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Utrum status purae naturae sit possibilis.
403. Diximus (n. 219.) statum naturae duo importare, unum positivum, alterum negativum. Nemo unquam negavit possibilitatem status illius quoad ejus positivum elementum; posse nempe humanam naturam a Deo condi cum iis omnibus, quae illam constituunt aut ab ea profluunt vel exiguntur admittunt omnes. Item nemo unquam negavit posse humanam naturam condi sine peccato. Si qua ergo est quaestio tota versatur quoad illa dona, quibus de facto cumulavit Deus primum hominem; et quaeritur utrum sine illis, nempe sine gratia sanctificante, sine destinatione ad visionem intuitivam, sine dono integritatis, immortalitatis, etc., potuerit Deus hominem creare.
403. We said (n. 219) that the state of nature imports two things, one positive, the other negative. No one has ever denied the possibility of that state as to its positive element; namely, everyone admits that human nature can be founded by God with all those things which constitute it, or flow from it, or are demanded by it. Likewise no one has ever denied that human nature can be founded without sin. Therefore, if there is any question, the whole of it turns on those gifts with which God in fact heaped up the first man; and it is asked whether God could have created man without them, namely, without sanctifying grace, without destination to the intuitive vision, without the gift of integrity, of immortality, etc.
404. Post ea quae disputavimus de supernaturalitate aut praeternaturalitate illorum donorum, responsio affirmativa propositae quaestioni deberet esse evidens: si enim omnia illa dona sunt indebita, consequens est potuisse a Deo humanam naturam sine illis creari. Non defuerunt tamen Theologi, qui dicerent statum purae naturae possibilem esse de potentia Dei absoluta, non vero de potentia Dei ordinata - vel possibilem quidem esse, minime vero convenientem. - Contra hanc distinctionem dirigitur praesens quaestio; sed imprimis verus ejus sensus est determinandus.
404. After the things which we have disputed concerning the supernaturalness or preternaturalness of those gifts, an affirmative answer to the proposed question ought to be evident: for if all those gifts are not owed, it follows that human nature could have been created by God without them. Nevertheless, there have not been lacking theologians who said that the state of pure nature is possible by God's absolute power, but not by God's ordered power; or that it is indeed possible, but by no means fitting. The present question is directed against this distinction; but first its true sense must be determined.
405. Veram distinctionem inter Dei potentiam absolutam et ordinatam proponit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 25. a. 5. ad 1.: "Quia," inquit, "potentia intelligitur ut exequens, voluntas autem ut imperans, et intellectus et sapientia ut dirigens; quod attribuitur potentiae secundum se consideratae, dicitur Deus posse secundum potentiam absolutam; et hujusmodi est omne illud in quo potest salvari ratio entis, ut supra dictum est, art. 3. hujus quaest.; quod autem attribuitur potentiae divinae, secundum quod exequitur imperium voluntatis justae, hoc dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinaria."
405. St. Thomas proposes the true distinction between God's absolute and ordered power in I, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1: "Because," he says, "power is understood as executing, but will as commanding, and intellect and wisdom as directing, that which is attributed to power considered according to itself is said to be something God can do according to absolute power; and of this sort is everything in which the ratio of being can be preserved, as was said above, article 3 of this question. But that which is attributed to divine power according as it executes the command of a just will, this is said to be something God can do by ordinary power."
406. Quam distinctionem explicans Suarez (de Deo 1. 3. c. 9. nn. 18. 19.), ait: "Potentia sumi potest vel per se, ac praecise spectata, vel ut conjuncta liberae voluntati, et quasi alligata ordini ab ipsa voluntate praescripto. Et juxta hanc duplicem considerationem videtur sumpta vulgaris distinctio Theologorum de divina potentia in absolutam et ordinatam in omni opinione certum est, potentiam non dici absolutam, vel ordinatam, nisi per respectum ad voluntatem, nam quatenus soluta concipitur ab omni lege, seu decreto voluntatis dicitur absoluta, ordinata vero, ut conjuncta illi. Potest autem hoc esse duobus modis. Unus est, quatenus potentia intelligitur conjuncta alicui legi universali... In qua lege potest Deus dispensare, cum voluerit, ut cum solem sistere facit, quod, juxta hanc expositionem censetur per potentiam absolutam fecisse. Alius modus est, ut potentia intelligatur conjuncta decreto aeternae voluntatis Dei de omnibus, et singulis, quae in quolibet tempore operatus est, et ita quidquid de facto operatur, dicitur facere per potentiam ordinatam, quia semper operatur juxta decretum suum, et ita solum ea dicetur posse de absoluta potentia, quae nunquam facturus est. Et uterque modus est satis usitatus, prior tamen videtur magis conformis communi modo loquendi, et commodior."
Jam, si sensu D. Thomae communiter in scholis recepto sumatur distinctio potentiae Dei absolutae et ordinatae, nulla, quoad rem praesentem, potest esse controversia: omnes enim concedunt quod supposito Providentiae ordine, quo Deus voluit elevationem humanae naturae, status purae naturae non est possibilis de potentia Dei ordinata.
Jam, si sensu D. Thomae communiter in scholis recepto sumatur distinctio potentiae Dei absolutae et ordinatae, nulla, quoad rem praesentem, potest esse controversia: omnes enim concedunt quod supposito Providentiae ordine, quo Deus voluit elevationem humanae naturae, status purae naturae non est possibilis de potentia Dei ordinata.
406. Explaining this distinction, Suarez (On God, book 3, c. 9, nn. 18-19) says: "Power can be taken either per se and precisely considered, or as joined to free will and, as it were, bound to the order prescribed by that will itself. And according to this twofold consideration the common distinction of theologians concerning divine power into absolute and ordered seems to have been taken. In every opinion it is certain that power is not called absolute or ordered except by relation to will; for insofar as it is conceived as loosed from every law or decree of will, it is called absolute, but ordered as joined to it. But this can be in two ways. One is insofar as power is understood as joined to some universal law... In this law God can dispense when he wills, as when he makes the sun stand still, which, according to this exposition, is judged to have been done by absolute power. The other mode is that power is understood as joined to the decree of God's eternal will concerning all things and each thing which he has worked at any time; and thus whatever he in fact works is said to be done by ordered power, because he always works according to his decree, and thus only those things which he will never do will be said to be possible by absolute power. And each mode is sufficiently usual, yet the former seems more conformable to the common manner of speaking and more convenient."
Now, if the distinction of God's absolute and ordered power is taken in the sense of St. Thomas, commonly received in the schools, there can be no controversy regarding the present matter: for all concede that, supposing the order of Providence by which God willed the elevation of human nature, the state of pure nature is not possible by God's ordered power.
Now, if the distinction of God's absolute and ordered power is taken in the sense of St. Thomas, commonly received in the schools, there can be no controversy regarding the present matter: for all concede that, supposing the order of Providence by which God willed the elevation of human nature, the state of pure nature is not possible by God's ordered power.
407. Sed Theologi, contra quos disputamus, aliter intelligunt potentiam Dei absolutam et ordinatam. Nam 1. potentiam absolutam vocant divinam omnipotentiam sejunctim spectatam ab aliis attributis sapientiae, bonitatis et justitiae; ordinatam autem, eamdem omnipotentiam cum illis attributis conjunctam - vel 2. appellant potentiam absolutam divinam omnipotentiam conjunctam solum cum justitia; ordinatam vero, eamdem omnipotentiam conjunctam etiam cum sapientia et bonitate.
407. But the theologians against whom we dispute understand God's absolute and ordered power otherwise. For 1. they call absolute power divine omnipotence considered separately from the other attributes of wisdom, goodness, and justice; but ordered power they call that same omnipotence joined with those attributes. Or 2. they call absolute power divine omnipotence joined only with justice; but ordered power that same omnipotence joined also with wisdom and goodness.
408. Hinc dicunt statum purae naturae esse possibilem de potentia Dei absoluta, seu non repugnare ex parte omnipotentiae in se spectatae vel ex parte omnipotentiae conjunctae cum justitia: impossibilem esse de potentia ordinata, seu repugnare ex parte divinae potentiae conjunctae cum justitia, sapientia et bonitate - vel saltem conjunctae cum sapientia et bonitate.
408. Hence they say that the state of pure nature is possible by God's absolute power, or that it is not repugnant on the part of omnipotence considered in itself, or on the part of omnipotence joined with justice; but that it is impossible by ordered power, or is repugnant on the part of divine power joined with justice, wisdom, and goodness, or at least joined with wisdom and goodness.
409. Atque eodem recidit alia distinctio, juxta quam statum purae naturae possibilem quidem, sed non convenientem adstruunt: possibilem enim dicunt, quia cum omnipotentia comparatus nullam repugnantiam exhibet; non vero convenientem, quia dedecet alia divina attributa. Unde Bellelli (Mens Augustini, 1. 3. c. 23. ad 3.), ait: "dicimus adjutorium supernaturale non esse juxta exigentiam naturae, secundum se praecise acceptae, sed prout stat sub providentia Dei justissima." - Et (ad 4.): "Signanter ei (supernaturali) non adversatur ut sit debitum jure justissimae Providentiae, quae sine causa nequit rationabiliter deficere in necessariis." - Et Berti (August. systema vindic., Diss. 2. c. 1. §. 6. n. 8.) dicit: "Creaturae rationalis finem ultimum esse Deum, hujusque intuitivam visionem Naturae integrae nulloque peccato corruptae supernaturalia gratiae auxilia conferenda fuisse, ut posset finem suum adipisci, non quod ejusmodi auxilia sint naturalia, pertineantque ad naturae constitutionem; sed potius quia ad finem suum consequendum rationales creaturae egent adminiculis naturae ordinem excedentibus, et quae propterea ipsis quadammodo debeantur, sive decentia Creatoris, ut docuit Card. Norisius, sive lege justissima Providentiae... ut Bellellius contendit."
409. And another distinction falls back to the same thing, according to which they maintain that the state of pure nature is indeed possible, but not fitting. For they say it is possible because, compared with omnipotence, it presents no repugnance; but not fitting, because it is unbecoming to the other divine attributes. Hence Bellelli (The Mind of Augustine, book 3, c. 23, ad 3) says: "We say that supernatural aid is not according to the exigency of nature, taken precisely according to itself, but according as it stands under the most just providence of God." And (ad 4): "It is not significantly opposed to it, namely to the supernatural, that it be owed by the right of most just Providence, which cannot reasonably fail in necessary things without cause." And Berti (The Augustinian System Vindicated, diss. 2, c. 1, § 6, n. 8) says: "The ultimate end of the rational creature is God, and his intuitive vision; supernatural helps of grace had to be conferred upon an integral nature corrupted by no sin, so that it could attain its end, not because helps of this sort are natural and pertain to the constitution of nature, but rather because, for attaining their end, rational creatures need supports exceeding the order of nature, and which therefore are in some way owed to them, whether by the fittingness of the Creator, as Cardinal Noris taught, or by the law of most just Providence... as Bellelli contends."
410. Ut melius determinetur status quaestionis, duo adhuc notanda sunt. Primum est quod quando illi Theologi vocant potentiam Dei ordinatam omnipotentiam conjunctam cum sapientia, non loquuntur de sapientia, seu scientia dirigente divinae voluntatis decretum, quo hominis elevationem Deus voluit (haec enim sapientia inseparabilis est ab illo decreto, et sic vero sensu sumerent potentiam Dei ordinatam); sed loquuntur de divina sapientia in se inspecta, ita ut Deus, si condidisset hominem propter alium finem, quam propter visionem intuitivam, omnino sine sapientia egisset. Secundum vero est quod quando iidem Theologi dicunt statum purae naturae, non convenientem, seu destinationem ad visionem intuitivam convenientem, non loquuntur de mera convenientia, quemadmodum, ex. gr. Incarnatio Verbi dicitur conveniens; sed de convenientia inducente necessitatem, cujus oppositum Deum, divina attributa dedeceat.
Quare verus quaestionis sensus est: utrum antecedenter ad decretum, quo Deus voluit statum elevationis, potuerit hominem condere in statu purae naturae (sine destinatione ad visionem intuitivam, sine immunitate a concupiscentia, mortalem, passibilem, etc.), salvis suis attributis justitiae, sapientiae, bonitatis.
Quare verus quaestionis sensus est: utrum antecedenter ad decretum, quo Deus voluit statum elevationis, potuerit hominem condere in statu purae naturae (sine destinatione ad visionem intuitivam, sine immunitate a concupiscentia, mortalem, passibilem, etc.), salvis suis attributis justitiae, sapientiae, bonitatis.
410. In order that the state of the question may be better determined, two things must still be noted. The first is that when those theologians call God's ordered power omnipotence joined with wisdom, they are not speaking of wisdom, or knowledge, directing the decree of the divine will by which God willed man's elevation; for this wisdom is inseparable from that decree, and thus they would be taking God's ordered power in the true sense. Rather, they are speaking of divine wisdom considered in itself, so that if God had founded man for another end than for the intuitive vision, he would have acted wholly without wisdom. The second is that when the same theologians say that the state of pure nature is not fitting, or that destination to the intuitive vision is fitting, they are not speaking of mere fittingness, in the way, for example, that the Incarnation of the Word is called fitting; rather, they are speaking of a fittingness inducing necessity, the opposite of which would be unbecoming to God and to the divine attributes.
Wherefore the true sense of the question is this: whether, antecedently to the decree by which God willed the state of elevation, he could have founded man in the state of pure nature, without destination to the intuitive vision, without immunity from concupiscence, mortal, passible, etc., while preserving his attributes of justice, wisdom, and goodness.
Wherefore the true sense of the question is this: whether, antecedently to the decree by which God willed the state of elevation, he could have founded man in the state of pure nature, without destination to the intuitive vision, without immunity from concupiscence, mortal, passible, etc., while preserving his attributes of justice, wisdom, and goodness.
411. NOTA. Objectiones, quae contra hanc thesim afferri possunt, et quae revera afferuntur a cit. Auctoribus, sunt eaedem, quae opponuntur supernaturalitati donorum justitiae originalis. Una tamen est, quam juverit breviter proponere et solvere.
411. NOTE. The objections which can be brought against this thesis, and which in fact are brought by the cited authors, are the same as those which are opposed to the supernaturalness of the gifts of original justice. Yet there is one which it will help to propose and solve briefly.
412. Dicunt: Si status purae naturae esset vere possibilis, ex morte, concupiscentia, miseriis hujus vitae non posset ostendi existentia peccati originalis; atqui S. Aug. et alii saepe hoc argumento usi sunt; ergo.
Resp. 1. Eos omnes usos fuisse hoc argumento, supposito statu elevationis, quem ex Scriptura probaverant contra illos, qui S. Script. auctoritatem non rejiciebant. - 2. D. Thomas 1. 4. c. g. "Peccati originalis in humano genere probabiliter quaedam signa apparent... Posset tamen aliquis dicere, hujusmodi defectus tam corporales quam spirituales non esse poenales, sed naturales defectus ex necessitate materiae consequentes. Necesse est enim corpus humanum, quum sit ex contrariis compositum, corruptibile esse, et sensibilem appetitum in ea, quae secundum sensum sunt delectabilia, moveri, quae interdum sunt contraria rationi... Sed tamen (licet haec verissima sint, ut alibi D. Thomas ipse constanter docet), si quis recte consideret, satis probabiliter poterit aestimare... Ut si quod hujus dominii impedimentum ex defectu naturae contingeret, ejus speciali et supernaturali beneficio tolleretur."
Resp. 1. Eos omnes usos fuisse hoc argumento, supposito statu elevationis, quem ex Scriptura probaverant contra illos, qui S. Script. auctoritatem non rejiciebant. - 2. D. Thomas 1. 4. c. g. "Peccati originalis in humano genere probabiliter quaedam signa apparent... Posset tamen aliquis dicere, hujusmodi defectus tam corporales quam spirituales non esse poenales, sed naturales defectus ex necessitate materiae consequentes. Necesse est enim corpus humanum, quum sit ex contrariis compositum, corruptibile esse, et sensibilem appetitum in ea, quae secundum sensum sunt delectabilia, moveri, quae interdum sunt contraria rationi... Sed tamen (licet haec verissima sint, ut alibi D. Thomas ipse constanter docet), si quis recte consideret, satis probabiliter poterit aestimare... Ut si quod hujus dominii impedimentum ex defectu naturae contingeret, ejus speciali et supernaturali beneficio tolleretur."
412. They say: If the state of pure nature were truly possible, the existence of original sin could not be shown from death, concupiscence, and the miseries of this life; but St. Augustine and others often used this argument; therefore.
I answer: 1. All of them used this argument with the state of elevation supposed, which they had proved from Scripture against those who did not reject the authority of Sacred Scripture. 2. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles IV: "Certain signs of original sin appear with probability in the human race... Yet someone could say that defects of this sort, both bodily and spiritual, are not penal, but natural defects following from the necessity of matter. For it is necessary that the human body, since it is composed of contraries, be corruptible, and that the sensible appetite be moved toward those things which are delightful according to sense, which sometimes are contrary to reason... But nevertheless, although these things are most true, as St. Thomas himself constantly teaches elsewhere, if one considers rightly, he will be able to judge quite probably... so that if any impediment of this dominion were to occur from a defect of nature, it would be removed by his special and supernatural benefit."
I answer: 1. All of them used this argument with the state of elevation supposed, which they had proved from Scripture against those who did not reject the authority of Sacred Scripture. 2. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles IV: "Certain signs of original sin appear with probability in the human race... Yet someone could say that defects of this sort, both bodily and spiritual, are not penal, but natural defects following from the necessity of matter. For it is necessary that the human body, since it is composed of contraries, be corruptible, and that the sensible appetite be moved toward those things which are delightful according to sense, which sometimes are contrary to reason... But nevertheless, although these things are most true, as St. Thomas himself constantly teaches elsewhere, if one considers rightly, he will be able to judge quite probably... so that if any impediment of this dominion were to occur from a defect of nature, it would be removed by his special and supernatural benefit."