Article 10. On the End to which the First Parents were Destined

338. The end connaturally owed to sanctifying grace is the intuitive vision of God. This is also usually treated in the treatise on God, in the question concerning the visibility of God, and in the treatise on beatitude. The question proper to this place concerns the supernaturality of the intuitive vision. In treating this, we shall touch upon the things which are altogether necessary for understanding it.

339. In the Constitution of Benedict XII which begins Benedictus Deus, February 4, 1336, it is read: "By this constitution, to have force in perpetuity, we define by Apostolic authority that ... the souls of the Saints see the divine essence with intuitive and also face-to-face vision, with no creature mediating in the account of object seen, but with the divine essence immediately showing itself to them nakedly, clearly, and openly." - The Council of Florence, in the Decree of Union with the Greeks, declared that the souls of the Saints "clearly behold the triune and one God himself, just as he is."

340. In order that this doctrine of the Church may be understood, we first note with St. Thomas, I, q. 67, a. 1, that the name vision "was first imposed to signify the act of the sense of sight; but on account of the dignity and certitude of this sense, this name was extended, according to the usage of speakers, to every cognition of the other senses. For we say: See how it tastes, or how it smells, or how hot it is; and further even to the cognition of the intellect, according to Matthew 5:8: 'Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.'"

341. From these things it follows that vision differs from simple cognition in three ways. Cognition can be confused and obscure; vision must be clear and distinct. Cognition can be abstractive; vision must be intuitive. Cognition can be mediate; vision must be immediate.

342. Vision must be, first, clear and distinct cognition, insofar as the thing is known according to its own proper entity, in the way in which color is seen by the eye. And this is opposed, first, to confused cognition, by which a thing is known per accidens, as man under the concept of visible; second, to cognition by which a thing is known through higher essentials, as man by the concept of animal. Therefore cognition is clear and distinct when the thing is known through itself or through its proper quiddity.

343. Vision must be, secondly, intuitive cognition, insofar as the thing is indeed known according to itself and is known in its presence, as, for example, the cognition by which I see my body. This is opposed to the cognition which is called abstractive, by which I can indeed know a thing according to its proper entity, but not according to presence. "And observe," says Toledo on I, q. 12, a. 2, "that abstractive cognition does not abstract from existence, as some say, because a thing is known abstractively with existence, since it is known as existing; but it abstracts from presence." But Suarez (On God, book 2, chapter 18, n. 5) adds: "Although through a cause or effect a thing can be known as existing, even if it is absent and is not seen in itself, nevertheless that the existence of a thing be evidently known in itself without another known medium cannot be understood without the presence of the thing, especially if such cognition is proper to the thing itself as it is in itself. Then I ask what is understood by the name presence. For if it is local undistance, this is neither necessary for intuitive vision, as is clear in bodily sight and in the Angelic intellect, which can intuit things even if they are distant in place, and besides this has no place in God, who, since he is immense, cannot be seen as locally distant from the one seeing. Or that presence is objective, and this cannot be lacking with respect to the act, because it is made through the vision itself. Therefore there cannot be vision of a thing existing in itself, and as it is in itself, unless that thing is objectively present to the intellect through the vision itself."

344. Hence it is clear why the intuitive vision of God is also called cognition of God just as he is, or quidditative cognition; for we understand it to be nothing other than the proper cognition of a thing through which all the essential properties of that thing, its very essence, are known. It is also clear why the intuitive vision of God is opposed to cognition in a riddle; for clear and distinct cognition is opposed to this. Finally, it is clear why the intuitive vision of God is opposed to partial cognition, since, because God is most simple, when he is known according to presence, he is known whole.

345. "Vision must be immediate cognition. In this matter it must be noted that there is a fourfold medium by which some thing can be known by us, namely: `quo`, `sub quo`, `in quo`, and `per quod`. The medium `quo` is that which holds itself on the part of the object and is received in the power, determining it to cognition; and this is called the species of the object. It is not the species which is known, but that by which something is known. The medium `sub quo` is that which either strengthens the power for knowing, or strengthens the object itself for acting upon the power; and this in the eye is sensible light, and in the intellect a certain spiritual light, whatever this may be. The medium `in quo` is that which is some likeness of the thing; hence, knowing it, we are said to know that thing, yet in such a way that cognition does not proceed beyond that medium. In this way, when we know all those things, we somehow know God, but in those things, and so much the more as the thing is more perfect; for the likeness will be more exact. The medium `per quod` exists when from cognition of it we ascend and form cognition of another; this occurs in discourse, by which through cognition of effects we come into knowledge of their causes. And thus it is said at Romans 1: 'The invisible things of God, being understood through the things that have been made, are beheld.'" Thus Toledo in the cited place. - See also St. Thomas, Quodlibet 7, article 1.

The intuitive vision of God certainly is not called immediate insofar as it excludes the medium `sub quo`; for that, as we shall see, is the light of glory, which must be admitted. Indeed the medium `sub quo` properly does not make cognition non-immediate. Certainly, from the cited Constitution of Benedict XII, it excludes the medium `in quo` and `per quod`. The question is only about the medium `quo`.

346. St. Thomas explains the necessity of the medium `quo` for cognition in general in this way, I, q. 12, a. 2: "For vision, both sensible and intellectual, two things are required, namely the visual power and the union of the thing seen with sight. For vision does not come about in act except through this, that the thing seen is in some way in the one seeing. And in corporeal things it is apparent that the thing seen cannot be in the one seeing through its essence, but only through its likeness; just as the likeness of the stone is in the eye, through which vision comes about in act, but not the substance itself of the stone."

347. But in order that it may become known what sort of likeness of the object is in the knower, it must be observed with Suarez (On God, book 2, chapter 13, n. 1) that "a threefold likeness can be understood in the mind through which cognition of some thing can come about, which we can name impressed, expressed, and objective, or by way of first act, or by way of second act, or by way of object, or as representing effectively, formally, or objectively. A sensible example can be found in sight: for there is an impressed species, and there is also the act of seeing, which is also judged to be an intentional likeness. And it is said to represent formally, because by informing the power it makes the object present to it; and therefore it is also said to represent in second act, in which it differs from the impressed species, which represents only effectively and of itself in first act. But they agree with each other in this, that, speaking per se and in direct cognition, they themselves are not seen when the object is seen through them, because they do not terminate the vision; rather one is its principle, the other is the vision itself. Besides these, there can be an objective likeness, as in sight there can be an image of a friend externally proposed for intuiting the friend in it."

348. Objective likeness has already been excluded from intuitive vision by excluding the medium `in quo`; therefore it remains that the medium `quo` is an impressed or expressed likeness, which is usually called a species. Concerning each species, impressed and expressed, it is asked whether it has a place in the intuitive vision of God.

349. With respect to impressed species, although its various offices are usually distinguished (see Suarez in the cited place, chapter 12, nn. 6-13), nevertheless the principal one, which most pertains to our matter, is that it determines the intellect to act. For since the intellect is a potency, of itself it is undetermined for acting; therefore in order that it proceed into act, it needs to be determined. This determination cannot proceed except from the object. The object cannot determine the intellect unless in some way it is united to it. This union must take place in the intellect itself, for its operations are vital and immanent; hence that phrase, "cognition occurs according as the thing known is in the knower." The object cannot always be joined through itself with the cognitive power. Therefore it is necessary that it impress in the power its likeness, as its vicar, through which it as it were fecundates the cognitive power and constitutes it in first act, proximate and complete for knowing.

350. Now it is the opinion of St. Thomas, received in the time of Suarez by the almost common, now common, consent of theologians (cited place, chapter 12, n. 21), that the intuitive vision of God in fact is without impressed species. For impressed species in intuitive vision is superfluous; therefore in fact it is not given. The antecedent is proved. Impressed species is necessary in order to supply the defect of an object which cannot through itself be united to the power and thus determine it, either because it does not exist, or because it is not present, or because through itself it is not proximately intelligible. But none of these things occurs in God, who necessarily exists, can be made intimately present to the blessed intellect, and, because he is most actual, is supremely intelligible. Therefore.

351. But here it is usually asked whether at least by the absolute power of God an impressed species could be given in the intuitive vision of God. The Doctors differ in this matter. Cardinal Toledo, however, recalls this to another question, namely whether impressed species is a formal likeness of the object, or only an effective one, as we heard above from Suarez, or even a virtual one, insofar as it is not "some formal likeness or painted image of the object itself, but is only like a seed and instrument, in which virtual assimilation suffices," as the same Author speaks (chapter 12, n. 12). Those who hold the first (see Sylvius on I, q. 12, a. 2) deny that an impressed species can be given in the intuitive vision of God, since it is impossible, they say, that any created species should perfectly represent God formally. But those who hold the second consequently teach that by the absolute power of God an intelligible species can be given in the intuitive vision of God. Yet to others the same species seems possible, even though it is conceded that it is a formal likeness of the object. Compare Suarez in the cited place, chapter 13.

352. Looking only to the fact, we conclude with Valencia (tome 1, disputation 1, q. 12, p. 2): From these things "first it is understood that the divine essence concurs with the beatific vision under a twofold title, namely both as the most universal agent and as the object of such vision. Secondly, it is understood what that is which is usually said: that the divine essence in the present matter supplies the place of the intelligible species, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas here, article 2, ad 3. For it is nothing other than that through the divine essence in that beatific vision there is provided, much better, what is usually provided per se by an intelligible species; namely that it both concurs with the intellect on the part of the object for that vision, and consequently renders the intellect completely able to understand or see. For just as the divine essence, as the object of that intellection, is more perfectly united by itself with the intellect, as its source and principle, than if it were united to it only according to some accident which would be its likeness and would inhere in the intellect; so also it more perfectly provides in the present matter those offices of the intelligible species. For that an intelligible species is an accident and inheres is not required for intellection per se, as St. Thomas teaches excellently, I, q. 56, a. 1. Thirdly, from this it is understood how that should be taken which is rightly usually said by theologians: that the intellect of the blessed is constituted formally in intelligible first act through the divine essence, as supplying in the present matter the place of a species. For this is nothing other than what has already been said, namely that through it the intellect is rendered able to elicit intellection, or beatific vision, insofar as the divine essence itself, as object, concurs with the intellect for this operation."

353. Now concerning expressed species. And first, that this expressed species, or word of the mind, is given, if the discussion concerns intellectual cognition in general, is most certain from the opinion not only of philosophers, but also of theologians and Fathers, who explain in this way the generation of the Divine Word through the act of cognition of the eternal Father.

354. But what this word of the mind is cannot be better expressed than by the words of St. Thomas (On Power, q. 8, a. 1): "The one understanding," he says, "in understanding can have order to four things: namely to the thing which is understood, to the intelligible species by which the intellect is made in act, to its own understanding, and to the conception of the intellect. This conception indeed differs from the three aforesaid. From the thing understood, because the thing understood is sometimes outside the intellect; but the conception of the intellect is only in the intellect; and again the conception of the intellect is ordered to the thing understood as to an end, for because of this the intellect forms in itself the conception of the thing, so that it may know the thing understood. But it differs from the intelligible species: for the intelligible species, by which the intellect is made in act, is considered as the principle of the action of the intellect, since every agent acts according as it is in act; and it is made in act through some form, which must be the principle of action. But it differs from the action of the intellect, because the aforesaid conception is considered as the term of the action and as something constituted by it. For by its action the intellect forms the definition of the thing, or also an affirmative or negative proposition. But this conception of the intellect in us is properly called word; for this is what is signified by the exterior word. For the exterior voice signifies neither the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but the conception of the intellect by mediation of which it is referred to the thing."

355. From this we gather, first, that besides the likeness of the object which the object itself impresses in the intellect (the impressed species), there is given a likeness of the object which the intellect itself, by understanding, expresses within itself (the expressed species); hence that phrase: "the intellect by understanding becomes in some way all things." Secondly, that this expressed species, since it proceeds from the intellect by way of a certain vital and internal birth, is called concept. Thirdly, that since the intellect, by expressing the object to itself, as it were speaks internally to itself, the expressed species is also called word. "It must be observed," says Suarez (On the Soul, book 3, chapter 5, n. 10), "that to say a word was first said of voices; nevertheless from here it is transferred to the special speech which occurs by understanding, for there is a certain speech in the mind by which one speaks to oneself. Hence to say a word is very commonly attributed to spiritual speech, according to that passage of Matthew 9 and Luke 1, 'The scribes and Pharisees were saying within themselves,' and Wisdom 1, 'The impious said within themselves, thinking,' and in Psalm 13, 'The fool said in his heart,' etc. Therefore to say and to speak are properly used of acts of the intellect, from which Augustine gathers, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 10, that the word `word` has been extended to signify properly the concept of the mind, perhaps for this reason, because exterior speech flows from interior speech."

356. Therefore, with these things laid down concerning the nature of the mental word and concerning its existence with respect to intellectual cognition in general, the question is whether it is also given in the intuitive vision of God. This question is usually much discussed by theologians; it will be enough for us to note the following things.

1. If it is asked whether the Blessed, seeing God intuitively, have in their intellect some likeness of God, whatever in the end that likeness may be, the unanimous response is affirmative. Hence that phrase: "we shall be like him, because we shall see him just as he is."

2. If the word of the mind is said to be intellection itself, or the action of understanding, with no distinction made, the certain response is that in the intuitive vision there is given a word or expressed species. This is as certain as it is certain that there is given a vision which is an act of the intellect of the Blessed. Hence in this matter even the more recent Thomists agree, whatever the older ones may have said. See Gotti, treatise 3, q. 3, doubt 1, § 3, end; Billuart, On God, disputation 4, a. 6, objection 8. - At least in this way those things which St. Augustine has seem to be understood (On the Trinity, book 9, chapter 11): "When we know God, that knowledge ... is a word, and some likeness of God is made by that knowledge." - And (book 15, chapter 16): "When we shall be like him, when we shall see him just as he is, then indeed our word will not be false." - And (The City of God, book 14, chapter 17): "In this image the likeness will then be perfect, when the vision of God will be perfect."

3. In intellection itself there must be distinguished, at least by a distinction of reason, the account of action and the account of likeness, representation, word. "For a conception of this kind," says St. Thomas in the cited book On Power, "or word, by which our intellect understands a thing other than itself, arises from one thing and represents another. It arises indeed from the intellect through its act, but it is the likeness of the thing understood." But if only a distinction of reason is admitted between the action of understanding and the concept or word, it is evident from what has been said that in the intuitive vision of God there is given a word.

4. Therefore, so that the reason for the disagreement among the Doctors concerning the question whether a mental word is given in the intuitive vision of God may be understood, another theory must be recalled, on which that question in some way depends. Some teach, therefore, that intellection can be considered `in fieri` and `in facto esse`: `in fieri`, they say, it has the account of action and production; `in facto esse` it has the account of term, and therefore of word, since the word is the term of intellection. Now they say that the word is the same as intellection `in facto esse`, but is distinguished from intellection `in fieri`, as the produced term is distinguished from the action by which it is produced; and this distinction they say is modal. Compare Suarez (On the Soul, book 3, chapter 5). Applying this theory to the present question, they establish that intuitive vision `in fieri` is the action productive of a term or word, which is modally distinguished from vision `in fieri`, although it is the same as vision `in facto esse`. Consequently they define the word "to be a quality which is made in the mind through the action of understanding, and depends on it in such a way that it does not endure except as long as the mind actually thinks or operates ... that quality is an image representing in some expressed mode the thing known." Compare Suarez (On God, book 2, chapter 11). But this does not prevent the intuitive vision of God from being immediate, because in direct cognition the word is not that which is known, but that by which it is known. For the action "which intervenes in beatific vision tends immediately to the created word as to the thing produced, but to God as to the object, because it tends to him as to the thing to be known, not as to its own term." Suarez (cited place, n. 10).

But to other theologians, among whom is de Lugo (On the Incarnation, disp. 19, n. 20), intuitive vision insofar as it is action seems to be distinguished only virtually from vision insofar as it is concept or word. Therefore when they deny that a created word is given in intuitive vision, they properly deny that there is given that quality distinct by the nature of the thing from vision `in fieri`. See Sylvius on I, q. 12, a. 2.

The theologians of the first opinion press this reason: every action must have a term; but intuitive vision is an action; therefore it must have a term. But intuitive vision is an action of the intellect, and the term of this action is nothing except a word. Therefore.

The authors of the other opinion reply by distinguishing: every action must have a term, namely either an object to which it tends and in which it rests, or something which it produces: conceded; always a term which it produces: denied.

The first insist: action is always productive of something; therefore, since intuitive vision is an action, it must have a term which it produces.

The others reply by denying that every action is production. Intuitive vision, they say, is a vital tendency of the intellect into God, who is proximately and immediately intelligible to it. "Therefore to one asking what the blessed person does by the blessed vision, it must be answered that he does this: that his intellect is actually understanding and perfected, and that he elicits intellection and sees God."

357. If the discussion concerns not intellection in general, but intuitive vision, it does not clearly appear what the mind of St. Thomas was in this controversy, as can be seen among the cited authors of each opinion. Let one who wants more consult them; we by no means settle the dispute.

358. Against the possibility of the intuitive vision, argument is usually made from a threefold head: from Scripture, from the authority of the Fathers, especially John Chrysostom, and from reason. The things usually brought forward from the Fathers may be seen in Perrone, On God the Creator. But the things which they take from Scripture come down to this: that there God is said to be invisible. To this head of difficulties an easy answer is given from the observation common among theologians, which Cardinal Toletus expounds neatly and clearly in I, q. 12, a. 1:

"Since the places of Scripture are explicit which prove that God can be seen by the intellect, one must seek the fitting sense of those texts in which the opposite seems to be said. But in truth there is no contradiction, nor can there be. A fourfold answer can be gathered from the sayings of the Saints. The first is that of Chrysostom, Homily XIV on John, which is also Augustine's in the Questions on the Trinity, tom. 3, and St. Thomas uses it in reply to the first objection: namely, that the places in which God is said not to be able to be seen are to be understood of comprehensive vision, by which God is known according to all his perfection. But by such cognition he cannot be understood by any created intellect; for he is incomprehensible. The second is from Augustine, Epistle 111: that they are to be understood of corporeal vision; for God can be seen by no sense, nor by the bodily eye. The third is that of Epiphanius, book III Against Heresies, heresy 70: that they are to be understood according to nature, namely, that no man can naturally see God according to himself; nevertheless through grace he is elevated to such vision. On Romans 6: 'The grace of God is eternal life.' The fourth is Durandus's, IV Sent., d. 49, where the Doctors treat this matter, q. 2, ad 4: that while man is in this corruptible state, he cannot see God; for that belongs to the blessed."

359. Finally, the objection from reason, which makes some difficulty, is of this sort: No potency can be elevated beyond the breadth of its own specificative object, since it would cease to be such a potency. But God, seen intuitively, is outside the breadth of the specificative object of any created intellect. Therefore.

360. But this objection, with a few changes, is easily pressed against the possibility of the supernatural order in general. That this may be understood, we note that the impossibility of the supernatural order, if it were granted, could be taken either from the created order, or from God elevating above that order, or from the creature to be elevated above that same order. The things usually sought from the created order are of no moment; for we have already said that through elevation to the supernatural order the natural order is not destroyed, but more firmly raised; not cast down, but exalted; not changed in itself, but perfected; not confused with that order, but remaining distinct from it; and finally not opposed to it, but subjected. Difficulties on this side would be almost the same as those usually brought forward against the possibility of miracle. It is enough to remember what St. Thomas teaches in I, q. 25, a. 5: "The order put into things by Divine wisdom, in which the ratio of justice consists, as was said above, q. 21, art. 2, does not equal divine wisdom in such a way that divine wisdom is limited to this order. But it is manifest that the whole ratio of the order which a wise maker imposes on things made by himself is taken from the end. Therefore, when the end is proportioned to the things made for the end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to some determinate order. But divine goodness is an end exceeding created things beyond all proportion. Hence divine wisdom is not determined to some one order of things, such that another course of things could not flow forth. Hence it must be said simply that God can make other things than those which he makes."

361. The impossibility of a supernatural being cannot be taken from God, unless the thing involves repugnance in itself; since divine potency, because it is infinite, extends itself to all those things which have the ratio of being; only those things which involve contradiction do not have the ratio of being. The things usually objected from divine immutability are recognized to be of no moment from the observation which St. Thomas hands down in I, q. 105, a. 6, ad 3: "It must be said," he says, "that God has put a fixed order into things in such a way that nevertheless he reserved to himself that he himself would sometimes, for a cause, act otherwise. Hence when he acts beyond this (natural) order, he is not changed."

362. Therefore the whole difficulty, if there were any, would arise from the creature itself which is to be elevated. Since, they say, the essences of things are immutable, it is repugnant for some being to be elevated to a good above its own species; for in this way it would cease to be what it is. If reason is added to a dog, it will cease to be a dog, but will become a rational animal, namely man. But if the supernatural order were possible, a creature would be elevated to some good above its own species, since it would receive the good of the divine order. Therefore.

363. For the solution of this difficulty, 1. the theory concerning obediential potency must be explained; 2. it must be applied to the intuitive vision. And first, obediential potency can be defined as: the aptitude of created things whereby, at the will of a superior agent and by his aid not owed to them, they fulfill an office which they cannot fulfill by native virtue and by the concurrence owed to them. It is divided into passive and active. The first is in order to receiving supernatural effects; the other is in order to producing them. Our will, for example, is capable of receiving the help of grace (passive obediential potency), by which, once received, it becomes capable of eliciting, together with it, a supernatural act (active obediential potency).

364. That potency of this sort is given is clear a) from the doctrine of St. Augustine set forth above (n. 158); b) from the common consensus of theologians. St. Thomas very often speaks of this matter. Thus, for example, De potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ad 18, he says: "The higher some active virtue is, the more it can bring the same thing through to a higher effect; and hence it is that some thing is in potency to different things according to its relation to different agents. Hence nothing prevents created nature from being in potency to some things to be done by divine potency, which a lower potency cannot do; and this is called the potency of obedience, according as every creature obeys the Creator." Likewise I, q. 115, a. 3, ad 4; in I Sent., dist. 42, a. 2, ad 4, etc.

c) From reason. For, as St. Thomas suggests, the more perfect an agent and its virtue is, the greater things it can do in some subject. The virtue of God is above the virtue of any created thing; therefore God can effect more in his creatures than they themselves can. But nevertheless God cannot effect what is repugnant; therefore there must be in creatures a non-repugnance, that is, an aptitude, for some effect to be produced in them by God which cannot be produced by created virtue. But this aptitude is called obediential potency. Therefore.

Besides, the same thing can be drawn out in a slightly different way from God's dominion. "The reason for this subordination," says Suarez (Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 31, sect. 14, nn. 7-8), "is to be taken a priori from the full dominion which God has over his creature, so that he can use it for every use which does not involve repugnance or contradiction. For full dominion of this sort belongs to God's infinite omnipotence; for dominion is not perfect in every respect unless it includes power for every possible use. But to this full dominion of God there corresponds in the creature full subjection; for these two are correlatives. And for this subjection such a condition is necessary on the part of the creature, by reason of which it is apt for carrying out whatever God has willed, whether by receiving or by acting. Hence, just as God cannot make a created being over which he does not have full and perfect dominion, so a created being cannot be made which does not have the aforesaid condition and subordination or subjection to God."

365. But if it is asked in what this obediential potency consists, the answer is given as follows. 1. At least it says non-repugnance in the creature for receiving or producing some effects from divine virtue; otherwise it would not be capacity, but incapacity; it would not be potency in any way, but impotence. Hence it follows that, as St. Augustine had already warned, God cannot produce all effects in all creatures. "You call the nature of men good," he says in book 4 Against Julian, c. 3, "which merits the help of such grace; and I would gladly hear this if you said it for this reason, that it is a rational nature. For the grace of God is not bestowed on stones, or woods, or beasts, but because it is the image of God, it merits (is apt for) this grace."

2. It does not consist in mere non-repugnance, but the potency is positive and real, as Molina, Suarez, Valentia, and others commonly teach. For obediential potency, especially that of which we are treating here, toward grace and toward glory, truly flows into supernatural acts; but a real influx cannot proceed except from something positive and real; therefore. In truth, as will be said in its own place, the will aided by grace is itself also the immediate principle of the act; the intellect elevated by the light of glory itself also elicits the vision; for these acts are at once vital and supernatural.

3. Obediential potency does not consist in some thing superadded to the natures of creatures and really distinct from them; rather, it is the very entity of the creature, or of its natural potency, considered in order to supernatural effects, as Molina, Valentia, and others teach, and Suarez also grants. Thus, for example, our intellect itself is capable, that is, has obediential potency, of receiving the light of glory and, with it, eliciting the act of beatific vision.

366. Hence, to one asking whether obediential potency is natural or supernatural, one must answer with a distinction. "For it is certain," says Suarez (Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 43, sect. 4, n. 16), "that this potency is not some thing superadded to the natures of things or distinct from them in reality itself; for one would have to suppose another capacity for it, concerning which the same question would return. Hence according to this respect such potency can be called natural to the subject, both because it is naturally connate with it, and because it is its very natural entity. In this way Augustine said: To be able to have faith and charity belongs to the nature of the faithful; and St. Thomas in the same sense says that the rational soul is naturally capable of grace; and again he says that the soul's aptitude for grace follows upon its nature. But in comparison with the act and with the agent, from which potency is denominated simply, this potency cannot be called natural, as St. Thomas rightly says, both because that act is simply and in itself supernatural, and also because it cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent, and moreover because such an act is not owed from the nature of the thing to such a potency, nor does the potency itself have a natural inclination toward it according to the truer opinion of theologians. And therefore this potency is customarily called obediential potency or potency of obedience."

367. From these things it follows, 1. that some things can be done by a creature exercising natural powers with God's ordinary concurrence: for these the creature has natural potency. Some things cannot in any way be done by a creature and in a creature, for example, thinking matter: for these the creature has every-way impotence. Finally, some things indeed cannot be done by a creature and in a creature left to itself with ordinary concurrence, but can be done when God infuses a new strength, a new virtue: for these the creature has obediential potency.

It follows, 2. that although on the one hand there is no repugnance that some things be done in the creature to which it cannot reach by its natural virtue, since God can do more in us than we ourselves can, nevertheless on the other hand, if such things are done, they are not natural but supernatural, since obediential potency does not say exigency, but mere aptitude for an effect and an agent not owed.

368. Now, in order that the objection against the possibility of intuitive vision may be solved from the theory proposed, a twofold object of the intellect must be distinguished. One is proper or proportionate, which is also customarily called specificative; the other is adequate, which is also called terminative. The specificative object, as the name itself indicates, must be proportioned to the intellect not only insofar as it is intellect, but insofar as it is intellect of such a species; therefore the intellect will be able to reach it by its own powers. But the adequate object is that which, as it were, corresponds to intellect insofar as it is a certain immaterial faculty, abstracting from the specific grade of immateriality. The intellect cannot naturally extend itself to this object; nevertheless, if it is supernaturally strengthened, it will be able to do so, or it has obediential potency toward it.

369. The proper or proportionate object of our intellect in the state of union is the quiddity of a material thing and consequently whatever is knowable by connotation to it and according to its mode. For the object must be proportioned to the faculty, and the faculty to the subject, since operation follows being: our soul now has being in matter. In the same way the proper object of the intellect of the separated soul must be proportioned to such a mode of its being; and likewise concerning the angelic intellect.

370. But the adequate object of any intellect, and therefore also of our intellect, which is the lowest, is being considered in its whole breadth. For the adequate object embraces all things concerning which a potency can be occupied. But intellect can in some way know whatever has the ratio of being; therefore. The minor is proved. "It is established by experience," says Suarez (On the Soul, book 4, c. 1, n. 2), "and by induction; for our intellect knows God, angels, and material things, and their accidents and essence; therefore, etc. Secondly, whatever is intelligible can be known by intellect, for the intelligible and intellect mutually correspond to one another and are made adequate to one another. But whatever has entity is intelligible; therefore that very thing can be known in some way by our intellect." Cf. here.

371. God, who is to be seen intuitively, cannot be the proportionate object of any created intellect, as will be clear when the supernaturalness of the vision is treated; but he is the adequate object of our intellect, since he is something intelligible. Therefore by natural powers we cannot see him intuitively; but strengthened and elevated by supernatural force, we can. Therefore I answer in form to the proposed objection: no potency can act outside its object; I distinguish: outside its specificative and adequate object, granted; outside its specificative object alone, I subdistinguish: naturally, granted; supernaturally, denied.

372. And from this the difference between intellect and the senses, with respect to the present matter, is also clear. "For the divine substance," says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 3, c. 54), "is not outside the faculty of created intellect as though it were something wholly foreign to it, as sound is to sight, or an immaterial substance to sense. For the divine substance is the first intelligible and the principle of all intellectual cognition. But it is outside the faculty of created intellect as exceeding its virtue, just as the excellence of sensible things is outside the faculty of the senses. Hence also the Philosopher in the second book of the Metaphysics, text comm. 7, says that our intellect is related to the most manifest things as the eye of the owl is to the light of the sun. Therefore the created intellect needs to be strengthened by some divine light in order that it may be able to see the divine essence." See also I, q. 12, art. 4, ad 3.

373. The supernaturalness of the intuitive vision, as we said concerning sanctifying grace (266), can be considered 1. in relation to all created nature; 2. in relation even to creatable nature.

374. As to the first, it is Catholic doctrine that the intuitive vision is an end not owed to man, to the angels, and therefore to the whole of created nature. Clement V, in the Council of Vienne, among other errors of the Beguards and Beguines, condemned this one, n. 5: "That any intellectual nature whatsoever is naturally blessed in itself, and that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it for seeing God and blessedly enjoying him." But among the propositions condemned in Baius, especially 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 bear upon the present matter.

375. Here we note only that we in no way admit the manner of speaking of certain theologians who, although in conclusion they taught that the intuitive vision is an end not owed to our nature, nevertheless, in order to extricate themselves from some difficulty of which there will be discussion below, said that "beatitude is man's natural end with respect to appetite, not with respect to attainment." See Bellarmine, On the Grace of the First Man, c. 7. Against this opinion Suarez rightly observes (Proleg. 4, On Grace, c. 1, n. 8): "The ultimate end is customarily distinguished with respect to attainment, or with respect to intention, or appetition, and in this way it is said to be twofold with respect to attainment, because one can be obtained naturally, the other only supernaturally, although each is natural with respect to appetition. But in this I find a twofold repugnance. One is that there be a twofold ultimate end with respect to appetition. For if the appetite of human nature does not rest in some natural good, but tends beyond to the supernatural, assuredly no natural good is its ultimate end; for the ultimate end includes the negation of a tendency toward a further end, otherwise the other end is not ultimate, if rest is not taken there. And this is taken openly from Aristotle in the first book of the Ethics, chapter 7, when he says that happiness is not sought for the sake of something else, but only for its own sake. The other repugnance is that an end supernatural with respect to attainment should be natural with respect to appetition, since natural appetite is not founded except in natural power, as is treated more broadly in Metaphysics and has been said in the matter of Beatitude. Hence if the beatitude of the homeland is natural with respect to the tendency and intention of natural appetite, it will also be natural with respect to some natural perfection. From this it follows, as we argued above, that man could not have been not created for that end." He has the same things in On God, book 2, c. 8, n. 4.

376. As to the second, there have not been lacking theologians to whom it was not evident that it is repugnant for God to found some creature to which grace and the intuitive vision would be owed; and therefore they left in doubt whether the intuitive vision is supernatural with respect to any nature whatsoever, even a creatable one. Nevertheless even these theologians admitted the weight of authority for the affirmative opinion. Thus, for example, Ripalda (On Supernatural Being, disp. 23, sect. 2, n. 3): "Standing by authority," he says, "the opinion which denies a possible supernatural substance and therefore affirms that supernatural things are above every creatable substance must absolutely be maintained"; although he adds: "The authority of such a denying opinion is not so great that the affirming opinion cannot be freely defended without a note of temerity." Becanus (On the Divine Attributes, c. 9, q. 5, n. 4) says: "The latter opinion, affirming the supernaturalness of the intuitive vision with respect to any nature whatsoever, even a creatable one, has more authors on its side and is more received in the schools; and therefore it is safer to adhere to it."

377. But now that opinion, once the more received, seems common, and, if we attend to arguments from authority, admits no doubt. Therefore we say:

PROPOSITION XXXIII. The intuitive vision of God is an end so exceeding every exigency of nature that there is no nature, created or creatable, to which it can be owed.

Proof I, From Scripture and the Fathers. The intuitive vision is proposed a) as an inheritance. Romans 8:17: "But if sons, also heirs; heirs indeed of God, and coheirs with Christ." Colossians 3:24: "Knowing that from the Lord you will receive the recompense of the inheritance," etc.

b) It is proposed as reward and promise. James 1:12: "Blessed is the man who suffers temptation, because when he has been proved, he will receive the crown of life, which God has promised to those who love him." James 2:5: "Heirs of the kingdom, which God has promised to those who love him." Hebrews 10:23: "Let us hold the confession of our hope unwavering, for he who promised is faithful," etc.

c) It is proposed as God's own beatitude and kingdom. Matthew 25:21: "Well done, good and faithful servant; because you have been faithful over a few things, I will set you over many; enter into the joy of your Lord." Apocalypse 3:21: "He who has conquered, I will grant him to sit on my throne, as I also conquered and sat with my Father on his throne." Luke 22:28-31: "But you are those who have remained with me in my temptations; and I dispose to you, as my Father disposed to me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel."

d) It is proposed as the consummation of likeness with God, or of Deification. 1 John 3:2: "Now we are sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is." 2 Corinthians 3:18: "But we all, with unveiled face beholding the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image," etc.

Hence: 1. Inheritance is not of itself connatural and owed except to a son; but the beatific vision is a divine inheritance; therefore it cannot be owed except to sons of God. But divine filiation, which is had through sanctifying grace, can be owed to no creature (n. 270, Proof I, b). Therefore.

2. A recompense which, in order to be owed, requires a special promise on the part of the one recompensing, corresponding to merit founded in some gratuitous gift of the one recompensing, and which exceeds every merit, is truly not owed or supernatural. But such is the intuitive vision not only with respect to men and angels, but with respect to any creature whatsoever. Therefore.

The minor is proved with respect to the promise. It is clear first from the cited testimonies of Sacred Scripture, in which eternal life is called absolutely and, as it were, by antonomasia, "the promise." It is confirmed from the Fathers. St. Augustine (Enarration on Psalm 83, n. 16): "The Lord himself made himself a debtor, not by receiving, but by promising; it is not said to him, return what you received, but return what you promised." And (Sermon 159, On the Words of the Apostle, Romans 8:30 and 31, and c. 2, n. 2): "In those things which we do not yet have, we hold him as debtor. For he was made debtor not by receiving something from us, but by promising what pleased him. For in one way we say to a man, you owe me, because I gave to you; and in another way we say, you owe me, because you promised me. When you say, you owe me, because I gave to you, the benefit proceeded from you, but as lent, not as given. But when you say, you owe me, because you promised me, you gave nothing and yet you exact. For the goodness of him who promised will give." Sts. Basil, Ambrose, Hilary, Chrysostom, Fulgentius, Gregory, and others have the same.

The minor is proved with respect to the gratuitous gift in which merit is founded. All acts have proportion with eternal life, or with the intuitive vision, only insofar as they are acts of a son of God and are informed by supernatural grace. But this grace is not owed to any creature whatsoever, as we showed above. Therefore. Hence St. Augustine, in the same place on Psalm 83: "Whence is God a debtor? Has he received something? To whom does God owe anything? Behold, we see that Paul holds him as debtor: he obtained mercy, exacting truth: the Lord, he says, will return to me on that day. What will he return to you except what he owes you? Whence does he owe you? What did you give to him? Who first gave to him, and it will be repaid to him?" St. Fulgentius (preface to the book to Monimus): "He is the author of the debt who is the author of the gift. For by his own generosity he deigned to make himself debtor: not because, being needy, he receives from anyone, but because, being abundant, he gives more lavishly." St. Dionysius (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, c. 1): "This salvation can happen to those who are saved only when they have already been deified." St. Irenaeus (book 4, c. 20, n. 5): "God, powerful in all things, will be seen in the kingdom of the heavens paternally: the Spirit indeed preparing man into the Son of God, the Son leading him to the Father, and the Father giving incorruption unto eternal life, which comes to each one from this, that he sees God."

The minor is proved with respect to the excess of the recompense. If a reward is to be given for the works of a servant, it will be some good befitting a servant, not the inheritance itself of sons, not the kingdom, not that joy which God himself enjoys. But the intuitive vision is the inheritance of sons, the kingdom, the beatitude itself of God; and every creature, according to nature, is a servant. Therefore.

The first part of this minor is established from the cited testimonies of Sacred Scripture; the other from the cited testimonies of the Fathers (n. 270, Proof II, 4). It can be confirmed from St. Augustine, who (City of God, book 13, c. 1, n. 2) says: "Although not every creature can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and whatever is of that sort neither obtain nor desire this gift), nevertheless that creature which can be blessed cannot be so from itself, because it was created out of nothing, but from him by whom it was created." St. Ambrose (book of meditations, prayer 7): "Your creature, for whom to live is one thing and to live blessedly another, owes all that it lives and all that it lives blessedly only to your grace." Marcus the Archbishop, whom Nicephorus mentions in book 2, c. 35, according to Corderius: "But the Lord, wishing more to show that every precept is a certain debt, but that our adoption, made by his own blood, has been given to men, says: when you have done all things," etc.; "Wherefore the kingdom of heaven is not the reward of works" (this must be taken in a Catholic sense), "but the grace of God prepared for faithful servants. Nor does a servant ask freedom as a reward, but as a debtor he works well; that freedom, however, is granted from grace."

It is astonishing that against this argument Becanus, otherwise a theologian of great perspicacity, says (l. c., q. 4, n. 5): "The second argument contends that all creatures are naturally servants of God, and therefore that none can naturally be a daughter or son of God. But this is not rightly inferred. For first, it is certain that the same creature can by a different title be a servant and a child of God: a servant by nature; a child by grace. This belongs to all the just, whether existing in this life or in the other. All are servants by nature; children by grace. Therefore this alone is asked here, whether someone can at the same time be a servant and a child by nature. I think that this is possible, but in a different respect. He can be a servant by reason of creation; a child by reason of operation."

But I answer: 1. A creature indeed can be a servant of God according to nature and a child according to grace; but it cannot be a servant and child of God according to the same thing, that is, according to nature. Yet it would be such if grace and glory were owed to it. 2. That operation either is a consequence of creation, insofar as it belongs to the creature according to nature, and then, since by creation it is a servant and not a child, it will also be such through operation; or that operation is not owed to the creature's nature, and now it is through a superadded gift, or an unowed gift, that it becomes a child.

3. Beatitude which is proper and connatural to God, which supposes the Deification of the creature, and which is the consummation of that Deification, cannot belong according to nature to any creature. But such is the intuitive vision of God. Therefore.

To these could be added the things usually sought from that text, "No one knows the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son wills to reveal him"; from the testimonies of Sacred Scripture by which God is called invisible; and with the interpretation of the Fathers added, concerning invisibility according to the natural powers of the creature. But these proofs, and the proofs already given, which we have scarcely sketched, you will find confirmed and developed by many testimonies of the holy Fathers in Casini, What Is Man, etc., Mainz, 1862.

Proof II, from St. Bonaventure (in II Sent., dist. 27, a. 1, q. 3). Grace and glory do not differ according to essence; but, as we showed above, grace is not owed to any creature. Therefore neither is glory, or the intuitive vision.

The major is proved. a) "Either glory renders one accepted by God, or it does not. If not, therefore glory does not please God as much as grace does; therefore neither does the state of the homeland please him as much as the state of the way: which is unfitting. If it does, then, since this is the proper act of grace, it is necessary that glory be grace."

b) "When someone passes from grace to glory, either he loses grace, or he does not. If he loses grace, then it seems that he ceases to be pleasing to God, and that glory and grace have repugnance to one another, both of which are false. If he does not lose it, since grace is the life of the soul, as was shown above, and in one soul there is only one life, either glory will not be life, or grace and glory will be the same by essence. But it is established that glory is life; therefore, etc."

c) "The perfect or the imperfect do not vary a thing according to essence; but grace states the assimilation of the soul to God according to the state of imperfection, while glory states it according to the state of perfection; therefore, etc."

Hence grace is called the seed of glory; and in Proverbs 4:18 it is read: "But the path of the just, like a shining light, goes forward and increases even to perfect day." Hence also faith, the supernatural cognition of the way, is imperfect with respect to the intuitive vision, which is the cognition of the homeland: through faith we know through a mirror, in a riddle, in part; in heaven we shall see face to face, we shall know as we have been known. Hope is, as it were, an inchoate and imperfect possession of the object which in heaven we possess perfectly. Hope is called an inchoate possession because the just person has a right to seeing God, who is faithful; hence that saying, "rejoicing in hope": joy properly concerns a good possessed in some way. Finally charity, which never falls away, is the same on the way and in the homeland; but in the homeland it is consummated. See 1 Corinthians 13, from v. 10.

Proof III, from St. Thomas, who in Contra Gentiles III, c. 52, brings forward several reasons, but in I, q. 12, a. 4, chooses one, which we shall briefly propose.

A mode of knowing which exceeds someone's mode of being, or his nature, cannot be natural to him, since operation follows being, and cognition takes place according as the thing known is in the knower. But the mode by which the blessed in heaven see God intuitively exceeds the mode of being of any creature whatsoever, or any nature whatever created and creatable. Therefore the intuitive vision of God cannot be natural to any creature.

The minor is proved. The mode by which the blessed in heaven see God is according to the mode of being of God himself: "we shall see him as he is." Hence in the same mode, namely intuitively, God connaturally and necessarily knows himself, although besides this he comprehends himself. But God's mode of being exceeds the mode of being of any creature whatsoever, or is above any nature whatever created and creatable. Therefore the mode by which the blessed in heaven see God intuitively exceeds any nature whatever created and creatable.

In order that the force of this argument may be better known, and at the same time vindicated from the attacks of Scotus and others, two things especially must be noted. The first is that when St. Thomas teaches, "If the mode of being of the thing known exceeds the mode of the nature of the knower, it is necessary that cognition of that thing be above nature," St. Thomas is not considering particular or specific modes of being, but generic and universal modes; for he distinguishes diverse modes of being in order to cognition. Cognition occurs according to immateriality; but immateriality, which is the root of cognoscibility, is contained by generic and universal modes of being. See Sylvester on this chapter.

Hence rightly only three modes of being are distinguished in order to intellectual cognition, four in order to cognition in general. "The first," says Toletus after St. Thomas, "is of that which is a form in individuated matter and totally received, as corruptible material forms. The second is of those things which indeed are in matter, yet together with this subsist through themselves, as the rational soul. The third is of those things which subsist and are in no way in matter; yet they so subsist that in them existence is not of their essence, such as angels are. The fourth is of those things which subsist both without matter and have existence the same as essence, and this is God alone."

From this observation it follows, 1. that that principle, "if the mode of being, etc.," can be demonstrated, as it were, inductively from experience and analogy. "Those things which have themselves in the first mode," says Toletus, "because they are totally in matter, know only things in matter, as brute animals do. Those which have themselves in the second mode, because they are partly in matter and partly without matter, naturally know only those things which either are in matter or are abstracted from matter, as the rational soul, which understands through phantasms, but does not know other things of a higher mode, or angels. I am always speaking of cognition of a thing through its essence and distinctly. Those things which have themselves in the third mode know similar things, or angels, but not the higher order. God is the one to whom it naturally belongs to know himself."

It follows, 2. that Scotus's objection is of no moment, when he said that from that principle, "if the mode of being, etc.," it follows that a lower angel cannot naturally know a higher angel; for all angels are in the same generic grade of being. See Suarez, On God, book 2, c. 9, n. 12.

The other thing which we said must be noted in this argument is that it proceeds concerning the natural mode of knowing. For when cognition is natural, then it proceeds from the principles of nature, and consequently must be proportioned to that nature, since an effect cannot surpass its cause. But if the question is of cognition through a superadded gift, it is evident that it cannot and need not be proportioned to the nature of the knower alone, but to the nature elevated through that gift. Now when some created nature is elevated through grace to seeing God intuitively, by this very fact this cognition does not suppose that that nature is purest act; for the very composition of nature and superadded gift destroys the ratio of purest act. But if the same created nature could by its own powers see God as he is, who is purest act, that is, see God as it is connatural to God to see himself, then the creature would have to have the same mode of being as God, namely it would have to be purest act. See n. 270, Note.

378. From all these things it is clear that if, according to reason, one wishes to assign the root of the repugnance in the claim that some creature naturally sees God intuitively, that root consists in the very disproportionality of the creature's cognitive faculty, and therefore of its created being, to that object.

Translator's note: The PDF text layer has the broken reading `ipsius esse crea ad illud objectum`; this has been corrected to `ipsius esse creati ad illud objectum`, "of its created being to that object."

"Hence," says Suarez (On God, book 2, c. 9, n. 15), "in order that there be a created supernatural substance, it would have to be a substance which was pure act, because without this perfection it could not be connaturally united to God, as he is in himself, under the ratio of a cognoscible object. Therefore just as it is repugnant for a substance to be created and not to have those imperfections of potentiality and composition, from which we said it arises that the same light cannot be commensurate with such a substance as subject and with God as he is in himself as object, so it is repugnant for there to be a substance supernatural in that way. For it would be natural to that substance to have a light commensurate with itself, and regarding it itself as the maximally proper object, and consequently it could not at the same time regard God himself according to himself." Compare the whole of this chapter.

379. From the words of Clement V in the Council of Vienne cited above, one must hold not only that the intuitive vision of God is supernatural, but also that the soul needs the light of glory elevating it to seeing God.

380. To explain and defend this doctrine of the Church, it is necessary 1. to say what the light of glory is; 2. to show its necessity; 3. briefly to indicate how it concurs toward the intuitive vision.

381. As to the first, for the sake of clarity, we first exclude some opinions which seem in no way able to be held. And 1. by the light of glory one cannot understand the uncreated light itself, but a certain created gift. For a) the Council of Vienne speaks of the light of glory in the way in which theologians were accustomed to speak; but all, as Suarez testifies (l. c., n. 5), understood something created by the light of glory. b) "The uncreated light of glory does not properly elevate man's intellect, except insofar as God works something in the intellect itself above its nature. For the uncreated light itself is not formally united to the intellect by itself. Just as the will is not elevated to loving by uncreated charity itself and by the essence of God, but insofar as he infuses something into the will." Wherefore, just as from the Council of Trent we reject the opinion of those who said that we are formally just through the very Person of the Holy Spirit, since it must be held that we are formally constituted just through some created gift intrinsically inhering in the soul, so we reject the opinion of those who deny some created light elevating the soul to seeing God.

2. The created gift in which the light of glory consists is not the vision itself, but something distinct from the vision itself. For a) the Council says that the soul is elevated by the light of glory to seeing God; therefore it distinguishes the light from the vision. For the light is given for the vision, nor is the vision said to elevate the soul to vision. b) What the Beguards denied is decreed by the Council of Vienne; but they did not deny the vision, but asserted that the light was not necessary for having it. Therefore. See Suarez, On God, book 2, c. 14, n. 6.

3. The created light of glory is not an intelligible species. For a) an intelligible species does not elevate a potency, but is united to a potency already having powers for knowing the object, and determines it; but according to the Council of Vienne, the light of glory elevates the soul to seeing God; therefore. b) The common opinion of the Doctors, as we have seen, denies that this intelligible species is given in the intuitive vision of God. Was this opinion condemned by the Council? See Suarez, l. c., n. 8.

382. Therefore, with these things excluded, by the light of glory is understood "a certain created supernatural virtue infused by God, by which the intellect is rendered proximately powerful and able to see God."

We said, 1. virtue. For, as St. Thomas teaches in II-II, q. 175, a. 3, ad 2, the light of glory is divided in two ways: in one way it is received by way of a permanent habit; in another way, by way of a transient passion. In this second way the Apostle had the light of glory, if it is true that he saw God. But if the discussion is about the light of glory of the blessed in heaven, by it is understood a virtue, a certain infused habit, a certain permanent quality.

We said, 2. by which the intellect is rendered proximately powerful and able to see God. In order that this may be understood, one must note with St. Thomas, I, q. 12, a. 2, that "two things are required for seeing God: one is the seeing virtue, the other the union of the thing seen with the sight." Wherefore if the light of glory is said to be necessary for the vision, either it holds itself on the part of the object, or on the part of the potency, or on the part of the union of the object with the potency. But the light of glory does not properly hold itself on the part of the union, since in cognition union comes about through an intelligible species; as has been said, in the intuitive vision of God no created intelligible species is given, the divine essence itself is immediately united to the intellect, and the light of glory is some created gift. Nor does the necessity of the light hold itself on the part of the object, which of itself is supremely visible, or intelligible. Therefore it remains that the light holds itself on the part of the potency, which, since it is naturally impotent for seeing God, through that superadded virtue, through that light, becomes proximately powerful and able to see God. This was the constant opinion of St. Thomas, many passages of which Suarez gathers and explains (On God, book 2, c. 15, nn. 1-2).

383. But Scotus and Durandus thought the contrary. As Suarez reports (l. c., c. 8, n. 3), they thought that our intellect is of itself apt for seeing God, and therefore that it can see him without any superadded virtue by this alone, that God is present to it. Nevertheless they denied that a vision of this sort should be called natural, because God is not present to us under the ratio of object unless he voluntarily manifests himself. See Suarez, l. c., c. 9, n. 4.

384. Concerning this opinion of Scotus and Durandus, Cardinal Toletus has these words (on I, q. 12, a. 5): "The light of glory is infused in the blessed intellect for seeing God. This conclusion is against Scotus and Durandus. It is a conclusion of faith; the opposite is an error condemned in the Council of Vienne and is found in the Clementine Ad nostrum, On Heretics. One error of the Beguards was the fifth, that the intellect does not need the infused light of glory for seeing God, which is condemned there. Nor is it surprising that Scotus and Durandus hold the opposite, because their writings were before that Council, which was celebrated under Clement V in the year 1311, at which time their works already seem to have been published, although they flourished at almost that time. Hence now the matter ought not to be under opinion." Suarez and Lessius, however, think that the opinion of Scotus was not condemned by the Council; but that the opinion of St. Thomas and the common opinion are very consonant with the Council.

385. According to this opinion, therefore, the true office of the light of glory is easily understood, which Lessius explains splendidly in this way (On the Supreme Good, book 2, c. 8, n. 52): "This wondrous light provides three things. First, it elevates the mind to a divine state, and makes it deiform, as St. Dionysius says, and like the Father. For the mind thus illumined and elevated is constituted in first act, and receives powers for the production of the vision of the divine essence. Second, it expands the capacity of the mind into immensity, so that it is capable of the immense and unlimited good: as if a wineskin which by itself is capable of only one amphora were so internally stretched and dilated that it could contain within itself the whole ocean. For just as this bodily light causes the eye of the body to extend itself to the vastness of this world, and to embrace it within itself in a certain wondrous way, so spiritual and divine light causes the mind in which it has settled to be able to extend itself and, in some way, to embrace within itself the whole immensity of God. Yet note here that these two effects of the light of glory, which it formally provides through itself, are not wholly distinct, but necessarily conjoined; for by the very fact that it elevates the mind and gives it powers for producing the vision, it must also expand the same mind for receiving that vision, because that vision is to be produced nowhere else than in the mind itself, by the mind itself, by the help of the light. Third, it determines and carries the mind thus elevated and expanded into vision, helping it in an eminent way and at the same time concurring toward the production of that vision; and at the same time the divine essence, intimately present to the intellect, concurs like a seal toward forming that vision and assimilating it to itself. Behold the primary office of this most eminent light."

386. As to the second, we assert:

PROPOSITION XXXIV. There is in the blessed the light of glory supplying the natural defect of their intellect on the part of the potency; aided by it, the blessed elicit the act of vision.

Proof I. The intuitive vision is certainly a supernatural act; but a supernatural act cannot proceed from the natural powers of some potency; therefore in the blessed, for seeing God, some aid is required on the part of the potency, supplying this defect. But this aid is called the light of glory. Therefore.

Confirmation. In the will of the blessed there is the habit of charity by which they love God; therefore by like reason there ought to be something in the intellect by which they see God. But it is not faith, because this is obscure and, as the Apostle says, will be emptied out; therefore it will be another aid, the light of glory.

Proof II. Certainly there is in heaven the light of glory by which the blessed see God. But that light must hold itself on the part of the potency, elevating it and supplying its defect. Therefore.

The major is proved, which, moreover, if the question is about the light of glory understood in any way, none of the Catholics denies, from Scripture. Psalm 35: "In your light we shall see light." Apocalypse 21: "The city of the blessed does not need sun or moon, for the brightness of God will illuminate it." Isaiah 60: "You shall no longer have the sun for light by day, nor shall the splendor of the moon illuminate you; but the Lord will be for you an eternal light, and your God your glory."

The minor is proved. If the light of glory did not hold itself on the part of the potency, it would hold itself on the part of the object; concerning an impressed species we say nothing, both because it too is vicarious of the object, and because a created impressed species has already been excluded. But it cannot be said that it holds itself only on the part of the object. For:

a) So long as a potency remains disproportioned to some object, however much that object is presented to it, it cannot be attained by that potency. But if the light of glory held itself only on the part of the object, the intellect of the blessed would remain disproportioned to seeing God; for God seen in himself is a supernatural object, and the intellect of the blessed would have only natural powers. Therefore.

b) However perfectly the things of faith are proposed, explained, and conceived by the mind, we cannot assent to them as is necessary for salvation unless the potency itself is elevated and helped by the habit of faith, or by supernatural aid, for eliciting such assent. In a similar way, however perfectly it is proposed to the will that God must be loved above all things, nevertheless it cannot love him with supernatural love unless it is helped on its own part by the gift of charity. But if for such acts, which are much less excellent and supernatural, the potencies themselves must be completed and helped on their own part, it is clear that this is much more necessary for the beatific vision, which is in the highest grade of supernatural reality.

c) If the light of glory did not hold itself on the part of the potency by elevating it, the intuitive vision would truly be natural; therefore. The antecedent is proved. Then, as the adversaries admit, the whole supernaturalness would consist in this, that God could according to his pleasure make himself present to the intellect, or not; but he would have to make himself present; therefore. The minor is proved. What God owes to some nature cannot be judged better than from that nature's powers; for if a nature has powers sufficient for something, that thing is said to be owed to it. But if the light of glory did not hold itself on the part of the potency, but only on the part of the object, the potency, or intellect, as the adversaries hold, would have sufficient powers for seeing God. Therefore.

Suarez very well develops this argument (l. c., c. 15, nn. 9-13) by the example of angels. Angels need species in order to see other angels; the species are infused into them by God; nevertheless they are called natural, because angels have a natural power sufficient for seeing other angels. Therefore, if their intellect had a power sufficient for seeing God intuitively, why should it not be said that, if God makes himself present to their intellect, it acts naturally? "Wherefore," thus the cited author rightly concludes, n. 14, "I have always judged that the other opinion is not to be approved, nor admitted in any way; and the more and more I consider it, the more firmly I adhere to this judgment, especially because I have seen no foundation of authority or reason which introduces any difficulty."

387. As to the third, in order that it may be understood how the light of glory concurs toward the vision, it must be noted 1. that "three things can be considered in the vision. First, there is the substance itself of the vision. Second, its production or procession, and its continual dependence on a living substance, such as the soul is. Third, its reception in the same soul. The substance of the vision is not some thin mode, as figure is in bodies, but a solid quality and, as it were, a painting and image of the object, which Augustine calls the word of the mind. This penetrates the whole soul, paints it, and assimilates it to the object; just as the species of colors, diffused into the air from objects by the help of light, paint the air itself with various colors and figures, and make it green, yellow, blue, red, etc., in a wondrous way, although because of their subtlety they are not seen unless, according to a certain relation, they are received by a dense and white body placed opposite them... The production of the vision comes about from the living substance from which it so proceeds that it continually depends on it, just as the light of the sun in the air so proceeds from the sun that it continually depends on it and must be conserved by it. Reception occurs in the same substance from which it proceeds. The same is discerned in all other vital acts, which for this reason are called immanent."

It must be noted 2. that "three principles concur for eliciting this vision, namely the intellect, the light of glory infused into the intellect, and the divine essence. From the intellect the vision has that it is a vital action and the life of the soul; from the light of glory, that it is supernatural and of the divine order, and a clear and distinct contemplation; from the divine essence, that it is an image and vision of it rather than of another thing... Therefore it is necessary, first, that it proceed from the intellect, or from an intelligent substance, because otherwise it will not be a vital intellection, nor life, and consequently it will not be able to beatify the soul, as was shown above. Then it must also proceed effectively from the light of glory, or from supernatural aid which supplies the powers of that light, for I do not distinguish these in the present matter; otherwise it will not be supernatural nor of divine character, nor will it clearly represent the object. For the intellect by the force of its own nature cannot impress such excellence upon its act, but needs some divine gift by whose help it provides this. Therefore this excellence per se and properly comes from this gift, and this gift per se, primarily and directly, is the cause of that excellence. Finally, it must also in some way proceed from the divine essence whose vision it is, and to which as its primary object it is terminated, because it is a likeness and image of this, and clearly and distinctly represents this; wherefore the essence must concur toward forming it. For without such concurrence it cannot easily be conceived how it is made similar to the essence itself. For why is the concept which the mind forms in itself an image of this object rather than of another, if the object concurs in no way?"

388. Since, therefore, the concurrence both of the intellect and of the light is necessary for the vision, the one question that remains concerning the nature of the concurrence on the part of the light is that which is debated between the Thomists and other theologians. For the former hold that the intellect concurs toward the vision only radically and remotely, and that consequently the sole total proximate ratio of the vision is the light of glory. See Gotti, tract. 3, q. 4, doubt 3. But others hold that from the intellect and the light of glory there is one proximate principle of the vision.

389. Since this question concerns all supernatural acts, here we shall briefly indicate what seems to us must be held. Therefore the intuitive vision proceeds from the intellect informed and elevated by the light of glory, and consequently both the intellect and the light of glory flow into it. But when the elevated intellect is said to flow into the vision, it is understood that it flows not only through the light of glory by which it is informed, but through itself, or through its own entity, for according to this it gives to the vision that it is a vital act. Indeed, although it can be said that the intellect has remote activity with respect to the intuitive vision of God, insofar as it needs to be completed by the light of glory so that it can elicit it, nevertheless in a true sense that activity is called proximate, insofar as, once completed by the habit, it proximately and immediately flows in its own grade into the vision, just as the light itself does. Therefore from the intellect and the light there arises one proximate and adequate principle of the vision, of which the intellect alone, or the light alone, is only an inadequate and partial principle. It is partial indeed by partiality of cause, not by partiality of effect, since the effect is a simple act, and, whole as it is, is at once vital and supernatural; and therefore one part of it cannot, as it were, be produced by the intellect and another part by the light of glory.

390. Wherefore of the intuitive vision one can say what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 15 concerning other supernatural acts: "Yet not I, but the grace of God with me." On these words St. Bernard, in the book On Grace and Free Choice, near the end, says: "He could have said through me; but because that was less, he preferred to say with me, presuming that he was not only the minister of the work through the effect, but also in some way a companion of the one working through consent." And below: "What was begun by grace alone is completed equally by both, so that they work mixedly, not separately; together, not in turn through individual advances; not partly grace and partly free choice, but each performs the whole by an undivided work, indeed the whole by this and the whole by that." See Suarez, book 6 On Grace, c. 4, and c. 5, n. 15, and c. 7, nn. 1-6. See also Becanus, On the Divine Attributes, cap. 9, q. 4, n. 4.

391. You will say against the stated proposition: If the light of glory were something created, a created intellect naturally seeing God could be given, and consequently an intrinsically supernatural created substance. For in truth a created intellect together with the light of glory is something finite; therefore God, who can found a more and more perfect intellect indefinitely, will be able to arrive at one intellect which is of as much perfection as is an intellect suffused with the light of glory.

I answer: The identity of the intellect with the proper power of the light of glory is a perfection greater than that which arises from the composition of intellect and light of glory accidentally superadded to it, since unity itself and identity is a perfection greater than composition. But that this greater perfection is beyond any finite perfection is shown by those arguments by which we proved that the intuitive vision of God cannot be connatural except to God. Hence St. Thomas rightly responds to the same objection in I, q. 12, a. 5, ad 3: "A disposition to the form of fire cannot be natural except to one having the form of fire. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature, unless the creature were of divine nature, which is impossible. For by this light the rational creature is made deiform."

392. Objection 1. Beatitude, which man naturally desires, is owed to him, and therefore is natural; but man naturally desires the intuitive vision; therefore.

Confirmation 1. Several Scholastics taught that there is in man a natural appetite for the intuitive vision. Confirmation 2. Especially St. Thomas constantly teaches this. See I, q. 12, a. 1; I-II, q. 3, a. 8; and q. 5, a. 3, ad 3; Contra Gentiles III, cc. 50-51, etc.

393. Objection II. Man in whatever state cannot be blessed unless he loves God above all things; but he cannot naturally love God above all things; therefore.

Confirmation. St. Augustine, besides the love of charity, which is supernatural, recognizes only earthly cupidity, which is evil; therefore he does not admit a natural love of God.

394. I answer to the first objection by distinguishing. The beatitude which man naturally desires by innate appetite, and by appetite of exigency, I concede; by elicited appetite, I subdistinguish; by elicited appetite that is ordered, absolute, and efficacious, I concede; by elicited appetite that is disordered, conditioned, and inefficacious, I deny.

395. Hence a twofold appetite must be distinguished: one innate, the other elicited. Innate appetite is so called by analogy with elicited appetite, and can be defined as the ordering or propensity of nature toward some good, with no cognition of it presupposed. "It consists," says Suarez, "in the weight of nature, and therefore is common with other living things and with inanimate things; and in those things in which it exists, it exists perpetually... it does not state some thing, or a real mode distinct from natural potency; but through a metaphor explains the force and nature of the natural potency itself." But elicited appetite is a vital act tending toward a known good: "hence," says the same author, "it is proper to beings living animal or rational life; and is present only when the living being actually knows and operates."

396. Further, innate appetite is divided into innate appetite of exigency, and of simple capacity, or aptitude. The first is borne toward a good proportioned and owed to nature; if it cannot possess that good, nature will be miserable. But the other simply states a receptive potency for a good, although that good is not owed; and therefore if it is not possessed, nature will not be deprived of a perfection owed to it, nor will it be miserable. Innate appetite of aptitude corresponds, as is clear, to obediential potency.

397. Inefficacious, conditioned, imperfect elicited appetite exists and can be borne toward a good that is even unowed and impossible; likewise there can be a disordered appetite for a thing unowed or impossible. But efficacious, absolute, ordered elicited appetite cannot be borne except toward a good that is owed and possible. The fact that an unowed or impossible object cannot be attained does not make nature miserable; but if by a disordered elicited appetite someone desiring an impossible or unowed good becomes miserable, he will be such by his own fault, and this should in no way be attributed to the Author of nature.

398. With these things briefly noted, since we presuppose them from philosophy, one must say, 1. that there is in man an innate appetite for the intuitive vision, if it is understood of innate appetite of simple aptitude; for there is in man, as we have seen, obediential potency toward it.

2. But there is not in man a natural innate appetite of exigency toward the intuitive vision. For a) natural innate appetite of exigency is founded in a potency which is natural also in order to the object; but neither man nor any creature has such a potency for seeing God intuitively, as we proved; therefore. b) It is certain that a twofold beatitude is distinguished, natural and supernatural, and that the natural is desired by man by innate appetite of exigency; therefore by the same appetite the intuitive vision cannot be desired, since it is supernatural beatitude; otherwise that natural beatitude would not satisfy man's appetite, and so would not be beatitude. See Suarez, On the Ultimate End of Man, disp. 16, sect. 2, from n. 6.

3. There is not in man a natural, absolute, and efficacious elicited appetite for the intuitive vision. For a) if man naturally desired the intuitive vision in that way, then, if it were not obtained, human nature would be miserable; but if this were so, the intuitive vision would be natural and owed; therefore. b) The elicited appetite of which we are treating here is founded in innate appetite of exigency; but there is no such appetite in man toward the intuitive vision; therefore. c) "This efficacious appetite," says Suarez (l. c., sect. 3, n. 5), "virtually includes an absolute will of executing all the means necessary for attaining that beatitude; but man cannot have this will by his natural powers; for if he cannot naturally have an efficacious will of believing truths, and with supernatural faith, which is a necessary means, how will he be able to have another will which contains this one and several others?"

4. Conditioned and inefficacious elicited appetite for the intuitive vision can exist, as is clear from what has been said, not only in a man illumined by supernatural reason, but also in pure nature. Suarez nevertheless observes (l. c., n. 7): "There is only a twofold difference, because from revelation that beatitude is easily apprehended as a great good and as possible; yet from natural discourse alone it could scarcely fall into man's mind, but it would not be repugnant for it in some way and conditionally to be apprehended, that is, that it would be good to see the first cause, if it were possible. The second difference is that after it is established for man through revelation that he is ordered to that beatitude, man desires it with his whole affection, not indeed perfectly, but as much as he can, and he is not content or at rest outside it, at least on the way. But standing in pure nature, although man might conceive some conditioned desire of that vision, nevertheless, if he conducted himself prudently, he would not be restless, but would be content with his natural lot; just as man could also in that way desire to understand without discourse, yet that appetite would neither solicit nor disturb the soul, because it would know that this concerns a thing very alien from human nature." Compare the cited disputation 16 On the Ultimate End, and Prolegomenon 4 On Grace, c. 1.

399. I answer to the first confirmation: a) It was the common opinion of the Scholastics that man could have been created in pure natural things without destination to the intuitive vision. "This assertion," says Suarez (Prolegomenon 4, On Grace, c. 1, n. 16), "as I think, is common among theologians, although they rather suppose it than dispute it, by distinguishing various states of human nature and comparing them with one another." They also unanimously taught that the intuitive vision is simply supernatural. b) Some said that there is in us a natural innate appetite for the intuitive vision; but, as is clear from their doctrine, they were speaking of an appetite of mere aptitude. See Ripalda, On Supernatural Being, disp. 8, sect. 4. c) But since their true doctrine is established, the fact that some said some things less accurately is easily understood from this, that before the errors of Baius they were in tranquil possession of the truth.

400. I answer to the second confirmation. It is certain a) that St. Thomas accurately distinguished a twofold beatitude, natural and supernatural. "But the ultimate perfection," he says in I, q. 62, a. 1, "of rational or intellectual nature is twofold: one indeed which it can attain by the virtue of its own nature; and this is in some way called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle too, in Ethics 10, c. 8, says that man's most perfect contemplation, by which he can contemplate in this life the best intelligible, which is God, is man's ultimate happiness. But above this happiness there is another happiness, which we expect in the future, by which we shall see God as he is; and this indeed is above the nature of any created intellect, as was shown above."

b) He teaches that the intuitive vision in man could have been a simple lack and not a privation, in the state of pure nature. "Lack," he says in q. 4 De malo, "of the divine vision belongs to someone in two ways: in one way, such that he does not have from himself that by which he can arrive at the divine vision; and in this way lack of the divine vision would belong to one who was in natural things alone without sin. For in this way lack of the divine vision would not be punishment, but a defect following upon every created nature," etc.

c) He constantly teaches that the intuitive vision is supernatural with respect to man, angel, and any created nature whatsoever. It is enough to present what he splendidly writes in III Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, art. 4, q. 3: "The end to which divine generosity has ordered man, namely the enjoyment of himself, is elevated above the faculty of created nature, because eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him, as is said in 1 Corinthians 2. Hence through natural things alone man does not have a sufficient inclination toward that end." Aquinas explains the apostolic words with fuller commentary in these words. "Eye has not seen. It is shown that that glory of open vision is unknown by men in two ways. First, because it does not lie under the human senses, from which all human cognition takes its beginning. And he posits two senses: first, the sense of sight, which serves discovery, when he says that eye has not seen... And this is because it is not something colored and visible. Second, he posits the sense of hearing, which serves teaching, saying: Nor has ear heard, namely that glory itself, because it is not sound, nor a sensible voice. Then he excludes intellectual knowledge of it. Hence he says: Nor has it ascended into the heart of man... That is properly said to ascend into the heart of man which comes to man's intellect from something lower, for example from sensible things. For things are in the intellect according to its mode; therefore lower things are in the intellect in a higher mode than they are in themselves; and therefore, when they are grasped by the intellect, they in some way ascend into the heart. But those things which are above the intellect are in themselves in a higher mode than in the intellect; and therefore when they are grasped by the intellect, they in some way descend." See De Rubeis, On Original Sin, cap. 32.

d) He denies that there is an elicited natural, efficacious, absolute appetite for the intuitive vision, which would make man miserable if he did not attain it. "It must be known," he says in II Sent., dist. 33, q. 2, a. 1, "that from the fact that someone lacks that which exceeds his proportion, he is not afflicted, if he is of right reason; just as no wise man is afflicted that he cannot fly like a bird, or because he is not a king or emperor, since this is not owed to him. But he would be afflicted if he were deprived of that for the having of which he had aptitude in some way... But children were never proportioned to this, that they should have eternal life, because it was not owed to them from the principles of nature, since it exceeds every faculty of nature, nor could they have had proper acts by which they would attain so great a good; and therefore they will grieve in no way at all over the lack of the intuitive vision."

e) Therefore when St. Thomas says that there is in us a natural appetite for seeing God, it can be understood sometimes of innate appetite of mere aptitude; sometimes of inefficacious and conditioned elicited appetite; sometimes of absolute elicited appetite, but with elevation supposed. Hence for proving the possibility of the intuitive vision he also used the cognition which he had concerning it, with faith shining beforehand. Compare De Rubeis, op. cit., capp. 34-35.

401. I answer to the second objection. A twofold love of God must be distinguished: natural love, which follows the cognition which we naturally acquire concerning God through creatures; and supernatural love, which on the way requires beforehand the cognition of faith, and in the homeland the vision. This distinction of twofold love must be retained from propositions 34 and 36 condemned in Baius, and also from the bull Auctorem fidei, censure 24, in which one reads: "In that part, however, where between dominant cupidity and dominant charity no intermediate affections are posited, implanted by nature itself and praiseworthy by their own nature, which together with love of beatitude and natural propensity to good remained as the outermost outlines and remains of the image. From St. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, cap. 28. Just as if between divine love, which leads us to the kingdom, and illicit human love, which is condemned, there were not given a licit human love, which is not reprehended. From St. Augustine, sermon 349, On Charity, Maurist edition: false, otherwise condemned." But the things that are usually objected from St. Augustine are not for this place to weigh. See, if you wish, Faure, on chapters 1-2 of St. Augustine's Enchiridion.

402. NOTE. For resolving the difficulties that are usually sought from the Fathers, especially from St. Augustine, it will help 1. to note that the Fathers speak of the present state, in which certainly God must be loved by supernatural love so that we may be blessed; 2. to recall the various acceptations already handed down of the word "natural," for from this it will become plain in what sense the love of charity can or cannot be called natural; 3. to remember that St. Augustine often took the name charity to signify any good love whatever, to which therefore he rightly opposed cupidity, or bad love; 4. to observe that St. Augustine sometimes used an argument ad hominem against Pelagius. For Pelagius said that the intuitive vision is man's natural end, yet denied that little ones dying without baptism attain it; hence Augustine said, "why do you snatch away the patrimony from the innocent?" See Casini, op. cit., cap. 7.