conceived; it does not conceive unless it has enticed, that is, unless it has obtained the assent of the will for perpetrating evil."

2. In Romans 8 it is read: "There is therefore no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus." "In this passage, after he had said many things in chapters 6 and 7 concerning concupiscence, which he had called now sin by metonymy, now the law of the members, he finally concludes that nothing is to be feared by those justified in Christ, even if they still feel that concupiscence in their members resisting the law of the mind. Nor does he mean so much that there is no condemnation for those justified in Christ on account of concupiscence, as that there is nothing in them worthy of condemnation, or no cause of condemnation. For that they were not yet actually and in very fact condemned was clear, because the sentence of damnation is not passed except after this life. Therefore from this passage we have that concupiscence, such as remains in the reborn, is not sin from its own nature."

Hence St. Augustine, epistle 200 to Asellicus, says: "Although the desires of sin are in us while we are in the body of this death, if we were to give assent to none of them, there would be no source from which we should say to our Father who is in heaven, forgive us our debts."

3. If concupiscence is taken for a motion or act to which the will consents, it will be actual sin, not original sin, in adults; and it cannot exist in infants lacking the use of reason, in whom, nevertheless, there is original sin. "If it is taken for an involuntary act, that is, for the first motions of concupiscence which the mind resists, it is no sin; therefore much less will it be sin if it is taken for the proneness itself toward the act. The adversaries concede the consequence of this argument, because they wish proneness to be sin for this reason, that they think it conflicts with the law of God; but it is certain that it does not conflict with the law of God if its act does not conflict with that same law." Therefore the antecedent is proved. Concupiscence in children, the mentally unsound, and those sleeping is not sin, because it is not in their power not to feel concupiscence, as St. Augustine teaches in book 10 of the Confessions, chapter 30; St. Prosper in book 3 of On the Contemplative Life, chapter 6; and St. Ambrose in book 1 of On Duties, chapter 21. But neither is it in the power of wise and waking men not to have those first motions of concupiscence, as experience teaches; therefore those motions are not sins, and Blessed Augustine truly said in book 1 of The City of God, chapter 25: "How much more is concupiscential disobedience without fault in the body of one not consenting, if it is without fault in the body of one sleeping?" See Bellarmine (same place, chapters 4-14).

Opinions of certain theologians.

494. I. Some theologians taught that the body of Adam after sin was infected by some morbid quality or contagion. This quality, they said, was not only in the flesh, but also in the seed of Adam. Hence it comes about that all descendants who are born from Adam's seed contract the same quality in the flesh. From this quality of the flesh a similar quality is derived into the soul, and this happens at the point of conception, when the soul is joined to the flesh. Each quality, both the one which is in the soul and the one which is in the body, can be called concupiscence. Only the latter, which is in the soul, is original sin. This same quality excites evil desires and concupiscences in us.

495. But in truth, that the vice of concupiscence by no means consists in some positive superadded quality will be clear from what must be said concerning the effects of original sin. Even if this positive quality in the body were granted, it is not apparent how it could infect the soul by producing in it another similar evil quality. It will be clear from what must be said concerning the true nature of original sin that it posits no positive quality in the soul. That positive quality which they call concupiscence is either taken away through baptism or is not taken away. If it is taken away, then in a baptized person there is no longer concupiscence, which is plainly false. If it is not taken away, then original sin remains after baptism, which is heretical. Nor is it valid to say that it indeed remains, but is not imputed as fault; for this is the error of the heretics.

496. But we would be lingering in vain in refuting this opinion, whose falsity is sufficiently open, and which there is now no one who teaches. See Bellarmine (same place, chapter 15).

497. II. The other opinion of theologians to be mentioned here is the one which St. Anselm mentions (On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, chapters 25 and 26), and which Albert Pighius and Ambrosius Catharinus later renewed. They used to say "that Adam's descendants are born deprived of charity and justice, also destitute of the bond of perfect dominion and subjection between the rational mind, the sentient appetite, and the body, and likewise subject to punishment. All these things are intimately in them; but there is nothing among them by which they are constituted and named sinners. The sin of origin which is being investigated, and from which all the aforesaid things come forth as effects from a cause, ought not to be distinguished from that first disobedience by which Adam violated the command not to taste of the tree of knowledge. One and the very same sin, which is called original, is wholly in all human beings; and the very sin which Adam committed is in his descendants through imputation."

498. Since we are dealing with Catholics, it is enough to oppose to this opinion the following observations of Bellarmine (same place, chapter 16). "There exists the most open definition of the Ecumenical Council of Trent, in session 5, where four statements are read concerning original sin, which are four arguments against the doctrine of Pighius and Catharinus. First, the Council teaches that the sin of origin is transmitted by propagation, not by imitation. But that which is numerically one is not propagated, nor is it truly transmitted. Likewise, that which immediately passed away once completed, and now is nowhere and is nothing, cannot be propagated and transmitted."

"Second, the same Council teaches that the sin of origin is in each one as his own. But that one sin of Adam can be common to all; it cannot be proper to each one. Third, it teaches that through the grace of baptism the whole of that which has in little children the true and proper ratio of sin is remitted. Therefore there will be something in little children which has the true and proper ratio of sin, which certainly cannot be said of Adam's sin, since that sin does not inhere in little children. Finally, it teaches that the sin of origin is remitted, not that it is not, nor that it is not imputed, but that it is truly taken away. But if the sin of origin were nothing other than Adam's sin communicated to his descendants through imputation, certainly it would follow that for it to be remitted is nothing other than for it no longer to be imputed. Therefore we have that the opinion of Catharinus and Pighius conflicts not obscurely with the Council of Trent."

499. The explanation of the nature of original stain must be such that it presents the true ratio of sin, as we saw was defined by the Council of Trent. In order that this may become known, we shall do two things here: 1. we shall delineate the true notion of sin; 2. that same notion will be accommodated to original sin.

500. I. Therefore it must first be noted that the name of sin, even in Sacred Scripture, is taken in multiple senses. For it is taken: 1. for the punishment of sin; in Leviticus 20 it is said: "Both shall bear their sin; they shall die without children." 2 Maccabees 12: "It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins." 2. For the effect of a past sin and the cause of a new one; Romans 7: "Now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells in me." Concerning this, Trent, session 5, in the decree on original sin, says: "This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin." 3. For the matter in which, or concerning which, one sins; thus the golden calf is called sin by Moses in Deuteronomy 9: "But your sin which you had made, that is, the calf, I took and burned with fire." 4. For the victim and sacrifice offered for sins; thus Hosea 4:8 says: "The priests shall eat the sins of my people." And 2 Corinthians 5 says of Christ: "Him who knew no sin, he made sin for us, that we might be made the justice of God in him." 5. For a moral defect, or an inordination of the will, which is an impediment to a human being's being able to arrive at the ultimate end or beatitude. This is the proper acceptance of sin; and this is what is at issue in the present question.

501. Sin properly so called is usually taken in two ways. In one way it is taken for a free transgression of a precept, and this is actual sin. This is defined by St. Augustine (Against Faustus, book 22, chapter 27) as "something done, spoken, or desired against the eternal law." And by St. Thomas (De Malo, question 4, article 2) as "a motion of the will ... without fitting order to the due end; and this inordination is aversion from the unchangeable good. And this is as it were formal ... for the formal ratio of a moral act is taken by comparison to the end." In another way it is taken for the persevering state of aversion from God as ultimate end, under the displeasure and disapproval of God. "For just as one who is turned away from the sun remains turned away in darkness until he turns again to the sun; and one who recedes from something remains at that distance until he approaches again; so also one who through sin is turned away from God and recedes from him, not only while he sins, but also after he has sinned, remains turned away from God and far removed, until through repentance he is converted and returns to God." Hence those who have committed sin, as long as their evil will is not retracted, are properly and formally called sinners; they are said to be in sin, to have sin, and so forth.

502. If man had not been elevated to a supernatural end and order, habitual sin would be completed by the privation of due ordination to God as the ultimate natural end. But in the supernatural order, man has been made a sharer of the divine nature, an adoptive son of God, ordained to a supernatural end, namely to the intuitive vision of God; all of which are conferred upon him through sanctifying grace intrinsically inhering in him. Therefore just as in the supernatural order man is said to be turned toward God, or duly ordered to God, through sanctifying grace, so contrariwise he is said to be turned away from God, not suitably ordered to God, through the privation of sanctifying grace. And so, if habitual sin is the state of persevering aversion from God as ultimate end, in the supernatural order it will be the state of persevering privation of sanctifying grace.

503. We say: of the privation of sanctifying grace. For St. Thomas rightly notes (2 Sentences, distinction 30, article 2): "Defect imports the simple negation of some good. But evil is a name of privation. Hence the lack of something, even if it is not naturally suited to be had, can be called a defect; but it cannot be called an evil unless it is the defect of that good which is naturally suited to be had. Hence the lack of life in a stone can be called a defect, but not an evil.... And just as that gift of nature (original justice conferred not only on the person of Adam, but in him on universal human nature) was, and would have been, propagated into the whole nature if man had persisted in justice, so also the privation of that good is produced into the whole nature as a privation and vice of nature; for privation and habit are referred to the same genus."

504. From these things it follows, first, that those who assert that habitual sin consists in persevering aversion from God say the same thing as we do, who assert that it consists in the privation of sanctifying grace. For that aversion does not signify something positive, but something negative or privative; namely, it signifies the defect of due conversion to God. But this due conversion to God is had through sanctifying grace; therefore the state of privation of sanctifying grace is the state of aversion from God, the state of sin.

Second, it follows that those who assert that habitual sin consists in a stain, as if left in the soul by the act of sin, say the same thing as we do. For a stain is nothing other than a certain privation of the splendor of the soul; in the present state, the splendor of the soul must be had through sanctifying grace; therefore the privation of this will be the privation of splendor, a stain, sin.

505. II. In order that the general notion of sin handed down may be applied to original sin, which is true sin, we first note that original sin can be considered in Adam, who committed it, and in his descendants, who contract it. Hence original sin is usually distinguished into original sin originating, which was in Adam, and original sin originated, which is in his descendants: the former is cause, the latter effect. "For the sin of Adam was one thing," says St. Anselm (On Original Sin, chapter 26), "and the sin of infants is another. For the former was the cause, the latter the effect. Adam lacked due justice not because another abandoned it, but because he himself abandoned it; infants lack it not because they themselves abandoned it, but because another abandoned it." Hence also there is the distinction of sin into sin of the person and sin of nature: the former is committed and contracted by one's own and personal will; the latter Adam's descendants contract by generation from Adam the prevaricator. "There is sin from nature," says St. Anselm (On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, chapter 23, elsewhere 21), "and there is sin from the person. And so what is from the person can be called personal; but what is from nature can be called natural, which is called original. And just as the personal passes to the nature, so the natural passes to the person." And St. Thomas, 2 Sentences, distinction 30, article 2: "Just as there is a certain good which regards the nature, and a certain good which regards the person, so also there is a certain fault of nature and a certain fault of the person. Hence for fault of the person the will of the person is required, as is clear in actual fault, which is committed through the act of the person; but for fault of nature nothing is required except will in that nature."

506. Now nothing need be said here about originating original sin, which, if the ratio of sin is considered, agrees with the other sins which are now committed and contracted by human beings through personal will; here the question concerns only the nature of originated original sin.

507. This sin cannot be actual. For when the act of sin in which Adam's descendants are born was committed, they did not exist, and therefore they could not act. They contract this sin as soon as their soul is infused into the body; and at that time they are incapable of moral action. Hence proposition 49 was condemned in Baius, which runs thus: "And from a dominant habitual will it comes about that a little child dying without the Sacrament of regeneration, when he shall have attained the use of reason, actually hates God, blasphemes God, and resists the law of God." If Adam had persevered in the justice received, his descendants would have been constituted just in their conception, not by their own and personal act, but by the infusion of habitual justice. It remains, therefore, that originated original sin be reduced to habitual sin. We said that habitual sin consists in the persevering state of aversion from God, of the privation of sanctifying grace. Therefore the ratio of originated original sin is contained in this privation of sanctifying grace, which by the law of God ought to be present in us.

508. Nor does it stand in the way, first, that, as Angelus Paschalis, Bishop of Motula, argued in the preliminary Congregation of the Council of Trent held on May 21, 1546, with a larger assembly of the Fathers applauding (Pallavicino, book 7, chapter 8): "The nature of original guilt, as of any defect, can be declared better from no other source than from the nature of the opposite perfection. For example, in order to understand what blindness is, you must understand what the faculty of seeing is. For original sin is a certain emptiness opposed to that perfection which adorned innocent Adam and was called original justice." But original justice consisted not only in sanctifying grace, but also in the other gifts enumerated in their place.

For the answer is that although original sin imports the privation of all the gifts of original justice, nevertheless the question here is which of these privations constitutes the true ratio of sin. But sin properly is aversion from God as ultimate end; conversion to God as supernatural ultimate end is had through sanctifying grace; therefore the true ratio of sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace.

Hence St. Thomas, who often teaches that original sin consists in the privation of original justice (the cited bishop, together with others, was expounding his doctrine in the Council of Trent), says in 2 Sentences, distinction 30, article 3: "That part which by itself is naturally suited to be joined to the end is the will itself, whose role it is to impose the order of the end on all the other parts. And so the destitution of the will itself from that rectitude to the end which it had in the institution of nature is what is formal in original sin." Besides, if the distinction handed down earlier (nos. 224ff.) between adequate and inadequate original justice is kept before one's eyes, it is easily understood that original sin indeed imports the privation of adequate original justice, but that the true ratio of sin consists in the privation of inadequate original justice; and in this sense original sin can be said to be the privation of original justice.

509. Nor does it stand in the way, second, that the privation of sanctifying grace is the effect and punishment of sin, and therefore cannot be sin itself.

For the answer is: a) if originating original sin is considered, which in Adam was both actual and habitual, the persevering privation of sanctifying grace is habitual sin itself, and also the effect and punishment of the actual transgression; b) if originated original sin is considered in relation to originating original sin, the permanent privation of sanctifying grace in us is original sin itself, and also the effect of Adam's transgression; c) finally, if originated original sin alone is considered, the privation of sanctifying grace considered actively, namely insofar as on God's part it is the withdrawal of sanctifying grace, has the ratio of punishment inflicted by God; but considered passively, namely insofar as it is the state of the soul, it has the ratio of sin.

In reality, "sanctifying grace, or charity, is understood as a kind of bond between God and man. It is that by which man is subject to God and God is turned toward man. Man becomes God's friend, and in turn God becomes man's friend; and finally man is constituted a lover of God, and God regards him as pleasing and beloved to himself. When man sins, he loses grace and charity, and God withdraws it. But once grace or charity has been lost by man and withdrawn by God, two things follow: man's aversion from God and God's withdrawal from man; the removal of man's friendship with God and the removal of God's friendship toward man; finally, the privation of man's subjection toward God and the privation of God's conversion toward man. Now it follows that God's withdrawal from man, or the removal of God's friendship toward man, or the privation of God's conversion toward man is called, and is, the punishment of sin, not fault; and that it is inflicted by God the just avenger when he withdraws charity or sanctifying grace. But man's aversion from God, or the removal of man's friendship with God, or the privation of man's subjection toward God, this is what I call sin in the true sense, that is, habitual sin."

510. Nor does it stand in the way, third, that St. Thomas, I-II, question 82, article 2, says: "The cause of this corrupted disposition, which is called original sin, is one only, namely the privation of original justice." For, as Bellarmine answers very well (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 5, chapter 20), "St. Thomas is speaking of the formal cause; and if the formal cause of original sin is the privation of original justice, certainly original sin formally consists in the privation of original justice, as the same St. Thomas teaches in the same question, article 3."

511. From these things it follows, first, that although original sin is reduced to habitual sin, nevertheless it cannot properly be called a habit. For a habit, whether operative, which inclines a potency to acting, or entitative, which disposes a subject to being well or badly, is a certain quality; but original sin is a privation. Nevertheless original sin is related after the manner of a habit, insofar as it signifies a persevering state and not a transient action. See St. Thomas, I, question 82; and Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 5, chapter 19, end).

512. Second, it is understood in what sense that should be taken which many theologians after St. Thomas have often taught, namely that concupiscence is the material element of original sin, just as they said that the privation of grace is the formal element.

a) The sense is not that the privation of sanctifying grace communicates the being of sin to concupiscence, just as form communicates its own being to matter; for we have often said that concupiscence of itself, namely without the consent of the will, does not have the true ratio of sin.

b) Nor is the sense that the privation of sanctifying grace (the form) is in concupiscence (the matter) as in a subject; for St. Thomas himself teaches (2 Sentences, distinction 32, question 1, article 1, reply 3) that actual sin is constituted by the privation of due rectitude as form, and by the act as matter; nevertheless he adds that "concupiscence is not related to the original stain in the same way as the act of sin is related to the actual stain." Hence, just as sanctifying grace inheres in the very substance of the soul or in the will as in a subject, so the privation of it is only in the soul or in the will.

c) But concupiscence is called the material element of original sin because an effect is usually compared to its cause as the material to the formal, and likewise a secondary effect to a primary effect. But the inordination of the lower powers is an effect with respect to the inordination of the soul, just as in original justice sanctifying grace was the root and foundation of the other gifts. See Sylvius (on I-II, article 3, conclusion 3). Hence St. Thomas himself, question 83, article 2, reply 3, says: "Concupiscence is related materially and by consequence in original sin." See also de Rubeis (On Original Sin, chapter 58, IV).

513. III. For explaining the nature of original sin, there would remain only to explain how the privation of sanctifying grace in those who are born from Adam has the ratio of the voluntary, which belongs to the essence of sin. Hence St. Thomas, after handing down the distinction between defect and privation, as we saw a little earlier, immediately adds (2 Sentences, cited distinction 30, article 2): "But fault adds, beyond this (defect and privation), the ratio of the voluntary; for someone is blamed from this, that he is deficient in that which can be had through his own will. Hence it is necessary that, according as something has the ratio of fault, according to this the ratio of the voluntary be found in it."

514. But since it must be shown below how the ratio of the voluntary is found in original sin, and since, from what was said before, original sin is derived from Adam into his descendants, we rightly assume here that the privation of sanctifying grace in us has the ratio of the voluntary from the very transgression of the precept committed by Adam. Hence St. Thomas, in the place just cited, adds: "The defect of that original justice which was conferred on man in his creation happened from the will of man. And just as that gift of nature was, and would have been, propagated into the whole nature if man had persisted in justice, so also the privation of that good is brought down into the whole nature as a privation and vice of nature; for privation and habit are referred to the same genus. And in each human being it has the ratio of fault from this, that such a defect was introduced through the will of the principle of nature, that is, of the first man."

515. From these things it is clear, first, that the formal ratio of original sin is not contained in the privation of sanctifying grace alone, but in the privation of sanctifying grace derived into descendants through common origin, or in the privation of sanctifying grace on account of the act of sin freely committed by the first parent. For the voluntary belongs to the ratio of sin; the privation of sanctifying grace, in which Adam's descendants are born, has the ratio of the voluntary in no other way than through order to Adam's prevarication. Therefore, in order that the privation of sanctifying grace in us may have the ratio of sin, it must be taken together with that order to Adam's transgression.

Second, it is clear that although sanctifying grace is lost through any mortal sin whatever, one does not thereby fall into original sin. Hence St. Thomas, I-II, question 86, article 1, reply 3, says: "a stain is not something positive in the soul, nor does it signify privation alone, but it signifies a certain privation of the splendor of the soul in order to its cause, which is sin; and therefore diverse sins induce diverse stains; and it is similar with a shadow, which is the privation of light from the object of some body, and shadows are diversified according to the diversity of the bodies objected." And similarly in 4 Sentences, distinction 18, question 1, article 2: "although the stains of sins do not differ with respect to the privation of grace itself, nevertheless they differ with respect to the cause from which the stain follows."

516. Therefore, briefly touching upon the things that have been set forth, the true opinion concerning the nature of original sin is easily established and proved.

PROPOSITION XL. The formal ratio of original sin consists in habitual aversion from God, the supernatural end, or in the privation of grace and charity, introduced into descendants through the act of sin freely committed by the first parent.

Proof I. Original sin is the death of the soul; but the death of the soul in the present state is nothing other than the privation of grace and charity; therefore.

The major is proved. The Second Council of Orange, canon 2, teaches: "sin, which is the death of the soul, passed through one man into the whole human race." The Council of Trent, session 5, canon 2, says: "If anyone says that that man (Adam), stained by the sin of disobedience, transmitted into the whole human race only death and the punishments of the body, but not also sin, which is the death of the soul, let him be anathema." The Apostle presents the sin derived from Adam into his descendants through the concept of death; for he says in Romans 5:15: "If by the offense of one many died, much more has the grace of God and the gift in the grace of one man abounded unto many." There, by opposing grace to death, he is plainly speaking, as we shall immediately confirm, of the death of the soul, not of the body.

The minor is proved. Death is nothing other than the privation of life: the death of the body is its separation from the soul, or the privation of its vital principle; therefore the death of the soul will also be the privation of a vital principle. But the principle of the supernatural life of the soul, or the principle of that life by which, after the elevation of the whole of human nature had been made in Adam, all human beings ought to have lived, is grace and charity. Therefore the privation of this is the death of the soul. Hence the Apostle, in the cited chapter 5 to the Romans, after he had said that all human beings died through Adam's sin, opposes to this death the grace of God, which abounded through one man unto many; the grace by which, from many offenses, one comes into justification; the grace by which all will be made alive in Christ. Therefore grace is the life of the soul, and consequently the privation of it is the death of the soul.

Proof II. The Council of Trent, as we said (no. 486), teaches that original sin is in each one as his own, and that through baptism the whole of that which has the true ratio of sin is taken away. But the privation of original justice, according as through it the will was subjected to God, is in each of those born as his own; and this alone is what is wholly taken away through baptism, precisely by the fact that in baptism grace and charity are conferred, subjecting their wills to God. Therefore the privation of grace and charity is original sin.

Proof III. By Origen (on Leviticus, homily 8), original sin is called filth; this is common to all those who appeal to the testimony of Job in order to prove the existence of original sin. St. Ambrose (Apology of David, book 2, chapter 1) calls original sin "a stain of the soul." By Tertullian (On the Soul, chapter 40), the soul is said to be "unclean in Adam, and sinful because unclean." By St. Augustine (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapter 34), the soul is said to be "turned away from God through sin." See St. Anselm on these points (On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin).

Hence, according to the Fathers, original sin is filth of the soul, a stain, an aversion from God. But, as we said, these consist in nothing other than the privation of sanctifying grace. Therefore.

Proof IV. What original sin is cannot be better understood except by opposition to original justice, of which it is the privation. But among the gifts of original justice, there is none whose privation contains the true ratio of sin except sanctifying grace. For just as this turns the soul toward God and makes it pleasing and acceptable to God, so the privation of the same is aversion from God and places the soul under God's displeasure and disapproval; and in this the true ratio of sin consists. Therefore. See Bellarmine (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 5, chapter 19).

Therefore De Rubeis rightly observes (cited work, chapter 58, no. 3): "For why should it not most properly be called sin (the privation of grace and charity)? For it is the privation of rectitude, holiness, and friendship with God. It is not mere lack or negation, but the truest privation of a perfection owed according to the divine promises. It must also be called voluntary, not after the manner of an action which proceeds from free will, but after the manner of an effect which follows an evil action, or after the manner of a terminus into which an evil action finally leads. From it, at last, man is denominated habitually evil and a sinner, and is rendered abominable to God. Moreover, it deprives man of brightness and radiance; hence it is a stain, pollution, uncleanness, and stain of the soul. All these things indeed constitute the true ratio of sin."

There is added the authority of the Doctors. St. Anselm (On the Conception of the Virgin, chapter 29) says: "This sin which I call original I can understand in those same infants to be nothing other than that nakedness of due justice, which I set down above, brought about through Adam's disobedience." St. Thomas, whose many testimonies we have already given, I-II, question 82, article 3: "That which is formal in original sin must be taken on the part of the cause of original sin. But of opposites the causes are opposite. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered from the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole ordering of original justice is from this, that the will of man was subject to God. This subjection was first and principally through the will, whose role it is to move all the other parts to the end, as was said above (question 9, article 1). Hence from the aversion of the will from God there followed inordination in all the other powers of the soul. Thus, therefore, the privation of original justice, by which the will was subjected to God, is what is formal in original sin; but every other inordination of the powers of the soul is related in original sin as something material." Suarez (On Vices and Sins, disputation 9, section 2), not only teaches the doctrine handed down, but, reporting the opinions of other theologians, says: "it is explained in various ways by theologians, whom nevertheless I judge all to agree in reality."