Article 2. General Idea of the State of Original Justice

222. The name justice is not taken here to signify one of the cardinal virtues, but insofar as it signifies the right order of some whole (man) and of all its parts (soul, body, the diverse faculties), each of which is contained in its own order, so that it is rightly disposed both in order to the other parts and in order, if the discussion is about faculties, to its proper acts. But this justice is called original both because the first Parents obtained it from the beginning, and because, if they had not sinned, they would have transmitted it to their descendants, not precisely by force of generation, but with God infusing it into each of those descending from Adam by the common way of generation.

223. Justice accepted in this way can be natural or supernatural, according as that right disposition of the whole man and of all his parts is in order to a natural or supernatural end. Here we are treating only of that justice in which the first Parents were in fact established, and therefore of supernatural justice.

224. This supernatural justice can be taken adequately or inadequately. Taken adequately, it imports the complex of all the gifts which were conferred upon Adam, and by which he was rightly disposed in order to God, the last supernatural end. Taken inadequately, however, it imports the principal form which is related as root and foundation to the other perfections of original justice.

225. Supernatural justice taken adequately is also usually called the state of innocence: not insofar as it lacks fault, since this also pertains to the state of pure nature, but insofar as it is compatible with no fault, with none of those defects which are now the punishment of sin, and is most apt for preserving innocence: the state of innocence by antonomasia.

226. As St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 95, a. 1, there were three principal, as it were, parts of adequate original justice, to which the others are easily reduced: "there was rectitude according to this, that reason was subjected to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul." Explaining this, Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 20, n. 10) says: "The rectitude of that justice consisted chiefly in three things, namely in the due subordination of the soul to God, which is through the intellect and will, and consequently through the gifts or habits rightly disposing those powers in order to God. Likewise in the due subordination of the lower part to the higher, that is, of phantasy to intellect and of the sensitive appetite to the will, through which it came about that in these lower powers no motion unbecoming to man could exist, so long as reason persevered in perfect subjection to God. Likewise in the due subordination of the body to the soul with respect to freedom from suffering, impassibility, and immortality."

227. But original justice taken inadequately consists in sanctifying grace. In order that this may be rightly understood, it must be noted that among the gifts of adequate original justice some are as it were intrinsically connected with sanctifying grace, as, for example, the habits of the infused virtues; but others are connected with it as it were by accident, or from the extrinsic ordination of God, as, for example, the gift of immunity from concupiscence. With respect to the first, sanctifying grace is called their root and foundation insofar as these gifts either result physically from it, or are connaturally owed to it, precisely insofar as it is sanctifying grace. But with respect to the others, sanctifying grace is said to be their root and foundation, not insofar as they were connaturally owed to it, precisely insofar as it is sanctifying grace, but insofar as they were so ordered, by divine ordination, to the sanctifying grace of that state of innocence, that while it stood, the other gifts remained, and when it was lost, they were lost, as will be clearer below.

228. Wherefore it is understood, first, how sanctifying grace, although the same in species in Adam before sin and in us, rooted in him certain gifts which it roots neither in Adam after penance nor in us. For although with the grace which we recover through Christ we also obtain the infusion of gifts which connaturally follow it, nevertheless we do not recover the other gifts which were connected with the grace of the first state only by divine ordination. Hence St. Thomas, in II, dist. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, says: "To exclude penalities of this kind is not the effect of justice insofar as it is justice; but it was an effect of original justice by reason of a certain accident annexed to it, namely insofar as it was continued and not interrupted in human nature. For it was fitting that, just as the soul without interruption was directed to God through justice, so also the body should without interruption obey the soul totally. And therefore it is not necessary that that effect of gratuitous justice be fitting when an interruption of the rectitude of human nature toward God has been made."

229. It is understood, second, what should be answered to the question whether sanctifying grace in Adam was a habit distinct from the gift of original justice. Passing over the diverse opinions which formerly were customarily agitated here and there concerning this matter, we can say: first, that if original justice is taken either insofar as it abstracts from a natural or supernatural end, or insofar as it bespeaks a right disposition in order to a natural end (though in this way it was not in Adam), certainly sanctifying grace is a gift altogether distinct from it; second, that if supernatural original justice is taken inadequately, it is the same as sanctifying grace; third, if finally supernatural original justice is taken adequately, sanctifying grace is distinguished from it as a part from a whole.

230. Therefore, with these things having been set down, it is easily shown:

Proposition XXII. Among the gifts of original justice, sanctifying grace must be held as the root and foundation of the others.

Proof I. Original justice formally and adequately was a certain collection of several perfections given by God for constituting man in a certain state of felicity; therefore all those things were given with some order among themselves. For a multitude without order is confusion, and therefore the things which are from God are ordered; indeed, they are ordered with the highest wisdom and beauty. But the best order demands that, when many things come together into one, the lower things be subordinated to the higher, and that what is supreme in them be as it were the head and foundation of the others; therefore original justice was so constituted. Hence, since in that collection grace was the principal form, it must be judged as quasi-essential in that justice, while all the rest are as its properties, or as helps and ornaments joined to it for living and operating more perfectly according to justice and without defect.

Proof II. If by the name grace we understand only the simple form of grace existing in the essence of the soul, that is first compared to operative habits infused in themselves as essence is to properties; and by this reason it is said to be their root and foundation. But if the discussion is about the whole of habitual grace, insofar as it includes operative habits infused in themselves and provides supernatural rectitude to the soul, then in this way grace too was the foundation and root of that natural rectitude which was added above pure nature through original justice. For, with Augustine as witness, indeed with experience and with the effect which Scripture narrates as witness, that integrity or rectitude of nature was given under this law: that as long as the prior rectitude toward God endured, the lower natural rectitude would also be preserved, and once the prior was destroyed, the latter would consequently be lost. Therefore it is a sign that grace too was the foundation of natural rectitude, at least by the law and covenant of God. Indeed, once the elevation of human nature to the supernatural end and the state of grace is supposed, this followed from the nature of the thing, because man in this state cannot turn himself away from God as supernatural end without sinning also against natural reason, and consequently abandoning natural rectitude; and therefore even perfect natural rectitude had to be founded in the supernatural.

Proof III. Since man was established in that state on account of a supernatural end, whatever of perfection he received in natural rectitude was given to him for preserving supernatural rectitude more happily and better, and so that man could tend easily, and without impediments, toward that end without sin and with great merit. Therefore all that perfection was given with a view to grace, and under that account can be judged as a special assistance of grace; therefore it was founded and rooted in it, and was given on account of it as on account of the principal form. And in the same way one can conclude concerning the other perfections pertaining to the strength and impassibility of the body. For these too were given on account of the operation of virtue as dispositions which made both the avoidance of evil and the operation of good easier. And besides, if anything can be considered in original justice which pertains either to man's ornament, or to natural convenience, or to delight, all of it was given to man as a friend and son of God, just and innocent; and therefore it was given dependently on the first grace conferred in the state of innocence. Therefore that grace was the foundation of the remaining goods of original justice. - We have taken these proofs from Suarez (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 20, nn. 21, 22, 23). - St. Thomas often hands down the same: I, q. 95, a. 1; I-II, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2; Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 52, etc.