LatineEnglish
Corrected Latin Text
Articulus Septimus.
Utrum Homo in Prima Sui Conditione Fuerit per Gratiam Impassibilis.
Articulus Septimus.
Utrum Homo in Prima Sui Conditione Fuerit per Gratiam Impassibilis.
311. Simul hic comprehendimus quae pertinent tum ad passiones animi tum ad morbos et dolores corporis, simulque quaerimus utrum Adam fuerit ab illis immunis, et utrum haec immunitas fuerit donum superadditum ejus naturae; post ea enim, quae disputavimus de immunitate a concupiscentia et a morte, quae hic dicturi sumus, facile intelligentur.
311. Here we comprehend at the same time the things which pertain both to the passions of the soul and to diseases and pains of the body; and at the same time we ask whether Adam was immune from them, and whether this immunity was a gift superadded to his nature. For after the things which we have discussed concerning immunity from concupiscence and from death, the things which we shall say here will be easily understood.
312. Est vera doctrina, fundamentum habens in Scriptura, et a Patribus tradita, quod primi Parentes, in prima sui conditione, liberi ab aerumnis doloribusque, quibus nos subjicimur, in quodam felicitatis statu singulari Dei beneficio constituti fuere.
312. It is true doctrine, having its foundation in Scripture and handed down by the Fathers, that the first Parents, in their first condition, were free from the hardships and pains to which we are subjected, and were constituted, by a singular benefit of God, in a certain state of happiness.
313. Contra hanc doctrinam insurgunt ex una parte recentiores quidam rationalistae illum felicitatis statum negantes ex communibus argumentis, quibus quidquid supernaturale est inficiantur; ex alia vero parte Baius, Jansenius, Quesnellus asserentes quidem statum illum felicitatis, sed simul homini innocenti debitum esse statuentes: cum enim in aerumnis hujus vitae nonnisi mali et poenae rationem agnoscant, non potuisse, aiunt, homini innocenti infligi. Prop. 72. damnata in Baio est: "Omnes omnino justorum afflictiones sunt ultiones peccatorum ipsorum: unde et Job, et Martyres, quae passi sunt, propter peccata sua passi sunt." - Jansenius (tom. 2. edit. Lov. pag. 938.) scribit: "Ex ipsis terminis crudelitatem et injustitiam spirat, innocentem animam, nulli peccato obnoxiam, ad miserias status praesentis condemnare." Et pag. 873.: "Mors corporis nequit innocenti creaturae sine merito praecedentis iniquitatis a Deo infligi." Et pag. 945.: "Ex miseriis purae naturae cogimur ad diversas impietates, ad blasphemiam in Deum, ad Manichaeismum." - Prop. Quesnelli 70. est: "Numquam Deus affligit innocentes: et afflictiones semper serviunt vel ad puniendum peccatum, vel ad purificandum peccatorem."
313. Against this doctrine there rise up, on the one side, certain more recent rationalists, who deny that state of happiness from the common arguments by which they deny whatever is supernatural; but, on the other side, Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel, who indeed assert that state of happiness, but at the same time establish that it was owed to innocent man. For since in the hardships of this life they recognize nothing except the account of evil and of punishment, they say that they could not have been inflicted on innocent man. Proposition 72 condemned in Baius is: "Absolutely all afflictions of the just are punishments for their own sins: hence both Job and the Martyrs suffered the things which they suffered on account of their own sins." - Jansenius (tome 2, Louvain edition, page 938) writes: "From the very terms it breathes cruelty and injustice to condemn an innocent soul, liable to no sin, to the miseries of the present state." And page 873: "Death of the body cannot be inflicted by God on an innocent creature without the merit of a preceding iniquity." And page 945: "From the miseries of pure nature we are driven to various impieties, to blasphemy against God, to Manichaeism." - Proposition 70 of Quesnel is: "God never afflicts the innocent; and afflictions always serve either for punishing sin or for purifying the sinner."
314. Pauca claritatis gratia praenotamus. Ac imprimis "passio," inquit D. Thomas, 1. p. q. 97. a. 2., "dupliciter dicitur, uno modo proprie; et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur; passio enim est effectus actionis. In rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. Alio modo dicitur passio communiter secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiamsi pertineat ad perfectionem naturae, sicut intelligere, vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur secundo modo homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur et secundum animam, et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam, et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis."
314. For the sake of clarity we make a few preliminary notes. And first, "passion," says St. Thomas, I, q. 97, a. 2, "is said in two ways: in one way properly; and thus that is said to suffer which is removed from its natural disposition, for passion is the effect of action. But in natural things contraries act and suffer mutually, one of which removes the other from its natural disposition. In another way passion is said commonly, according to any change whatever, even if it pertains to the perfection of nature, just as understanding or sensing is said to be a certain suffering. Therefore in this second way man in the state of innocence was passible, and suffered both according to soul and according to body. But with passion taken in the first way, he was impassible both according to soul and according to body, just as he was immortal."
315. Ex hac animadversione sequitur 1. quod "illae passiones," uti docet D. Th., 1. p. q. 95. a. 2. c., "quae possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri boni in suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non affligens, fuerunt in statu innocentiae; aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi; non erant in eo (statu innocentiae) passiones animae, nisi ex rationis judicio consequentes."
Sequitur 2.: "Somnus," inquit D. Thomas 2. dist. 19. q. 1. a. 3. ad. 3., "quandoque convenit ex causa naturali, sicut ex vaporatione alimenti, vel ex humiditate cerebri, ut in prima aetate; et sic videtur, utraque de causa potuisse esse somnum in primo statu. Quandoque vero ex causa innaturali, sicut ex labore, aut aegritudine: et sic non fuisset ibi somnus. Somnus enim quantum in se est, est passio ad perfectionem totius animalis pertinens, eo quod in somno intenduntur virtutes naturales, et quietantur virtutes animales, ut postmodum fortiores sint in actibus suis."
Sequitur 3. quod cum homo in statu innocentiae haberet vitam etiam animalem, deberet cibis uti. "Cibus," ait D. Th. l. c. a. 2. ad 2., "sumebatur ad restaurationem deperditi, et ad augmentum corporis in quantitate perfecta, et ad multiplicationem speciei per viam seminalem, secundum quod nutritiva augmentativae, et generativae deservire dicitur." Nec inde sequitur fuisse in eo statu passionem laesivam; siquidem, uti monet Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 14. n. 26.), temperamentum unicuique homini conveniens et connaturale non consistit in indivisibili, sed habet quamdam latitudinem, intra quam variari potest sine defectu vel laesione corporis. Imo futura etiam erat in statu innocentiae fames et sitis, non quidem quatenus important aliquam molestiam, sed prout important nudum appetitum edendi et bibendi; cibus enim non est gratus et jucundus nisi esurienti. Unde S. Aug. (de civ. Dei l. 13. c. 20.) ait: "Alebantur ergo aliis, quae sumebant, ne animalia corpora molestiae aliquid esuriendo, et sitiendo sentirent."
Sequitur 4. quod in statu innocentiae non omnis labor abfuisset, uti patet ex Gen. 2. 15. "posuit eum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur, et custodiret illum;" omnis tamen abfuisset molestia et defatigatio, quam nunc labor secum affert. Unde S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 14. in Gen.) ait: "Dixit: Posuit illum in horto voluptatis; addit, ut coleret illum et custodiret. Etiam hoc magnae curae et providentiae nostri argumentum est. Nam cum omnibus deliciis potirentur ibi vitam agentes, tam oblectamentis eorum, quae videbant, quam laetitia eorum, quibus fruebantur, ut ne immodica prosperitate homo insolesceret (omnem enim malitiam docuit otium), propterea praecepit Deus, ut operaretur illum et custodiret. Quid autem? dicet aliquis, illius cura indigebat paradisus? Non hoc dico, sed voluit, ut parvam quandam sibique congruam gereret curam partim custodiendo, partim operando. Si enim laboris omnis fuisset expers, protinus ex multo otio in ignaviam delapsus esset: nunc vero in operatione occupatus, quae neque dolorem, neque molestiam adferret, moderatior utique atque continentior esse debuit."
Sequitur 2.: "Somnus," inquit D. Thomas 2. dist. 19. q. 1. a. 3. ad. 3., "quandoque convenit ex causa naturali, sicut ex vaporatione alimenti, vel ex humiditate cerebri, ut in prima aetate; et sic videtur, utraque de causa potuisse esse somnum in primo statu. Quandoque vero ex causa innaturali, sicut ex labore, aut aegritudine: et sic non fuisset ibi somnus. Somnus enim quantum in se est, est passio ad perfectionem totius animalis pertinens, eo quod in somno intenduntur virtutes naturales, et quietantur virtutes animales, ut postmodum fortiores sint in actibus suis."
Sequitur 3. quod cum homo in statu innocentiae haberet vitam etiam animalem, deberet cibis uti. "Cibus," ait D. Th. l. c. a. 2. ad 2., "sumebatur ad restaurationem deperditi, et ad augmentum corporis in quantitate perfecta, et ad multiplicationem speciei per viam seminalem, secundum quod nutritiva augmentativae, et generativae deservire dicitur." Nec inde sequitur fuisse in eo statu passionem laesivam; siquidem, uti monet Suarez (de op. sex dier. l. 3. c. 14. n. 26.), temperamentum unicuique homini conveniens et connaturale non consistit in indivisibili, sed habet quamdam latitudinem, intra quam variari potest sine defectu vel laesione corporis. Imo futura etiam erat in statu innocentiae fames et sitis, non quidem quatenus important aliquam molestiam, sed prout important nudum appetitum edendi et bibendi; cibus enim non est gratus et jucundus nisi esurienti. Unde S. Aug. (de civ. Dei l. 13. c. 20.) ait: "Alebantur ergo aliis, quae sumebant, ne animalia corpora molestiae aliquid esuriendo, et sitiendo sentirent."
Sequitur 4. quod in statu innocentiae non omnis labor abfuisset, uti patet ex Gen. 2. 15. "posuit eum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur, et custodiret illum;" omnis tamen abfuisset molestia et defatigatio, quam nunc labor secum affert. Unde S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 14. in Gen.) ait: "Dixit: Posuit illum in horto voluptatis; addit, ut coleret illum et custodiret. Etiam hoc magnae curae et providentiae nostri argumentum est. Nam cum omnibus deliciis potirentur ibi vitam agentes, tam oblectamentis eorum, quae videbant, quam laetitia eorum, quibus fruebantur, ut ne immodica prosperitate homo insolesceret (omnem enim malitiam docuit otium), propterea praecepit Deus, ut operaretur illum et custodiret. Quid autem? dicet aliquis, illius cura indigebat paradisus? Non hoc dico, sed voluit, ut parvam quandam sibique congruam gereret curam partim custodiendo, partim operando. Si enim laboris omnis fuisset expers, protinus ex multo otio in ignaviam delapsus esset: nunc vero in operatione occupatus, quae neque dolorem, neque molestiam adferret, moderatior utique atque continentior esse debuit."
315. From this observation it follows, first, that "those passions," as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 95, a. 2, corpus, "which can be of a present good, such as joy and love, or which are of a future good to be had in its own time, such as desire and hope that does not afflict, were in the state of innocence; nevertheless otherwise than in us. For in us the sensual appetite, in which the passions are, is not totally subject to reason; in that state of innocence there were no passions of the soul except those following from the judgment of reason."
It follows, secondly: "Sleep," says St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 19, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3, "sometimes belongs from a natural cause, as from the vaporization of food or from the humidity of the brain, as in the first age; and thus it seems that, from each cause, sleep could have existed in the first state. But sometimes it belongs from an unnatural cause, as from labor or sickness; and thus there would not have been sleep there. For sleep, considered in itself, is a passion pertaining to the perfection of the whole animal, because in sleep the natural powers are intensified and the animal powers are quieted, so that afterwards they may be stronger in their acts."
It follows, thirdly, that since man in the state of innocence also had animal life, he would have had to use foods. "Food," says St. Thomas in the cited place, a. 2, ad 2, "was taken for the restoration of what was lost, and for the increase of the body into perfect quantity, and for the multiplication of the species through the seminal way, according as the nutritive power is said to serve the augmentative and generative powers." Nor does it follow from this that in that state there was a harmful passion; since, as Suarez notes (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 14, n. 26), the temperament suitable and connatural to each man does not consist in an indivisible point, but has a certain latitude within which it can be varied without defect or injury of the body. Indeed, in the state of innocence there would also have been hunger and thirst, not indeed insofar as they imply some distress, but insofar as they imply the bare appetite for eating and drinking; for food is not pleasing and delightful except to one who is hungry. Hence St. Augustine (The City of God, book 13, chapter 20) says: "They were therefore nourished by other things which they took, lest their animal bodies should feel any distress by hungering and thirsting."
It follows, fourthly, that in the state of innocence not every labor would have been absent, as is clear from Genesis 2:15, "he placed him in the Paradise of pleasure, that he might work and guard it"; nevertheless every distress and weariness which labor now brings with itself would have been absent. Hence St. John Chrysostom (Homily 14 on Genesis) says: "He said: He placed him in the garden of pleasure; he adds, that he should cultivate it and guard it. This too is an argument of great care and providence for us. For since they who lived there enjoyed all delights, both by the charms of the things which they saw and by the gladness of the things which they enjoyed, lest man should grow insolent through excessive prosperity (for leisure taught every evil), God therefore commanded that he work it and guard it. But what? someone will say, did Paradise need his care? I do not say this, but he willed that man exercise a certain small care suitable to himself, partly by guarding, partly by working. For if he had been free from every labor, he would at once have fallen from much leisure into sloth; but now, occupied in work which would bring neither pain nor distress, he certainly ought to have been more moderate and more continent."
It follows, secondly: "Sleep," says St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 19, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3, "sometimes belongs from a natural cause, as from the vaporization of food or from the humidity of the brain, as in the first age; and thus it seems that, from each cause, sleep could have existed in the first state. But sometimes it belongs from an unnatural cause, as from labor or sickness; and thus there would not have been sleep there. For sleep, considered in itself, is a passion pertaining to the perfection of the whole animal, because in sleep the natural powers are intensified and the animal powers are quieted, so that afterwards they may be stronger in their acts."
It follows, thirdly, that since man in the state of innocence also had animal life, he would have had to use foods. "Food," says St. Thomas in the cited place, a. 2, ad 2, "was taken for the restoration of what was lost, and for the increase of the body into perfect quantity, and for the multiplication of the species through the seminal way, according as the nutritive power is said to serve the augmentative and generative powers." Nor does it follow from this that in that state there was a harmful passion; since, as Suarez notes (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 14, n. 26), the temperament suitable and connatural to each man does not consist in an indivisible point, but has a certain latitude within which it can be varied without defect or injury of the body. Indeed, in the state of innocence there would also have been hunger and thirst, not indeed insofar as they imply some distress, but insofar as they imply the bare appetite for eating and drinking; for food is not pleasing and delightful except to one who is hungry. Hence St. Augustine (The City of God, book 13, chapter 20) says: "They were therefore nourished by other things which they took, lest their animal bodies should feel any distress by hungering and thirsting."
It follows, fourthly, that in the state of innocence not every labor would have been absent, as is clear from Genesis 2:15, "he placed him in the Paradise of pleasure, that he might work and guard it"; nevertheless every distress and weariness which labor now brings with itself would have been absent. Hence St. John Chrysostom (Homily 14 on Genesis) says: "He said: He placed him in the garden of pleasure; he adds, that he should cultivate it and guard it. This too is an argument of great care and providence for us. For since they who lived there enjoyed all delights, both by the charms of the things which they saw and by the gladness of the things which they enjoyed, lest man should grow insolent through excessive prosperity (for leisure taught every evil), God therefore commanded that he work it and guard it. But what? someone will say, did Paradise need his care? I do not say this, but he willed that man exercise a certain small care suitable to himself, partly by guarding, partly by working. For if he had been free from every labor, he would at once have fallen from much leisure into sloth; but now, occupied in work which would bring neither pain nor distress, he certainly ought to have been more moderate and more continent."
316. His declaratis, dicimus:
Prop. XXXI. Protoparentes 1. liberi ab aerumnis ac doloribus, constituti fuerunt in singulari externae felicitatis statu; 2. qui tamen erat eorum naturae indebitus.
Prob. 1ma pars. a) Hanc felicitatem ex Scriptura ea ostendunt, quae leguntur Gen. 2. 15. seqq. de loco, in quo collocati fuerunt, videlicet in paradiso voluptatis - quae Gen. 1. 26.; Eccli. 17. 3.; Ps. 8. dicuntur de dominio, quod Protoparentibus in res creatas concessum fuit - quae ex Gen. 1. et 2. de immunitate a molestis laboribus et de copia bonorum, quibus primi homines divina largitate affluebant.
b) Unde S. Jo. Chrys., l. c., ait: "Non simpliciter dixit in horto, sed apposuit voluptatis, ut excellentem voluptatem, qua fruiturus esset inhabitando, nobis declararet." - S. Aug. (de civ. Dei, l. 14. c. 29.): "Vivebat itaque homo in paradiso, sicut volebat, quamdiu hoc volebat quod Deus jusserat. Vivebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus; vivebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper vivere habens in potestate: cibus aderat, ne esuriret: potus, ne sitiret; lignum vitae, ne illum senecta dissolveret. Nihil corruptionis in corpore, vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis ejus sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus extrinsecus ictus metuebatur. Summa in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas. Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus, aut frigus, ita in ejus habitatore nulla ex cupiditate, vel timore accedebat bonae voluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum; gaudium vero perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat caritas de corde puro, et conscientia bona, et fide non ficta; atque inter se conjugum fida ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque vigilia, et mandati sine labore custodia. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat invitum." Vid. Petav. de opif. sex dier. l. 2. c. 6.
c) D. Thomas 1. p. q. 95. a. 2. c. inquit: "Omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat, nec imminebat, nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum, 14. de Civ. Dei, loc. nunc. cit., omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant, ut timor, et dolor, et hujusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum, et tunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans."
d) Primaevam protoparentum felicitatem gentium traditiones confirmant. Communis est enim apud omnes nationes opinio de saeculo aureo, nempe de prisca vita ab aerumnis, quibus nunc premimur, libera, ac proinde beatissima; etsi hanc ideam quisque pro suo ingenio ac sensu informaverit. Jamvero, admissa veritate facti, admissa nempe existentia illius beatae vitae, facile hujusmodi traditiones explicantur; secus vero, nequit intelligi quomodo populi omnes religione, moribus, indole, aetate, lingua, regione longe a se dissiti in eandem opinionem concesserint. Vid. Dan. Huetium (Quaest. Alnetan. l. 2. c. 11.)
Prob. 2da pars. I. Ideo, juxta adversarios, immunitas ab aerumnis esset humanae naturae debita, quia habent illae rationem veri mali - quod non potest infligi nisi uti poena - et faciunt hominem vere miserum ac propterea Deus esset injustus, si hominem innocentem eisdem subjiceret. Atqui contrarium omnino constanter docuere Patres. Ergo.
Prob. min. a) Patres docent miserias hujus vitae non esse quid in se vere malum. S. Justinus de iis loquens (expl. q. 46.), ait: "Neque in eo, quod salubre est, quidquam inest mali." - S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 8. in c. 4. Tim.): "Haec sciens, quaenam sint bona, quae mala, quae media, disce: ut puta bonum virtus, nequitia malum, media vero divitiae, paupertas, vita, mors. Cum ista didiceris, adde, quod ideo premantur justi, ut coronentur, peccatores vero, ut poenas exsolvant." S. Hier. (in Amos. 3. 6.): "Malum quod Dominus facit in civitate, non contrarium est virtuti, sed afflictio et cruciatus, quod non per se malum est, sed malum videtur his esse, qui sustinent." Et (l. 15. in cap. 55. Isaiae): "Perspicuum est divitias et egestatem, sanitatem et languorem neque bona esse neque mala."
b) Docent aerumnas non habere solum rationem poenae. Gaudentius (in praef. ad Ben.): "Doloris triplex est ratio, correctionis, purgationis, probationis, etc." - S. Aug. (de agone Christ. c. 7.): "Nec enim nos moveat, quod in hac vita, secundum carnem, quam portant justi, multa gravia et adversa tolerant; nihil enim mali patiuntur, quia jam possunt dicere, quod ille vir spiritalis exultat et praedicat, Apostolus Paulus, dicens: Gloriamur in tribulationibus, scientes quoniam tribulatio patientiam operatur." - Et (l. 2. de pecc. mer. et rem. c. 23. n. 53.): "Si propter peccatum dixit Deus homini, in sudore vultus tui etc., quare et post remissionem labor hic permanet? Respondemus dicentes, ante remissionem esse illa supplicia peccatorum, post remissionem autem certamina exercitationesque justorum." - S. Gregorius (Mor. in Job., Praef. c. 9. n. 12.): "Percussionum quippe diversa sunt genera. Alia namque est percussio, qua peccator percutitur, ut sine retractatione puniatur (vera miseria et aeterna); alia qua peccator percutitur, ut corrigatur; alia qua nonnunquam quisque percutitur non ut praeterita corrigat, sed ne futura committat; alia qua plerumque percutitur, per quam nec praeterita culpa corrigitur, nec futura prohibetur, sed ut, dum inopinata salus percussionem sequitur, salvantis virtus cognita ardentius ametur, cumque innoxius flagellis atteritur, ei per patientiam meritorum summa conferatur."
c) Docent hujus vitae aerumnas non modo posse a Deo citra injustitiam justis infligi, sed insuper ejus tribuendas esse bonitati. S. Aug. (Ep. 210. 1.): "Quod ergo non misericorditer praestatur hominibus a Domino Deo, a quo et tribulatio beneficium est. Nam res prospera donum est consolantis, res autem adversa donum est admonentis Dei." - Cyr. Alex. (in Gen. l. 5.): "Cur Deus sanctis non confert id, quod delectat, absque labore? Ne inexercitatos sineret esse et virtutis mercedem largiretur."
d) Docent ex hominis natura procedere, eumque miserum minime facere. S. Athanasius (disp. 2. c. gent. n. 4.): "Si gratiam concessam servarent, et in bono permanerent, praeter promissam in caelis immortalitatem, vita maeroris, doloris et solicitudinis vacua in Paradiso fruerentur. Sin vero latam legem transgressi, mali fierent, certo scirent, se mortis corruptionem secundum naturam subituros." - S. Fulgentius (ep. 2. ad Gallam c. 9.): "Alia sunt, quae sic a Deo temporaliter donantur, ut temporaliter auferantur, sicut est abundantia divitiarum, incolumitas corporum et si quae sunt similia, quae nec miseros possunt facere homines nec beatos. Ideo haec et bonis et malis a Domino dantur, et nonnunquam bonis malisque divinitus auferuntur. Beatus fuit Job, quum in divitiis juste viveret, sed beatior, quum in paupertate justior extitisset. Beatus fuit in corporis sospitate, sed beatior est factus in vulnere ... Attende etiam duos, unum in divitiis et sanitate miserum (divitem in Evangelio), alterum (Lazarum) in egestate et vulnere multum beatum." - Plura PP. testimonia vid. apud Casini op. c. art. 3.
Prob. II. Ex ratione. a) Quae diximus de concupiscentia et mortalitate, eodem modo, imo a fortiori aptari possunt sive passionibus animi, sive doloribus corporis. Atqui immunitas a concupiscentia et immortalitas, uti ostendimus, sunt dona humanae naturae indebita. Ergo.
b) Plures, praeter rationem poenae, possumus assignare rationes, propter quas Deus hominem subjiciat miseriis hujus vitae: pro supremo dominio quod habet, potest in sui gloriam hoc sacrificium holocausti exigere a sua creatura - mala hujus vitae promovent rerum temporalium contemptum - humilitatem edocent - occultas animi vires excitant - virtutem animi augent - possunt et praemium per patientiam augere. Atqui hujusmodi rationes valent etiam pro homine innocente. Ergo.
Nota. Fere omnes difficultates, praesertim ex S. Augustino desumptae, solvuntur ex iis quae adnotavimus (n. 306.) Pro iis vero, quae citant adversarii ex disp. 1. et 2. cont. Fortunatum, ubi inter caetera scribit S. Doctor: "crudelitatis fore, si Deus hujus vitae aerumnis animas nullius peccati reas addiceret;" notandum est insuper 1. quod Fortunatus, Manichaeus, inter eas miserias ponebat peccatum, cujus non liberum arbitrium nostrum, sed Deum Auctorem faciebat - 2. quod miserias hujus vitae non in nostri utilitatem, sed in Dei saeviendi libidinem referebat. - Unde (disp. 1. c. Fort. n. 27.) ita, ex S. Aug., anima hominis expostulat cum Deo: "Non est mihi servatum liberum arbitrium. Tu nosti necessitatem, qua pressa sum: cur mihi vulnera imputas, quare me cogis ad poenitentiam, cum tu sis causa vulnerum meorum, cum tu scias, quae passa sum, gentem tenebrarum in me fecisse, te auctore?"
Prop. XXXI. Protoparentes 1. liberi ab aerumnis ac doloribus, constituti fuerunt in singulari externae felicitatis statu; 2. qui tamen erat eorum naturae indebitus.
Prob. 1ma pars. a) Hanc felicitatem ex Scriptura ea ostendunt, quae leguntur Gen. 2. 15. seqq. de loco, in quo collocati fuerunt, videlicet in paradiso voluptatis - quae Gen. 1. 26.; Eccli. 17. 3.; Ps. 8. dicuntur de dominio, quod Protoparentibus in res creatas concessum fuit - quae ex Gen. 1. et 2. de immunitate a molestis laboribus et de copia bonorum, quibus primi homines divina largitate affluebant.
b) Unde S. Jo. Chrys., l. c., ait: "Non simpliciter dixit in horto, sed apposuit voluptatis, ut excellentem voluptatem, qua fruiturus esset inhabitando, nobis declararet." - S. Aug. (de civ. Dei, l. 14. c. 29.): "Vivebat itaque homo in paradiso, sicut volebat, quamdiu hoc volebat quod Deus jusserat. Vivebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus; vivebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper vivere habens in potestate: cibus aderat, ne esuriret: potus, ne sitiret; lignum vitae, ne illum senecta dissolveret. Nihil corruptionis in corpore, vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis ejus sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus extrinsecus ictus metuebatur. Summa in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas. Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus, aut frigus, ita in ejus habitatore nulla ex cupiditate, vel timore accedebat bonae voluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum; gaudium vero perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat caritas de corde puro, et conscientia bona, et fide non ficta; atque inter se conjugum fida ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque vigilia, et mandati sine labore custodia. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat invitum." Vid. Petav. de opif. sex dier. l. 2. c. 6.
c) D. Thomas 1. p. q. 95. a. 2. c. inquit: "Omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat, nec imminebat, nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum, 14. de Civ. Dei, loc. nunc. cit., omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant, ut timor, et dolor, et hujusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum, et tunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans."
d) Primaevam protoparentum felicitatem gentium traditiones confirmant. Communis est enim apud omnes nationes opinio de saeculo aureo, nempe de prisca vita ab aerumnis, quibus nunc premimur, libera, ac proinde beatissima; etsi hanc ideam quisque pro suo ingenio ac sensu informaverit. Jamvero, admissa veritate facti, admissa nempe existentia illius beatae vitae, facile hujusmodi traditiones explicantur; secus vero, nequit intelligi quomodo populi omnes religione, moribus, indole, aetate, lingua, regione longe a se dissiti in eandem opinionem concesserint. Vid. Dan. Huetium (Quaest. Alnetan. l. 2. c. 11.)
Prob. 2da pars. I. Ideo, juxta adversarios, immunitas ab aerumnis esset humanae naturae debita, quia habent illae rationem veri mali - quod non potest infligi nisi uti poena - et faciunt hominem vere miserum ac propterea Deus esset injustus, si hominem innocentem eisdem subjiceret. Atqui contrarium omnino constanter docuere Patres. Ergo.
Prob. min. a) Patres docent miserias hujus vitae non esse quid in se vere malum. S. Justinus de iis loquens (expl. q. 46.), ait: "Neque in eo, quod salubre est, quidquam inest mali." - S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 8. in c. 4. Tim.): "Haec sciens, quaenam sint bona, quae mala, quae media, disce: ut puta bonum virtus, nequitia malum, media vero divitiae, paupertas, vita, mors. Cum ista didiceris, adde, quod ideo premantur justi, ut coronentur, peccatores vero, ut poenas exsolvant." S. Hier. (in Amos. 3. 6.): "Malum quod Dominus facit in civitate, non contrarium est virtuti, sed afflictio et cruciatus, quod non per se malum est, sed malum videtur his esse, qui sustinent." Et (l. 15. in cap. 55. Isaiae): "Perspicuum est divitias et egestatem, sanitatem et languorem neque bona esse neque mala."
b) Docent aerumnas non habere solum rationem poenae. Gaudentius (in praef. ad Ben.): "Doloris triplex est ratio, correctionis, purgationis, probationis, etc." - S. Aug. (de agone Christ. c. 7.): "Nec enim nos moveat, quod in hac vita, secundum carnem, quam portant justi, multa gravia et adversa tolerant; nihil enim mali patiuntur, quia jam possunt dicere, quod ille vir spiritalis exultat et praedicat, Apostolus Paulus, dicens: Gloriamur in tribulationibus, scientes quoniam tribulatio patientiam operatur." - Et (l. 2. de pecc. mer. et rem. c. 23. n. 53.): "Si propter peccatum dixit Deus homini, in sudore vultus tui etc., quare et post remissionem labor hic permanet? Respondemus dicentes, ante remissionem esse illa supplicia peccatorum, post remissionem autem certamina exercitationesque justorum." - S. Gregorius (Mor. in Job., Praef. c. 9. n. 12.): "Percussionum quippe diversa sunt genera. Alia namque est percussio, qua peccator percutitur, ut sine retractatione puniatur (vera miseria et aeterna); alia qua peccator percutitur, ut corrigatur; alia qua nonnunquam quisque percutitur non ut praeterita corrigat, sed ne futura committat; alia qua plerumque percutitur, per quam nec praeterita culpa corrigitur, nec futura prohibetur, sed ut, dum inopinata salus percussionem sequitur, salvantis virtus cognita ardentius ametur, cumque innoxius flagellis atteritur, ei per patientiam meritorum summa conferatur."
c) Docent hujus vitae aerumnas non modo posse a Deo citra injustitiam justis infligi, sed insuper ejus tribuendas esse bonitati. S. Aug. (Ep. 210. 1.): "Quod ergo non misericorditer praestatur hominibus a Domino Deo, a quo et tribulatio beneficium est. Nam res prospera donum est consolantis, res autem adversa donum est admonentis Dei." - Cyr. Alex. (in Gen. l. 5.): "Cur Deus sanctis non confert id, quod delectat, absque labore? Ne inexercitatos sineret esse et virtutis mercedem largiretur."
d) Docent ex hominis natura procedere, eumque miserum minime facere. S. Athanasius (disp. 2. c. gent. n. 4.): "Si gratiam concessam servarent, et in bono permanerent, praeter promissam in caelis immortalitatem, vita maeroris, doloris et solicitudinis vacua in Paradiso fruerentur. Sin vero latam legem transgressi, mali fierent, certo scirent, se mortis corruptionem secundum naturam subituros." - S. Fulgentius (ep. 2. ad Gallam c. 9.): "Alia sunt, quae sic a Deo temporaliter donantur, ut temporaliter auferantur, sicut est abundantia divitiarum, incolumitas corporum et si quae sunt similia, quae nec miseros possunt facere homines nec beatos. Ideo haec et bonis et malis a Domino dantur, et nonnunquam bonis malisque divinitus auferuntur. Beatus fuit Job, quum in divitiis juste viveret, sed beatior, quum in paupertate justior extitisset. Beatus fuit in corporis sospitate, sed beatior est factus in vulnere ... Attende etiam duos, unum in divitiis et sanitate miserum (divitem in Evangelio), alterum (Lazarum) in egestate et vulnere multum beatum." - Plura PP. testimonia vid. apud Casini op. c. art. 3.
Prob. II. Ex ratione. a) Quae diximus de concupiscentia et mortalitate, eodem modo, imo a fortiori aptari possunt sive passionibus animi, sive doloribus corporis. Atqui immunitas a concupiscentia et immortalitas, uti ostendimus, sunt dona humanae naturae indebita. Ergo.
b) Plures, praeter rationem poenae, possumus assignare rationes, propter quas Deus hominem subjiciat miseriis hujus vitae: pro supremo dominio quod habet, potest in sui gloriam hoc sacrificium holocausti exigere a sua creatura - mala hujus vitae promovent rerum temporalium contemptum - humilitatem edocent - occultas animi vires excitant - virtutem animi augent - possunt et praemium per patientiam augere. Atqui hujusmodi rationes valent etiam pro homine innocente. Ergo.
Nota. Fere omnes difficultates, praesertim ex S. Augustino desumptae, solvuntur ex iis quae adnotavimus (n. 306.) Pro iis vero, quae citant adversarii ex disp. 1. et 2. cont. Fortunatum, ubi inter caetera scribit S. Doctor: "crudelitatis fore, si Deus hujus vitae aerumnis animas nullius peccati reas addiceret;" notandum est insuper 1. quod Fortunatus, Manichaeus, inter eas miserias ponebat peccatum, cujus non liberum arbitrium nostrum, sed Deum Auctorem faciebat - 2. quod miserias hujus vitae non in nostri utilitatem, sed in Dei saeviendi libidinem referebat. - Unde (disp. 1. c. Fort. n. 27.) ita, ex S. Aug., anima hominis expostulat cum Deo: "Non est mihi servatum liberum arbitrium. Tu nosti necessitatem, qua pressa sum: cur mihi vulnera imputas, quare me cogis ad poenitentiam, cum tu sis causa vulnerum meorum, cum tu scias, quae passa sum, gentem tenebrarum in me fecisse, te auctore?"
316. With these things declared, we say:
Proposition XXXI. The first parents 1. were free from hardships and pains, and were constituted in a singular state of external happiness; 2. nevertheless this state was not owed to their nature.
Proof of the first part. a) From Scripture those things show this happiness which are read in Genesis 2:15 ff. concerning the place in which they were placed, namely in the Paradise of pleasure; those things which are said in Genesis 1:26, Ecclesiasticus 17:3, and Psalm 8 concerning the dominion which was granted to the first Parents over created things; and those things from Genesis 1 and 2 concerning immunity from distressing labors and concerning the abundance of goods with which the first men abounded by divine largess.
b) Hence St. John Chrysostom, in the cited place, says: "He did not simply say in a garden, but added of pleasure, so that he might declare to us the excellent pleasure which he would enjoy by dwelling there." - St. Augustine (The City of God, book 14, chapter 29): "Therefore man lived in Paradise as he wished, as long as he wished what God had commanded. He lived enjoying God, from whose good he was good; he lived without any want, having it in his power always to live thus: food was present, lest he hunger; drink, lest he thirst; the tree of life, lest old age dissolve him. Nothing of corruption in the body, or from the body, brought any distresses upon any of his senses. No internal disease, no external blow was feared. Highest health in the flesh, entire tranquillity in the soul. Just as in Paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense of good will came from desire or fear. There was nothing sad at all, nothing vainly glad; but joy was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity burned from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith not feigned; and between the spouses there was faithful society from honorable love, harmonious vigilance of mind and body, and custody of the command without labor. Weariness did not fatigue one at leisure; sleep did not oppress one unwilling." See Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book 2, chapter 6.
c) St. Thomas, I, q. 95, a. 2, corpus, says: "Of all the passions of the soul, some are ordered to good, such as love and joy; some to evil, such as fear and pain. And because in the first state no evil was present or threatening, nor was any good absent which the good will would desire to have for that time, as is clear through Augustine, book 14 of The City of God, in the place now cited, all those passions which regard evil were not in Adam, such as fear and pain and things of this kind; likewise neither were those passions which regard a good not possessed and then to be possessed, such as burning desire."
d) The traditions of the nations confirm the primeval happiness of the first parents. For there is among all nations a common opinion concerning a golden age, namely concerning an ancient life free from the hardships by which we are now pressed, and consequently most blessed, although each people formed this idea according to its own character and sense. Now, once the truth of the fact is admitted, namely once the existence of that blessed life is admitted, traditions of this kind are easily explained; but otherwise it cannot be understood how all peoples, far distant from one another in religion, customs, character, age, language, and region, came together into the same opinion. See Daniel Huet, Quaestiones Alnetanae, book 2, chapter 11.
Proof of the second part, I. According to the adversaries, immunity from hardships would be owed to human nature because those hardships have the account of a true evil - which cannot be inflicted except as punishment - and make man truly miserable; and for that reason God would be unjust if he subjected innocent man to them. But the Fathers altogether constantly taught the contrary. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. a) The Fathers teach that the miseries of this life are not something truly evil in themselves. St. Justin, speaking of them (Explanation of Question 46), says: "Nor is there anything evil in that which is salutary." - St. John Chrysostom (homily 8 on chapter 4 of Timothy): "Knowing these things, learn what things are good, what evil, what middle: for example, virtue is good, wickedness evil, but riches, poverty, life, death are middle. When you have learned these things, add that the just are pressed so that they may be crowned, but sinners so that they may pay penalties." St. Jerome (on Amos 3:6): "The evil which the Lord does in the city is not contrary to virtue, but affliction and torment; this is not evil of itself, but seems to be evil to those who endure it." And (book 15 on chapter 55 of Isaiah): "It is clear that riches and want, health and sickness, are neither good nor evil."
b) They teach that hardships do not have only the account of punishment. Gaudentius (in the preface to Ben.): "There is a threefold account of pain: correction, purgation, probation, etc." - St. Augustine (On the Christian Combat, chapter 7): "Nor should it move us that in this life, according to the flesh which the just bear, they tolerate many grave and adverse things; for they suffer nothing evil, because they can already say what that spiritual man exults and proclaims, the Apostle Paul, saying: We glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience." - And (book 2, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 23, n. 53): "If on account of sin God said to man, In the sweat of your face, etc., why does this labor remain even after remission? We answer by saying that before remission those things are punishments of sinners, but after remission they are contests and exercises of the just." - St. Gregory (Morals on Job, Preface, chapter 9, n. 12): "There are indeed diverse kinds of blows. For one blow is that by which a sinner is struck so that he may be punished without reconsideration (true and eternal misery); another by which a sinner is struck so that he may be corrected; another by which sometimes someone is struck, not that he may correct past things, but lest he commit future things; another by which he is often struck, through which neither a past fault is corrected nor a future one prevented, but so that, when unexpected health follows the blow, the known power of the Savior may be loved more ardently, and when an innocent person is worn down by scourges, the highest sum of merits may be conferred on him through patience."
c) They teach that the hardships of this life not only can be inflicted by God upon the just without injustice, but furthermore are to be attributed to his goodness. St. Augustine (Epistle 210.1): "What, then, is not mercifully bestowed upon men by the Lord God, from whom even tribulation is a benefit? For a prosperous thing is the gift of God consoling, but an adverse thing is the gift of God admonishing." - Cyril of Alexandria (on Genesis, book 5): "Why does God not confer on the saints that which delights without labor? Lest he allow them to be unexercised and bestow the reward of virtue."
d) They teach that they proceed from the nature of man and do not in the least make him miserable. St. Athanasius (Disputation 2 against the Gentiles, n. 4): "If they preserved the grace granted and remained in good, beyond the immortality promised in heaven, they would enjoy in Paradise a life free from sadness, pain, and solicitude. But if, transgressing the law given, they became evil, they would know certainly that they would undergo the corruption of death according to nature." - St. Fulgentius (Epistle 2 to Galla, chapter 9): "There are other things which are so temporally given by God that they are temporally taken away, such as abundance of riches, soundness of bodies, and any similar things, which can make men neither miserable nor blessed. Therefore these things are given by the Lord both to the good and to the evil, and sometimes are divinely taken away from the good and the evil. Job was blessed when he lived justly in riches, but more blessed when in poverty he had become more just. He was blessed in health of body, but he was made more blessed in wound ... Consider also two men, one miserable in riches and health (the rich man in the Gospel), the other (Lazarus) very blessed in want and wound." - See more testimonies of the Fathers in Casini, cited work, article 3.
Proof II. From reason. a) The things which we have said concerning concupiscence and mortality can be applied in the same way, indeed a fortiori, either to the passions of the soul or to pains of the body. But immunity from concupiscence and immortality, as we have shown, are gifts not owed to human nature. Therefore.
b) Besides the account of punishment, we can assign several reasons on account of which God may subject man to the miseries of this life: because of the supreme dominion which he has, he can require this holocaust-sacrifice from his creature for his own glory; the evils of this life promote contempt of temporal things; they teach humility; they stir up hidden powers of the soul; they increase virtue of soul; and they can also increase reward through patience. But reasons of this kind hold even for innocent man. Therefore.
Note. Almost all difficulties, especially those drawn from St. Augustine, are solved from the things which we noted above (n. 306). But for those things which the adversaries cite from disputations 1 and 2 against Fortunatus, where among other things the holy Doctor writes that "it would be cruelty if God should assign to the hardships of this life souls guilty of no sin," it must be noted besides: 1. that Fortunatus the Manichaean placed among those miseries sin, of which he made not our free will but God the Author; 2. that he referred the miseries of this life not to our advantage, but to God's lust for cruelty. - Hence (disputation 1 against Fortunatus, n. 27), according to St. Augustine, the soul of man remonstrates with God in this way: "Free will was not preserved for me. You know the necessity by which I have been pressed: why do you impute wounds to me, why do you compel me to penance, when you are the cause of my wounds, when you know that what I have suffered, the race of darkness has done in me, with you as author?"
Proposition XXXI. The first parents 1. were free from hardships and pains, and were constituted in a singular state of external happiness; 2. nevertheless this state was not owed to their nature.
Proof of the first part. a) From Scripture those things show this happiness which are read in Genesis 2:15 ff. concerning the place in which they were placed, namely in the Paradise of pleasure; those things which are said in Genesis 1:26, Ecclesiasticus 17:3, and Psalm 8 concerning the dominion which was granted to the first Parents over created things; and those things from Genesis 1 and 2 concerning immunity from distressing labors and concerning the abundance of goods with which the first men abounded by divine largess.
b) Hence St. John Chrysostom, in the cited place, says: "He did not simply say in a garden, but added of pleasure, so that he might declare to us the excellent pleasure which he would enjoy by dwelling there." - St. Augustine (The City of God, book 14, chapter 29): "Therefore man lived in Paradise as he wished, as long as he wished what God had commanded. He lived enjoying God, from whose good he was good; he lived without any want, having it in his power always to live thus: food was present, lest he hunger; drink, lest he thirst; the tree of life, lest old age dissolve him. Nothing of corruption in the body, or from the body, brought any distresses upon any of his senses. No internal disease, no external blow was feared. Highest health in the flesh, entire tranquillity in the soul. Just as in Paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense of good will came from desire or fear. There was nothing sad at all, nothing vainly glad; but joy was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity burned from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith not feigned; and between the spouses there was faithful society from honorable love, harmonious vigilance of mind and body, and custody of the command without labor. Weariness did not fatigue one at leisure; sleep did not oppress one unwilling." See Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book 2, chapter 6.
c) St. Thomas, I, q. 95, a. 2, corpus, says: "Of all the passions of the soul, some are ordered to good, such as love and joy; some to evil, such as fear and pain. And because in the first state no evil was present or threatening, nor was any good absent which the good will would desire to have for that time, as is clear through Augustine, book 14 of The City of God, in the place now cited, all those passions which regard evil were not in Adam, such as fear and pain and things of this kind; likewise neither were those passions which regard a good not possessed and then to be possessed, such as burning desire."
d) The traditions of the nations confirm the primeval happiness of the first parents. For there is among all nations a common opinion concerning a golden age, namely concerning an ancient life free from the hardships by which we are now pressed, and consequently most blessed, although each people formed this idea according to its own character and sense. Now, once the truth of the fact is admitted, namely once the existence of that blessed life is admitted, traditions of this kind are easily explained; but otherwise it cannot be understood how all peoples, far distant from one another in religion, customs, character, age, language, and region, came together into the same opinion. See Daniel Huet, Quaestiones Alnetanae, book 2, chapter 11.
Proof of the second part, I. According to the adversaries, immunity from hardships would be owed to human nature because those hardships have the account of a true evil - which cannot be inflicted except as punishment - and make man truly miserable; and for that reason God would be unjust if he subjected innocent man to them. But the Fathers altogether constantly taught the contrary. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. a) The Fathers teach that the miseries of this life are not something truly evil in themselves. St. Justin, speaking of them (Explanation of Question 46), says: "Nor is there anything evil in that which is salutary." - St. John Chrysostom (homily 8 on chapter 4 of Timothy): "Knowing these things, learn what things are good, what evil, what middle: for example, virtue is good, wickedness evil, but riches, poverty, life, death are middle. When you have learned these things, add that the just are pressed so that they may be crowned, but sinners so that they may pay penalties." St. Jerome (on Amos 3:6): "The evil which the Lord does in the city is not contrary to virtue, but affliction and torment; this is not evil of itself, but seems to be evil to those who endure it." And (book 15 on chapter 55 of Isaiah): "It is clear that riches and want, health and sickness, are neither good nor evil."
b) They teach that hardships do not have only the account of punishment. Gaudentius (in the preface to Ben.): "There is a threefold account of pain: correction, purgation, probation, etc." - St. Augustine (On the Christian Combat, chapter 7): "Nor should it move us that in this life, according to the flesh which the just bear, they tolerate many grave and adverse things; for they suffer nothing evil, because they can already say what that spiritual man exults and proclaims, the Apostle Paul, saying: We glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience." - And (book 2, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 23, n. 53): "If on account of sin God said to man, In the sweat of your face, etc., why does this labor remain even after remission? We answer by saying that before remission those things are punishments of sinners, but after remission they are contests and exercises of the just." - St. Gregory (Morals on Job, Preface, chapter 9, n. 12): "There are indeed diverse kinds of blows. For one blow is that by which a sinner is struck so that he may be punished without reconsideration (true and eternal misery); another by which a sinner is struck so that he may be corrected; another by which sometimes someone is struck, not that he may correct past things, but lest he commit future things; another by which he is often struck, through which neither a past fault is corrected nor a future one prevented, but so that, when unexpected health follows the blow, the known power of the Savior may be loved more ardently, and when an innocent person is worn down by scourges, the highest sum of merits may be conferred on him through patience."
c) They teach that the hardships of this life not only can be inflicted by God upon the just without injustice, but furthermore are to be attributed to his goodness. St. Augustine (Epistle 210.1): "What, then, is not mercifully bestowed upon men by the Lord God, from whom even tribulation is a benefit? For a prosperous thing is the gift of God consoling, but an adverse thing is the gift of God admonishing." - Cyril of Alexandria (on Genesis, book 5): "Why does God not confer on the saints that which delights without labor? Lest he allow them to be unexercised and bestow the reward of virtue."
d) They teach that they proceed from the nature of man and do not in the least make him miserable. St. Athanasius (Disputation 2 against the Gentiles, n. 4): "If they preserved the grace granted and remained in good, beyond the immortality promised in heaven, they would enjoy in Paradise a life free from sadness, pain, and solicitude. But if, transgressing the law given, they became evil, they would know certainly that they would undergo the corruption of death according to nature." - St. Fulgentius (Epistle 2 to Galla, chapter 9): "There are other things which are so temporally given by God that they are temporally taken away, such as abundance of riches, soundness of bodies, and any similar things, which can make men neither miserable nor blessed. Therefore these things are given by the Lord both to the good and to the evil, and sometimes are divinely taken away from the good and the evil. Job was blessed when he lived justly in riches, but more blessed when in poverty he had become more just. He was blessed in health of body, but he was made more blessed in wound ... Consider also two men, one miserable in riches and health (the rich man in the Gospel), the other (Lazarus) very blessed in want and wound." - See more testimonies of the Fathers in Casini, cited work, article 3.
Proof II. From reason. a) The things which we have said concerning concupiscence and mortality can be applied in the same way, indeed a fortiori, either to the passions of the soul or to pains of the body. But immunity from concupiscence and immortality, as we have shown, are gifts not owed to human nature. Therefore.
b) Besides the account of punishment, we can assign several reasons on account of which God may subject man to the miseries of this life: because of the supreme dominion which he has, he can require this holocaust-sacrifice from his creature for his own glory; the evils of this life promote contempt of temporal things; they teach humility; they stir up hidden powers of the soul; they increase virtue of soul; and they can also increase reward through patience. But reasons of this kind hold even for innocent man. Therefore.
Note. Almost all difficulties, especially those drawn from St. Augustine, are solved from the things which we noted above (n. 306). But for those things which the adversaries cite from disputations 1 and 2 against Fortunatus, where among other things the holy Doctor writes that "it would be cruelty if God should assign to the hardships of this life souls guilty of no sin," it must be noted besides: 1. that Fortunatus the Manichaean placed among those miseries sin, of which he made not our free will but God the Author; 2. that he referred the miseries of this life not to our advantage, but to God's lust for cruelty. - Hence (disputation 1 against Fortunatus, n. 27), according to St. Augustine, the soul of man remonstrates with God in this way: "Free will was not preserved for me. You know the necessity by which I have been pressed: why do you impute wounds to me, why do you compel me to penance, when you are the cause of my wounds, when you know that what I have suffered, the race of darkness has done in me, with you as author?"