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Disputation IV — On Man's Fall, or on Original Sin

Article 1. On the Sin of the First Parents

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DE HOMINIS LAPSU, SEU DE PECCATO ORIGINALI.
ON THE FALL OF MAN, OR ON ORIGINAL SIN.
413. Praeclarissima illa dona, quibus Deus protoparentes instruxit in prima eorum conditione, non ipsis solum, sed in illis toti humanae naturae collata fuere. Qua de re specialem propositionem non statuimus, tum quia recolendo Sacrae Script. et Patrum testimonia, quibus munera illa Adamo collata esse ostendimus, facile et nobis in illo collata demonstrantur; tum quia ex dicendis de eorumdem donorum amissione, haec veritas satis superque innotescet.
413. Those most splendid gifts with which God furnished the first parents in their first condition were conferred not on them alone, but in them on the whole of human nature. We do not establish a special proposition concerning this matter, both because, by recalling the testimonies of Sacred Scripture and of the Fathers by which we showed that those gifts were conferred on Adam, it is easily demonstrated that they were conferred also on us in him, and because from the things to be said concerning the loss of those same gifts, this truth will become more than sufficiently known.
414. Causam ergo inquirimus, qua factum est, ut licet ex largitate conditoris ad supernaturalem et cujusdam felicitatis statum evecti fuerimus, omnes tamen innumeris miseriis subjiciamur. Hanc vero causam manifestavit Apostolus, dicens: "Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, etc." Unde S. Aug. (op. imperf. c. Julian. 1. 6. c. 21.) ait: "Sicut enim poenae humanarum miseriarum, quas communiter perferunt filii Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, ideo sunt omnium, de quorum praevaricatione ista venerunt: ita ipsorum duorum praevaricatio tam magnum peccatum debet intelligi, ut posset omnium ex viro et muliere nascentium in deterius mutare naturam, et communi reatu tamquam haereditarii debiti obligare chirographum."
414. Therefore we inquire into the cause by which it came about that, although from the largess of the Creator we had been raised to a supernatural state and a state of a certain happiness, nevertheless all of us are subjected to innumerable miseries. The Apostle manifested this cause when he said: "Through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death," etc. Hence St. Augustine (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 6, c. 21) says: "For just as the penalties of human miseries, which the children of Adam commonly bear from the day of their exit from their mother's womb, belong to all because these things came from their prevarication, so the prevarication of those two must be understood as so great a sin that it could change for the worse the nature of all those born from man and woman, and bind the document of debt by a common guilt, as though of an hereditary debt."
415. Statuto igitur facto, quod primi parentes graviter peccaverunt, de illius peccati in totum humanum genus transfusione, seu de originali peccato agendum est. Hujus existentiam - naturam - propagationem - effectus, prout tempus dabit, investigabimus.
415. Therefore, once the fact has been established that the first parents gravely sinned, we must treat of the transfusion of that sin into the whole human race, or of original sin. Its existence, nature, propagation, and effects, as time permits, we shall investigate.
De peccato protoparentum.
416. In hoc articulo statuemus imprimis existentiam peccati protoparentum - dein vero ejusdem naturam paucis exponemus.
416. In this article we shall establish first the existence of the sin of the first parents; then we shall briefly explain its nature.
§ I.
Utrum primi parentes graviter peccaverint.
§ I.
Whether the First Parents Sinned Gravely.
417. Conc. Trid. sess. 5. can. 1. docet: "Si quis non confitetur primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei in Paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et justitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse, incurrisseque per offensam praevaricationis hujusmodi iram et indignationem Dei, atque ideo mortem, quam antea illi comminatus fuerat Deus, et cum morte captivitatem sub ejus potestate qui mortis deinde habuit imperium, hoc est, diaboli, totumque Adam, per illam praevaricationis offensam, secundum corpus et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse; anathema sit."
417. The Council of Trent, session 5, canon 1, teaches: "If anyone does not confess that the first man Adam, when he had transgressed the commandment of God in Paradise, immediately lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted, and incurred through the offense of this prevarication the wrath and indignation of God, and therefore death, which God had previously threatened him with, and with death captivity under the power of him who thereafter had the empire of death, that is, the devil, and that the whole Adam, through that offense of prevarication, was changed for the worse according to body and soul, let him be anathema."
418. Ut catholica haec veritas ita statuatur, ut adversariorum effugia praeoccupentur, pauca praenotamus. Ac imprimis, uti refert Bellarminus (de Amiss. gr. et it. pecc. 1. 3. c. 1.) non defuerunt qui assererent primos parentes nec peccasse nec peccare potuisse ea ratione ducti, quod verba in 1 Gen., ut non ederent de ligno scientiae boni et mali, non legem fuisse dicerent, sed admonitionem more medicorum, cum aliquid noxium prohibent. Quem errorem confirmabant ex 1. Tim. 1., ubi dicitur quod lex non est posita justo sed peccatori. Ut ergo de protoparentum peccato constet, ostendi debet existentia praecepti, quod transgrediendo peccaverunt.
418. In order that this Catholic truth may be established in such a way that the evasions of the adversaries may be anticipated, we note a few things beforehand. And first, as Bellarmine reports (On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, book 3, c. 1), there have not been lacking those who asserted that the first parents neither sinned nor could have sinned, led by this reason: that the words in Genesis 1, that they should not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, were not a law, they said, but an admonition after the manner of physicians when they prohibit something harmful. They confirmed this error from 1 Timothy 1, where it is said that law is not laid down for the just but for the sinner. Therefore, in order that the sin of the first parents may be established, the existence must be shown of a precept which they sinned by transgressing.
419. Ut autem natura illius praecepti intelligatur, dicendum est ut docet D. Th. opusc. 2. c. 118., quod "ejus ligni esus non ideo prohibitus est, quia secundum se malus esset, sed ut homo saltem in hoc modico aliquid observaret, ea sola ratione, quia esset a Deo praeceptum." Quibus verbis indicat etiam S. Doctor rationem illius praecepti, quam SS. Patres tradiderant. Ita S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 14. in Gen.), inquit: "Haec faciebat (scilicet Deus) quasi Dominus aliquis liberalis domum magnam alicui concredens, ut dominium sibi salvum maneat, parvam tantum pecuniam dandam ab illo praescribat." - Et S. Aug. (de Gen. ad litt. 1. 8. c. 13.): "Ut causam jussionis hujus non diutius requiramus, si haec ipsa magna est utilitas homini, quod Deo servit, jubendo Deus utile facit, quidquid jubere voluerit."
419. But in order that the nature of that precept may be understood, one must say, as St. Thomas teaches in Opusc. 2, c. 118, that "the eating of that tree was not prohibited because it was evil according to itself, but so that man at least in this small thing might observe something for this reason alone, that it had been commanded by God." In these words the holy Doctor also indicates the reason of that precept, which the holy Fathers had handed down. Thus St. John Chrysostom, Homily 14 on Genesis, says: "God was doing these things as some liberal lord entrusting a great house to someone, so that his dominion may remain safe, prescribes that only a small sum of money be given by him." And St. Augustine (On Genesis to the Letter, book 8, c. 13): "That we may not seek the cause of this command for too long, if this itself is a great utility for man, that he serves God, God by commanding makes useful whatever he has willed to command."
420. Quamvis autem, uti bene notat Suarez (de op. sex dier. 1. 3. c. 21. n. 9.), praeceptum illud non fuisset simpliciter necessarium "ut homo per subjectionem suam, dominatum Dei recognosceret, vel ut ei obedientiam praestaret, nam sine dubio, et cognitio illa multis aliis modis haberi, et obedientia in aliis praeceptis exerceri poterat: nihilominus tamen convenientissimum fuit illud praeceptum ad peculiarem modum subjectionis, et obedientiae restringere, quia in aliis praeceptis aliqua ratio mali, vel incommodi praeter Dei prohibitionem invenitur, et ideo, ut ait August. dicto cap. 1. 3. talis prohibitio facta est, quod ex sola transgressione voluntatis Dei mala esset, ut inde ostenderetur inobedientiae malitia, quia ex sola ratione obedientiae abstinere bonum fuit, et comedere malum, quod alias seclusa prohibitione malum non esset." - Ex fine ipso hujus praecepti, ejusdem, ut videbimus, gravitas deduci potest.
420. But although, as Suarez rightly notes (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, c. 21, n. 9), that precept was not simply necessary "so that man through his subjection might recognize God's dominion, or so that he might render obedience to him, for without doubt both that cognition could be had in many other ways, and obedience could be exercised in other precepts; nevertheless it was most fitting to restrict that precept to a peculiar mode of subjection and obedience, because in other precepts some ratio of evil or inconvenience is found besides God's prohibition. And therefore, as Augustine says in the cited chapter, book 3, such a prohibition was made, so that it would be evil from the transgression of God's will alone, so that from this the malice of disobedience might be shown, because from the ratio of obedience alone abstaining was good, and eating was evil, which otherwise, the prohibition set aside, would not be evil." From the very end of this precept, as we shall see, its gravity can be deduced.
421. Si quis quaereret cur arbor illa dicta sit scientiae boni et mali; respondet Suarez (1. c. n. 6.): "Illius nominis variae redduntur rationes. Greg. Nyssen. lib. de opificio hominis c. 20. hanc reddit, quod fructus ille sub specie boni oblatus, mali experientiam induxit. Et huc etiam spectat ratio alia, quod ita dicta fuerit scientia boni et mali, quia serpens hanc scientiam per illius esum promisit; ita ut nomen sit, quasi per antiphrasim impositum, sicut dixit Deus, 'Ecce Adam sicut unus ex nobis factus est, sciens bonum et malum.' Ratio vero frequentius recepta est, nomen illud impositum esse ab eventu, quia comedendo de illa arbore experimento cognovit bonum, quod amisit; et malum in quod incidit, ut ait Chrysost. hom. 16. in Gen. circa finem. Vel per illud novit peccatum, ut ait Theodor. quaest. 62. in Gen. Vel quia ostensum est inobedientiae malum, et quantum fuisset obedientiae bonum, ut ait S. Aug. 14. de Civit. c. 17. et lib. 8. Gen. ad litt. c. 6. et 13., et cum eo D. Thomas 1. p. q. 102. a. 1. ad 4."
421. If someone should ask why that tree is called the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Suarez answers (l. c., n. 6): "Various reasons are given for that name. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On the Making of Man, c. 20, gives this one: that that fruit, offered under the appearance of good, brought in the experience of evil. And another reason also looks to this: that it was called the knowledge of good and evil because the serpent promised this knowledge through eating it, so that the name is imposed, as it were, by antiphrasis, just as God said, 'Behold Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil.' But the more frequently received reason is that that name was imposed from the event, because by eating of that tree he knew by experience the good which he lost and the evil into which he fell, as Chrysostom says, Homily 16 on Genesis, near the end. Or through it he knew sin, as Theodoret says, question 62 on Genesis. Or because the evil of disobedience was shown, and how great the good of obedience would have been, as St. Augustine says in book 14 City of God, c. 17, and book 8 On Genesis to the Letter, cc. 6 and 13, and with him St. Thomas, I, q. 102, a. 1, ad 4."
422. His itaque declaratis, dicimus:

PROP. XXXVI. Protoparentibus 1. verum impositum fuit praeceptum quod 2. transgressi - 3. graviter peccaverunt et 4. justitiam originalem amiserunt.

Prob. 1ma pars I. Ex Scriptura. Legitur enim Gen. 2. 16. 17.: "Praecepitque ei dicens: Ex omni ligno paradisi comede. De ligno autem scientiae boni et mali ne comedas: in quocumque enim die comederis ex eo, morte morieris." - Et c. 3. 1. seqq.: "Qui (serpens) dixit ad mulierem: Cur praecepit vobis Deus ut non comederetis de omni ligno paradisi? Cui respondit mulier: De fructu lignorum, quae sunt in paradiso, vescimur: de fructu vero ligni, quod est in medio paradisi, praecepit nobis Deus ne comederemus, et ne tangeremus illud, ne forte moriamur."

Unde: a) Moises, scriptor historicus, utitur repetitis vicibus voce praecepit; eandem adhibent mulier tentata, serpens a quo tentatur: nihil obstat quominus vox illa proprio sensu sumatur. Ergo agitur de vero praecepto et non de simplici admonitione.

b) Cum superior aliquid prohibet sanctione adjecta, vere legem vel praeceptum imponit; sed Deus prohibens ne comederent de ligno scientiae boni et mali, addidit: "quocumque die ex eo comederis, morte morieris"; ergo.

c) Esus illius fructus saepe in aliis Script. locis infra citandis dicitur transgressio, peccatum - mors, quam Deus comminatus fuerat, dicitur poena illius peccati. Ergo fuit impositum verum praeceptum, ne comederent de illo fructu.

Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Clemens Alex. (strom. 1. 5.), ait: "Adam fuit perfectus: elegit autem quod vetitum erat." - S. Cyprianus (1. de Incarn. Verbi): "In origine statim mundi et generis humani, Adam praecepti immemor et datae legis transgressor fuit." - S. Irenaeus (1. 5. adv. haeres. c. 19.), loquitur de seductione Evae "quae per verba Angeli (mali) ad violandum praeceptum divinum et Deum deserendum incitata fuit." S. Chrysostomus (Hom. 16. in Gen.): "Gustus ille inobedientiae erat argumentum, et praevaricatio mandati a Deo traditi," etc.

Prob. III. Ex inanitate rationis oppositae. "Siquidem," ait Bellarminus 1. c., "ex eo quod ipsi docent, primos homines non peccasse, quia legem non habuerunt, cum essent justi, sequitur, nullos homines peccare, quin etiam fieri non posse, ut ulli homines peccent. Nam si peccatum praerequirit legem cum sit praevaricatio legis: et lex praerequirit peccatum, cum lex justo non ponatur, sed peccatori; ergo peccatum semper praerequirit peccatum, nullum igitur fuit primum peccatum. Et si primum non fuit, unde caetera extiterunt? Quare necesse est, ut vel fuerit lex ante peccatum, et falsa sit adversariorum opinio; vel certe nulla sint, nec fuerint unquam in mundo peccata, qui est error Libertinorum, quorum impudentia (ut diximus libro superiore) non argumentis, sed tormentis, et suppliciis tantum coercenda esset."

Plura praeclare disserit cit. Auctor, et in fine subdit interpretationem S. Augustini ad objectum testim. Apostoli ex 1. Tim.: "S. Augustinus lib. de spiritu et litera cap. 10. hunc eundem locum Apostoli ex cap. 1. prioris ad Tim. Justo non est lex posita, sed injustis, vult similem esse locis illis ejusdem Apostoli, 'Non estis sub lege, sed sub gratia,' Rom. 6. et, 'Si spiritu ducimini, non estis sub lege.' Galat. 5.; quae loca non significant, justos non teneri legibus, vel non peccare, si legem non servent, sed non habere legem supra se, quasi cervicibus imminentem, et flagello minantem, ac terrentem, ut habent injusti, qui timore poenae bonum operantur. Operantur enim justi bonum amore justitiae, ac libenti animo, operaturi etiam si lex non esset, vel poenam nullam minaretur. Quocirca in lege potius sunt, quam sub lege, ut Apostolus de se loquitur 1. Corinth. 9. ubi dicit, se sub lege non esse, et tamen sine lege non esse, sed in lege esse Christi."

Prob. 2da pars. Quod materialiter saltem transgressi sint praeceptum ne comederent de arbore scientiae boni et mali, aperte traditur in Scriptura. Nam Gen. 3. 6. legitur: "Vidit igitur mulier quod bonum esset lignum ad vescendum, et pulchrum oculis, aspectuque delectabile: et tulit de fructu illius, et comedit; deditque viro suo, qui comedit." Quod autem formalis fuerit illa transgressio, probatur sic: Ut legis transgressio sit formale peccatum, requiritur et sufficit legis cognitio et libertas. Atqui non defuit protoparentibus praecepti cognitio; mulier enim serpenti, a quo tentata fuit, respondit: "De fructu vero ligni, quod est in medio paradisi, praecepit nobis Deus ne comederemus, et ne tangeremus illud, ne forte moriamur." Nec defuit libertas, quae certe pertinet ad humanam naturam, et ipsi adversarii (Novatores) homini innocenti non denegant. Ergo.

Prob. 3a pars. I. Dicitur Eccli. 10. 14.: "Initium superbiae hominis, apostatare a Deo: quoniam ab eo, qui fecit illum, recessit cor ejus; quoniam initium omnis peccati est superbia." - Et Tob. 4. 14.: "Superbiam nunquam in tuo sensu aut in tuo verbo dominari permittas: in ipsa enim initium sumpsit omnis perditio." Unde: peccatum, quod includit apostasiam, recessum a Deo, et quod est initium omnis perditionis, est certe grave. Atqui tale fuit peccatum protoparentum. Ergo.

Prob. II. Sanctio addita praecepto, fuit "quocumque die comederis ex eo, morte morieris." Morti autem debent addi omnia mala, uti patet ex iis, quae in praecedente disputatione diximus. Unde, gravitas praecepti, uti bene notat Suarez (1. c. n. 10.) ex comminatione mortis addita praecepto aperte comprobatur. "Nam si intelligatur de morte animae, ut voluit Philo, et senserunt Gregor. et Eucherius in ipsa comminatione formaliter continetur praedicta mortalis gravitas; si vero intelligatur de morte corporis (ut ad litteram intelligi debet juxta Paulum, et Concilium Trid.) ex comminatione tam gravis poenae ita colligitur praeceptum illud obligasse sub gravi culpa, et ideo Patres communiter de utraque morte corporis, et animae comminationem illam interpretati sunt."

Prob. III. Ex fine ipso praecepti, et auctoritate Patrum. Nam a) S. Augustinus (de Civ. Dei 1. 14. c. 12.), ait: "Non ideo debet aliquis existimare leve, aut parvum fuisse illud commissum, quia in esca factum est non mala quidem, neque noxia, sed quia prohibita est, nam obedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae virtus in creatura rationali mater quodammodo est omnium custosque virtutum."

b) Idem (op. imp. cont. Julian. 1. 1. c. 105.) peccatum Adae vocat ineffabiliter grave peccatum. Et (1. 3. c. 65.): "Adam tanta impietate peccavit, quantam nos metiri et aestimare non possumus, sed quantam illam judicaverit Deus." - Saepe S. Doctor enumerat varias circumstantias, quae peccatum illud aggravant. Notat enim 1. (de Civ. Dei 1. 14. c. 12.) quod Adam habuit unum tantum praeceptum positivum - 2. quod deerant, quae nos impediunt ab observantia legis; nulla enim erat in ipso ignorantia, nulla infirmitas aut concupiscentia. etc.; unde c. 633. concludit: "Quanto enim magis homo fruebatur Deo, tanto majore impietate dereliquit Deum, et factus est malo dignus aeterno, qui hoc in se peremit bonum, quod esse posset aeternum" - 3. quod multa erant, quae ad servandum divinum mandatum impellerent. Unde (de Civ. Dei 1. 14. c. 15.), scribit: "Contemptus est Deus jubens, qui creaverat, qui ad imaginem suam fecerat, qui caeteris animalibus praeposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat, qui praeceptis nec pluribus, nec gravibus, nec difficilibus oneraverat."

Prob. 4a pars. Dona justitiae originalis, ut vidimus, sunt praecipue gratia sanctificans, et illam consequens destinatio ad visionem intuitivam - immunitas a concupiscentia - a morte - ab aerumnis hujus vitae. Atqui haec omnia amiserunt primi parentes per peccatum. Ergo.

Prob. min. quoad gratiam sanctificantem et jus ad aeternam beatitudinem. Legitur 2. Cor. 6. 14.: "Quae participatio justitiae cum iniquitate? aut quae societas lucis ad tenebras?" Et 1. Jo. 3. 9.: "Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit: quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare." Rom. 5. 6.: "Judicium quidem ex uno in condemnationem: gratia autem ex multis delictis in justificationem." Et 5. 18.: "Sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem: sic per unius justitiam in omnes homines in justificationem vitae." - Quibus verbis aperte docetur peccatum non posse cum gratia et charitate componi; secum ferre mortem spiritualem - inducere condemnationem, ac proinde exclusionem ab aeterna vita et beatitudine.

Prob. min. quoad immunitatem a concupiscentia et a morte ex iis, quae diximus superius de his donis; praesertim (nn. 290. et 302.)

Prob. min. quoad immunitatem ab aerumnis. a) Gen. 3. 16-19. dicitur: "Mulieri quoque dixit: Multiplicabo aerumnas tuas, et conceptus tuos: in dolore paries filios, et sub viri potestate eris, et ipse dominabitur tui. Adae vero dixit: Quia audisti vocem uxoris tuae, et comedisti de ligno, ex quo praeceperam tibi ne comederes, maledicta terra in opere tuo: in laboribus comedes ex ea cunctis diebus vitae tuae. Spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi, et comedes herbam terrae. In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es: quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris." - Et 3. 23. seq.: "Et emisit eum Dominus Deus de paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur terram, de qua sumptus est. Ejecitque Adam: et collocavit ante paradisum voluptatis Cherubim, et flammeum gladium atque versatilem, ad custodiendam viam ligni vitae."

b) S. Theophilus Antiochenus (Ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 25.): "Primo homini mandati praetergressio id attulit, ut e paradiso ejiceretur; non quod mali quidquam inesset ligno scientiae; sed ex peccato tamquam ex fonte in hominem fluxerunt labores, dolores, molestiae, ac denique mors ipsa." - S. Ambrosius (de Paradiso c. 14. n. 70.): "Adam ubi es? id est, de quibus bonis, de qua beatitudine, de qua gratia, in quam miseriam recedisti?"
422. With these things therefore explained, we say:

PROPOSITION XXXVI. 1. A true precept was imposed on the first parents, which 2. they transgressed; 3. they sinned gravely; and 4. they lost original justice.

Proof of the first part, I. From Scripture. For in Genesis 2:16-17 it is read: "And he commanded him, saying: Eat of every tree of paradise. But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, do not eat; for on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death." And chapter 3:1ff.: "He, the serpent, said to the woman: Why has God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of paradise? To whom the woman answered: Of the fruit of the trees which are in paradise, we eat; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of paradise, God has commanded us that we should not eat, and that we should not touch it, lest perhaps we die."

Hence: a) Moses, a historical writer, uses repeatedly the word "commanded"; the same word is employed by the tempted woman, and by the serpent by whom she is tempted. Nothing prevents that word from being taken in its proper sense. Therefore it is a question of a true precept and not of a simple admonition.

b) When a superior prohibits something with a sanction added, he truly imposes a law or precept; but God, prohibiting them from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, added: "on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death"; therefore.

c) The eating of that fruit in other places of Scripture to be cited below is often called transgression and sin; death, which God had threatened, is called the punishment of that sin. Therefore a true precept was imposed, that they should not eat of that fruit.

Proof II. From the Fathers. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book 5, says: "Adam was perfect; but he chose what was forbidden." St. Cyprian (On the Incarnation of the Word): "At once at the origin of the world and of the human race, Adam was forgetful of the precept and a transgressor of the law given." St. Irenaeus, book 5 Against Heresies, c. 19, speaks of the seduction of Eve, "who through the words of the evil angel was incited to violating the divine precept and abandoning God." St. Chrysostom, Homily 16 on Genesis: "That tasting was an argument of disobedience and a prevarication of the command handed down by God," etc.

Proof III. From the emptiness of the opposing reason. "Indeed," Bellarmine says in the cited place, "from what they themselves teach, that the first men did not sin because they did not have a law, since they were just, it follows that no men sin; indeed that it cannot happen that any men sin. For if sin presupposes law, since it is a prevarication of law, and law presupposes sin, since law is not laid down for the just but for the sinner, then sin always presupposes sin; therefore there was no first sin. And if there was no first sin, whence did the rest arise? Wherefore it is necessary either that there was law before sin, and that the opinion of the adversaries is false, or certainly that there are not, nor have there ever been, any sins in the world, which is the error of the Libertines, whose shamelessness, as we said in the previous book, should be restrained not by arguments, but only by tortures and punishments."

The cited author discusses many things splendidly, and at the end adds St. Augustine's interpretation of the objected testimony of the Apostle from 1 Timothy: "St. Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 10, wants this same passage of the Apostle from chapter 1 of the first letter to Timothy, 'Law is not laid down for the just, but for the unjust,' to be similar to those places of the same Apostle, 'You are not under law, but under grace,' Romans 6, and, 'If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under law,' Galatians 5. These places do not mean that the just are not bound by laws, or that they do not sin if they do not keep the law, but that they do not have the law above them, as though hanging over their necks and threatening and terrifying with a whip, as the unjust have, who work good from fear of punishment. For the just work good from love of justice and with a willing spirit, and would work even if there were no law or if it threatened no punishment. Therefore they are rather in the law than under the law, as the Apostle says of himself in 1 Corinthians 9, where he says that he is not under law, and nevertheless that he is not without law, but is in the law of Christ."

Proof of the second part. That they at least materially transgressed the precept not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is openly handed down in Scripture. For in Genesis 3:6 it is read: "Therefore the woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and beautiful to the eyes, and delightful to behold; and she took of its fruit and ate, and gave to her husband, who ate." But that this transgression was formal is proved thus: for a transgression of law to be formal sin, cognition of the law and freedom are required and suffice. But cognition of the precept was not lacking to the first parents; for the woman answered the serpent by whom she was tempted: "But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of paradise, God has commanded us that we should not eat and should not touch it, lest perhaps we die." Nor was freedom lacking, which certainly belongs to human nature, and which the adversaries themselves, the Innovators, do not deny to innocent man. Therefore.

Proof of the third part. I. Ecclesiasticus 10:14 says: "The beginning of man's pride is to apostatize from God, because his heart withdrew from him who made him; because the beginning of every sin is pride." And Tobit 4:14: "Never permit pride to rule in your sense or in your word; for in it every perdition took its beginning." Hence a sin which includes apostasy, withdrawal from God, and which is the beginning of every perdition, is certainly grave. But such was the sin of the first parents. Therefore.

Proof II. The sanction added to the precept was "on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death." But to death must be added all evils, as is clear from the things which we said in the preceding disputation. Hence, as Suarez rightly notes (l. c., n. 10), the gravity of the precept is openly proved from the threat of death added to the precept. "For if it is understood of the death of the soul, as Philo wished, and as Gregory and Eucherius thought, the aforesaid mortal gravity is formally contained in the very threat. But if it is understood of bodily death, as according to the letter it must be understood according to Paul and the Council of Trent, from the threat of so grave a punishment it is gathered that that precept obliged under grave fault; and therefore the Fathers commonly interpreted that threat of both deaths, of body and of soul."

Proof III. From the very end of the precept and the authority of the Fathers. For a) St. Augustine (City of God, book 14, c. 12) says: "No one ought therefore to think that that deed was light or small because it was done in a food, not indeed evil or harmful, but because it was forbidden; for obedience was commended in the precept, which virtue in a rational creature is in a certain way the mother and guardian of all virtues."

b) The same Augustine (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 1, c. 105) calls Adam's sin an ineffably grave sin. And in book 3, c. 65: "Adam sinned with so great an impiety as we cannot measure and estimate, but as God judged it." Often the holy Doctor enumerates various circumstances which aggravate that sin. For he notes, 1. in City of God, book 14, c. 12, that Adam had only one positive precept; 2. that the things which hinder us from observing the law were lacking, for there was no ignorance in him, no weakness or concupiscence, etc.; hence in c. 633 he concludes: "For the more man enjoyed God, the greater the impiety with which he abandoned God, and he was made worthy of eternal evil, since he destroyed in himself that good which could have been eternal"; 3. that there were many things which impelled him to keeping the divine command. Hence in City of God, book 14, c. 15, he writes: "God commanding was despised: he who had created, who had made him to his image, who had set him over the other animals, who had established him in paradise, who had provided an abundance of all things and of salvation, who had burdened him with precepts neither many, nor grave, nor difficult."

Proof of the fourth part. The gifts of original justice, as we have seen, are chiefly sanctifying grace and the destination to the intuitive vision consequent upon it; immunity from concupiscence, from death, and from the hardships of this life. But the first parents lost all these things through sin. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to sanctifying grace and the right to eternal beatitude. It is read in 2 Corinthians 6:14: "What participation has justice with iniquity? Or what fellowship has light with darkness?" And 1 John 3:9: "Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin, because his seed remains in him, and he cannot sin." Romans 5:6: "Judgment indeed from one unto condemnation; but grace from many offenses unto justification." And 5:18: "As through the offense of one unto all men unto condemnation, so through the justice of one unto all men unto justification of life." By these words it is openly taught that sin cannot be composed with grace and charity; that it carries spiritual death with itself; that it induces condemnation, and consequently exclusion from eternal life and beatitude.

The minor is proved with respect to immunity from concupiscence and from death from the things which we said above concerning these gifts, especially nn. 290 and 302.

The minor is proved with respect to immunity from hardships. a) In Genesis 3:16-19 it is said: "To the woman also he said: I will multiply your hardships and your conceptions; in pain you shall bring forth children, and you shall be under the power of your husband, and he shall rule over you. But to Adam he said: Because you have listened to the voice of your wife and have eaten of the tree from which I had commanded you not to eat, cursed is the earth in your work; in labors you shall eat from it all the days of your life. Thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you, and you shall eat the herb of the earth. In the sweat of your brow you shall eat bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are dust, and into dust you shall return." And 3:23ff.: "And the Lord God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure, that he might work the earth from which he was taken. And he cast out Adam, and placed before the paradise of pleasure Cherubim and a flaming and turning sword, to guard the way of the tree of life."

b) St. Theophilus of Antioch (To Autolycus, book 2, n. 25): "To the first man, the transgression of the command brought this, that he was cast out of paradise; not because anything evil was in the tree of knowledge, but from sin, as from a fountain, there flowed into man labors, pains, distresses, and finally death itself." St. Ambrose (On Paradise, c. 14, n. 70): "Adam, where are you? That is, from what goods, from what beatitude, from what grace, into what misery have you withdrawn?"
423. NOTA. Est communis et certa sententia Adam et Evam obtinuisse sui peccati veniam, et aeternam salutem consecutos esse. Legitur enim Sap. 10. 1.: "Haec (sapientia) illum qui primus formatus est a Deo, pater orbis terrarum, cum solus esset creatus, custodivit, et eduxit illum a delicto suo." - S. Augustinus (Ep. 99. ad Evodium) inquit: "Ecclesiam fere totam consentire Christum, cum ad inferos descendit, inde Adamum liberasse." - S. Gregor. (Ep. 31. alibi 195.): "Adam postmodum per poenitentiam ad vitam rediit." - S. Augustinus (de pecc. mort. 1. 2. c. 34.) de primis hominibus ait: "Post peccatum juste vivendo, merito creduntur per Domini sanguinem ab aeterno supplicio liberati." - S. Gregorius Nazianzenus (Or. 31. in 19. Matth.): "Utrumque (Adamum et Evam) serpens decepit: utrumque Christus passione sua salute donavit." Vid. Suarez (de op. sex dier. 1. 4. c. 9.)
423. NOTE. It is a common and certain opinion that Adam and Eve obtained pardon for their sin and attained eternal salvation. For in Wisdom 10:1 it is read: "This, namely wisdom, guarded him who was first formed by God, father of the world, when he alone had been created, and led him out of his offense." St. Augustine, Epistle 99 to Evodius, says: "Almost the whole Church agrees that Christ, when he descended to the lower regions, freed Adam from there." St. Gregory, Epistle 31, otherwise 195: "Adam afterward returned to life through penitence." St. Augustine (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, c. 34) says concerning the first human beings: "After sin, by living justly, they are deservedly believed to have been freed by the blood of the Lord from eternal punishment." St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31 on Matthew 19: "The serpent deceived both, Adam and Eve; Christ by his passion gave salvation to both." See Suarez, On the Work of the Six Days, book 4, c. 9.
Sectio II.
Quaedam de natura peccati protoparentum.
SECTION II.
Certain Points Concerning the Nature of the Sin of the First Parents.
424. Pauca hic breviter attingimus, quae ad naturam peccati protoparentum, et modum quo in illud prolapsi sunt explicandum conferunt. Atque imprimis, supposito D. Thomae, 2. 2. q. 163. a. 1., principio "quod ad unum peccatum multi motus concurrere possunt" conveniunt omnes primo Adae et Evae peccato alia peccata fuisse conjuncta.
424. Here we briefly touch upon a few things which contribute to explaining the nature of the sin of the first parents, and the manner in which they fell into it. And first of all, once the principle of St. Thomas, II-II, q. 163, a. 1, has been supposed, namely, "that many movements can concur toward one sin," all agree that other sins were joined with the first sin of Adam and Eve.
425. Praeter peccatum superbiae utrique, ut dicemus commune, Eva commisit peccatum infidelitatis. "Nam," inquit Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 4. c. 2. n. 11.), "imprimis de Eva dicit Apost. 1. ad Tim. 2. 'Mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit,' cum tamen de Adam dicat, non fuisse seductum. Illa autem seductio Evae in rebus ad fidem pertinentibus fuisse videtur; nimirum in hoc, quod serpenti dicenti, 'nequaquam moriemini,' plus credidit, quam Deo dicenti, 'morte moriemini'; ergo per hanc deceptionem in infidelitatem incidit. Item credidit promissioni serpentis, 'eritis sicut dii,' quae errorem in fide continebat. Denique credidit, Deum prohibuisse esum ligni, quasi ex invidia, ne fierent sicut dii, scientes bonum, et malum, quod etiam errorem intolerabilem continet." Vid. etiam n. 23. - Peccavit (n. 26.) "per internum etiam desiderium inchoatum, opere vero consummatum, comedendo de ligno vetito. Et hoc significant illa verba, 'Vidit mulier, quod bonum esset lignum ad vescendum, et pulchrum oculis, aspectuque delectabile, et tulit de fructu illius, et comedit.'" - "Post haec vero peccata secutum est gravissimum peccatum scandali contentum in illis verbis 'dedit viro suo'." - "Quibus tandem addi potest excusatio peccati, quam adhibuit cum a Deo fuit reprehensa. Sed forte in ea excusatione non fuit mortalis malitia, ut inferius agentes de peccatis Adae notabimus."
425. Besides the sin of pride, which, as we shall say, was common to both, Eve committed the sin of unbelief. "For," says Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 4, c. 2, n. 11), "first of all, concerning Eve the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 2, 'The woman, having been seduced, was in prevarication,' although concerning Adam he says that he was not seduced. But that seduction of Eve seems to have been in things pertaining to faith; namely in this, that she believed the serpent saying, 'You shall by no means die,' more than God saying, 'You shall die the death'; therefore through this deception she fell into unbelief. Likewise she believed the promise of the serpent, 'you shall be as gods,' which contained an error in faith. Finally, she believed that God had prohibited the eating of the tree as if from envy, lest they should become as gods, knowing good and evil, which also contains an intolerable error." See also n. 23. - She sinned (n. 26) "also through an internal desire begun, but consummated by deed, by eating of the forbidden tree. And this is signified by those words, 'The woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and beautiful to the eyes, and delightful to behold; and she took of its fruit and ate.'" - "But after these sins there followed the most grave sin of scandal, contained in those words, 'she gave to her husband'." - "To these, finally, can be added the excuse of the sin which she used when she was rebuked by God. But perhaps in that excuse there was not mortal malice, as we shall note below when treating of the sins of Adam."
426. Quoad Adamum vero "Secundum ejus peccatum," ait Suarez (l. c. c. 4. n. 23.), "fuit inordinatus amor ad uxorem. Ita sumitur ex Aug. in d. lib. 14. de Civit. cap. 11. et lib. 11. Gen. ad litt. cap. 42., ubi ait, Adam comedisse de ligno ut complaceret uxori; ergo praecessit nimia benevolentia uxoris antequam de ligno comederet." - "Tertium peccatum Adae (n. 25.) recenseri potest; quod de ligno vetito comedit. Et hoc quasi per antonomasiam lapsus Adae vocatur, quia per illud totum genus humanum concidit; et ita de illo specialiter loquitur Apostolus ad Rom. 5. cum dicit, 'Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.' Et similiter inferius nomine inobedientiae illud peccatum intelligit, cum dicit, 'Sicut per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi; ita et per unius obedientiam justi constituuntur multi.'" Alii alia etiam enumerant tum Adae tum Evae peccata, de quibus tamen non eadem est certitudo.
426. But with regard to Adam, "His second sin," says Suarez (l. c., c. 4, n. 23), "was inordinate love toward his wife. This is taken from Augustine in the cited book 14 of City of God, c. 11, and book 11 of On Genesis to the Letter, c. 42, where he says that Adam ate of the tree in order to please his wife; therefore excessive benevolence toward his wife preceded before he ate of the tree." - "The third sin of Adam (n. 25) can be reckoned as this: that he ate of the forbidden tree. And this, as it were by antonomasia, is called the fall of Adam, because through it the whole human race fell; and thus the Apostle speaks specially of it in Romans 5, when he says, 'Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so death passed into all men, in whom all sinned.' And similarly below, under the name of disobedience, he understands that sin, when he says, 'As through the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also through the obedience of one many shall be constituted just.'" Others also enumerate other sins both of Adam and of Eve, concerning which, however, there is not the same certainty.
427. His positis, prima quaestio est: quodnam fuit primum protoparentum peccatum? Responsio communissima est primum protoparentum peccatum fuisse superbiam. Quod patet a) ex Scriptura. Recole loca ex Eccli. 10., et Tobiae 4. superius recitata. Unde hoc praecipue peccatum Deus improbavit, dicens, Gen. 3. 22.: "Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis factus est, sciens bonum et malum." Et S. Aug. (de Gen. ad litt. c. 39.) animadvertit in h. l.: "Verba enim sunt haec Dei, non tam huic (Adamo) insultantis, quam caeteros, ne ita superbiant deterrentis." - b) Ex Patribus. S. Ambrosius (Serm. 14. in Ps. 118.): "Superbia hominem prima dejecit." - S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad litt. l. 11. c. 8.): "Neque arbitrandum est, quod esset hominem dejecturus iste tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda." - Et (de Civ. Dei, l. 14. c. 13.): "In occulto mali esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inobedientiam laberentur; non enim ad malum opus perveniretur, nisi mala voluntas praecessisset. Porro malae voluntatis initium quid potuit esse nisi superbia? initium enim omnis peccati superbia." - Eadem habet S. Prosper, S. Gregorius, S. Leo, etc. Vid. Suarez (l. c. cap. 2. n. 14. seqq.; et cap. 3. a n. 9.)
427. With these things posited, the first question is: what was the first sin of the first parents? The most common response is that the first sin of the first parents was pride. This is clear a) from Scripture. Recall the places from Ecclesiasticus 10 and Tobias 4 recited above. Hence God chiefly condemned this sin, saying, Genesis 3:22: "Behold, Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil." And St. Augustine (On Genesis to the Letter, c. 39) remarks on this place: "For these are words of God, not so much insulting this man (Adam), as deterring the others lest they be proud in this way." - b) From the Fathers. St. Ambrose (Sermon 14 on Psalm 118): "Pride first cast man down." - St. Augustine (On Genesis to the Letter, book 11, c. 8): "Nor should one think that that tempter would have cast man down unless there had preceded in man's soul a certain elation to be repressed." - And (City of God, book 14, c. 13): "They began to be evil in secret, so that they might fall into open disobedience; for the evil work would not have been reached unless an evil will had preceded. But what could the beginning of an evil will have been except pride? For pride is the beginning of every sin." - St. Prosper, St. Gregory, St. Leo, etc., have the same. See Suarez (l. c., c. 2, n. 14ff.; and c. 3 from n. 9).
428. Altera quaestio est: in quo consistit elatio, seu superbia protoparentum? huic quaestioni praeclare respondet D. Th. 2. 2. q. 163. a. 2. Supposito enim quod peccaverint appetendo similitudinem cum Deo, animadvertit imprimis "quod duplex est similitudo. Una omnimodae aequiparantiae: et hanc similitudinem ad Deum primi parentes non appetierunt, quia talis similitudo ad Deum non cadit in apprehensione, praecipue sapientis. Alia autem est similitudo imitationis, qualis possibilis est creaturae ad Deum, in quantum videlicet participat aliquid de similitudine ipsius secundum suum modum. Dionysius enim dicit in 9. cap. de divin. nom. (a. med. lect. 3.): 'Eadem similia sunt Deo et dissimilia: illud quidem secundum contingentem imitationem; hoc autem secundum quod causata minus habent a causa.' Quodlibet autem bonum in creatura existens est quaedam participata similitudo primi boni. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo appetiit aliquod spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, ut dictum est art. praec., consequens est quod appetierit divinam similitudinem inordinate."
428. The second question is: in what did the elation, or pride, of the first parents consist? St. Thomas answers this question admirably, II-II, q. 163, a. 2. For, having supposed that they sinned by desiring likeness with God, he first observes "that likeness is twofold. One is of complete equality; and the first parents did not desire this likeness to God, because such likeness to God does not fall within apprehension, especially that of a wise person. But another is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in relation to God, namely insofar as it participates something of his likeness according to its own mode. For Dionysius says in chapter 9 of The Divine Names (middle of the article, lecture 3): 'The same things are like God and unlike: the former according to contingent imitation; the latter insofar as effects have less than the cause.' But every good existing in a creature is a certain participated likeness of the first good. And therefore, from this very fact that man desired some spiritual good above his measure, as was said in the preceding article, it follows that he desired the divine likeness inordinately."
429. Explicat deinde in quo consistit similitudo imitationis, quam protoparentes inordinate appetierunt, inquiens: "Primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggessit, ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum; et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi; ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam. Unde Augustinus dicit, 11. super Gen. ad litt. cap. 30., circa med., quod 'menti mulieris inerat amor propriae potestatis.'" Vid. Suarez (l. c. cap. 2. n. 19.; et cap. 3. n. 12.)
429. Then he explains in what the likeness of imitation consisted which the first parents inordinately desired, saying: "The first man sinned principally by desiring likeness to God with respect to the knowledge of good and evil, as the serpent suggested to him; namely, so that by the power of his own nature he would determine for himself what was good and what was evil for acting; or even so that by himself he would know beforehand what good or evil would befall him. And secondarily he sinned by desiring likeness to God with respect to his own power of operating; namely, so that by the power of his own nature he would operate toward attaining beatitude. Hence Augustine says, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, c. 30, around the middle, that 'there was present in the woman's mind a love of her own power.'" See Suarez (l. c., c. 2, n. 19; and c. 3, n. 12).
430. Ex his plane consequitur primum peccatum hominis non fuisse inobedientiam; quod D. Thomas in dicta q. 163. a. 1. ad 1. expresse docet, inquiens: "Hoc, quod homo non obediret divino praecepto, non fuit propter se ab eo volitum, quia hoc non posset contingere, nisi praesupposita inordinatione voluntatis. Relinquitur ergo quod voluerit propter aliquid aliud. Primum autem quod inordinate voluit, fuit propria excellentia: et ideo inobedientia in eo causata fuit ex superbia."
430. From these things it plainly follows that the first sin of man was not disobedience; and St. Thomas expressly teaches this in the cited q. 163, a. 1, ad 1, saying: "This, that man did not obey the divine precept, was not willed by him for its own sake, because this could not happen unless a disordering of the will had been presupposed. Therefore it remains that he willed it for the sake of something else. But the first thing which he inordinately willed was his own excellence; and therefore disobedience in him was caused from pride."
431. At vero, quomodo hoc conciliari potest cum Apostolo Rom. 5. 19. dicente: "Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi?" Videtur enim illud peccatum primum fuisse, quod totam posteritatem corrupit. Responderi potest imprimis cum eodem D. Thoma 2. dist. 22. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3.: "Inobedientia dupliciter sumitur. Quandoque enim est speciale peccatum, quando scilicet ex contemptu praecepti aliquis specialiter peccat. Quandoque autem sumitur, prout est conditio generalis consequens omne peccatum mortale. Cum enim praeceptum legis actus omnium virtutum ordinet, consequens est, ut quodlibet vitium transgressionem annexam praecepti habeat, et inobedientiam. Et sic dicitur: per inobedientiam unius, etc."
431. But how can this be reconciled with the Apostle saying in Romans 5:19: "Through the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners"? For it seems that that sin was first which corrupted the whole posterity. One can answer first with the same St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: "Disobedience is taken in two ways. For sometimes it is a special sin, namely when someone sins specially from contempt of a precept. But sometimes it is taken as it is a general condition following upon every mortal sin. For since the precept of the law orders the acts of all the virtues, it follows that any vice whatever has annexed to it a transgression of the precept, and disobedience. And in this way it is said: through the disobedience of one, etc."
432. Suarez tamen (l. c. cap. 4. n. 25.), addit: "Licet probabile sit illam inobedientiam non fuisse formalem, id est, ex directa intentione non obediendi Deo, nec ex proprio contemptu praecepti ejus; nihilominus censeo illam fuisse specialem malitiam distinctam ab aliis, quia ex principali intentione Dei praecipientis illa prohibitio posita fuerat ad subjectionem profitendam, et quasi per modum tributi impositi in recognitionem divini dominii."

Unde (de vitiis et peccatis disp. 9. sect. 3. n. 7.), ait: "Cum Sancti videntur dicere primum Adae peccatum fuisse causam perditionis humanae naturae, loquuntur de peccato illo perfecto, et completo, quod et exterius apparuit, et expresse in Scriptura narratur. Quod docet D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 81. a. 2." Sed haec clariora fient ex inferius dicendis.
432. Suarez, however (l. c., c. 4, n. 25), adds: "Although it is probable that that disobedience was not formal, that is, not from a direct intention of not obeying God, nor from proper contempt of his precept, nevertheless I judge that it was a special malice distinct from the others, because from the principal intention of God commanding, that prohibition had been established for professing subjection, and as if by way of a tribute imposed in recognition of the divine dominion."

Hence (On Vices and Sins, disp. 9, sect. 3, n. 7), he says: "When the Saints seem to say that the first sin of Adam was the cause of the perdition of human nature, they are speaking of that perfect and complete sin which both appeared exteriorly and is expressly narrated in Scripture. This is what St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 81, a. 2." But these things will become clearer from what is to be said below.
433. Aliud, quod solet hic quaeri, est: cum peccatum non contingat sine aliquo pravo seu falso mentis judicio, vel saltem sine aliqua mentis perversitate; quomodo primi parentes, in scientia perfecti, ab errore immunes peccare potuerunt?

Resp. 1. Certum est nullum errorem praecessisse primum protoparentum peccatum. Unde cum D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 4., sibi objecisset illud 1. Tim. 2. 14. "mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit;" respondet: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim S. Augustinus 11. super Gen. ad litt. cap. 30. circ. med., quod 'mulier verbis serpentis non crederet, nisi jam inesset menti ejus amor propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio.'"

Resp. 2. Aliquibus non videtur necessaria mentis perversitas ad peccandum, siquidem voluntas deficit contra mentis judicium. Sed qui aliquam mentis perversitatem in omni peccato agnoscunt, ita rem explicant quoad peccatum protoparentum. "Multiplicem intellectus creati defectum distinguas oportet: scilicet nescientiam eorum, quae scire quis non tenetur: tum debitae carentiam cognitionis, quae vincibilis ignorantia dicitur: errorem praeterea, quo approbantur falsa pro veris, quod falsum judicium est: considerationis denique defectum. Primum nescientiae defectum ab Adamo removere, perinde foret ac ejus mentem increatam facere: nec enim mens creata scire omnia potest, aut debet. Unde comperta res est, hanc nescientiam statui non posse proximam peccati, quod admiserunt Protoparentes, causam. Non patitur alterum defectum, nec tertium vita eorum innocens: ubi debuit esse omne bonum integritati naturae conveniens, et omne abesse malum contrarium. Superest defectus considerationis. Proposita per serpentem similitudine cum Deo per ea verba, 'Eritis sicut dii;' cogitatio propriae excellentiae in eorum mente, ipsis volentibus, aut non repugnantibus, excitata est. Eam cogitationem ad opus applicuerunt, lato judicio de propria excellentia amanda: eamque amaverunt. Pravus amor hic fuit, superbiae labe infectus. In ea namque daemonis, similitudinem cum Deo proponentis, circumstantia, actu diligere Deum summum bonum, seque suamque excellentiam cum actuali relatione in Deum amare tenebantur. Sed judicium, quo pravus propriae excellentiae amor regebatur, non erat falsum, sed inconsideratum: ejusdemque considerationis reatus non ab aliqua priore, eademque prava, pendebat voluntate. Ex ipso pravo propriae excellentiae amore consequente, simulque coexistente procedebat: utpote quo, veluti reflectente, ipsa judicii inconsideratio approbata fuit." Vide De Rubeis (de pecc. orig. c. 47. n. 3.)
433. Another thing which is usually asked here is this: since sin does not occur without some depraved or false judgment of the mind, or at least without some perversity of mind, how could the first parents, perfect in knowledge and immune from error, have been able to sin?

Resp. 1. It is certain that no error preceded the first sin of the first parents. Hence when St. Thomas, I, q. 94, a. 4, had objected to himself that text of 1 Timothy 2:14, "the woman, having been seduced, was in prevarication," he answers: "Therefore to the first it must be said that that seduction of the woman, although it preceded the sin of deed, nevertheless followed the sin of internal elation. For St. Augustine says, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, c. 30, around the middle, that 'the woman would not have believed the words of the serpent unless there had already been in her mind a love of her own power and a certain proud presumption concerning herself.'"

Resp. 2. To some, perversity of mind does not seem necessary for sinning, since the will fails contrary to the judgment of the mind. But those who acknowledge some perversity of mind in every sin explain the matter thus with respect to the sin of the first parents. "One must distinguish a multiple defect of created intellect: namely, ignorance of those things which one is not bound to know; then the lack of due cognition, which is called vincible ignorance; further, error, by which false things are approved as true, which is false judgment; and finally, defect of consideration. To remove the first defect of ignorance from Adam would be the same as to make his mind uncreated; for a created mind neither can nor ought to know all things. Hence it is an ascertained thing that this ignorance cannot be established as the proximate cause of the sin which the first parents committed. Their innocent life does not allow the second defect, nor the third: for there every good fitting the integrity of nature ought to have been present, and every contrary evil absent. There remains defect of consideration. When likeness with God had been proposed by the serpent through those words, 'You shall be as gods,' the thought of their own excellence was stirred up in their mind, with them willing it, or not resisting. They applied that thought to action, a judgment having been made concerning their own excellence as something to be loved; and they loved it. This was a depraved love, infected with the stain of pride. For in that circumstance of the devil proposing likeness with God, they were bound actually to love God as the highest good, and to love themselves and their own excellence with an actual relation to God. But the judgment by which the depraved love of their own excellence was governed was not false, but inconsiderate; and the guilt of that lack of consideration did not depend on some prior will, likewise depraved. It proceeded from the very depraved love of their own excellence following upon it and at the same time coexisting with it, inasmuch as by that love, as though reflecting, the very lack of consideration in the judgment was approved." See De Rubeis (On Original Sin, c. 47, n. 3).
434. Si quis denique quaereret, quomodo fieri potuit, ut primi parentes tam perfecti in intellectu, tam recti in voluntate, ab appetitus inferioris rebellione immunes peccaverint; respondendum est haec omnia dona non impedivisse defectibilitatem propriam libertatis creatae, per quam et peccare potuerunt, et peccaverunt. Si enim multi ex Angelis, majoribus viribus praediti, lapsi sunt; cur id de hominibus impossibile judicatur?
434. Finally, if someone should ask how it could happen that the first parents, so perfect in intellect, so upright in will, immune from the rebellion of the lower appetite, sinned, one must answer that all these gifts did not impede the proper defectibility of created freedom, through which they both were able to sin and did sin. For if many of the Angels, endowed with greater powers, fell, why is that judged impossible concerning human beings?

On printed page 486 / PDF page 497, the embedded text layer contained an artifact between Proposita and per serpentem. The corrected Latin used here is: Superest defectus considerationis. Proposita per serpentem similitudine cum Deo per ea verba... This is grammatically required by the ablative absolute and is reflected in the English translation: "When likeness with God had been proposed by the serpent..."

To cite this page

Camillo Cardinal Mazzella, S.J., “Article 1. On the Sin of the First Parents,” in On God the Creator, English translation, Mind of the Church, https://mindofthechurch.com/works/de-deo-creatore/30-article-1-on-the-sin-of-the-first-parents/.

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