LatineEnglish
Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Octavus.
De Scientia Primi Hominis in Statu Innocentiae.
Articulus Octavus.
De Scientia Primi Hominis in Statu Innocentiae.
318. Quaerimus in hoc articulo utrum inter caetera dona, quibus Deus cumulavit primum hominem, fuerit etiam donum scientiae, simul ejus naturam investigando. Cum autem scientia possit esse naturalis et supernaturalis; de utraque distinctis paragraphis agemus.
318. In this article we ask whether, among the other gifts with which God heaped up the first man, there was also the gift of knowledge, while at the same time investigating its nature. But since knowledge can be natural and supernatural, we shall treat each in distinct paragraphs.
§ I.
Utrum Adam Habuerit Scientiam Rerum Naturalium.
Utrum Adam Habuerit Scientiam Rerum Naturalium.
§ I.
Whether Adam Had Knowledge Of Natural Things.
Whether Adam Had Knowledge Of Natural Things.
319. Est communis et certa sententia habuisse Adam statim ac creatus fuit naturalem scientiam sibi a Deo inditam. Antequam illam sententiam probemus, pauca praenotamus de natura et objecto illius scientiae.
319. It is the common and certain opinion that Adam, as soon as he was created, had natural knowledge implanted in him by God. Before we prove that opinion, we make a few preliminary notes concerning the nature and object of that knowledge.
320. Ac imprimis quoad naturam, scientia rerum naturalium Adae indita fuit secundum essentiam ejusdem speciei cum scientia, quae discursu et inventione humana acquiri potest; ac proinde fuit supernaturalis quoad modum, sed non quoad substantiam; infusa non per se, sed per accidens. "Primus homo," inquit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 3. ad 1., "habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo infusas; nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra, sicut nec oculi quos caeco nato Christus dedit fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit." Revera illa scientia data est Adae, ut perficeretur intellectus ejus in naturali ordine et secundum naturalem appetitum sciendi, ut videbimus; sufficit ergo si fuerit quoad substantiam naturalis quamvis ex dono Dei fuerit infusa.
320. And first, with respect to its nature, the knowledge of natural things implanted in Adam was, according to its essence, of the same species as the knowledge which can be acquired by human discourse and discovery; and consequently it was supernatural with respect to mode, but not with respect to substance; infused not per se, but by accident. "The first man," says St. Thomas, I, q. 94, a. 3, ad 1, "had knowledge of all things through species infused by God; nor nevertheless was that knowledge of another account than our knowledge, just as neither were the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind of another account than the eyes which nature produced." In reality that knowledge was given to Adam so that his intellect might be perfected in the natural order and according to the natural appetite for knowing, as we shall see; therefore it is sufficient if it was natural with respect to substance, although by the gift of God it was infused.
321. Ex hoc merito infert Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 9. n. 7.), 1. quod simul cum habitu hujus scientiae infudit Deus Adamo species intelligibiles, sine quibus non poterat habitus ille in actum prodire; dicere enim quod Adam debuerit ipse sua industria acquirere species necessarias, ut uteretur sua scientia, esset contrarium fini, propter quem scientia illa infundebatur, et alienum a perfecto modo operandi Dei, uti patebit ex probationibus thesis. - 2. Quod species illae, quamvis infusae, tales nihilo minus fuerunt, quales solent per sensus accipi et a phantasmatibus abstrahi; species enim debent esse proportionatae habitui. - 3. Quod scientia illa, quoad usum, debuit habere dependentiam a phantasmatibus; connaturale est enim animae conjunctae intelligere concomitante phantasmate. - 4. Quod consequenter fuerunt "Adae etiam infusa in interno sensu, seu phantasia, vel cogitativa omnia phantasmata ad usum illius scientiae necessaria." - 5. Quod scientia naturalis Adami erat, sicut nostra, discursiva. Qua in re notandum est quod discursus potest esse vel causalis seu illativus, vel successivus. In scientia primi hominis erat certe primus discursus, ac proinde quamvis simul tempore cognosceret, ex. gr., effectus et Deum; ex effectibus tamen cognoscebat Deum. Si vero de eadem Dei cognitione naturali agatur, dici potest quod erat in Adamo innocente sine discursu successivo; cum enim Adam jam haberet species rerum et habitum perfectum, et alias contemplari posset effectum, ex. gr., seipsum, et Deum per modum unius; simul poterat effectum et Deum ex effectu cognoscere. Atque ita intelligitur quod docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 94, a. 1. ad 3., dicens: "Non oportebat primum hominem pervenire in Dei cognitionem per demonstrationem sumptam ab aliquo effectu; sicut nobis est necessarium; sed simul in effectibus, praecipue intelligibilibus, suo modo Deum cognoscebat."
321. From this Suarez rightly infers (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 9, n. 7), 1. that together with the habit of this knowledge God infused into Adam intelligible species, without which that habit could not proceed into act; for to say that Adam had to acquire by his own industry the species necessary for using his knowledge would be contrary to the end on account of which that knowledge was being infused, and alien to the perfect mode of God's working, as will be clear from the proofs of the thesis. - 2. That those species, although infused, nevertheless were such as are customarily received through the senses and abstracted from phantasms; for species ought to be proportioned to the habit. - 3. That this knowledge, with respect to use, had to have dependence on phantasms; for it is connatural to the joined soul to understand with an accompanying phantasm. - 4. That consequently there were also infused into Adam, in the internal sense, or phantasy, or cogitative power, all phantasms necessary for the use of that knowledge. - 5. That Adam's natural knowledge was, like ours, discursive. In this matter it must be noted that discourse can be either causal or illative, or successive. In the knowledge of the first man there certainly was the first discourse, and consequently although he knew at the same time, for example, effects and God, nevertheless he knew God from effects. But if the discussion concerns the same natural knowledge of God, it can be said that it was in innocent Adam without successive discourse; for since Adam already had the species of things and a perfect habit, and at other times could contemplate an effect, for example himself, and God after the mode of one thing, he could at the same time know the effect and God from the effect. And in this way one understands what St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 94, a. 1, ad 3, saying: "It was not necessary for the first man to arrive at knowledge of God through a demonstration taken from some effect, as is necessary for us; but at the same time in effects, especially intelligible ones, he knew God in his own mode."
322. Quoad objectum vero naturalis scientiae Adamo infusae, docet D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 3. c.: "Primus homo sic institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare, ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et haec sunt omnia illa quae virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quaecumque scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt." - Quod exponens Suarez (l. c. n. 11.), inquit: "In eo gradu, in quo scientia ab hominibus acquiri potest, Adamus illam perfectam habuit, et quidquid vel unus, vel plures homines longo tempore, et magna industria, ac multiplici observatione de caelis, aut elementis, aut mixtis consequi possent, id totum per hanc scientiam Adamo inditum est. Et e contrario quod humana diligentia, et virtute sciri non potest inquirendo, sub illa etiam scientia comprehensum non est."
322. But with respect to the object of the natural knowledge infused into Adam, St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 94, a. 3, corpus: "The first man was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the body, so that at once he could generate; so also he was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the soul, so that at once he could instruct and govern others. But no one can instruct unless he has knowledge. And therefore the first man was so instituted by God that he had knowledge of all things in which man is born to be instructed. And these are all those things which virtually exist in the first principles known through themselves, namely whatever things men can know naturally." - Explaining this, Suarez says (cited place, n. 11): "In that degree in which knowledge can be acquired by men, Adam had it perfect; and whatever one or more men, over a long time and with great industry and manifold observation, could attain concerning the heavens, or the elements, or mixed bodies, all that was implanted in Adam through this knowledge. And, conversely, what cannot be known by human diligence and power by inquiry was not comprehended under that knowledge either."
323. Unde sequitur 1. quod Adam non cognovit futura libera contingentia et aliorum hominum internas cogitationes: haec enim objecta non cadunt sub humanam scientiam.
Sequitur 2. quod Adam habuit scientiam de Deo, uti patet. Cognovit etiam Angelorum existentiam. Philosophi enim gentiles agnoverunt existentiam substantiarum spiritualium; atque hanc notitiam hausisse etiam videntur "ex sensibilibus effectibus, qui virtute daemonum, vel aliorum spirituum fiunt:" ergo Adam per naturalem scientiam sibi inditam, saltem magna probabilitate et vehementi conjectura, id assequi potuit. Notat tamen Suarez (l. c. n. 20.): "Utraque tamen cognitio (de possibilitate et existentia Angelorum) erat per conceptus universales, quia Angeli utroque modo ex vi effectuum solum concipiuntur sub ratione substantiae spiritualis, intellectualis, et creatae, ac completae, et independentis a corpore in sua cognitione, sicut etiam in esse, et in eo gradu cognoscitur esse, vel posse esse multitudinem, et varietatem, quae omnia confusa, et universalia sunt. Neque ex vi hujus scientiae habuit Adam principia, per quae in cognitionem magis propriam, aut distinctam Angelorum perveniret." - Cognovit tandem Adam per eamdem scientiam res materiales creatas omnes quoad species, non omnes vero quoad individua, uti videntur omnes concedere. Vid. Suarez l. c. n. 14.
Sequitur 2. quod Adam habuit scientiam de Deo, uti patet. Cognovit etiam Angelorum existentiam. Philosophi enim gentiles agnoverunt existentiam substantiarum spiritualium; atque hanc notitiam hausisse etiam videntur "ex sensibilibus effectibus, qui virtute daemonum, vel aliorum spirituum fiunt:" ergo Adam per naturalem scientiam sibi inditam, saltem magna probabilitate et vehementi conjectura, id assequi potuit. Notat tamen Suarez (l. c. n. 20.): "Utraque tamen cognitio (de possibilitate et existentia Angelorum) erat per conceptus universales, quia Angeli utroque modo ex vi effectuum solum concipiuntur sub ratione substantiae spiritualis, intellectualis, et creatae, ac completae, et independentis a corpore in sua cognitione, sicut etiam in esse, et in eo gradu cognoscitur esse, vel posse esse multitudinem, et varietatem, quae omnia confusa, et universalia sunt. Neque ex vi hujus scientiae habuit Adam principia, per quae in cognitionem magis propriam, aut distinctam Angelorum perveniret." - Cognovit tandem Adam per eamdem scientiam res materiales creatas omnes quoad species, non omnes vero quoad individua, uti videntur omnes concedere. Vid. Suarez l. c. n. 14.
323. Hence it follows, first, that Adam did not know future free contingents and the internal thoughts of other men; for these objects do not fall under human knowledge.
It follows, secondly, that Adam had knowledge concerning God, as is clear. He also knew the existence of Angels. For the gentile philosophers recognized the existence of spiritual substances; and they seem also to have drawn this knowledge "from sensible effects which are produced by the power of demons or other spirits." Therefore Adam, through the natural knowledge implanted in him, could attain this, at least with great probability and vehement conjecture. Suarez notes, however (cited place, n. 20): "Yet each knowledge (concerning the possibility and existence of Angels) was through universal concepts, because Angels in each way are conceived from the force of effects only under the account of spiritual, intellectual, created, complete substance, independent of a body in its cognition as also in being; and in that degree it is known that there is, or can be, multitude and variety, all of which things are confused and universal. Nor by the force of this knowledge did Adam have principles through which he might arrive at a more proper or distinct knowledge of Angels." - Finally, through the same knowledge Adam knew all created material things with respect to species, but not all with respect to individuals, as all seem to concede. See Suarez, cited place, n. 14.
It follows, secondly, that Adam had knowledge concerning God, as is clear. He also knew the existence of Angels. For the gentile philosophers recognized the existence of spiritual substances; and they seem also to have drawn this knowledge "from sensible effects which are produced by the power of demons or other spirits." Therefore Adam, through the natural knowledge implanted in him, could attain this, at least with great probability and vehement conjecture. Suarez notes, however (cited place, n. 20): "Yet each knowledge (concerning the possibility and existence of Angels) was through universal concepts, because Angels in each way are conceived from the force of effects only under the account of spiritual, intellectual, created, complete substance, independent of a body in its cognition as also in being; and in that degree it is known that there is, or can be, multitude and variety, all of which things are confused and universal. Nor by the force of this knowledge did Adam have principles through which he might arrive at a more proper or distinct knowledge of Angels." - Finally, through the same knowledge Adam knew all created material things with respect to species, but not all with respect to individuals, as all seem to concede. See Suarez, cited place, n. 14.
324. Ex iis, quae dicta sunt tum de natura tum de objecto hujus scientiae Adae, patet 1. quod etsi quoad perfectionem essentialem eadem fuerat ac scientia nostra acquisita; in perfectione tamen accidentali, actus illius scientiae multis rationibus potuerunt caeterorum hominum scientiam excedere. "Primo," inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 21.), "propter excellentiam ingenii quam in Adamo fuisse diximus. Secundo propter optimum corporis temperamentum, et magnam perfectionem internorum, et externorum sensuum, quae ad munus intelligendi multum juvat. Tertio, quia verisimile est, species et phantasmata a Deo infusa fuisse perfectissima, et subtilissima intra naturalem ordinem, et habitum ipsius scientiae fuisse valde intensum. Denique habuit Adam in illo statu, ut infra dicemus, quandam naturae integritatem per subordinationem appetitus inferioris ad superiorem, quae omnem animae perturbationem, et involuntariam distractionem auferebat; quae animi compositio ad perfectam intelligentiam, et considerationem multum juvat. Igitur ex his principiis, et circumstantiis facile intelligitur, actus hujus scientiae in Adamo fuisse longe majoris perfectionis, quam in caeteris hominibus esse soleant."
Patet 2. quod potuit Adam in sua scientia proficere, sive quoad modum, quatenus quae per scientiam infusam cognoscebat, poterat deinde per scientiam experimentalem cognoscere, uti etiam de Christo concedunt; sive quoad numerum scitorum si sermo sit de individuis. Quod ultimum docet etiam D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 3. c. in fin., ubi, uti notat Sylvius, tacite corrigit id quod art. 4. q. 18. de ver. docuerat. "Alia vero," inquit, "quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli jaceant in flumine, et alia hujusmodi."
Patet 2. quod potuit Adam in sua scientia proficere, sive quoad modum, quatenus quae per scientiam infusam cognoscebat, poterat deinde per scientiam experimentalem cognoscere, uti etiam de Christo concedunt; sive quoad numerum scitorum si sermo sit de individuis. Quod ultimum docet etiam D. Thomas 1. p. q. 94. a. 3. c. in fin., ubi, uti notat Sylvius, tacite corrigit id quod art. 4. q. 18. de ver. docuerat. "Alia vero," inquit, "quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli jaceant in flumine, et alia hujusmodi."
324. From those things which have been said both concerning the nature and concerning the object of this knowledge of Adam, it is clear, first, that although with respect to essential perfection it was the same as our acquired knowledge, nevertheless in accidental perfection the acts of that knowledge could exceed the knowledge of other men for many reasons. "First," says Suarez (cited place, n. 21), "on account of the excellence of talent which we have said was in Adam. Secondly, on account of the best temperament of the body and the great perfection of the internal and external senses, which greatly assists the function of understanding. Thirdly, because it is likely that the species and phantasms infused by God were most perfect and most subtle within the natural order, and that the habit of the knowledge itself was very intense. Finally, Adam had in that state, as we shall say below, a certain integrity of nature through the subordination of the lower appetite to the higher, which removed every perturbation of the soul and involuntary distraction; this composition of soul greatly assists perfect understanding and consideration. Therefore from these principles and circumstances it is easily understood that the acts of this knowledge in Adam were of far greater perfection than they usually are in other men."
It is clear, secondly, that Adam could make progress in his knowledge, whether with respect to mode, insofar as the things which he knew through infused knowledge he could afterwards know through experimental knowledge, as they concede also concerning Christ; or with respect to the number of things known, if the discussion is about individuals. St. Thomas also teaches this last point, I, q. 94, a. 3, corpus, at the end, where, as Sylvius notes, he tacitly corrects what he had taught in De veritate, q. 18, a. 4. "But other things," he says, "which can neither be known by the natural study of man, nor are necessary for the government of human life, the first man did not know; such are the thoughts of men, future contingents, and certain singulars, for instance how many pebbles lie in a river, and other things of this kind."
It is clear, secondly, that Adam could make progress in his knowledge, whether with respect to mode, insofar as the things which he knew through infused knowledge he could afterwards know through experimental knowledge, as they concede also concerning Christ; or with respect to the number of things known, if the discussion is about individuals. St. Thomas also teaches this last point, I, q. 94, a. 3, corpus, at the end, where, as Sylvius notes, he tacitly corrects what he had taught in De veritate, q. 18, a. 4. "But other things," he says, "which can neither be known by the natural study of man, nor are necessary for the government of human life, the first man did not know; such are the thoughts of men, future contingents, and certain singulars, for instance how many pebbles lie in a river, and other things of this kind."
325. His itaque expositis, dicimus:
Prop. XXXII. Habuit Adam statim ac creatus fuit naturalem scientiam a Deo sibi inditam.
Prob. I. Legitur Gen. 2. 19. 20.: "Formatis igitur, Dominus Deus, de humo cunctis animantibus terrae, et universis volatilibus caeli, adduxit ea ad Adam, ut videret quid vocaret ea; omne enim quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est nomen ejus. Appellavitque Adam nominibus suis cuncta animalia, et universa volatilia caeli, et omnes bestias terrae." Unde: Imponere nomina cunctis animalibus convenienter ad eorum naturam, requirit certe rerum naturalium scientiam; atqui, ex cit. testimonio, imposuit Adam nomina animantibus, et quidem convenienter ad eorum naturam; sic enim Patres, et unanimiter Theologi interpretantur illud "Omne quod vocavit Adam ... ipsum est nomen ejus." Ergo. Unde S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 14. in Gen.) dicit: "Quod magna sapientia praeditus fuerit, disce ex his, quae nunc fiunt. Et adduxit illa, etc. fecit hoc Deus demonstraturus nobis magnam illius sapientiam." Et infra: "Ne igitur subito praetereas, sed cogita quanta fuerit sapientia volatilibus, etc. et omnibus congrua, et convenientia suae naturae imponit nomina." Et iterum infra: "Qui potest congruis nominibus jumenta appellare, et volatilia caeli, et alias bestias, quomodo non omni sapientia, et industria pollet?" - Et S. Aug. (op. imperf. c. Julian. l. c. 1.): "Neque secundum Christianam cogitatis fidem, qualis sit factus Adam, qui universis generibus animarum vivarum nomina imposuit: quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae, in saecularibus etiam litteris legimus. Nam ipse Pythagoras, a quo Philosophiae nomen exortum est, dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapientissimum, qui vocabula primus indidit rebus."
Prob. II. Legitur Eccli. 17. 1. 5. 6. 7.: "Deus creavit de terra hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum ... Creavit ex ipso adjutorium simile sibi: consilium, et linguam, et oculos, et aures, et cor dedit illis excogitandi: et disciplina intellectus replevit illos. Creavit illis scientiam spiritus, sensu implevit cor illorum: et mala et bona ostendit illis. Posuit oculum suum super corda illorum, ostendere illis magnalia operum suorum." Quamvis haec verba maxime indicent supernaturalem cognitionem, absque dubio tamen naturalem etiam scientiam comprehendunt. Nam a) sunt valde universalia - b) ad perfectam disciplinam intellectus pertinet etiam scientia naturalis: eam autem perfectionem assecutum esse Adam videntur ostendere verba "replevit illos" - c) multa cognoscuntur per hanc scientiam, quae ad Dei gloriam referuntur - d) dicitur ibid. vv. 3. 4. "Dedit illi potestatem eorum quae sunt super terram. Posuit timorem illius super omnem carnem, et dominatus est bestiarum et volatilium:" ad usum autem hujus potestatis et dominii necessaria erat scientia, uti jam notavit S. Jo. Chrys. l. c. Ergo.
Prob. III. Ratione D. Thomae cit. q. 94.: "Quia res primitus a Deo institutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut essent aliorum principia, ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse principium alterius, non solum per generationem corporalem, sed etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo sicut primus homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare, ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui."
Prob. IV. Ex Suarez (l. c. n. 4.) "Omnes alias res universi tam corporales, quam spirituales in statu perfecto creavit; ergo et hominem ex corpore, et spiritu compositum. Nam et ipsum hominem secundum corpus perfectum creavit; ergo multo magis secundum animam." - Ostendit deinde hanc scientiam valde necessariam fuisse "Primo ad integritatem, et felicitatem illius status, in quo homo ante peccatum constituebatur, quem in discursu sequentium capitum explicabimus. Secundo, quia si homo ignorans crearetur, ut ipse scientiam sibi acquireret, necessarium esset longo tempore in magna ignoratione versari. Quia humana scientia longo tempore, et magno labore acquiritur, adeo ut ad unam scientiam perfecte acquirendam vix longum vitae tempus sufficiat, nedum ad omnes. Praesertim cum esset sola inventione, et sine disciplina addiscenda, et acquirenda, quod longe difficilius est. Tertio, quia impossibile est homini solis naturae suae viribus scientiam veritatum etiam naturalium puram, et sine admixtione multorum errorum inquirendo, invenire. Propter quod ad providentiam auctoris naturae pertinuit hominem creare ita perfectum, ut sine errore posset naturales veritates intelligere."
Nota. Si Adam perseveravisset in statu justitiae originalis, filii ejus non fuissent nati cum perfecta scientia. Etenim "de iis," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 101. a. 1., "quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur. Unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, qu. 55. art. 2. et q. 84. art. 7.; et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est, quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia, sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent inveniendo, vel addiscendo." - Et Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 5. c. 8. n. 20.) addit: "Adam enim creatus est in aetate adulta, et perfecto rationis usu, in qua aetate jam erat de se capax scientiarum naturalium. Unde si illis caruisset, propriae ignorantiae fuisset subjectus: in filiis autem parvulis carentia scientiarum non fuisset ignorantia, sed pura nescientia, ut supra declaratum est. Deinde Adam non solum creatus est, ut persona privata, sed ut caput, et consequenter ut doctor, et instructor ipsius naturae; et ideo ratione sui muneris scientias omnes postulabat, et juxta convenientem providentiae ordinem illi erant debitae. Quae ratio in filiis locum non haberet, ut per se notum est."
Prop. XXXII. Habuit Adam statim ac creatus fuit naturalem scientiam a Deo sibi inditam.
Prob. I. Legitur Gen. 2. 19. 20.: "Formatis igitur, Dominus Deus, de humo cunctis animantibus terrae, et universis volatilibus caeli, adduxit ea ad Adam, ut videret quid vocaret ea; omne enim quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est nomen ejus. Appellavitque Adam nominibus suis cuncta animalia, et universa volatilia caeli, et omnes bestias terrae." Unde: Imponere nomina cunctis animalibus convenienter ad eorum naturam, requirit certe rerum naturalium scientiam; atqui, ex cit. testimonio, imposuit Adam nomina animantibus, et quidem convenienter ad eorum naturam; sic enim Patres, et unanimiter Theologi interpretantur illud "Omne quod vocavit Adam ... ipsum est nomen ejus." Ergo. Unde S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 14. in Gen.) dicit: "Quod magna sapientia praeditus fuerit, disce ex his, quae nunc fiunt. Et adduxit illa, etc. fecit hoc Deus demonstraturus nobis magnam illius sapientiam." Et infra: "Ne igitur subito praetereas, sed cogita quanta fuerit sapientia volatilibus, etc. et omnibus congrua, et convenientia suae naturae imponit nomina." Et iterum infra: "Qui potest congruis nominibus jumenta appellare, et volatilia caeli, et alias bestias, quomodo non omni sapientia, et industria pollet?" - Et S. Aug. (op. imperf. c. Julian. l. c. 1.): "Neque secundum Christianam cogitatis fidem, qualis sit factus Adam, qui universis generibus animarum vivarum nomina imposuit: quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae, in saecularibus etiam litteris legimus. Nam ipse Pythagoras, a quo Philosophiae nomen exortum est, dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapientissimum, qui vocabula primus indidit rebus."
Prob. II. Legitur Eccli. 17. 1. 5. 6. 7.: "Deus creavit de terra hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum ... Creavit ex ipso adjutorium simile sibi: consilium, et linguam, et oculos, et aures, et cor dedit illis excogitandi: et disciplina intellectus replevit illos. Creavit illis scientiam spiritus, sensu implevit cor illorum: et mala et bona ostendit illis. Posuit oculum suum super corda illorum, ostendere illis magnalia operum suorum." Quamvis haec verba maxime indicent supernaturalem cognitionem, absque dubio tamen naturalem etiam scientiam comprehendunt. Nam a) sunt valde universalia - b) ad perfectam disciplinam intellectus pertinet etiam scientia naturalis: eam autem perfectionem assecutum esse Adam videntur ostendere verba "replevit illos" - c) multa cognoscuntur per hanc scientiam, quae ad Dei gloriam referuntur - d) dicitur ibid. vv. 3. 4. "Dedit illi potestatem eorum quae sunt super terram. Posuit timorem illius super omnem carnem, et dominatus est bestiarum et volatilium:" ad usum autem hujus potestatis et dominii necessaria erat scientia, uti jam notavit S. Jo. Chrys. l. c. Ergo.
Prob. III. Ratione D. Thomae cit. q. 94.: "Quia res primitus a Deo institutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut essent aliorum principia, ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse principium alterius, non solum per generationem corporalem, sed etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo sicut primus homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare, ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui."
Prob. IV. Ex Suarez (l. c. n. 4.) "Omnes alias res universi tam corporales, quam spirituales in statu perfecto creavit; ergo et hominem ex corpore, et spiritu compositum. Nam et ipsum hominem secundum corpus perfectum creavit; ergo multo magis secundum animam." - Ostendit deinde hanc scientiam valde necessariam fuisse "Primo ad integritatem, et felicitatem illius status, in quo homo ante peccatum constituebatur, quem in discursu sequentium capitum explicabimus. Secundo, quia si homo ignorans crearetur, ut ipse scientiam sibi acquireret, necessarium esset longo tempore in magna ignoratione versari. Quia humana scientia longo tempore, et magno labore acquiritur, adeo ut ad unam scientiam perfecte acquirendam vix longum vitae tempus sufficiat, nedum ad omnes. Praesertim cum esset sola inventione, et sine disciplina addiscenda, et acquirenda, quod longe difficilius est. Tertio, quia impossibile est homini solis naturae suae viribus scientiam veritatum etiam naturalium puram, et sine admixtione multorum errorum inquirendo, invenire. Propter quod ad providentiam auctoris naturae pertinuit hominem creare ita perfectum, ut sine errore posset naturales veritates intelligere."
Nota. Si Adam perseveravisset in statu justitiae originalis, filii ejus non fuissent nati cum perfecta scientia. Etenim "de iis," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 101. a. 1., "quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur. Unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, qu. 55. art. 2. et q. 84. art. 7.; et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est, quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia, sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent inveniendo, vel addiscendo." - Et Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 5. c. 8. n. 20.) addit: "Adam enim creatus est in aetate adulta, et perfecto rationis usu, in qua aetate jam erat de se capax scientiarum naturalium. Unde si illis caruisset, propriae ignorantiae fuisset subjectus: in filiis autem parvulis carentia scientiarum non fuisset ignorantia, sed pura nescientia, ut supra declaratum est. Deinde Adam non solum creatus est, ut persona privata, sed ut caput, et consequenter ut doctor, et instructor ipsius naturae; et ideo ratione sui muneris scientias omnes postulabat, et juxta convenientem providentiae ordinem illi erant debitae. Quae ratio in filiis locum non haberet, ut per se notum est."
325. Therefore, with these things explained, we say:
Proposition XXXII. Adam, as soon as he was created, had natural knowledge implanted in him by God.
Proof I. It is read in Genesis 2:19-20: "Therefore, the Lord God having formed from the ground all the living creatures of the earth and all the birds of heaven, he brought them to Adam, that he might see what he would call them; for whatever Adam called a living soul, that is its name. And Adam called by their own names all the animals, and all the birds of heaven, and all the beasts of the earth." Hence: to impose names on all animals suitably to their nature certainly requires knowledge of natural things; but, from the cited testimony, Adam imposed names on the living creatures, and indeed suitably to their nature; for thus the Fathers and unanimously the theologians interpret that phrase, "Whatever Adam called ... that is its name." Therefore. Hence St. John Chrysostom (homily 14 on Genesis) says: "Learn from the things which are now done that he was endowed with great wisdom. And he brought them, etc.; God did this in order to show us his great wisdom." And below: "Therefore do not pass over it suddenly, but consider how great was the wisdom: on the birds, etc., and on all things he imposes names congruent and suitable to their own nature." And again below: "He who can call the beasts of burden, and the birds of heaven, and the other beasts by congruent names, how does he not possess every wisdom and industry?" - And St. Augustine (Unfinished Work against Julian, cited place, book 1): "Nor do you think according to the Christian faith what sort Adam was made, who imposed names on all kinds of living souls: that this was an indication of most excellent wisdom we read even in secular literature. For Pythagoras himself, from whom the name of Philosophy took its rise, is said to have said that he was wisest of all who first assigned words to things."
Proof II. It is read in Ecclesiasticus 17:1, 5, 6, 7: "God created man from the earth, and made him according to his own image ... He created from him a helper like himself; counsel, and tongue, and eyes, and ears, and a heart for thinking he gave to them; and he filled them with discipline of intellect. He created for them knowledge of spirit, filled their heart with sense; and showed them good and evil. He placed his eye upon their hearts, to show them the magnificent things of his works." Although these words chiefly indicate supernatural cognition, nevertheless beyond doubt they also comprehend natural knowledge. For a) they are very universal; b) natural knowledge also pertains to perfect discipline of the intellect, and the words "he filled them" seem to show that Adam attained that perfection; c) many things are known through this knowledge which are referred to the glory of God; d) it is said in the same place, verses 3-4: "He gave him power over those things which are upon the earth. He placed the fear of him over all flesh, and he had dominion over beasts and birds"; but for the use of this power and dominion knowledge was necessary, as St. John Chrysostom already noted in the cited place. Therefore.
Proof III. From the reason of St. Thomas in the cited q. 94: "Because things were first instituted by God not only that they might exist in themselves, but also that they might be principles of others, therefore they were produced in a perfect state, in which they could be principles of others. But man can be the principle of another not only through bodily generation, but also through instruction and government. And therefore, just as the first man was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the body, so that at once he could generate, so also he was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the soul, so that at once he could instruct and govern others. But no one can instruct unless he has knowledge. And therefore the first man was so instituted by God that he had knowledge of all things in which man is born to be instructed."
Proof IV. From Suarez (cited place, n. 4): "He created all other things of the universe, both corporeal and spiritual, in a perfect state; therefore also man, composed from body and spirit. For he created man himself perfect with respect to body; therefore much more with respect to soul." - He then shows that this knowledge was very necessary: "First, for the integrity and happiness of that state in which man was constituted before sin, which we shall explain in the course of the following chapters. Secondly, because if man were created ignorant, so that he himself might acquire knowledge for himself, it would be necessary for him to spend a long time in great ignorance. For human knowledge is acquired over a long time and with great labor, so much so that scarcely a long time of life suffices for perfectly acquiring one knowledge, much less all of them; especially since it would have to be learned and acquired by discovery alone and without instruction, which is far more difficult. Thirdly, because it is impossible for man by the powers of his nature alone to discover, by inquiry, pure knowledge of even natural truths and without admixture of many errors. On account of this it pertained to the providence of the author of nature to create man so perfect that he could understand natural truths without error."
Note. If Adam had persevered in the state of original justice, his children would not have been born with perfect knowledge. For "concerning those things," says St. Thomas, I, q. 101, a. 1, "which are above nature, one believes authority alone. Hence where authority fails, we ought to follow the condition of nature. But it is natural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as was said above, q. 55, art. 2, and q. 84, art. 7; and therefore the soul is united to the body because it needs it for its proper operation. This would not be so if from the beginning it had knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. And therefore it must be said that children in the state of innocence would not be born perfect in knowledge, but would have acquired it in the course of time without difficulty, by discovery or by learning." - And Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 5, chapter 8, n. 20) adds: "For Adam was created in adult age and with the perfect use of reason, at which age he was already of himself capable of natural sciences. Hence if he had lacked them, he would have been subject to proper ignorance; but in little children the lack of sciences would not have been ignorance, but pure nescience, as was declared above. Then, Adam was created not only as a private person, but as head, and consequently as teacher and instructor of nature itself; and therefore by reason of his office he required all sciences, and according to the fitting order of providence they were owed to him. This reason would not have place in the children, as is known of itself."
Proposition XXXII. Adam, as soon as he was created, had natural knowledge implanted in him by God.
Proof I. It is read in Genesis 2:19-20: "Therefore, the Lord God having formed from the ground all the living creatures of the earth and all the birds of heaven, he brought them to Adam, that he might see what he would call them; for whatever Adam called a living soul, that is its name. And Adam called by their own names all the animals, and all the birds of heaven, and all the beasts of the earth." Hence: to impose names on all animals suitably to their nature certainly requires knowledge of natural things; but, from the cited testimony, Adam imposed names on the living creatures, and indeed suitably to their nature; for thus the Fathers and unanimously the theologians interpret that phrase, "Whatever Adam called ... that is its name." Therefore. Hence St. John Chrysostom (homily 14 on Genesis) says: "Learn from the things which are now done that he was endowed with great wisdom. And he brought them, etc.; God did this in order to show us his great wisdom." And below: "Therefore do not pass over it suddenly, but consider how great was the wisdom: on the birds, etc., and on all things he imposes names congruent and suitable to their own nature." And again below: "He who can call the beasts of burden, and the birds of heaven, and the other beasts by congruent names, how does he not possess every wisdom and industry?" - And St. Augustine (Unfinished Work against Julian, cited place, book 1): "Nor do you think according to the Christian faith what sort Adam was made, who imposed names on all kinds of living souls: that this was an indication of most excellent wisdom we read even in secular literature. For Pythagoras himself, from whom the name of Philosophy took its rise, is said to have said that he was wisest of all who first assigned words to things."
Proof II. It is read in Ecclesiasticus 17:1, 5, 6, 7: "God created man from the earth, and made him according to his own image ... He created from him a helper like himself; counsel, and tongue, and eyes, and ears, and a heart for thinking he gave to them; and he filled them with discipline of intellect. He created for them knowledge of spirit, filled their heart with sense; and showed them good and evil. He placed his eye upon their hearts, to show them the magnificent things of his works." Although these words chiefly indicate supernatural cognition, nevertheless beyond doubt they also comprehend natural knowledge. For a) they are very universal; b) natural knowledge also pertains to perfect discipline of the intellect, and the words "he filled them" seem to show that Adam attained that perfection; c) many things are known through this knowledge which are referred to the glory of God; d) it is said in the same place, verses 3-4: "He gave him power over those things which are upon the earth. He placed the fear of him over all flesh, and he had dominion over beasts and birds"; but for the use of this power and dominion knowledge was necessary, as St. John Chrysostom already noted in the cited place. Therefore.
Proof III. From the reason of St. Thomas in the cited q. 94: "Because things were first instituted by God not only that they might exist in themselves, but also that they might be principles of others, therefore they were produced in a perfect state, in which they could be principles of others. But man can be the principle of another not only through bodily generation, but also through instruction and government. And therefore, just as the first man was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the body, so that at once he could generate, so also he was instituted in a perfect state with respect to the soul, so that at once he could instruct and govern others. But no one can instruct unless he has knowledge. And therefore the first man was so instituted by God that he had knowledge of all things in which man is born to be instructed."
Proof IV. From Suarez (cited place, n. 4): "He created all other things of the universe, both corporeal and spiritual, in a perfect state; therefore also man, composed from body and spirit. For he created man himself perfect with respect to body; therefore much more with respect to soul." - He then shows that this knowledge was very necessary: "First, for the integrity and happiness of that state in which man was constituted before sin, which we shall explain in the course of the following chapters. Secondly, because if man were created ignorant, so that he himself might acquire knowledge for himself, it would be necessary for him to spend a long time in great ignorance. For human knowledge is acquired over a long time and with great labor, so much so that scarcely a long time of life suffices for perfectly acquiring one knowledge, much less all of them; especially since it would have to be learned and acquired by discovery alone and without instruction, which is far more difficult. Thirdly, because it is impossible for man by the powers of his nature alone to discover, by inquiry, pure knowledge of even natural truths and without admixture of many errors. On account of this it pertained to the providence of the author of nature to create man so perfect that he could understand natural truths without error."
Note. If Adam had persevered in the state of original justice, his children would not have been born with perfect knowledge. For "concerning those things," says St. Thomas, I, q. 101, a. 1, "which are above nature, one believes authority alone. Hence where authority fails, we ought to follow the condition of nature. But it is natural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as was said above, q. 55, art. 2, and q. 84, art. 7; and therefore the soul is united to the body because it needs it for its proper operation. This would not be so if from the beginning it had knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. And therefore it must be said that children in the state of innocence would not be born perfect in knowledge, but would have acquired it in the course of time without difficulty, by discovery or by learning." - And Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 5, chapter 8, n. 20) adds: "For Adam was created in adult age and with the perfect use of reason, at which age he was already of himself capable of natural sciences. Hence if he had lacked them, he would have been subject to proper ignorance; but in little children the lack of sciences would not have been ignorance, but pure nescience, as was declared above. Then, Adam was created not only as a private person, but as head, and consequently as teacher and instructor of nature itself; and therefore by reason of his office he required all sciences, and according to the fitting order of providence they were owed to him. This reason would not have place in the children, as is known of itself."
Corrected Latin Text
§ II.
An, et Qualis Fuerit Supernaturalium Cognitio Adae Infusa.
§ II.
An, et Qualis Fuerit Supernaturalium Cognitio Adae Infusa.
§ II.
Whether, And Of What Kind, Adam's Infused Cognition Of Supernatural Things Was.
Whether, And Of What Kind, Adam's Infused Cognition Of Supernatural Things Was.
326. Tria hic breviter attingemus: 1. naturam scientiae supernaturalium, quam Adam habuit in statu innocentiae - 2. existentiam hujus scientiae - 3. ejusdem objectum.
326. Here we shall briefly touch on three things: 1. the nature of the knowledge of supernatural things which Adam had in the state of innocence; 2. the existence of this knowledge; 3. its object.
327. Quoad naturam, conveniunt omnes 1. quod haec scientia erat supernaturalis non modo ex parte revelationis et rei revelatae; sed etiam ex parte assensus. Nam creatus fuit Adam in statu gratiae; debuit ergo habere cognitionem huic statui proportionatam: eo vel magis, quod ad gratiam suscipiendam, propriis actibus se disposuit; fundamentum autem cujuscumque actus supernaturalis disponentis ad justitiam est cognitio, quae proinde debet necessario esse vere supernaturalis.
2. Omnes etiam pro certo habent, cognitionem Adae in illo statu non fuisse inferiorem nostra fide, in substantia, et specie sua, quia et gratia fuit ejusdem speciei cum nostra, et status ejus fuit aliquo modo excellentior, et felicior nostro; cum ergo sit de fide certum, nostram fidem esse supernaturalem ex parte ipsius assensus, et ex parte auxilii ad illum necessarii, idem de cognitione Adae citra dubium tenendum. Vid. Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 18. n. 11.)
3. Quaestio solummodo est, utrum eadem cognitio fuerit vera fides supernaturalis et divina ejusdem rationis ac nostra. - Videntur illud negavisse Hugo a S. Victore et Alensis; sententia tamen communis affirmat. Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 14. c. 26.), dicit: "Habuisse hominem in statu innocentiae gaudium verum, quod perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat charitas de corde puro, conscientia bona, et fide non ficta." - S. Ambrosius (in Luc. l. 7. c. 10.): "Adam nudatus est mandati caelestis custodia destitutus, et exutus fidei vestimento lethale vulnus accepit." D. Th. 1. p. q. 95. a. 3. c.: "Quaedam (virtutes) vero sunt quae de sui ratione imperfectionem important vel ex parte actus, vel ex parte materiae. Et si hujusmodi imperfectio non repugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus hujusmodi virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur. Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum fruitione finalis beatitudinis. Unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu et quantum ad habitum, et quantum ad actum."
2. Omnes etiam pro certo habent, cognitionem Adae in illo statu non fuisse inferiorem nostra fide, in substantia, et specie sua, quia et gratia fuit ejusdem speciei cum nostra, et status ejus fuit aliquo modo excellentior, et felicior nostro; cum ergo sit de fide certum, nostram fidem esse supernaturalem ex parte ipsius assensus, et ex parte auxilii ad illum necessarii, idem de cognitione Adae citra dubium tenendum. Vid. Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 18. n. 11.)
3. Quaestio solummodo est, utrum eadem cognitio fuerit vera fides supernaturalis et divina ejusdem rationis ac nostra. - Videntur illud negavisse Hugo a S. Victore et Alensis; sententia tamen communis affirmat. Unde S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 14. c. 26.), dicit: "Habuisse hominem in statu innocentiae gaudium verum, quod perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat charitas de corde puro, conscientia bona, et fide non ficta." - S. Ambrosius (in Luc. l. 7. c. 10.): "Adam nudatus est mandati caelestis custodia destitutus, et exutus fidei vestimento lethale vulnus accepit." D. Th. 1. p. q. 95. a. 3. c.: "Quaedam (virtutes) vero sunt quae de sui ratione imperfectionem important vel ex parte actus, vel ex parte materiae. Et si hujusmodi imperfectio non repugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus hujusmodi virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur. Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum fruitione finalis beatitudinis. Unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu et quantum ad habitum, et quantum ad actum."
327. With respect to its nature, all agree, first, that this knowledge was supernatural not only on the part of revelation and of the thing revealed, but also on the part of assent. For Adam was created in the state of grace; therefore he had to have cognition proportioned to this state, especially because he disposed himself by his own acts for receiving grace. But the foundation of any supernatural act disposing to justice is cognition, which consequently must necessarily be truly supernatural.
2. All also hold as certain that the cognition of Adam in that state was not inferior to our faith in its substance and species, because both grace was of the same species as ours, and his state was in some way more excellent and happier than ours. Since, therefore, it is certain by faith that our faith is supernatural on the part of the assent itself, and on the part of the help necessary for it, the same must without doubt be held concerning the cognition of Adam. See Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 18, n. 11).
3. The question is only whether this same cognition was true supernatural and divine faith of the same account as ours. Hugh of St. Victor and Alexander of Hales seem to have denied this; nevertheless the common opinion affirms it. Hence St. Augustine (The City of God, book 14, chapter 26) says: "Man in the state of innocence had true joy, which was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity burned from a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith not feigned." - St. Ambrose (on Luke, book 7, chapter 10): "Adam was stripped, destitute of the custody of the heavenly command, and, divested of the garment of faith, received a lethal wound." St. Thomas, I, q. 95, a. 3, corpus: "But there are certain virtues which by their account imply imperfection either on the part of the act or on the part of the matter. And if imperfection of this kind is not repugnant to the perfection of the first state, nevertheless virtues of this kind could exist in the first state; such as faith, which is of those things which are not seen. For the perfection of the first state did not extend to this, that man should see God through essence and have him by the fruition of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the first state both with respect to habit and with respect to act."
2. All also hold as certain that the cognition of Adam in that state was not inferior to our faith in its substance and species, because both grace was of the same species as ours, and his state was in some way more excellent and happier than ours. Since, therefore, it is certain by faith that our faith is supernatural on the part of the assent itself, and on the part of the help necessary for it, the same must without doubt be held concerning the cognition of Adam. See Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 18, n. 11).
3. The question is only whether this same cognition was true supernatural and divine faith of the same account as ours. Hugh of St. Victor and Alexander of Hales seem to have denied this; nevertheless the common opinion affirms it. Hence St. Augustine (The City of God, book 14, chapter 26) says: "Man in the state of innocence had true joy, which was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity burned from a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith not feigned." - St. Ambrose (on Luke, book 7, chapter 10): "Adam was stripped, destitute of the custody of the heavenly command, and, divested of the garment of faith, received a lethal wound." St. Thomas, I, q. 95, a. 3, corpus: "But there are certain virtues which by their account imply imperfection either on the part of the act or on the part of the matter. And if imperfection of this kind is not repugnant to the perfection of the first state, nevertheless virtues of this kind could exist in the first state; such as faith, which is of those things which are not seen. For the perfection of the first state did not extend to this, that man should see God through essence and have him by the fruition of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the first state both with respect to habit and with respect to act."
328. Quoad existentiam, patet quod Adam habuit in statu innocentiae hanc cognitionem supernaturalium, seu fidem supernaturalem et divinam. Quod probatur imprimis ex eo, quod habuit justitiam, ut antea probavimus: simul autem cum gratia sanctificante infunditur etiam fides. Deinde:
a) Certum est quod Adam ante peccatum non habuit visionem Dei intuitivam, unde nec fuit impeccabilis 1. p. q. 94. a. 1.: hinc certum est etiam quod non fuit in statu comprehensoris, sed viatoris; unde fuit in statu merendi, et ad hoc habuit a Deo praeceptum, ut per obedientiam posset de Deo bene mereri. Atqui conditio necessaria ad meritum est cognitio supernaturalis, seu fides; et est proprium justi viatoris eamdem cognitionem habere. Ergo. Revera, inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 3.): "Hoc est omnino certum; tum quia non minus est necessaria in viatore, cognitio termini, in quem tendit, quam intentio, et voluntas tendendi in illum: est terminus beatitudo supernaturalis, quae sine revelatione supernaturali cognosci non potest. Tum etiam, quia sicut voluntas supponit intellectum, ita supernaturales virtutes voluntatis supponunt supernaturalem cognitionem in intellectu."
b) Cum Adam in statu innocentiae, ex dictis, fuerit viator, debuit habere spem: atqui spes fidem cui innititur necessario supponit: ergo. - Major sic declarat Suarez l. c.: Habuit "Adam simul cum gratia, et charitate spem futurae beatitudinis, quia sicut is qui videt jam non sperat, et e converso, qui non videt ut justificari possit, et in beatitudinem tendere, necesse est, ut speret. Et ideo nunc ad justificationem necessaria est spes, ut Conc. Trident. Sess. 6., docet, in quo eadem est ratio de homine in statu innocentiae, quod attinet ad spem beatitudinis, nam spes remissionis peccatorum tunc non erat necessaria, nondum existente peccato. Potuit autem, et debuit sperari auxilium bene operandi et perseverandi, quia propositum obediendi Deo, et perseverandi in ejus obedientia tunc etiam necessarium erat."
a) Certum est quod Adam ante peccatum non habuit visionem Dei intuitivam, unde nec fuit impeccabilis 1. p. q. 94. a. 1.: hinc certum est etiam quod non fuit in statu comprehensoris, sed viatoris; unde fuit in statu merendi, et ad hoc habuit a Deo praeceptum, ut per obedientiam posset de Deo bene mereri. Atqui conditio necessaria ad meritum est cognitio supernaturalis, seu fides; et est proprium justi viatoris eamdem cognitionem habere. Ergo. Revera, inquit Suarez (l. c. n. 3.): "Hoc est omnino certum; tum quia non minus est necessaria in viatore, cognitio termini, in quem tendit, quam intentio, et voluntas tendendi in illum: est terminus beatitudo supernaturalis, quae sine revelatione supernaturali cognosci non potest. Tum etiam, quia sicut voluntas supponit intellectum, ita supernaturales virtutes voluntatis supponunt supernaturalem cognitionem in intellectu."
b) Cum Adam in statu innocentiae, ex dictis, fuerit viator, debuit habere spem: atqui spes fidem cui innititur necessario supponit: ergo. - Major sic declarat Suarez l. c.: Habuit "Adam simul cum gratia, et charitate spem futurae beatitudinis, quia sicut is qui videt jam non sperat, et e converso, qui non videt ut justificari possit, et in beatitudinem tendere, necesse est, ut speret. Et ideo nunc ad justificationem necessaria est spes, ut Conc. Trident. Sess. 6., docet, in quo eadem est ratio de homine in statu innocentiae, quod attinet ad spem beatitudinis, nam spes remissionis peccatorum tunc non erat necessaria, nondum existente peccato. Potuit autem, et debuit sperari auxilium bene operandi et perseverandi, quia propositum obediendi Deo, et perseverandi in ejus obedientia tunc etiam necessarium erat."
328. With respect to existence, it is clear that Adam had in the state of innocence this cognition of supernatural things, or supernatural and divine faith. This is proved first from the fact that he had justice, as we proved before; but together with sanctifying grace faith also is infused. Then:
a) It is certain that Adam before sin did not have the intuitive vision of God, whence neither was he impeccable, I, q. 94, a. 1. Hence it is also certain that he was not in the state of one who comprehends, but of one on the way; hence he was in a state of meriting, and for this he had from God a precept, so that through obedience he could merit well concerning God. But the necessary condition for merit is supernatural cognition, or faith; and it is proper to a just wayfarer to have the same cognition. Therefore. In reality, says Suarez (cited place, n. 3): "This is altogether certain, both because cognition of the term toward which he tends is no less necessary in the wayfarer than intention and will of tending toward it. The term is supernatural beatitude, which cannot be known without supernatural revelation. Also because, just as will supposes intellect, so the supernatural virtues of the will suppose supernatural cognition in the intellect."
b) Since Adam in the state of innocence, from what has been said, was a wayfarer, he had to have hope; but hope necessarily supposes the faith on which it rests; therefore. - Suarez declares the major in this way in the cited place: "Adam, together with grace and charity, had hope of future beatitude, because just as he who sees now does not hope, so conversely, he who does not see, in order that he may be justified and tend into beatitude, must hope. And therefore now hope is necessary for justification, as the Council of Trent, Session 6, teaches; in which there is the same reason concerning man in the state of innocence as regards hope of beatitude, for hope of remission of sins was not then necessary, since sin did not yet exist. But the help of operating well and persevering could and had to be hoped for, because the purpose of obeying God and persevering in his obedience was also then necessary."
a) It is certain that Adam before sin did not have the intuitive vision of God, whence neither was he impeccable, I, q. 94, a. 1. Hence it is also certain that he was not in the state of one who comprehends, but of one on the way; hence he was in a state of meriting, and for this he had from God a precept, so that through obedience he could merit well concerning God. But the necessary condition for merit is supernatural cognition, or faith; and it is proper to a just wayfarer to have the same cognition. Therefore. In reality, says Suarez (cited place, n. 3): "This is altogether certain, both because cognition of the term toward which he tends is no less necessary in the wayfarer than intention and will of tending toward it. The term is supernatural beatitude, which cannot be known without supernatural revelation. Also because, just as will supposes intellect, so the supernatural virtues of the will suppose supernatural cognition in the intellect."
b) Since Adam in the state of innocence, from what has been said, was a wayfarer, he had to have hope; but hope necessarily supposes the faith on which it rests; therefore. - Suarez declares the major in this way in the cited place: "Adam, together with grace and charity, had hope of future beatitude, because just as he who sees now does not hope, so conversely, he who does not see, in order that he may be justified and tend into beatitude, must hope. And therefore now hope is necessary for justification, as the Council of Trent, Session 6, teaches; in which there is the same reason concerning man in the state of innocence as regards hope of beatitude, for hope of remission of sins was not then necessary, since sin did not yet exist. But the help of operating well and persevering could and had to be hoped for, because the purpose of obeying God and persevering in his obedience was also then necessary."
329. Quoad objectum. 1.) Cum ex Hebr. 11. 6.: "credere enim oportet accedentem ad Deum quia est, et inquirentibus se remunerator sit;" sequitur quod cognovit Adam supernaturaliter Deum esse - et esse objectum supernaturalis beatitudinis - principium salutis, justitiae et gratiae - remuneratorem, qui redditurus est praemium divini et supernaturalis ordinis.
2.) Videtur etiam cognovisse Mysterium Trinitatis. Hoc docuit S. Epiphanius (con. haeres. in Praef.), dicens: "Adam protoplastus formatus est, non circumcisus, sed carne praeputium habens. Non autem erat idolatra, et novit Patrem Deum, et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, propheta enim erat." Quod infra probat, "Quia novit, quod Pater dixit Filio, faciamus hominem ad imaginem, et similitudinem nostram." Quod desumitur etiam ex D. Thoma 2. 2. q. 2. a. 8.
3.) Quoad mysterium Incarnationis, imprimis notandum est, quod potest illud cognosci, seu credi vel quoad substantiam, quatenus proponitur unio humanae naturae cum divino Verbo, et consequenter Christus verus Deus et verus homo, tamquam verus Filius Dei adorandus; vel potest credi quoad finem redemptionis hominum. Adam hoc secundo modo non cognovit mysterium Incarnationis, uti communiter docent (Vid. Suarez l. c. n. 10.); sed est communis et vera sententia quod primo modo illud cognovit. Etenim:
a) Legitur Gen. 2. 23. 24.: "Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, et caro de carne mea. Quamobrem relinquet homo patrem suum, et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae: et erunt duo in carne una." De quibus verbis Apostolus ad Eph. 5. 31. ait: "Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et Ecclesia." Atqui hoc Sacramentum certe Adam cognovit, uti docent S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 16. in Gen.), S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad lit. l. 9. c. 19.), S. Epiphanius (haeres. 48.), S. Hieronymus (in 5. ad Eph.), etc. Ergo.
b) Philonus (Const. 5. in fin.), cum dixisset: "Talem factam esse unionem Dei, et humanitatis, ut jure dicatur Deus homo, et homo Deus," addit "quod Adam primus omnium parens futurum divinitus praevidit, cum exclamavit, hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, praeviderat enim Deum aliquando ex homine nasciturum, cui homines tandem adhaesuri erant per fidem, spem, et charitatem." - S. Prosper (in 1. cap. de Praedest. et Promis. Dei): "Sacramentum magnum Christi, et Ecclesiae fuisse promissum Adae, quod promissum, inquit, ipse speravit." Si autem speravit, profecto cognovit.
c) Unde D. Thomas, licet doceat quod Verbum non fuisset incarnatum, nisi Adam peccasset; tamen 2. 2. q. 2. a. 7. c., inquit: "Ante statum peccati homo habuit explicitam fidem de Christi incarnatione, secundum quod ordinabatur ad consummationem gloriae, non autem secundum quod ordinabatur ad liberationem a peccato per passionem et resurrectionem, quia homo non fuit praescius peccati futuri. Videtur autem incarnationis Christi praescius fuisse per hoc quod dixit: `Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae,' ut habetur Genes. 2. 24. Et hoc Apostolus, ad Ephes. 5. 32. dicit, `sacramentum magnum esse in Christo et Ecclesia;' quod quidem sacramentum non est credibile primum hominem ignorasse." Cf. cit. c. 18. Suaresii.
2.) Videtur etiam cognovisse Mysterium Trinitatis. Hoc docuit S. Epiphanius (con. haeres. in Praef.), dicens: "Adam protoplastus formatus est, non circumcisus, sed carne praeputium habens. Non autem erat idolatra, et novit Patrem Deum, et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, propheta enim erat." Quod infra probat, "Quia novit, quod Pater dixit Filio, faciamus hominem ad imaginem, et similitudinem nostram." Quod desumitur etiam ex D. Thoma 2. 2. q. 2. a. 8.
3.) Quoad mysterium Incarnationis, imprimis notandum est, quod potest illud cognosci, seu credi vel quoad substantiam, quatenus proponitur unio humanae naturae cum divino Verbo, et consequenter Christus verus Deus et verus homo, tamquam verus Filius Dei adorandus; vel potest credi quoad finem redemptionis hominum. Adam hoc secundo modo non cognovit mysterium Incarnationis, uti communiter docent (Vid. Suarez l. c. n. 10.); sed est communis et vera sententia quod primo modo illud cognovit. Etenim:
a) Legitur Gen. 2. 23. 24.: "Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, et caro de carne mea. Quamobrem relinquet homo patrem suum, et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae: et erunt duo in carne una." De quibus verbis Apostolus ad Eph. 5. 31. ait: "Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et Ecclesia." Atqui hoc Sacramentum certe Adam cognovit, uti docent S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 16. in Gen.), S. Augustinus (de Gen. ad lit. l. 9. c. 19.), S. Epiphanius (haeres. 48.), S. Hieronymus (in 5. ad Eph.), etc. Ergo.
b) Philonus (Const. 5. in fin.), cum dixisset: "Talem factam esse unionem Dei, et humanitatis, ut jure dicatur Deus homo, et homo Deus," addit "quod Adam primus omnium parens futurum divinitus praevidit, cum exclamavit, hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, praeviderat enim Deum aliquando ex homine nasciturum, cui homines tandem adhaesuri erant per fidem, spem, et charitatem." - S. Prosper (in 1. cap. de Praedest. et Promis. Dei): "Sacramentum magnum Christi, et Ecclesiae fuisse promissum Adae, quod promissum, inquit, ipse speravit." Si autem speravit, profecto cognovit.
c) Unde D. Thomas, licet doceat quod Verbum non fuisset incarnatum, nisi Adam peccasset; tamen 2. 2. q. 2. a. 7. c., inquit: "Ante statum peccati homo habuit explicitam fidem de Christi incarnatione, secundum quod ordinabatur ad consummationem gloriae, non autem secundum quod ordinabatur ad liberationem a peccato per passionem et resurrectionem, quia homo non fuit praescius peccati futuri. Videtur autem incarnationis Christi praescius fuisse per hoc quod dixit: `Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae,' ut habetur Genes. 2. 24. Et hoc Apostolus, ad Ephes. 5. 32. dicit, `sacramentum magnum esse in Christo et Ecclesia;' quod quidem sacramentum non est credibile primum hominem ignorasse." Cf. cit. c. 18. Suaresii.
329. With respect to object. 1. Since from Hebrews 11:6, "for it is necessary that one approaching God believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him," it follows that Adam knew supernaturally that God is; that he is the object of supernatural beatitude; the principle of salvation, justice, and grace; and the rewarder who will render the reward of the divine and supernatural order.
2. He also seems to have known the Mystery of the Trinity. St. Epiphanius taught this (Against Heresies, in the Preface), saying: "Adam the first-formed was formed, not circumcised, but having foreskin in the flesh. But he was not an idolater, and he knew God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, for he was a prophet." He proves this below: "Because he knew that the Father said to the Son, Let us make man to our image and likeness." This is also drawn from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 8.
3. With respect to the mystery of the Incarnation, it must first be noted that it can be known, or believed, either with respect to substance, insofar as the union of human nature with the divine Word is proposed, and consequently Christ, true God and true man, is to be adored as the true Son of God; or it can be believed with respect to the end of the redemption of men. Adam did not know the mystery of the Incarnation in this second way, as they commonly teach (see Suarez, cited place, n. 10); but it is the common and true opinion that he knew it in the first way. For:
a) It is read in Genesis 2:23-24: "This now is bone from my bones, and flesh from my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh." Concerning these words the Apostle says at Ephesians 5:31: "This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church." But Adam certainly knew this Sacrament, as St. John Chrysostom (homily 16 on Genesis), St. Augustine (On Genesis according to the Letter, book 9, chapter 19), St. Epiphanius (heresy 48), St. Jerome (on Ephesians 5), etc., teach. Therefore.
b) Philo (Constitution 5, at the end), after he had said that "such a union of God and humanity was made that by right God is called man, and man God," adds "that Adam, the first parent of all, foresaw the future thing divinely when he exclaimed, This now is bone from my bones; for he had foreseen God at some time would be born from man, to whom men would at last cleave through faith, hope, and charity." - St. Prosper (in book 1, chapter on The Predestination and Promises of God): "The great Sacrament of Christ and the Church was promised to Adam; which promise, he says, he himself hoped for." But if he hoped, certainly he knew.
c) Hence St. Thomas, although he teaches that the Word would not have been incarnate unless Adam had sinned, nevertheless says, II-II, q. 2, a. 7, corpus: "Before the state of sin man had explicit faith concerning the Incarnation of Christ, according as it was ordered to the consummation of glory, but not according as it was ordered to liberation from sin through the Passion and Resurrection, because man was not foreknowing of future sin. But he seems to have been foreknowing of Christ's Incarnation through this, that he said: `For this reason a man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife,' as is had in Genesis 2:24. And this the Apostle, at Ephesians 5:32, says is `a great sacrament in Christ and the Church'; indeed it is not credible that the first man was ignorant of this sacrament." Compare the cited chapter 18 of Suarez.
2. He also seems to have known the Mystery of the Trinity. St. Epiphanius taught this (Against Heresies, in the Preface), saying: "Adam the first-formed was formed, not circumcised, but having foreskin in the flesh. But he was not an idolater, and he knew God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, for he was a prophet." He proves this below: "Because he knew that the Father said to the Son, Let us make man to our image and likeness." This is also drawn from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 8.
3. With respect to the mystery of the Incarnation, it must first be noted that it can be known, or believed, either with respect to substance, insofar as the union of human nature with the divine Word is proposed, and consequently Christ, true God and true man, is to be adored as the true Son of God; or it can be believed with respect to the end of the redemption of men. Adam did not know the mystery of the Incarnation in this second way, as they commonly teach (see Suarez, cited place, n. 10); but it is the common and true opinion that he knew it in the first way. For:
a) It is read in Genesis 2:23-24: "This now is bone from my bones, and flesh from my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh." Concerning these words the Apostle says at Ephesians 5:31: "This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church." But Adam certainly knew this Sacrament, as St. John Chrysostom (homily 16 on Genesis), St. Augustine (On Genesis according to the Letter, book 9, chapter 19), St. Epiphanius (heresy 48), St. Jerome (on Ephesians 5), etc., teach. Therefore.
b) Philo (Constitution 5, at the end), after he had said that "such a union of God and humanity was made that by right God is called man, and man God," adds "that Adam, the first parent of all, foresaw the future thing divinely when he exclaimed, This now is bone from my bones; for he had foreseen God at some time would be born from man, to whom men would at last cleave through faith, hope, and charity." - St. Prosper (in book 1, chapter on The Predestination and Promises of God): "The great Sacrament of Christ and the Church was promised to Adam; which promise, he says, he himself hoped for." But if he hoped, certainly he knew.
c) Hence St. Thomas, although he teaches that the Word would not have been incarnate unless Adam had sinned, nevertheless says, II-II, q. 2, a. 7, corpus: "Before the state of sin man had explicit faith concerning the Incarnation of Christ, according as it was ordered to the consummation of glory, but not according as it was ordered to liberation from sin through the Passion and Resurrection, because man was not foreknowing of future sin. But he seems to have been foreknowing of Christ's Incarnation through this, that he said: `For this reason a man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife,' as is had in Genesis 2:24. And this the Apostle, at Ephesians 5:32, says is `a great sacrament in Christ and the Church'; indeed it is not credible that the first man was ignorant of this sacrament." Compare the cited chapter 18 of Suarez.