Article 5. On the First Man's Immunity from Concupiscence

271. We shall complete the present question in two paragraphs; for first we shall show that Adam received the gift of integrity, and then we shall demonstrate that a gift of this kind was not owed to his nature.

272. We pre-note a few things for understanding the character of this gift. Since man is by nature composed of soul and body, there is in him a twofold appetite, just as there is a twofold kind of cognition: sensitive and intellectual appetite. Sensitive appetite is also usually called concupiscence.

273. Concupiscence can be considered in first act, or insofar as it is a certain faculty, whose object is delectable sensible good; and in second act, or insofar as it issues into act. Adam certainly cannot be said to have been immune from concupiscence considered in the first way, since it is a good and a true perfection of human nature.

274. Therefore the question concerns the very motion of concupiscence. But a twofold kind of motions of this sort can be distinguished: "some," says Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 12, n. 3), "can be called natural and harmless, or indifferent in order to morals, not only because in themselves they are neither good nor bad, but also because they do not induce one to something base as morally evil, as is some pain, or displeasure over an object disagreeable to sense, likewise hunger, thirst, and similar effects, or their contraries. But others are morally harmful motions, because they either incline to something base of itself, if they are made voluntarily, or render the operation of virtue difficult. And here we are chiefly speaking of this kind of motions of the lower appetite."

275. Therefore the gift of immunity from concupiscence, which is also usually called the gift of integrity, consists in exemption from the motions of the sensitive appetite which incline to evil or retard from good, insofar as they anticipate the command of reason or resist it. But although it is called exemption from motions or acts, it is nevertheless not only actual, but also habitual; for a man furnished with it was not only free from those disordered motions, but also had besides a permanent disposition by which the sensitive appetite was subjected to the command of the will.

276. But if someone asks through what means Adam obtained this perfect dominion of reason and will over the sensitive appetite, it can be answered that all the means can be reduced to two heads: to the extrinsic providence of God, and to a certain intrinsic perfection.

277. With respect to the extrinsic providence of God, Suarez notes (cited place, n. 17): "God could preserve this subordination of the appetites unharmed partly by denying concurrence to all these motions, partly by providing that objects disturbing this peace and tranquility of the soul should not occur, partly by applying and exciting reason and will, and also phantasy, partly through other hidden modes of his providence."

278. But besides the extrinsic providence of God, a certain intrinsic right disposition must be admitted. For "to the perfect mode of operating, it pertains that the proximate agent be intrinsically disposed for that operation to which it is ordered and moved by the first agent for rightly doing it. Therefore, since the works of God are perfect, it is not likely that he conferred this gift on the first men through extrinsic providence alone."

279. But that intrinsic right disposition does not consist in only one simple habit. For, as the same Suarez well observes (cited place, n. 19), "this perfection was required in many powers: in reason for considering and judging, or commanding suitably; in the will for following right reason delightfully, and for moving the appetite strongly; and in the appetite itself for obeying promptly. But one simple habit could not intrinsically perfect all these powers; therefore there was not only one habit. And this reason is confirmed, because, as St. Thomas rightly said, II-II, q. 2, art. 2, when an act depends upon several active principles, for its perfection it is required that all those active principles be perfectly disposed. But this disposition for acting well in powers of the soul which regard objects is habit; therefore, since this perfection of which we treat depends upon several powers of the soul, it demanded a right habitual disposition in all of them, and consequently included several habits at least on the part of the powers."

280. With these things declared, we say:

Proposition XXVII. Among the gifts conferred upon the first parents there must be counted immunity from concupiscence, or integrity, by which the faculty of sensing and desiring was thoroughly subjected to the rational will.

Proof I. The Council of Trent, session 5, chapter 5, decrees that what the first parents had lost was restored by Christ, but that "there remains in the baptized concupiscence or the tinder, which, since it has been left for struggle, cannot harm those who do not consent, but resist manfully through the grace of Christ Jesus." By these words it clearly signifies that that concupiscence did not exist in the first parents. Hence the Catechism of the Council of Trent, part 1, n. 23, says: "But as regards the soul, God formed it to his own image and likeness, and gave it free choice; moreover he so tempered in him all motions and appetitions of the soul that they always obeyed the command of reason."

Proof II. It is read in Genesis 2:25: "Both were naked, Adam namely and his wife, and they were not ashamed." - In 3:7 it is said that after sin "the eyes of both were opened; and when they had known themselves to be naked they sewed fig leaves and made themselves coverings." - And when Adam had said to God, 3:10: "I heard your voice in paradise; and I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself," the Lord responded, 3:11: "For who indicated to you that you were naked, unless you ate from the tree from which I had commanded you not to eat?" - Hence: Adam and Eve before sin, although they were naked, suffered no shame; yet they experienced it immediately after sin. But the shame of which there is question here is an effect of concupiscence; therefore before sin they were immune from concupiscence. Nor can that lack be explained from defect of the use of reason, as certain rationalists absurdly asserted; this is proved not only by the adult age, excellent knowledge, etc., in which the first parents were established, but even by the sin itself which followed, of which those who lack the use of reason are incapable.

Proof III. It is read in Romans 7:19-20: "For the good which I will, I do not do; but the evil which I will not, that I do. But if I do that which I will not, now it is not I who work it, but sin which dwells in me." And in verse 25 he concludes, saying: "Therefore I myself with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin." - Hence: Here the Apostle speaks, as is clear not only from the words themselves, but from the whole context, about rebellious concupiscence, and he calls it sin. But it is not formal sin, because consent of the will is lacking. Why then does he call it sin? Namely, as the Council of Trent says, session 5, canon 5, "because it is from sin and inclines to sin." Hence Suarez deservedly observes (cited place, n. 6): "By saying from sin, it openly teaches that it did not exist before sin; for if it had existed before, it would in no way have existed as an effect of sin. But concupiscence, or the tinder, is nothing other than the appetite itself, insofar as through its motions it anticipates reason and induces one to sin. And for this reason the same Council said there in canon 1 that the whole Adam, through that offense of prevarication, was changed for the worse according to body and soul."

Proof IV. From the Fathers. St. Augustine says (On Genesis to the Letter, book 11, chapter 1): "Therefore both were naked: it is true, the bodies of the two men conversing in paradise were entirely naked. Nor were they ashamed. For why should they be ashamed, when they had sensed no law in their members resisting the law of their mind? ... This punishment followed them after the prevarication, when disobedience usurped what was forbidden, and justice punished what had been committed. Before this happened, they were naked, as has been said, and were not confounded: there was no motion in the body to which modesty was owed; they thought nothing had to be veiled, because they had sensed nothing had to be restrained."

St. Chrysostom writes (Homily on Genesis 15, n. 14): "Until the prevarication, they lived in paradise as Angels, not burning with concupiscences, not liable to other affections, but altogether incorruptible and immortal, nor did they need cloak and garment. For when sin was not yet present, they were clothed with the grace which had come from above, and therefore they were not ashamed."

St. Fulgentius (On the Truth of Predestination and Grace, chapter 16, n. 25): "These necessities (among which he had also counted that the flesh lusts against the spirit) do not cease in the Saints living mortally in this body of death, so that they may acknowledge that they have lost that grace of holy liberty and first peace."

St. Gregory the Great (in the proemium to the third penitential Psalm, if indeed he is the author of that work): "In paradise the first man, having obtained delights, just as he could feel no hunger in the soul, so also he was ignorant of every passion which is born from the flesh."

St. John Damascene (Homily on the Withered Fig Tree, n. 3): "The first parents, although naked in body, nevertheless were covered by divine grace. They had no bodily clothing, but they were clothed with incorruption ... But once they became disobedient, they were made far from the grace by which they had been covered before." - We shall give other testimonies of the Fathers in the following thesis.

281. Before we answer this question, it will be useful to pre-note some things, especially for forestalling objections which are usually drawn from St. Augustine.

282. And first, concupiscence can be considered in three ways: 1. as it is a power indifferent of itself, preceding any act whatsoever; 2. as it is in act, and inclines either to lawful or to unlawful things, while the will has not yet approached; 3. as the motion of concupiscence is joined with the consent of the will. Under this threefold aspect, it must be seen whether concupiscence is good or evil, whether it is from God or not, so that from there it may become known whether God could have established man with concupiscence, or without the gift of integrity, and what St. Augustine thought about this matter.

283. Concupiscence viewed as a certain faculty still indifferent, or not yet operating, certainly a) is good of itself; for it is part of human nature, which is good; it is part of man, who, since he is a rational animal, ought to be furnished with a faculty by which he tends toward sensible good. - b) Nor in any way can concupiscence so considered be called a vicious habit; since such a habit inclines only to evil, but concupiscence, or the sensitive appetite, is a faculty which can tend toward an object either good or evil. - c) But if the very power of tending even toward an evil object should be called evil, such will not be otherwise than peccability; namely, it will be a physical evil, not a moral one, or rather it will be an evil, as they say, metaphysical, which consists in the simple limitation of further perfection, and which is common to every creature.

284. Hence it is clear: a) that certainly God, the author of human nature, is also the author of the sensitive appetite, which is good in itself; b) that nevertheless he cannot be called author of the power of tending to evil which is in that appetite, for God cannot properly be called author of the limitation which is the cause of that power; c) that the same power cannot be attributed to God from primary intention, since he intends of himself human nature as good, with the sensitive appetite good in itself; just as, says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85, a. 6, "that a sword is breakable and contracts rust, which follows from the natural disposition of iron," is not to be attributed to the craftsman; d) that it can nevertheless be attributed to God from a secondary intention ordered to victory, namely, as St. Augustine teaches (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapter 33, n. 53), so that "through these difficulties one advancing in the struggle of justice may be instructed." Hence St. Bernard says (On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 7, n. 22): "It was given to man to be able to sin, not so that he would therefore sin, but so that he would appear more glorious from this, if he did not sin, although he could sin ... Nor was there fault in the giver, but in the abuser, who indeed turned that faculty into the use of sinning, which he had received for the glory of not sinning." - And St. Augustine (On Genesis, book 9, chapter 6, n. 8): "Virtue is proved and exercised; and the palm is more glorious, not to have consented when tempted, than not to have been able to be tempted ... We concede that the nature which would be wholly unwilling to sin is better; let them also concede that the nature which is so holy that it could not sin if it willed is not evil."

285. Concupiscence considered as it is in act, but before any operation of the will whatsoever, can be borne toward what is lawful or unlawful. If it is borne toward a lawful object, there is no difficulty. But if it is borne toward an unlawful object, it must be said: a) that it is not properly morally evil, or is not formal sin, as the Council of Trent declared when it taught that through baptism the whole of that which has the true account of sin is taken away, and yet the tinder remains in the reborn. - Hence St. Augustine says (Retractations, book 1, chapter 9, n. 4): "The will alone is that by which one both sins and lives rightly." - And (Unfinished Work against Julian, book 4, nn. 43-48): "This was the virtue of that man (the first man): not to have it [concupiscence]; our virtue is not to consent to it." - St. Anselm [On Virgin Conception, chapter 4]: "Nor are the appetites themselves, which the Apostle calls the flesh [which lusts against the spirit], and the law of sin [which is in the members resisting the law of the mind], just or unjust considered in themselves. For they do not make the man sensing just or unjust, but unjust only when he consents by the will, when he ought not."

b) That nevertheless the motion of concupiscence toward what is unlawful, even before the consent of the will, cannot be called good, but rather evil; whence St. Augustine often called it a vice. But it is a physical evil, not moral; of nature, not of free will. - That motion of concupiscence is evil in man insofar as in man there is also mind, or the higher part, and that motion resists the mind when the mind wishes to restrain it; and it disturbs the mind when it incites the soul so that, having left behind the rational appetite, it desires the same thing and for the same reason as the sensitive appetite desires. - Hence the same motion of concupiscence does not have this very account of evil in brute animals, in whom there is no intellect. "In beasts," says St. Augustine [book 2 of the Unfinished Work against Julian, 230], "this is therefore not evil, because the flesh does not lust against the spirit." And [ibid., book 4]: "But this lust is therefore not evil in beasts, because it does not fight against reason, which they lack."

c) Consequently, we are not ashamed of concupiscence because its motions, of which we are here treating, are true sin, nor, according to St. Augustine, because in the present they are effects of sin. But concupiscence is an evil to be ashamed of because we are ashamed not only of vices of morals and of soul, but also of the body, because whatever in any way misbeseems rational nature causes shame. But, as we have seen, it misbeseems rational nature that the motion of animal appetite move the members apart from and against the command of the will. Hence St. Augustine [book 4 against Julian] says: "It was not fitting that there be shame when the command of the will moved the members, not the flesh lusting against the spirit." Compare also City of God, book 14, chapter 23.

285 bis. This whole doctrine concerning concupiscence rests upon certain principles and upon the authority of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, as we have seen. Yet so that the mind of St. Augustine may become better known, we recall in a few words the state of the question between him and Julian. Julian, then, with the Pelagians denied original sin; nevertheless, like them, he affected reverence for the Scriptures. Hence St. Augustine argued against him in this way: God is said to have made man right, and the gifts of God are without repentance; but man now is not right, as is clear from concupiscence, "for the flesh lusts against the spirit; what is not lawful is pleasing." Therefore this struggle, or this defect of rectitude, is a punishment of sin. But all experience this struggle, even those who have committed no personal sin; therefore it is the punishment of original sin. Julian did not dare to deny Scripture asserting that God made man right; he could not deny the rebellion of concupiscence; therefore he said that concupiscence is not evil, but good, and consequently that from the struggle of flesh against spirit a defect of rectitude in man is not rightly argued. - St. Augustine answered that this struggle is evil, which he proved by several things: for example, if it is not evil, why are we ashamed? Or, we must fight against concupiscence by continence, which is a virtue; therefore this is a vice, etc.

286. From all these things it is clear: 1. that St. Augustine speaks of concupiscence in the present state, with the first condition of man supposed, in which by the singular benefit of God man was right and free from concupiscence; 2. that St. Augustine speaks not of the faculty itself, or of its act tending toward what is lawful, but of the act of concupiscence toward what is unlawful; 3. that in this sense he calls concupiscence an evil, a vice, but not a true moral evil or sin; yet a true physical evil, misbeseeming rational nature, such that it can be inflicted as a punishment; 4. that St. Augustine denies that God is the author of concupiscence as tending toward what is unlawful, either because he sometimes speaks of the present state in which concupiscence is a punishment of sin, or because that struggle proceeds from the limitation of our nature, and God did not will it by primary intention; 5. hence that St. Augustine in no way teaches that man could not have been established from the beginning just as he is now born, namely with the struggle of concupiscence; this last point will be still clearer from the things to be said.

287. These things indeed are sufficient for solving all the objections which are usually drawn especially from St. Augustine, with one exception, which is of this sort: If according to the holy Doctor the struggle of flesh against spirit were not a moral evil, or sin, and could in any hypothesis be repeated from human nature, he would not have said (Unfinished Work, book 6, chapter 4): "But you, who do not know what you are saying, object to me that I say God creates sin; resist the Manichaean saying that, in the discord of flesh and spirit, contrary natures of evil and good appear among themselves. It is yours that we answer, so that that pest may be conquered, namely that the sin of the first man turned this discord into our nature; by denying this you try that they should conquer, and you are sufficiently manifest as a feigned opponent of the Manichaeans and a true helper."

Reply. If the rebellion of concupiscence is not traced back, in the present order, to sin, the Manichaeans could infer that there is an evil God and author of evil, not because this would be a good consequence, but because, since they were obstinate in their error, they could with greatest difficulty conceive that that battle must be attributed to the limitation of nature. Hence the holy Doctor himself, as we saw (Retractations, book 1, chapter 9), says: "Although ignorance and difficulty, even if they were natural beginnings of man, God would not even thus be blamed, but praised, as we argued in that same third book. That disputation must be held against the Manichaeans, who do not receive the holy Scriptures of the Old Testament, in which original sin is narrated." - And (On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 11): "Even if it were true what the Pelagians say, that ignorance and difficulty, without which no man is born, are beginnings, not punishments, of nature: nevertheless the Manichaeans would be conquered, who maintain that there are two coeternal natures, namely of good and of evil."

288. With these things laid down beforehand, we say:

Proposition XXVIII. Integrity, or immunity from concupiscence, which Adam had in his first condition, was a gift not owed to human nature.

The truth of this thesis is clearly drawn from propositions 26, 55, and 79 condemned in Baius, and from censure 16 in the Bull Auctorem Fidei, reported above.

Proof I. from the Fathers. The immunity from concupiscence with which the first man was furnished, according to the Fathers, a) must be attributed to the singular benevolence of God, indeed to grace; b) disturbance from the rebellion of the senses flows from the very nature of man; c) imperturbability is proper either to a glorified body, or to the Angels, or to God himself. But what is of this kind cannot be owed to human nature. Therefore.

Proof of the major a). St. Augustine (On Genesis against the Manichaeans, book 2, chapter 16) teaches concerning the first parents that "that they should live without those affections which occur against reason and disturb the mind must be assigned to grace, and indeed to great grace." - St. John Chrysostom (Homily 16 on Genesis chapter 2): "The glory which surrounded them was taken away, because they had made themselves unworthy of such honor ... Stripped because of sin of the cloak of heavenly grace, they received the sense of their sensible despoiling. God made them sense, once they had been stripped of that new and admirable garment of glory and heavenly benevolence, the things which before they did not sense because of his singular benevolence toward them."

Proof of the major b). Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, book 4): "The virtue of man, since by his essence he is liable to disturbances, etc." - Nemesius (Philosophical Book on the Nature of Man, chapter 1): "Man is not only a sharer in reason, but is also an animal ... the necessary uses of animal life and turbulent motions very often attack reason." - St. Augustine (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapter 22): "What is the nakedness indicated after the forbidden food was tasted, except that what grace covered was laid bare by sin? For there was great grace of God there, where the earthly and animal body did not have bestial lust [which it ought to have had by its nature]." - St. Maximus (Martyr, century 2, chapter 20, Oecumenic.): "Since nature and grace do not have the same account, there is no doubt in what way some of the Saints at times overcame affections, but at other times rather succumbed to affections, since we know that miracle pertains to grace, but affection to nature." - St. John Damascene (book 3, On the Faith, chapter 20): "These passions in Christ the Lord were both according to nature and above nature. For they were stirred in him according to nature, when he permitted nature to suffer or be affected; but above nature, because in the Lord the things which were natural in no way anticipated the will."

Proof of the major c). St. Augustine [Epistle to Marcellinus, 145]: "Who can narrate all the inconveniences of carnal infirmity? These certainly will not exist when this corruptible puts on incorruption, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life. Then, therefore, the spiritual body rules wholly according to choice; but now, not in every way, but as the laws of the universe (which are of themselves natural and not necessarily penal) allow." - Clement of Alexandria (Paedagogue, book 1, chapter 2) says "Christ the Lord is most like the Father, because wholly free from human disturbances, etc."

Proof II. Baius, Jansenius, etc., taught that integrity was owed to human nature for this reason: because concupiscence is so evil that God could not have established man with it. But this is false.

Proof of the minor. 1. From the things said above in the exposition of the question. - 2. Directly from St. Augustine (Retractations, book 1, chapter 9): "To that misery of just condemnation belong ignorance and difficulty (which arises from concupiscence, as is clear from the preceding things), which every man suffers from the beginning of his birth, nor is anyone liberated from that evil except by the grace of God. The Pelagians do not wish this misery to descend from just condemnation, denying original sin; although ignorance and difficulty, even if they were natural beginnings of man, God would not even thus be blamed, but praised, as we argued in that same third book On Free Choice." - 3. From the common consent of the Doctors. It is enough to cite St. Thomas, who often repeats what he had written (II, disp. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3): "God could from the beginning, when he established man, also form another man from the slime of the earth, whom he would leave in the condition of his nature, namely so that he would be mortal and passible, and sensing the battle of concupiscence against reason: in him nothing would be derogated from human nature, because this follows from the principles of nature. Nevertheless this defect would not have had in him the account of fault or punishment, because this defect would not have been caused through the will." - Scotus has the same in II Sentences, dist. 29, single question, nn. 3 and 6.

Proof III. from reason. The defects from which man was freed through the gift of integrity are: 1. that the motions of the sensitive appetite anticipate the command of the will; 2. that they resist it. Hence St. Augustine (Unfinished Work, book 1, n. 71) says: "Cupidity did not lead the will, did not precede the will, did not resist the will." But each defect is natural to man insofar as it proceeds from his very limited nature. Therefore immunity from them is supernatural or not owed.

Proof of the minor as to the first part. The sensitive appetite is naturally moved when an object suitable to it has been presented; but the will cannot always prevent an object from occurring to the senses unless it is first moved by the intellect. But since the intellect is excited through the senses, the alteration of sense, and of appetite, also precedes first. And consequently it is not always in the natural power of the human will, as St. Augustine said, not to be touched by things seen.

Proof of the minor as to the second part. A necessary cause persists in act as long as those things through which it was brought into act are supplied to it. But things exciting the sensitive appetite [species in phantasy, commotion of spirits, as they say, disturbance of humors, etc.] can endure even after and against the command of the will. Therefore. "The appetite itself," says Suarez [On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 12, n. 10], "does not obey the will despotically, as Aristotle says, or servilely, but in a civil and political manner, by means of cognition or phantasy, which the will cannot always correct by its merely natural efficacy."

Compare altogether on this question Casini [What Is Man, etc., article 5]. - For objections, Sardagna [vol. 4, page 439], and Cercia [Appendix to the treatise On Grace, Prol. 4, lecture 4ff.].

Note I. Experience testifying, there are not only in the sensible appetite certain motions inclining to sin, but a certain struggle often obtains even in the higher part of man. We are too much enticed, for example, by love of honor, excellence, and other things of this kind. Since these are spiritual, they do not affect the sensible appetite of themselves; but, just as happens in sensible good, they render human nature prone to moral evil and less ready for moral good. Hence besides sensible concupiscence a certain spiritual concupiscence must be admitted.

This has the greatest analogy to the former. For a) just as in the composite nature of man there must be distinguished, as we said, a twofold cognition and appetite, so also in the rational part of man there must be distinguished a twofold reason, lower and higher. Lower reason attends to temporal things, contemplating them according to themselves, and estimating them either insofar as they agree in some way among themselves, or insofar as they are for our convenience and delight. But higher reason "attends," as St. Augustine says (On the Trinity, book 12, chapter 7), "to eternal things to be beheld or consulted," insofar as it contemplates God, or creatures as these agree with God's law. See I, q. 79, a. 9.

b) Just as the motion of the sensitive appetite can anticipate the judgment of reason and the command of the will, because, as we said, it follows sensible cognition, which is prior to intellectual cognition, so lower reason, and the appetite consequent upon it, can anticipate higher reason, insofar as we perceive created goods before uncreated goods, and in created things we first perceive that goodness by which they are for our convenience or delight, before that by which they agree with God and his law.

c) Just as the motions of the sensitive appetite can persevere against the command of the will, insofar as, as we said, the causes by which they were excited can persevere even after the command of the will, so the apprehension of lower reason, and the motion of the appetite corresponding to it, can persevere against the command of higher reason, insofar as by the force of the latter the causes by which the former were excited are not at once removed. Hence, just as in one man, in one soul, there is battle between two faculties, the sensible appetite and the rational appetite, so in one man, in one soul, indeed in one and the same faculty, there is battle, since, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited place ad 1, "insofar as reason is divided according to diverse offices, higher and lower reason are called parts, and not because they are diverse powers." See St. Thomas in II, dist. 24, q. 2, 3.

From these things it follows that lower reason can be called good or bad, from God or not, in the same sense as the sensitive appetite. In the same way as Adam, in whom there was perfect integrity from the beginning, is called immune from sensible concupiscence, he is also called immune from spiritual concupiscence. By the same reason as immunity from the first, immunity also from the other was not owed to him. See D. Scheeben's note to article 4 of the cited dissertation of Casini.

Note II. Although some Fathers, such as Nyssen (On the Making of Man, chapter 17) and Damascene (book 2, chapter 30), thought otherwise, nevertheless it is certain that the human race was to be propagated by generation from the union of male and female in the state of original justice, without the disorder of lust. For a) generation is the natural mode of communicating animal nature, and is a good of nature. - b) Male and female were created from the beginning, and nevertheless Adam and Eve were established in the state of justice; God joined them in marriage before sin, and before sin said to them: "increase and multiply." - c) Original sin is propagated, as we have seen, to all who descend from Adam through common generation; and in the same way original justice would have been communicated to all if Adam had not sinned. These things could not be understood if, while Adam was in the state of original justice and while he sinned, the propagation of the human race through generation had not yet been instituted. d) Hence St. Augustine says (On Original Sin, chapter 33): "There would undoubtedly have been marriages even had sin not preceded, because not for another reason was a helper made for the man, not another man but a woman. And those words 'increase and multiply' are not a prediction of sins to be condemned, but a blessing of marriages to be made fruitful." See I, q. 98, aa. 1, 2.