Article 6. On the Immortality of the First Man

289. Adhering to the proposed method, we shall establish the fact of the conferral of this gift, and then its preternaturality. Yet certain things must be added, both so that its true nature may become known, and so that difficulties may be forestalled.

290. The doctrine of the Church on this matter is handed down in the Second Council of Milevis, A.D. 416: "It has pleased us to establish: That whoever says that Adam, the first man, was made mortal, so that whether he sinned or did not sin he would die in the body, that is, depart from the body, not by the merit of sin, but by necessity of nature, let him be anathema." - In the Second Council of Orange, A.D. 529: "If anyone asserts that Adam's prevarication harmed him alone, and not also his offspring, or certainly testifies that only the death of the body, which is the punishment of sin, but not also sin, which is the death of the soul, passed through one man into the whole human race, he will give injustice to God, contradicting the Apostle who says: Through one man, etc." The Council of Trent has the same, session 5, decree on original sin, canons 1 and 2.

291. The difficulty in this matter is drawn from this, that since Adam's body consisted of the same elements of which ours now consists, it seems, like ours, to have been corruptible, and consequently not immortal. See Suarez, On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 14, n. 6.

292. In order to meet this difficulty, and at the same time to understand the character of the immortality granted to Adam, it must be noted with St. Thomas, I, q. 97, a. 1, "that something can be called incorruptible in three ways. In one way on the part of matter, namely because it does not have matter, as an Angel ... and this is called incorruptible according to nature. In another way something is called incorruptible on the part of form, because, namely, in a thing corruptible by nature there inheres some disposition through which it is totally prevented from corruption; and this is called incorruptible according to glory: because, as Augustine says in the Epistle to Dioscorus, God made the soul of so powerful a nature that from its beatitude there redounds into the body the fullness of health and the vigor of incorruption. In a third way something is called incorruptible on the part of the efficient cause; and in this way man in the state of innocence would have been incorruptible and immortal ... For his body was not indissoluble through some vigor of immortality existing in it."

293. Hence Suarez rightly concludes in the cited place, n. 8, that the immortality granted to Adam was one "which does not exclude the intrinsic capacity of death, but only grants that that potency not be reduced to act. But because this was infallible from divine promise, therefore, speaking theologically, that power of not dying can be called a certain immortality; and, on the contrary, Adam is said to have been made mortal by sinning, because he lost that privilege on account of sin."

294. This same is the doctrine of St. Augustine (apud Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, chapter 6, n. 7), who says: "That body (of Adam), before sin, could be called both mortal according to one cause and immortal according to another; that is, mortal because it could die, immortal because it could not die. For it is one thing not to be able to die, as God created certain immortal natures; but another thing to be able not to die. According to this mode the first man was created immortal; this was furnished to him from the tree of life, not from the constitution of nature. From that tree he was separated when he had sinned, so that he could die, who, unless he had sinned, could not die. Therefore he was mortal by the condition of the animal body, but immortal by the benefit of the Creator. For if an animal body, certainly mortal, because it could also die, though also immortal for this reason, because it could also not die."

295. From these things certain sayings, whether among the Fathers or among the older theologians, are easily explained: "Adam was mortal, but not going to die"; "he was mortal and immortal"; "he was neither wholly mortal nor wholly immortal," etc.

296. But all these things will become still clearer if we weigh the means by which God conferred immortality upon man in the first condition. In two ways, as Suarez notes, death can happen to man, namely from an extrinsic cause, as by fire, water, sword, etc., which is called violent death; or from within, which is called natural death. Man in the first state was immune from each mode of death; but the cause of preservation for each was not the same.

297. For preserving man from violent death, there was not necessary in man some intrinsic quality, as pleased some; but it is enough to admit the peculiar extrinsic providence of God, as St. Thomas teaches in II, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 4, saying: "From this mode of corruption divine providence preserved man unharmed." And I, q. 97, a. 2, ad 4: "The body of man in the state of innocence could be preserved partly indeed through his own reason, by which he could avoid harmful things, and partly also through divine providence, which protected him in such a way that nothing would unexpectedly occur to him by which he would be harmed." Suarez confirms this (On the Work of the Six Days, chapter 14, n. 13), saying: "That intrinsic quality ... would be too miraculous and has no foundation ... Nor was anything else necessary for the fitting order of providence, for through man's own prudent diligence, joined with the peculiar providence of God, and guardianship by himself or through Angels, man could sufficiently and fittingly enough be preserved from these extrinsic inconveniences. For, for example, so that man could not be burned by fire, or heated too much, what need was there for him to be affected by such a quality that, although he entered into fire, he could not suffer from it, when it was much easier to avoid excessive nearness to fire? Otherwise it would also have to be said that man was so affected through an intrinsic quality that, although he walked upon waters, he would not sink, or although he sank, he would not be suffocated. But these and similar things are incredible. Therefore it is much more truly and easily said that all these inconveniences could have been guarded against by prudence, and consequently also had to be avoided."

298. But for preserving the first man from natural death, as the more common opinion of theologians, more conformable to the doctrine of the Fathers, holds, no intrinsic quality must be admitted either. See Suarez, cited place, n. 29. But in order to explain positively the mode of preservation from this cause of death, they note that natural death can happen in two ways: either 1. from defect of suitable food, or 2. from discord of the humors and elements from which the human body is concreted, which at last breaks out into its final destruction. Explaining this second mode of death from within, St. Thomas says, I, q. 97, a. 4: "That which is generated from something extrinsic, joined to what was there before, diminishes the active power of the species; just as water joined to wine is indeed at first converted into the taste of wine, but according as more and less is added, it diminishes the strength of the wine, and finally the wine becomes watery. Thus, therefore, we see that in the beginning the active power of the species is so strong that it can convert from food not only what suffices for the restoration of what has been lost, but also what suffices for increase. Afterwards, however, what is generated in addition does not suffice for increase, but only for the restoration of what has been lost. Finally, in the state of old age, it does not suffice even for this; whence there follows decrease and finally the dissolution of the body."

299. The first defect was supplied through the fruits of the common trees of Paradise; whence it is said in Genesis 2: "Eat from the tree of Paradise"; and St. Augustine says: "Food was present lest he hunger, drink lest he thirst." But with respect to the other defect, first in the body itself there was given a perfect disposition and tempering of the humors, so that they could not have among themselves a vehement action which could induce sickness or some similar disposition altogether preternatural from without. Then through the gift of justice it was given that the humors could not be excessively altered either from burning passion or from excessive labor, because in this state there would be the greatest moderation in all these things. And so St. Augustine says above: "No corruption in the body, or from the body, brought any troubles upon any of its senses; no sickness within, no act from without was feared; there was the highest health in the flesh." Besides, also on the part of those fruits or foods by which the prior defect was supplied, it was provided that they be of the best quality, so that with great ease and with the least alteration of the parts of man's body they could be converted into his substance. The best and wholesome disposition of the place also assisted toward this. And this is what Augustine said in the cited place of The City of God: "Just as in Paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant there was no offense from desire or fear, nothing at all sad; no weariness fatigued him at leisure, no sleep oppressed him unwilling."

300. But although all these things would suffice for preserving the body in due disposition for some time, nevertheless for wholly warding off death there was need of another remedy, which God furnished in the Tree of Life. Hence St. Augustine says: "The tree of life was present, lest old age dissolve man." And again: "As long as he endured in the law of the Creator, he was worthy to eat from the tree of life, so that he could not die. For the body was not such that it was impossible for it to be dissolved, but the fruit of the tree of life inhibited the corruption of the body."

301. Concerning this tree of life, for our matter, we note the following things from the more received doctrine. 1. The fruit of that tree was not only a figure of the incorruption which God was going to give, but by its own efficacy given to it conferred vigor and renewal. Otherwise it would not have been necessary to cast Adam out of Paradise, lest perhaps, as is read in Genesis 3, by eating of that food he would become a participant of immortality. For God had not promised that effect except to man persevering in his obedience.

2. Although the exhibition of immortality through the tree of life certainly was preternatural to man, nevertheless there is a question whether that efficacy was connatural or supernatural to the tree itself. Several adhere to St. Augustine, who says (On Genesis to the Letter, book 8, chapter 5): "Although that tree provided bodily food, nevertheless it was such that the body of man was strengthened by it with stable health, not as from another food, but by some hidden inspiration of healthfulness."

3. The fruit of the tree of life not only nourished the body by way of food, but also restored, strengthened, and repaired it by way of medicine, "namely either by perfecting through new qualities the very connatural temperament of the body if anything in it had been diminished, or by intensifying native qualities and remitting others."

4. The tree of life indeed had the power of preserving life not only for a long time, but perpetually, as seems certain; yet not when taken once, but more often at suitable times, as the more common opinion holds after St. Augustine, St. Thomas, etc., apud Suarez (cited work, chapter 15, n. 4ff.). Explaining this in n. 7, he says: "Let us suppose Adam created in the best state of life and of his complexion, and that he lived for a year, or any other designated time, taking food from the other trees of Paradise, and afterwards ate once from the tree of life. Then certainly through that taking he would be reduced at most to that best state in which he was created, because either he could not be better, or if he is imagined better, that would not be natural nor accommodated to the human body. Therefore after the first taking, by using other foods again, that best state would again be diminished; therefore lest he finally be corrupted, it would have been necessary for him again to take from the tree of life."

302. With these things explained, we say:

Proposition XXIX. God conferred upon the first parents the gift of immortality, by which, immune from the necessity of dying, they would never have died if they had persevered in the justice received.

Proof I. from Scripture. It is read in Genesis 2:17: "For on whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death," that is, you will be liable to death, you will be made mortal. Although Gregory and Eucherius understand these words of the death of the soul, nevertheless it is certain, contrary to what Pelagius thought, that they must also and principally be understood of the death of the body. This is openly clear not only from the constant interpretation of the Fathers, but from the context itself. For by these words God threatens that punishment to which he then condemned Adam after sin; but he condemned him to the punishment of bodily death, as is clear from the words in Genesis 3: "In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are dust, and to dust you shall return." Hence: if Adam had not had the gift of immortality in his first condition, God could not have threatened him with death as punishment of prevarication, and said "on the day you eat, you will be liable to death"; for without prevarication Adam would have been in the same condition. But God threatened death as punishment of prevarication. Therefore.

Confirmation. In Wisdom 1:13ff. it is said: "For God did not make death, nor does he rejoice in the destruction of the living. For he created all things that they might be." - 2:23ff.: "For God created man inexterminable, and made him to the image of his likeness. But by the envy of the devil death entered into the world." By these words it is directly declared that man, as he proceeded from the hand of God, was not liable to death.

It is said in Romans 5:12: "Therefore, as through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, etc." - 8:10: "But if Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit lives because of justification." And 1 Corinthians 15:21: "For indeed through man came death, and through man the resurrection of the dead." From these things it is clear that, according to the Apostle, death first set foot in the world on account of Adam's sin; therefore before sin Adam was immortal.

Proof II. From the Fathers. Tatian (Against the Greeks, chapter 7): "We were not made so that we should die; but we die by our own fault." Theophilus of Antioch (book 2, to Autolycus, chapter 27): "Man by his disobedience summoned death to himself." St. Cyprian (Sermon on Patience): "In that first transgression of the command, firmness of body departed together with immortality." - St. Athanasius (book On the Incarnation of the Word, nn. 4-6): "But if they should transgress the law, they would know that they would suffer the natural corruption of death, dying unto death and being dissolved into decay." - St. Ambrose (book On the Good of Death, chapter 4): "God did not make death, but after man slipped into crime, he pronounced the sentence that earth should return into its earth." St. Augustine (book 13 of The City of God, chapter 24): "Whence it is established among Christians truly holding the Catholic faith that even the very death of the body is inflicted upon us not by the law of nature, because God made no death for man, but by the merit of sin." You will find several testimonies of the Fathers in the following thesis.

303. From propositions 55 and especially 78 condemned in Baius, it is established, according to the doctrine of the Church, that the immortality granted to the first parents was a gift not owed to human nature.

304. In order to defend this doctrine well, it must be seen how death is natural to us; for from this it will be clear how immortality is not owed. St. Thomas notes, II-II, q. 164, a. 1, ad 1, "that natural is said of what is caused from the principles of nature. But the principles of nature of themselves are form and matter. Now the form of man is the rational soul, which of itself is immortal; and therefore death is not natural to man on the part of his form. But the matter of man is a body of such a kind that it is composed of contraries, upon which corruptibility follows by necessity: and with respect to this death is natural to man."

305. Nor from the fact that the form of man is immortal does it follow that by necessity it demands to be joined with incorruptible matter. For, as the same holy Doctor observes, q. 5 On Evil, art. 5: "If there could have been found in nature some body composed from the elements which was incorruptible, without doubt such a body would be suitable to the soul according to nature. Just as if there could be found iron unbreakable and not contracting rust, it would be the most suitable matter for a saw (for a knife), and the craftsman would seek such. But because such cannot be found, it is accepted such as it can be: namely hard, but breakable. Similarly because nature cannot find a body composed from the elements which according to the nature of matter is incorruptible, an organic body, although corruptible, is naturally fitted to the incorruptible soul." - And I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 1, he says: "From the necessity of matter it follows that the body is corruptible. But if someone says that God could avoid this necessity, it must be said that in the constitution of natural things one does not consider what God can do, but what befits the nature of things." Compare this place.

306. Although this doctrine is clear, the adversaries especially oppose two things: one from authority, the other from reason. - From authority: they bring forward the Council of Orange, which sanctioned in canon 2: "They give injustice to God who judge that Adam would have died even if he had not sinned." - St. Augustine, who in book 13 of The City of God, chapter 15, asserts that "the death of the body was inflicted not by the law of nature, but by the merit of sin." But the holy Doctor often teaches similar things, and St. Gelasius I (Epistle 7 to the Bishops of Picenum), St. Anselm (book 2, Why God Became Man, chapter 2), etc., hand down the same. Therefore, they say, all these thought that innocent man, with God's justice and goodness preserved, could not have been created liable to death; or, that immortality, sin excluded, was owed to human nature. But this head of objections is easily met. For the conclusion is distinguished: they thought that innocent man could not have been created liable to death, with God's justice and goodness preserved, in the present providence, or with the gratuitous promise of immortality supposed: conceded; in another possible providence, or abstracting from that gratuitous promise: denied. The truth of this response is drawn from the testimonies partly already adduced, partly to be adduced, and from the very state of the question between St. Augustine and the Pelagians.

307. But from reason they object: If immortality of body were not owed to man, resurrection would be owed to him; but this seems to be a greater benefit; therefore. But they prove the major in various ways, and especially, first: the Fathers and theologians commonly prove the resurrection of bodies from the fact that man himself, and not only a part of him, is destined to beatitude; but man is a composite of soul and body. It is not the soul alone which in this life merits well or badly concerning God; and consequently not the soul alone, but also the body, according to God's providence, ought to receive reward or punishment. Therefore if immortality were not owed to man, resurrection would be owed.

2. It cannot be said that the soul of those who conducted themselves well in this life has, while it is in the term, a state less perfect than that which it had while it was on the way; but so it would be if in the state of beatitude it remained separated from the body. Therefore if it is natural to the soul that it be separated at some time, it will also be natural for it to be joined again.

3. To man in the state of pure nature natural beatitude would certainly be owed; but he could not attain this if the soul remained separated from the body, since the soul would naturally desire union with it, and as long as some natural appetite remains without attainment of its object, beatitude is impossible. Therefore if it were natural for man to die, it would also be natural, or owed, for him to rise again.

4. Since the soul according to its essence is the form of the body, it is natural for it to inform the body; but if it does not inform, it will be in a violent state. But beatitude is incompatible with this state. Therefore.

308. In order to satisfy these, certainly serious, difficulties, three things must first be noted. 1. We can consider resurrection in two ways: insofar as the soul is again joined to its body, either as it was before, corruptible and liable to miseries; or as freed from corruptibility and miseries, as happens in the present providence. If resurrection is viewed in this second way, no one doubts that it is not owed to human nature; and the matter is clear of itself.

2. But if resurrection is considered in the first way, it could perhaps seem to someone not improbable that it is owed to man according to the laws of the providence of God as Author of nature. If this were so, the proposed difficulties would easily be solved, as is clear; and at the same time the truth would remain that immortality is a gift not owed.

3. But it seems altogether to be held that resurrection is not owed not only on account of the glory of risen bodies, but even on account of the mere restoration and vivification of the dead body. In reality, all concede that God alone can work resurrection, and that there is no power in nature which can do it. "Things which are of one species," says St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 75, a. 3, "have one determinate mode of origin ... But the natural mode by which man arises is his generation from something similar in species, which is not the case in resurrection. Therefore it will not be natural." And that God does not work the resurrection of bodies because this is demanded by nature, Suarez declares in this way, omitting several things (on III, tome 2, disp. 44, sect. 7): "This is explained from the difference between the creation of the soul and resurrection. For natural agents can dispose matter for the first union of soul and body, with a disposition which of its nature demands such a form; for which reason it pertains to natural providence and owed concurrence that God infuse it. But in order to the repeated union which is made in resurrection, natural causes can effect nothing, nor so dispose matter that it demands the union of that soul. Therefore that resurrection cannot be called simply natural." - This doctrine seems conformable to the expressions of Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, who speak of resurrection as of a supernatural thing, even abstracting from the glory of bodies, which the reprobate will not have. Let St. Cyprian stand for all:

"Man," he says (Sermon on the Resurrection of Christ), "who was compacted from heavenly and earthly matter, clothed outwardly with skin and flesh, received a time in which, at your command, he would return to the earth what he had taken from the earth, and the spirit, whose nature does not admit the injury of dissolution, would return to its immaterial origin. The body to be consumed by decay, and the flesh by worms, according to the account of its nature could not enjoy the privilege of eternity; and what did not belong to it by right it could not demand from the Creator. Nor did any questioning of them concerning this deserve an answer. But you, best Lord, freely willing to give grace to the spirit, decreed more mercifully that, from the society and service which the flesh had rendered to the soul, some advantage should come to it, and that the flesh which had been its vehicle and sharer in studies, joined again in recompense of ministry to the beloved inhabitant, should return modest and peaceful, carrying back with itself no insults by which thereafter it would shake the purity of internal quiet. But this too, Lord, you added to the heap of benefit: that afterwards there should be no diversity between the law of flesh and spirit, nor after the covenant was entered should any rebellion grow up again between them, but that the reconciliation ordered by your hand should persevere stable forever. Therefore at your command earth becomes flesh, and, expelled from the house, is again joined to the man, now not a handmaid but free; and they dwell in the house of one character, with the murmurings stilled which once warring concupiscences stirred up among themselves."

309. But with this true doctrine concerning the supernaturality of resurrection supposed, behold how the proposed difficulties can be answered:

Reply to the first. a) "It is enough," says Suarez in the cited place, "that man can be blessed as man ... For man does not desire to be blessed except as long as he exists. Therefore for the natural beatitude of man it is enough that it can endure as long as man exists. Therefore, because man is corruptible by his nature, even the beatitude which can naturally be conferred on man, as he is an integral individual of the human species, is not simply perpetual, but temporal. But because the soul of man is perpetual, therefore in it the beatitude of man can endure perpetually as to that which is essential in it, namely as to natural knowledge and love of God. And only this is owed and consonant with the natures of things; but whatever is added beyond this is supernatural."

b) "The soul," says the same Author in the same place, "is the proper and per se principle of good or bad action; it is enough for man to receive in it the principal reward of virtue. But the body, which is only the organ of the soul, just as in this mortal life alone it would be the instrument of virtue, so in the same life it could receive some reward proportioned to its action. It is not necessary that this consist in temporal riches and pleasures, which are not usually very useful for the exercise of virtue, but in other goods or helps by which the body itself can more easily and conveniently be kindled toward the pursuit of virtue. Therefore resurrection is in no way owed to man from merely natural providence."

c) Those and other similar reasons are reasons of fittingness, not of necessity. But they were fittingly applied especially by the Fathers and by St. Thomas in the Contra Gentiles, so that they might persuade those denying the possibility of resurrection that it not only is not repugnant, but is fittingly admitted. Hence St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 75, a. 3, ad 2, says: "From natural things something non-natural is not known by a demonstrating reason; but by a persuading reason something above nature can be known, because those things which are in nature represent some likeness of those things which are above nature; just as the union of soul and body represents the union of the soul to God through the glory of fruition, as the Master says, II, dist. 1. And in a similar way the examples which the Apostle and Gregory introduce support the faith of resurrection." Compare Sylvius on this place.

Reply to the second. The soul can be considered with respect to its being and with respect to its operations. Hence a) with respect to being: since the soul which was in the body and remains separated is numerically the same, it will be of the same substance in each state; the soul in the state of separation also preserves the same existence which it had in the body, for if it lost that, it would be corrupted; the separated soul is a person, just as when it was united; and in each state it can be called a semi-person. For "the soul in the body," says Suarez (On the Soul, book 6, chapter 1, n. 5), "and outside it, is subsisting communicably with respect to the body, incommunicably with respect to inferiors, differing only in this, that it actually communicates itself or does not communicate itself, which does not vary the account of semi-person. But it is called a semi-person, both because it is only part of a nature, though it belongs to the account of person that it be the connatural terminus of an integral nature, namely of an individual substance; and because it is not altogether incommunicable, which nevertheless is most well known to belong to the account of person, since it must be an integral supposit." Compare this place. Hence the same Author concludes (cited place, chapter 9, n. 3): "The whole substance of the soul which is in the body remains outside the body; therefore the soul is not perfected, nor is it made more imperfect, on account of communication or separation. But while it is united to the body, it perfects the whole man."

b) With respect to operations. In order to operations the soul is perfected extensively in the body; for separated from the body it cannot exercise the operations of vegetative, sensitive life, etc. Yet in the state of separation it exercises in a more perfect mode the operations of intellective life, which are the principal ones. "First," says Suarez (On the Soul, book 6, chapter 8, n. 2), "because it understands itself quidditatively, which it does not provide in the body. Secondly, it conceives intelligences by proper concepts, and not through negations, which it does not do so in the body. Thirdly, it knows God better because it knows his effects better, and better effects. Fourthly, since it is free from the body, it is more apt for understanding and for persevering in acts of the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches, art. 2, ad 1, and is gathered from Wisdom 9: The body which is corrupted weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the mind thinking many things."

Moreover St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 89, a. 1, ad 3: "The separated soul does not understand through innate species, nor through species which it then abstracts, nor only through conserved species, as the objection proves; but through species participated from the influence of divine light, of which the soul is made a partaker, just as also the other separated substances are, although in a lower mode. Hence, as soon as conversion to the body ceases, it is converted to higher things. Nor on account of this is the cognition or power not natural, because God is the Author not only of the influence of gratuitous light, but also of natural light." Compare this article.

Now Suarez observes in the cited place, n. 3: "The separated soul understands better through acquired species than when joined, because it is freer, and the light of the intellect is less hindered. It understands better through infused species than through acquired ones, because the infused are more perfect and more proportioned to the soul for that state than the acquired; and it is reasonable that the soul should understand better through conversion to higher things than through conversion to lower things. Hence it is clear that when separated it will understand better through infused species than when joined through acquired ones, which is the final comparison. And so in every mode it will understand better when separated."

Reply to the third. Here the discussion concerns the reunion of the soul with a corruptible body, and not a glorious one; for this does not pertain to the state of pure nature. Nor is the discussion about natural appetite, which, as Suarez teaches (cited place, chapter 10, n. 2), "is only a certain natural aptitude of the thing, which is metaphorically explained by the name appetite, as was said by us in book 1 of the Physics and elsewhere more than once; but the separated soul always retains the same aptitude toward the body, and is always by its nature a part for perfecting another." But this simple aptitude does not impede beatitude. Therefore the discussion is only about elicited appetite, which is the motion of an appetitive faculty into its object, previous cognition being supposed. Now we say that the separated soul does not desire reunion with the body with an efficacious and absolute desire, namely of such a kind that it could impede its natural beatitude. For a) there does not seem to be such a desire for an impossible and unowed good, except by God's absolute power; but such is resurrection in the state of pure nature; therefore. b) The soul would rightly judge that reunion with the body would fall to it as an evil rather than as a good; for it would lose a more spiritual state free from every weight of the body. And although it could again put forth some operations, nevertheless it would lose other most perfect ones, and the fellowship of separated substances. Compare Suarez, cited chapter 10, n. 4.

Reply to the fourth. a) The state of the soul in the body is natural, as conformable to its essence, for it is form; nevertheless the state of separation is not therefore violent, but is also natural, since the soul from its essence is also subsistent and immortal. "From the condition," says Suarez (cited place, chapter 9, n. 5), "of its nature it claims to be united to a corruptible body, from which it naturally follows that it must at last be separated from it; but after separation it is also natural to it to remain thus, that is, it has from itself powers for remaining, and in fact remains in a sufficiently perfect state, where it fulfills a certain most perfect natural inclination."

b) The state of union of the soul with a corruptible body is indeed natural, but it is rather a natural imperfection. "For many things," says Suarez, n. 4, "belong to things inseparably, not as their perfections, but rather as imperfections, so to speak, miseries which follow from the imperfection of the subject. Thus it is natural to man to be mortal, not as a perfection, but as an imperfection. Thus in the present the proper condition of our soul is to be united to a corruptible body, and this is the natural mode of its inception. If from this it suffers some detriment in operating, this is certainly its natural imperfection and misery, not violence; just as it would be better for the soul always to use reason, and never to lack the use of reason, and yet it is natural to it for some years to lack that use, nor can this be called violent, but a certain natural imperfection."

310. With these things laid down, we say:

Proposition XXX. The immortality granted to the first parents was a gift not owed to innocent human nature.

Proof I. From the Fathers. Dionysius (On the Divine Names, chapter 8): "Divine justice orders and determines all things, and distributes to each the things fitting to them, as agrees with the dignity of each. For if we say these things rightly, those who cavil at divine justice, while they least observe it, manifestly condemn their own injustice; for they say that immortality is owed to mortals, and perfection to imperfect things."

St. Irenaeus (book 5, chapter 2): "Our bodies will rise again in their own time, the Word of God giving resurrection to them, unto the glory of God the Father, who clothes this mortal thing with immortality and gratuitously gives incorruption to the corruptible, because the power of God is perfected in weakness, so that by experience we may learn that from his greatness, and not from our nature, we have perseverance unto eternity."

St. Athanasius (On the Incarnation of the Word, n. 5): "For man by his nature is mortal, since he was made from nothing. Nevertheless, on account of his likeness with him who is, if he had preserved it by constant contemplation of him, he would have blunted natural corruption"; and n. 5: "Men became the cause of death to themselves, mortal indeed by nature, but by the grace by which they were partakers of the Word, escaping the condition of nature if they had remained good."

Cyril of Alexandria (book 1 on John, chapter 1, verse 14): "Man is indeed a rational animal, but composed, namely, of soul and of this fragile and earthly flesh. But when he had been made by God and brought forth to origin, he did not have incorruptibility and immortality from his own nature," etc. - See other testimonies of the Fathers in Casini (What Is Man, etc., article 2).

Proof II. From Reason. From what has been said (n. 296), it is established that death can happen to man either from an intrinsic or from an extrinsic cause, according as death is natural or violent. But liberation from neither is owed to man. Therefore.

Proof of the minor as to the first part: from the very intrinsic constitution of man it follows, as we explained above, that he can and ought naturally to die; therefore it cannot be owed to him that from within he neither can nor ought to die.

Proof of the minor as to the second part. In order that man be freed from violent death, so that he cannot die by this death, as we have seen, a certain special providence of God is necessary. But this is not owed to man. Therefore.

See Casini (What Is Man, etc., article 2, disputation from reason).