LatineEnglish
Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Nonus.
Utrum ab Errore et a Peccato Veniali Immunes Fuerint Protoparentes.
Articulus Nonus.
Utrum ab Errore et a Peccato Veniali Immunes Fuerint Protoparentes.
330. Utramque hanc immunitatem simul complectimur, ut haec, quae sunt minoris momenti, paucis expedientes, statim quae ad finem supernaturalem pertinent aggredi possimus.
330. We comprehend both these immunities together, so that, by dispatching in a few words these things which are of lesser moment, we may at once approach those things which pertain to the supernatural end.
331. Quoad immunitatem ab errore, notandum est imprimis cum Suarez (de op. sex. dier. l. 3. c. 10. nn. 14. seq.), quod triplici modo potest error contingere in intellectu, nempe absque ulla culpa - cum culpa veniali - cum mortali. "Primo modo," inquit, "potest nunc homo errare speculative in judicio probabilis opinionis, in quo nihil peccat, quando prudenter se gerit, quamvis contingat judicium in re falsum esse. Secundo modo potest homo errare cum culpa veniali si ferat judicium imprudenter, et cum aliqua levi temeritate, sine alio gravi damno sui, vel alterius. Tertius modus deceptionis manifestum est in haeresi, et in judicio temerario contra honorem proximi, et similibus."
Jamvero videtur concedendum quod Adam potuerit in errorem incidere tertio modo: cum enim constet non fuisse in statu innocentiae immunem a libertate peccandi, nec ulla ratio sit excipiendi hoc peccatum; sequitur quod potuerit in errorem per grave peccatum incidere. Hoc autem, uti bene observat Suarez, non obstat quominus dicatur Adam in statu innocentiae non potuisse decipi; siquidem "vi illius voluntatis peccaminosae ab illo statu caderet, et ita prius esset peccator, quam judicium erroneum haberet." - Patebit ex inferius dicendis hominem in statu innocentiae non potuisse committere peccatum veniale; ideoque nec poterat secundo modo in errorem incidere. Superest ergo quaestio de errore, in quem quis incideret absque ulla culpa.
Jamvero videtur concedendum quod Adam potuerit in errorem incidere tertio modo: cum enim constet non fuisse in statu innocentiae immunem a libertate peccandi, nec ulla ratio sit excipiendi hoc peccatum; sequitur quod potuerit in errorem per grave peccatum incidere. Hoc autem, uti bene observat Suarez, non obstat quominus dicatur Adam in statu innocentiae non potuisse decipi; siquidem "vi illius voluntatis peccaminosae ab illo statu caderet, et ita prius esset peccator, quam judicium erroneum haberet." - Patebit ex inferius dicendis hominem in statu innocentiae non potuisse committere peccatum veniale; ideoque nec poterat secundo modo in errorem incidere. Superest ergo quaestio de errore, in quem quis incideret absque ulla culpa.
331. With respect to immunity from error, it must first be noted with Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 10, nn. 14 ff.) that error can occur in the intellect in three ways, namely without any fault, with venial fault, and with mortal fault. "In the first way," he says, "man can now err speculatively in the judgment of a probable opinion, in which he sins in nothing when he conducts himself prudently, although it happens that the judgment is false in reality. In the second way man can err with venial fault if he forms a judgment imprudently and with some slight rashness, without other grave harm to himself or another. The third mode of deception is manifest in heresy, and in a rash judgment against the honor of a neighbor, and in similar things."
Now it seems it must be conceded that Adam could have fallen into error in the third way; for since it is established that in the state of innocence he was not immune from freedom of sinning, and there is no reason to except this sin, it follows that he could have fallen into error through grave sin. But this, as Suarez well observes, does not prevent it from being said that Adam in the state of innocence could not have been deceived; since "by force of that sinful will he would fall from that state, and thus he would be a sinner before he had an erroneous judgment." - It will be clear from the things to be said below that man in the state of innocence could not commit venial sin; and therefore neither could he fall into error in the second way. Therefore the question remains concerning error into which someone would fall without any fault.
Now it seems it must be conceded that Adam could have fallen into error in the third way; for since it is established that in the state of innocence he was not immune from freedom of sinning, and there is no reason to except this sin, it follows that he could have fallen into error through grave sin. But this, as Suarez well observes, does not prevent it from being said that Adam in the state of innocence could not have been deceived; since "by force of that sinful will he would fall from that state, and thus he would be a sinner before he had an erroneous judgment." - It will be clear from the things to be said below that man in the state of innocence could not commit venial sin; and therefore neither could he fall into error in the second way. Therefore the question remains concerning error into which someone would fall without any fault.
332. Est sententia communis, vera et tenenda, juxta Suarez (l. c. n. 3.), quod Adam in statu innocentiae non poterat absque ulla culpa errare. Nam:
a) S. Augustinus (de lib. arb. l. 3. c. 18.), dicit: "Approbare falsa pro veris, ut erret invitus, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati." Et l. lib. retract. cap. 9. confirmat ignorantiam, et difficultatem esse poenas primi peccati, nulla autem est deterior ignorantia, quam error. Et in Enchirid. c. 16. et sequentibus, ex professo probat, quemcumque errorem etiam in materia levissima inter mala hujus vitae deputandum esse, et ad quandam miseriam pertinere, ut in cap. 21. dicit. At vero lib. 14. de Civit. cap. 10. dicit, non interveniente peccato nullum malum potuisse in primis hominibus inveniri. Ac denique lib. 11. Gen. ad liter. cap. 30. dicit, non fuisse Evam a serpente decipiendam, nisi jam per superbiam peccasset, in quo supponit, ante peccatum decipi non potuisse.
b) D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 4. c. ait: "Ut Augustinus dicit 14. de Civitate Dei cap. 10. ante med., 'in illo statu erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente nullum malum omnino esse poterat.' Manifestum est autem quod sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum ejus, ut dicitur in 6. Ethicorum, cap. 2. Unde non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicujus, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat: ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicujus, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi." Cf. h. art., et Suarez cit. c. 10.
a) S. Augustinus (de lib. arb. l. 3. c. 18.), dicit: "Approbare falsa pro veris, ut erret invitus, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati." Et l. lib. retract. cap. 9. confirmat ignorantiam, et difficultatem esse poenas primi peccati, nulla autem est deterior ignorantia, quam error. Et in Enchirid. c. 16. et sequentibus, ex professo probat, quemcumque errorem etiam in materia levissima inter mala hujus vitae deputandum esse, et ad quandam miseriam pertinere, ut in cap. 21. dicit. At vero lib. 14. de Civit. cap. 10. dicit, non interveniente peccato nullum malum potuisse in primis hominibus inveniri. Ac denique lib. 11. Gen. ad liter. cap. 30. dicit, non fuisse Evam a serpente decipiendam, nisi jam per superbiam peccasset, in quo supponit, ante peccatum decipi non potuisse.
b) D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 4. c. ait: "Ut Augustinus dicit 14. de Civitate Dei cap. 10. ante med., 'in illo statu erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente nullum malum omnino esse poterat.' Manifestum est autem quod sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum ejus, ut dicitur in 6. Ethicorum, cap. 2. Unde non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicujus, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat: ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicujus, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi." Cf. h. art., et Suarez cit. c. 10.
332. It is the common, true, and to-be-held opinion, according to Suarez (cited place, n. 3), that Adam in the state of innocence could not err without any fault. For:
a) St. Augustine (On Free Choice, book 3, chapter 18) says: "To approve false things as true, so that one errs unwillingly, is not the nature of instituted man, but the punishment of condemned man." And in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 9, he confirms that ignorance and difficulty are punishments of the first sin, but there is no ignorance worse than error. And in the Enchiridion, chapter 16 and following, he explicitly proves that any error, even in the lightest matter, is to be reckoned among the evils of this life and pertains to a certain misery, as he says in chapter 21. But in book 14 of The City, chapter 10, he says that, sin not intervening, no evil could have been found in the first human beings. And finally in book 11 of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 30, he says that Eve would not have been deceived by the serpent unless she had already sinned through pride, in which he supposes that before sin she could not have been deceived.
b) St. Thomas, I, q. 94, a. 4, corpus, says: "As Augustine says in book 14 of The City of God, chapter 10, before the middle, 'in that state there was a tranquil avoidance of sin, and while this remained there could be no evil at all.' But it is manifest that, just as the true is the good of the intellect, so the false is its evil, as is said in book 6 of the Ethics, chapter 2. Hence it could not be that, while innocence remained, the intellect of man would assent to something false as though true. For just as in the members of the body of the first man there was indeed the lack of some perfection, for instance brightness, yet no evil could be present; so in the intellect there could be lack of some knowledge, yet there could be there no estimation of the false." Compare this article and Suarez, cited chapter 10.
a) St. Augustine (On Free Choice, book 3, chapter 18) says: "To approve false things as true, so that one errs unwillingly, is not the nature of instituted man, but the punishment of condemned man." And in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 9, he confirms that ignorance and difficulty are punishments of the first sin, but there is no ignorance worse than error. And in the Enchiridion, chapter 16 and following, he explicitly proves that any error, even in the lightest matter, is to be reckoned among the evils of this life and pertains to a certain misery, as he says in chapter 21. But in book 14 of The City, chapter 10, he says that, sin not intervening, no evil could have been found in the first human beings. And finally in book 11 of On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 30, he says that Eve would not have been deceived by the serpent unless she had already sinned through pride, in which he supposes that before sin she could not have been deceived.
b) St. Thomas, I, q. 94, a. 4, corpus, says: "As Augustine says in book 14 of The City of God, chapter 10, before the middle, 'in that state there was a tranquil avoidance of sin, and while this remained there could be no evil at all.' But it is manifest that, just as the true is the good of the intellect, so the false is its evil, as is said in book 6 of the Ethics, chapter 2. Hence it could not be that, while innocence remained, the intellect of man would assent to something false as though true. For just as in the members of the body of the first man there was indeed the lack of some perfection, for instance brightness, yet no evil could be present; so in the intellect there could be lack of some knowledge, yet there could be there no estimation of the false." Compare this article and Suarez, cited chapter 10.
333. Praeter dona scientiae et immunitatis ab errore, quibus mirifice perficiebatur intellectus protoparentum, infudit certe illis Deus omnimodam rectitudinem in voluntate. - Et quidem, si sermo sit de rectitudine supernaturali, nihil est quod hic addamus post ea quae diximus de gratia sanctificante et charitate. - Duplex autem perfectio, seu rectitudo naturalis in voluntate considerari potest - prima dicitur innocentiae, quae consistit in carentia omnis culpae: nemini dubium est hanc habuisse Adam - altera dicitur virtutis positivae, quae consistit in habitibus studiosis rectis ordinis naturalis, seu in hujus ordinis virtutibus.
333. Besides the gifts of knowledge and immunity from error, by which the intellect of the first parents was wonderfully perfected, God certainly infused into them every sort of rectitude in the will. And indeed, if the discussion is about supernatural rectitude, there is nothing here for us to add after the things which we have said concerning sanctifying grace and charity. But a twofold perfection, or natural rectitude, can be considered in the will: the first is called the perfection of innocence, which consists in the lack of every fault; no one doubts that Adam had this. The other is called the perfection of positive virtue, which consists in right virtuous habits of the natural order, or in the virtues of this order.
334. Jamvero certum est etiam hominem ante peccatum habuisse omnes virtutes morales, quae per actus bonos naturalis ordinis acquiri possunt, quae proinde fuerunt infusae tantum per accidens. Nam a) virtutes ex suo genere acquisitae perficiunt et complent rectitudinem voluntatis, per quam voluntas rectae rationi naturali est subjecta, atque recte disposita est ad appetitum inferiorem in officio honestatis continendum; atqui habuit Adam hanc perfectissimam rectitudinem. Ergo. - b) Ad perfectionem simpliciter hominis magis pertinent virtutes morales, quam scientia rerum naturalium; unde quamvis aliqui Theologi dubitent de scientia acquisita, conveniunt omnes quod virtutes morales infusae per accidens fuerunt in anima Christi a primo instanti suae conceptionis. Atqui infusa fuit Adamo scientia rerum naturalium. Ergo.
334. Now it is also certain that man before sin had all the moral virtues which can be acquired through good acts of the natural order, and which consequently were infused only by accident. For a) virtues acquired from their own genus perfect and complete the rectitude of the will, through which the will is subject to right natural reason and is rightly disposed for keeping the lower appetite in the office of honesty; but Adam had this most perfect rectitude. Therefore. b) Moral virtues pertain more to the perfection of man simply than knowledge of natural things does; hence although some theologians doubt concerning acquired knowledge, all agree that moral virtues infused by accident were in the soul of Christ from the first instant of his conception. But knowledge of natural things was infused into Adam. Therefore.
335. Unica in hac re difficultas est: deficiente objecto alicujus virtutis, deest ipsa virtus; sed aliquarum moralium virtutum objectum deficiebat in statu justitiae originalis; ergo. Deficiebat, ex. gr., objectum poenitentiae, quod est peccatum commissum - objectum misericordiae, quia nulla erat miseria, etc.
335. The only difficulty in this matter is: when the object of some virtue is lacking, the virtue itself is lacking; but the object of some moral virtues was lacking in the state of original justice; therefore. For example, the object of penitence was lacking, which is committed sin; the object of mercy, because there was no misery, etc.
336. Resp. tamen 1. Virtutes sunt habitus; habitus autem bene stare possunt sine actu. Nam a) habitus est prior, et bene disponit hominem ad actum, sive illum effecturus sit sive non. b) Habitus non respicit materiam ut praesentem vel futuram, sed tantum ut possibilem; et ita habere poterat locum cujuslibet virtutis materia in statu innocentiae. c) Possibile erat homini innocenti amittere illum statum, quem de facto amisit; et ita utile erat habere virtutes per accidens infusas, de quibus agimus, quae in illo manerent si caderet, ut de facto manserunt. Unde merito D. Thomas 1. p. q. 95. a. 3. c. ait: "Si vero imperfectio, quae est de ratione virtutis alicujus, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat hujusmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, et non secundum actum, ut patet de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena. Perfectioni autem primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde hujusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, et non secundum actum. Erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro posse repelleret: sicut Philosophus dicit, in Ethic., c. ult. in fin., quod 'verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, contingit studioso solum sub conditione; est enim sic dispositus quod verecundaretur, si turpe aliquid committeret.'"
Resp. 2. Imo notat Suarez quod possent etiam aliqui actus earum virtutum in statu innocentiae elici. "Potuisset (Adam) primo exercere actus internos conditionatos, ut in poenitentia esset hic actus, si peccarem dolerem, in misericordia, si proximus indigeret, illi subvenirem. Secundo posset exercere actus complacentiae circa honestatem objectivam talium virtutum. Tertio specialiter virtus poenitentiae, quamvis non posset detestari malum commissum, ut probat ratio facta, posset odio habere peccatum, quod offertur ut committendum, et habere voluntatem non faciendi Deo injuriam. Misericordia etiam non semper, per se requirit dolorem in miserente, nam voluntas sublevandi miserum, si absque dolore haberi possit, revera erit actus misericordiae. Hoc autem modo si status innocentiae duraret, posset unus homo cadere, et alter innocens habere voluntatem subveniendi illi, cum displicentia de malo ejus, quae posset haberi sine tristitia, vel dolore." Cf. Suarez (de op. sex dier. c. 11.)
Resp. 2. Imo notat Suarez quod possent etiam aliqui actus earum virtutum in statu innocentiae elici. "Potuisset (Adam) primo exercere actus internos conditionatos, ut in poenitentia esset hic actus, si peccarem dolerem, in misericordia, si proximus indigeret, illi subvenirem. Secundo posset exercere actus complacentiae circa honestatem objectivam talium virtutum. Tertio specialiter virtus poenitentiae, quamvis non posset detestari malum commissum, ut probat ratio facta, posset odio habere peccatum, quod offertur ut committendum, et habere voluntatem non faciendi Deo injuriam. Misericordia etiam non semper, per se requirit dolorem in miserente, nam voluntas sublevandi miserum, si absque dolore haberi possit, revera erit actus misericordiae. Hoc autem modo si status innocentiae duraret, posset unus homo cadere, et alter innocens habere voluntatem subveniendi illi, cum displicentia de malo ejus, quae posset haberi sine tristitia, vel dolore." Cf. Suarez (de op. sex dier. c. 11.)
336. Nevertheless I reply, first: virtues are habits; but habits can well stand without act. For a) a habit is prior and disposes man well toward an act, whether he is going to effect that act or not. b) A habit does not regard matter as present or future, but only as possible; and thus the matter of any virtue could have a place in the state of innocence. c) It was possible for innocent man to lose that state, which in fact he lost; and thus it was useful to have the virtues infused by accident, of which we are speaking, which would remain in him if he fell, as in fact they did remain. Hence St. Thomas rightly says, I, q. 95, a. 3, corpus: "But if the imperfection which belongs to the account of some virtue is repugnant to the perfection of the first state, such a virtue could exist there according to habit, and not according to act, as is clear concerning penitence, which is sorrow over committed sin, and concerning mercy, which is sorrow over another's misery. But both sorrow and fault and misery are repugnant to the perfection of the first state. Hence virtues of this kind were in the first man according to habit, and not according to act. For the first man was so disposed that if sin had preceded, he would grieve; and similarly if he saw misery in another, he would repel it as far as he could: just as the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, the last chapter, at the end, that 'shame, which concerns a base deed, happens to the virtuous man only under a condition; for he is so disposed that he would be ashamed if he committed something base.'"
Reply 2. Indeed Suarez notes that some acts of those virtues could also be elicited in the state of innocence. "First, Adam could have exercised conditioned internal acts, so that in penitence there would be this act: if I sinned, I would grieve; in mercy: if my neighbor were in need, I would help him. Secondly, he could exercise acts of complacency concerning the objective honesty of such virtues. Thirdly, especially the virtue of penitence, although it could not detest an evil committed, as the reason given proves, could hate sin which is offered as something to be committed, and have the will not to do injury to God. Mercy also does not always, of itself, require sorrow in the one having mercy; for the will to relieve the miserable, if it can be had without sorrow, will truly be an act of mercy. But in this way, if the state of innocence endured, one man could fall and another innocent man could have the will to help him, with displeasure concerning his evil, which could be had without sadness or sorrow." Compare Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, chapter 11).
Reply 2. Indeed Suarez notes that some acts of those virtues could also be elicited in the state of innocence. "First, Adam could have exercised conditioned internal acts, so that in penitence there would be this act: if I sinned, I would grieve; in mercy: if my neighbor were in need, I would help him. Secondly, he could exercise acts of complacency concerning the objective honesty of such virtues. Thirdly, especially the virtue of penitence, although it could not detest an evil committed, as the reason given proves, could hate sin which is offered as something to be committed, and have the will not to do injury to God. Mercy also does not always, of itself, require sorrow in the one having mercy; for the will to relieve the miserable, if it can be had without sorrow, will truly be an act of mercy. But in this way, if the state of innocence endured, one man could fall and another innocent man could have the will to help him, with displeasure concerning his evil, which could be had without sadness or sorrow." Compare Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, chapter 11).
337. Sed hanc rectitudinem primam hominis cumulavit Deus dono exemptionis a peccato veniali. Quod, ut bene intelligatur, notandum est imprimis, peccatum veniale duplici modo committi posse: vel ex surreptione, quatenus ex imperfecta deliberatione per motum aliquem illam praevenientem committitur, uti contingere potest etiam in materia gravi; vel cum perfecta deliberatione fit, et ideo solum in materia levi locum habet. - Scotus docuit potuisse hominem in statu innocentiae peccare venialiter utroque modo. Altisiodorensis tenuit potuisse venialiter peccare cum plena deliberatione, sed non ex surreptione: tertia sententia, quam D. Thomas, D. Bonaventura, Suarez vocant communem, asserit nullo modo potuisse hominem in statu justitiae originalis venialiter peccare. "Communiter ponitur," inquit D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 89. a. 3., "quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit venialiter peccare ... Sic ergo intelligendum est quod non potuit peccare venialiter, quia non potuit esse ut committeret aliquid quod esset de se peccatum veniale, antequam integritatem primi status amitteret, peccando mortaliter." Probatur autem.
a) Quoad venialia ex surreptione argumento D. Thomae l. c. "Peccatum veniale ex surreptione contingit propter imperfectionem actus; imperfectio autem actus contingit propter quemdam defectum ordinis ex eo quod inferius non continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non est omnino subdita rationi; quod vero insurgat subitus motus in ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus rationis non subditur deliberationi, quae est ex altiori bono. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in 1. habitum est, quaest. 95. art. 1. erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur sub superiori, quamdiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut etiam Augustinus dicit 14. de Civit. Dei, cap. 13. et ideo oportebat quod inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale."
b) Quoad omnia peccata venialia. Si conferantur quae diximus de justitia originali (in qua gratia sanctificans est veluti radix et fundamentum caeterorum donorum) cum iis, quae diximus art. 7. hujus disp., praesertim ex Aug., patet Deum statuisse ut status ille justitiae illaesus et integer permaneret, quamdiu homo non averteretur ab ultimo fine; atqui si potuisset homo in eo statu peccatum veniale quocumque modo committere, status justitiae non mansisset integer et illaesus; ergo.
Prob. min. 1. Ipsum peccatum veniale est formaliter diminutio quaedam illius status, siquidem est diminutio rectitudinis. 2. Peccatum veniale est objectum doloris et tristitiae; sed in illo statu nullus erat dolor, nulla tristitia. - 3. Immunitas ab omni poena pertinebat ad illum statum; sed per peccatum veniale fit homo reus alicujus poenae.
Unde praeclare Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 13. n. 24.) rem concludit, dicens: "Vivebat," inquit (Augustinus), "homo in Paradiso, sicut volebat, quamdiu hoc volebat, quod Deus jusserat, vivebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus: vivebat sine ulla egestate." Quod verbum ultimum ponderari potest, nam pejus peccatum veniale est, quam quaelibet egestas, imo ipsummet veniale peccatum magna est miseria. Addit infra, "Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas." Quomodo autem animus sapiens, et justus cum peccato veniali posset esse tranquillus? Et si in corpore summa sanitas, cur non magis in anima? at ubi est peccatum veniale, non est summa animae sanitas. Et subjunxit inferius, "Nihil omnino triste, nihil inaniter laetum." Est autem inanis laetitia quoddam genus venialis peccati; ergo, sicut hoc ab illo statu August. excludit, ita censet de reliquis, est enim eadem ratio. Cf. integrum cit. cap. ex Suarez.
a) Quoad venialia ex surreptione argumento D. Thomae l. c. "Peccatum veniale ex surreptione contingit propter imperfectionem actus; imperfectio autem actus contingit propter quemdam defectum ordinis ex eo quod inferius non continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non est omnino subdita rationi; quod vero insurgat subitus motus in ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus rationis non subditur deliberationi, quae est ex altiori bono. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in 1. habitum est, quaest. 95. art. 1. erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur sub superiori, quamdiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut etiam Augustinus dicit 14. de Civit. Dei, cap. 13. et ideo oportebat quod inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale."
b) Quoad omnia peccata venialia. Si conferantur quae diximus de justitia originali (in qua gratia sanctificans est veluti radix et fundamentum caeterorum donorum) cum iis, quae diximus art. 7. hujus disp., praesertim ex Aug., patet Deum statuisse ut status ille justitiae illaesus et integer permaneret, quamdiu homo non averteretur ab ultimo fine; atqui si potuisset homo in eo statu peccatum veniale quocumque modo committere, status justitiae non mansisset integer et illaesus; ergo.
Prob. min. 1. Ipsum peccatum veniale est formaliter diminutio quaedam illius status, siquidem est diminutio rectitudinis. 2. Peccatum veniale est objectum doloris et tristitiae; sed in illo statu nullus erat dolor, nulla tristitia. - 3. Immunitas ab omni poena pertinebat ad illum statum; sed per peccatum veniale fit homo reus alicujus poenae.
Unde praeclare Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 13. n. 24.) rem concludit, dicens: "Vivebat," inquit (Augustinus), "homo in Paradiso, sicut volebat, quamdiu hoc volebat, quod Deus jusserat, vivebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus: vivebat sine ulla egestate." Quod verbum ultimum ponderari potest, nam pejus peccatum veniale est, quam quaelibet egestas, imo ipsummet veniale peccatum magna est miseria. Addit infra, "Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas." Quomodo autem animus sapiens, et justus cum peccato veniali posset esse tranquillus? Et si in corpore summa sanitas, cur non magis in anima? at ubi est peccatum veniale, non est summa animae sanitas. Et subjunxit inferius, "Nihil omnino triste, nihil inaniter laetum." Est autem inanis laetitia quoddam genus venialis peccati; ergo, sicut hoc ab illo statu August. excludit, ita censet de reliquis, est enim eadem ratio. Cf. integrum cit. cap. ex Suarez.
337. But God heaped up this first rectitude of man with the gift of exemption from venial sin. In order that this may be well understood, it must first be noted that venial sin can be committed in two ways: either by surreption, insofar as it is committed from imperfect deliberation through some motion anticipating that deliberation, as can happen even in grave matter; or it happens with perfect deliberation, and therefore has place only in light matter. Scotus taught that man in the state of innocence could have sinned venially in each way. The Altisiodorensian held that he could have sinned venially with full deliberation, but not by surreption. The third opinion, which St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Suarez call common, asserts that man in the state of original justice could in no way have sinned venially. "It is commonly posited," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89, a. 3, "that man in the state of innocence could not sin venially ... Therefore it must be understood in this way, that he could not sin venially, because it could not be that he would commit something which of itself was venial sin before he lost the integrity of the first state by sinning mortally." But it is proved:
a) With respect to venial sins by surreption, by the argument of St. Thomas in the cited place. "Venial sin by surreption occurs on account of the imperfection of the act; but imperfection of the act occurs on account of a certain defect of order, from the fact that the lower is not firmly contained under the higher. For that a sudden motion of sensuality rises up in us happens from the fact that sensuality is not altogether subject to reason; but that a sudden motion rises up in reason itself arises in us from the fact that the very execution of the act of reason is not subjected to deliberation, which is from a higher good. But in the state of innocence, as was held in I, q. 95, a. 1, there was infallible firmness of order, so that the lower was always contained under the higher, as long as man's highest part was contained under God, as Augustine also says in book 14 of The City of God, chapter 13. And therefore disorder in man had to exist only if it began from this, that man's highest part was not subject to God; which happens through mortal sin."
b) With respect to all venial sins. If the things which we have said concerning original justice, in which sanctifying grace is as it were the root and foundation of the other gifts, are compared with those things which we said in article 7 of this disputation, especially from Augustine, it is clear that God established that that state of justice should remain unharmed and whole as long as man did not turn away from the last end. But if man in that state could have committed venial sin in any way whatever, the state of justice would not have remained whole and unharmed. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. 1. Venial sin itself is formally a certain diminution of that state, since it is a diminution of rectitude. 2. Venial sin is the object of sorrow and sadness; but in that state there was no sorrow, no sadness. 3. Immunity from every punishment pertained to that state; but through venial sin man becomes guilty of some punishment.
Hence Suarez excellently concludes the matter (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 13, n. 24), saying: "Man lived," says Augustine, "in Paradise as he wished, as long as he wished what God had commanded; he lived enjoying God, from whose good he was good; he lived without any want." This last word can be weighed, for venial sin is worse than any want whatever; indeed venial sin itself is a great misery. He adds below, "Highest health in the flesh, entire tranquillity in the soul." But how could a wise and just soul be tranquil with venial sin? And if there was highest health in the body, why not more so in the soul? But where there is venial sin, there is not highest health of soul. And he adds below, "Nothing at all sad, nothing vainly glad." But vain gladness is a certain kind of venial sin; therefore, just as Augustine excludes this from that state, so he judges concerning the rest, for the reason is the same. Compare the whole cited chapter from Suarez.
a) With respect to venial sins by surreption, by the argument of St. Thomas in the cited place. "Venial sin by surreption occurs on account of the imperfection of the act; but imperfection of the act occurs on account of a certain defect of order, from the fact that the lower is not firmly contained under the higher. For that a sudden motion of sensuality rises up in us happens from the fact that sensuality is not altogether subject to reason; but that a sudden motion rises up in reason itself arises in us from the fact that the very execution of the act of reason is not subjected to deliberation, which is from a higher good. But in the state of innocence, as was held in I, q. 95, a. 1, there was infallible firmness of order, so that the lower was always contained under the higher, as long as man's highest part was contained under God, as Augustine also says in book 14 of The City of God, chapter 13. And therefore disorder in man had to exist only if it began from this, that man's highest part was not subject to God; which happens through mortal sin."
b) With respect to all venial sins. If the things which we have said concerning original justice, in which sanctifying grace is as it were the root and foundation of the other gifts, are compared with those things which we said in article 7 of this disputation, especially from Augustine, it is clear that God established that that state of justice should remain unharmed and whole as long as man did not turn away from the last end. But if man in that state could have committed venial sin in any way whatever, the state of justice would not have remained whole and unharmed. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. 1. Venial sin itself is formally a certain diminution of that state, since it is a diminution of rectitude. 2. Venial sin is the object of sorrow and sadness; but in that state there was no sorrow, no sadness. 3. Immunity from every punishment pertained to that state; but through venial sin man becomes guilty of some punishment.
Hence Suarez excellently concludes the matter (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 13, n. 24), saying: "Man lived," says Augustine, "in Paradise as he wished, as long as he wished what God had commanded; he lived enjoying God, from whose good he was good; he lived without any want." This last word can be weighed, for venial sin is worse than any want whatever; indeed venial sin itself is a great misery. He adds below, "Highest health in the flesh, entire tranquillity in the soul." But how could a wise and just soul be tranquil with venial sin? And if there was highest health in the body, why not more so in the soul? But where there is venial sin, there is not highest health of soul. And he adds below, "Nothing at all sad, nothing vainly glad." But vain gladness is a certain kind of venial sin; therefore, just as Augustine excludes this from that state, so he judges concerning the rest, for the reason is the same. Compare the whole cited chapter from Suarez.