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Corrected Latin Text
Disputatio III.
De Hominis Elevatione Ad Statum Supernaturalem.
Disputatio III.
De Hominis Elevatione Ad Statum Supernaturalem.
On Man's Elevation To The Supernatural State.
209. Considerantes in praecedente disputatione hominem secundum id, quod pertinet ad ejus naturam, vidimus eum ita supra caeteras visibiles creaturas extolli, ut merito de eo dicatur "minuisti enim paulo minus ab Angelis." Sed Deus, qui dives est in misericordia, supernaturalibus insuper donis eum cumulans, ad altissimam filiorum Dei dignitatem evexit. "Etsi," inquit S. Augustinus (Epist. 117. ad Innoc.) "quadam non improbanda ratione dicitur gratia Dei qua creati sumus, ut nonnihil essemus, nec ita essemus aliquid ut cadaver quod non vivit, aut arbor quae non sentit, aut pecus quod non intelligit, sed homines, qui et essemus, et viveremus, et sentiremus, et intelligeremus, et de hoc tanto beneficio Creatori nostro gratias agere valeamus; unde merito et ista gratia dici potest, quia non praecedentium aliquorum bonorum operum meritis, sed gratuita Dei bonitate donata est: alia est tamen qua praedestinati vocamur, justificamur, glorificamur."
209. Considering in the preceding disputation man according to that which pertains to his nature, we saw that he is so raised above the other visible creatures that it is deservedly said of him, "For thou hast made him a little less than the Angels." But God, who is rich in mercy, heaping him besides with supernatural gifts, raised him to the highest dignity of the sons of God. "Although," says St. Augustine (Epistle 117, to Innocent), "by a certain not disapproved reasoning that may be called the grace of God by which we were created, so that we should be something, and should not be something in such a way as a corpse which does not live, or a tree which does not sense, or a beast which does not understand, but men, who both should exist, and should live, and should sense, and should understand, and should be able to give thanks to our Creator for so great a benefit; whence this too can deservedly be called grace, because it was given, not by the merits of any preceding good works, but by the gratuitous goodness of God: nevertheless that grace is another by which, having been predestined, we are called, justified, glorified."
210. Duplex in hac disputatione adversariorum genus impetimus. Pelagiani, Sociniani, Arminiani, quibus subscribunt recentiores rationalistae negant protoparentes donis supernaturalibus fuisse exornatos: et cum nihil in homine nunc desideretur, quod ad naturam humanam constituendam requiritur, existimarunt hominem in ea conditione nunc nasci, in qua olim conditus fuit, nempe sine gratia, sine peccato. Ex quo falso principio inferunt nullum esse peccatum originale, nullam gratiae necessitatem, nullam proprie dictam reparationem per Christum.
210. In this disputation we attack two kinds of adversaries. The Pelagians, Socinians, Arminians, to whom the more recent rationalists subscribe, deny that the first parents were adorned with supernatural gifts; and since nothing is now lacking in man which is required for constituting human nature, they thought that man is now born in that condition in which he was formerly established, namely without grace, without sin. From this false principle they infer that there is no original sin, no necessity of grace, no restoration properly so called through Christ.
211. Lutherani, Calvinistae, Janseniani, Baius, Quesnellus, etc., e contra contendunt hominem non modo accepisse a Deo omnia dona, quae eum in statu justitiae originalis collocabant, sed etiam ipsius naturae esse debita. Hinc inferebant per peccatum hominem intrinsece in sua natura corruptum fuisse; concupiscentiae, quam verum peccatum dicunt, subjici; libero arbitrio privari, etc. Vid. Bell. (De Grat. Primi hom. cap. 1.)
211. The Lutherans, Calvinists, Jansenists, Baius, Quesnell, etc., on the contrary contend that man not only received from God all the gifts which placed him in the state of original justice, but also that they were owed to nature itself. Hence they inferred that through sin man was intrinsically corrupted in his nature; that he was subjected to concupiscence, which they call true sin; that he was deprived of free will, etc. See Bellarmine, On the Grace of the First Man, chapter 1.
212. Doctrina Catholica vero veluti media incedit inter hos oppositos errores. Dum enim adstruit factum, nempe Deum instruxisse hominem gratia sanctificante, integritate, immortalitate, etc.; simul tenet omnia illa dona fuisse humanae naturae indebita. - Ut ergo integram catholicam veritatem in hac re tueamur, debemus imprimis existentiam, dein autem eorum donorum supernaturalitatem vindicare. Utrumque praestabimus, postquam generales quasdam notiones de diversis humanae naturae statibus - de justitia originali - de supernaturalitate donorum tradiderimus.
212. Catholic doctrine, however, proceeds as a sort of middle way between these opposed errors. For while it asserts the fact, namely that God furnished man with sanctifying grace, integrity, immortality, etc., at the same time it holds that all those gifts were not owed to human nature. Therefore, so that we may protect the whole Catholic truth in this matter, we must first vindicate the existence, and then the supernaturality, of those gifts. We shall accomplish both after we have handed down certain general notions concerning the diverse states of human nature, concerning original justice, and concerning the supernaturality of gifts.
Articulus Primus.
Generalis Notio De Diversis Humanae Naturae Statibus.
Generalis Notio De Diversis Humanae Naturae Statibus.
213. "Status," inquit D. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 185. a. 1. c., "proprie loquendo significat quamdam positionis differentiam, secundum quam aliquid disponitur, secundum modum suae naturae, quasi in quadam immobilitate."
213. "State," says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 185, a. 1, corpus, "properly speaking signifies a certain difference of position, according to which something is disposed, according to the mode of its nature, as though in a certain immobility."
214. Haec generica status acceptio non eodem modo applicatur in diversis scientiis. Ita in jure civili significabat certam personae conditionem, secundum quam sui, vel alieni juris est: serva, vel libera, unde status servitutis vel libertatis. - In jure Canonico, significat genus illud vivendi, cui immobiliter homo est alligatus, ut status Matrimonii, Religionis, Sacrorum Ordinum. - In Theologia Morali nomen status vel sumitur una ex praedictis significationibus, quas habet in jure Canonico; vel ad significandum uniuscujusque privatam conditionem, secundum quam homo dicitur esse in statu gratiae, vel peccati.
214. This generic acceptance of state is not applied in the same way in the diverse sciences. Thus in civil law it signified a definite condition of a person, according to which he is under his own right or another's right: slave or free; whence the state of servitude or liberty. - In canon law, it signifies that kind of life to which a man is immovably bound, as the state of Matrimony, Religion, or Sacred Orders. - In Moral Theology the name state is either taken in one of the aforesaid significations which it has in canon law, or for signifying each person's private condition, according to which a man is said to be in the state of grace or of sin.
215. Sed his omissis, in re praesenti nomine status intelligimus certam conditionem, seu certum modum se habendi totius humani generis in ordine ad ultimum finem, secundum divinae Providentiae legem. Comprehendit ergo et finem, et media, et obstacula, et externam Dei Providentiam, etc.
215. But omitting these things, in the present matter by the name state we understand a definite condition, or a definite mode of comporting itself, of the whole human race in order to the last end, according to the law of divine Providence. Therefore it comprehends the end, the means, the obstacles, the external Providence of God, etc.
216. Duplici autem modo potest generatim se habere homo in ordine ad ultimum finem: vel eo jam acquisito fruitur, vel ad eumdem nondum acquisitum tendit. Hinc divisio status in statum termini, et statum viae. Primus potiori ratione dicitur status, siquidem habet omnimodam stabilitatem; sed de hoc nunc non agimus.
216. Now in general man can comport himself in two ways in order to the last end: either he enjoys it as already acquired, or he tends toward it as not yet acquired. Hence the division of state into the state of the term and the state of the way. The first is called state with greater reason, since it has stability in every respect; but we are not now treating of this.
217. Generatim apud antiquiores Theologos de duplici solum statu viae fieri solet mentio: de statu naturae integrae (ita vocabant statum, in quo Adam conditus a Deo fuit), et de statu naturae lapsae. Subortis vero haeresibus Novatorum, majori distinctione haec quaestio de statibus tractari caepit. Unde variae status viae divisiones inductae sunt, quarum praecipua est in status viae reales, et mere possibiles; prout consideratur status, in quo humana natura vere fuit, vel actu est; aut status, in quo numquam fuit, sed esse posset.
217. In general among the older theologians mention is usually made of only two states of the way: the state of integral nature (so they called the state in which Adam was established by God), and the state of fallen nature. But after the heresies of the Innovators arose, this question concerning states began to be treated with greater distinction. Hence various divisions of the state of the way were introduced, of which the chief is into real states of the way and merely possible states, according as one considers the state in which human nature truly was, or actually is, or a state in which it never was, but could be.
218. Status viae reales tres numerantur: status justitiae originalis, qui vocari etiam solet status naturae innocentis - status naturae lapsae - status naturae lapsae et reparatae.
Status justitiae originalis est ille, in quo Adam conditus fuit, et comprehendit ea omnia dona, quae declarabimus, cum de eo statu erit sermo. - Status naturae lapsae est ille, in quo sunt omnes posteri Adae ante Baptismum. - Status naturae lapsae et reparatae, est ille, in quo sunt omnes homines per merita Christi redempti.
Status justitiae originalis est ille, in quo Adam conditus fuit, et comprehendit ea omnia dona, quae declarabimus, cum de eo statu erit sermo. - Status naturae lapsae est ille, in quo sunt omnes posteri Adae ante Baptismum. - Status naturae lapsae et reparatae, est ille, in quo sunt omnes homines per merita Christi redempti.
218. Three real states of the way are counted: the state of original justice, which is also usually called the state of innocent nature; the state of fallen nature; and the state of fallen and repaired nature.
The state of original justice is that in which Adam was established, and it comprehends all those gifts which we shall declare when there is discussion of that state. - The state of fallen nature is that in which all the descendants of Adam are before Baptism. - The state of fallen and repaired nature is that in which all men redeemed through the merits of Christ are.
The state of original justice is that in which Adam was established, and it comprehends all those gifts which we shall declare when there is discussion of that state. - The state of fallen nature is that in which all the descendants of Adam are before Baptism. - The state of fallen and repaired nature is that in which all men redeemed through the merits of Christ are.
219. Inter status vero mere possibiles, specialem meretur attentionem status purae naturae. Hic status duo comprehendit, positivum unum, alterum negativum. Positivum est, ut habeat humana natura cum perfectione essentiali, naturales facultates, finem sibi convenientem, concursum et Providentiam sibi proportionatam, etc. Negativum autem, ut humana natura praeter id, quod ut diximus, ipsi competit, nihil aliud habeat sive boni sive mali. Hinc concipitur homo esse in statu purae naturae, quando concipitur esse sine peccato, et sine ullo dono indebito, seu superaddito naturae exigentiis.
219. But among the merely possible states, the state of pure nature merits special attention. This state comprehends two things, one positive, the other negative. The positive is that human nature should have, together with essential perfection, natural faculties, an end suitable to itself, concurrence and Providence proportioned to itself, etc. The negative is that human nature, besides that which, as we have said, belongs to it, should have nothing else, whether good or evil. Hence man is conceived to be in the state of pure nature when he is conceived to be without sin and without any gift not owed, or superadded to the demands of nature.
220. Praeter statum purae naturae plures alii status viae possibiles distingui solent, quamvis in eorum numero designando non videantur convenire Theologi, quod mirum non est; siquidem, uti bene observat Suarez (de op. sex. dierum, lib. 3., cap. 20., n. 45.) cum agatur de statibus possibilibus, "isti multiplicari possunt, vel unum vel plures (status) dividendo, vel ex mixtione plurium alios conficiendo." Unde habetur:
Status naturae elevatae, in quo homo esset elevatus ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, ac consequenter haberet omnia illa dona, quae ad illam consequendam requiruntur: quod quidem commune esset huic statui cum statu justitiae originalis. Sed in statu naturae simpliciter elevatae, non haberet homo caetera dona propria justitiae originalis, uti est immortalitas, immunitas a concupiscentia, etc.
Status naturae integrae solet distingui a statu justitiae originalis. "Nam posset Deus," inquit Suarez, l. c. n. 46., "condere hominem perfectum intra ordinem naturalem, et sine fomite, vel rebellione inter carnem, et spiritum, absque aliis peculiaribus privilegiis datis Adae in primo statu; et ille status sic conceptus vocatur integritatis naturae qui separabilis est a statu gratiae, ut ex dictis constat, et praeterea distingueretur ab statu originalis justitiae, quia non haberet adjuncta privilegia, vel immortalitatis, vel indolentiae, aut praeservationis ab omni errore, vel defectu veniali."
Sic a multis distinguitur, ait idem Auctor n. 45. status justitiae originalis perficientis hominem intra ordinem et finem naturalem, a statu gratiae, seu statu justitiae ut includentis gratiam. In hoc statu concipitur homo instructus non modo dono immunitatis a concupiscentia, quod invenitur in statu naturae integrae, sed etiam aliis donis, quae plenam rectitudinem in naturali ordine, justitia originalis conferebat. Dicitur autem rectitudo in naturali ordine, non quia esset debita humanae naturae, dona enim illa essent praeternaturalia; sed quia per se perficiunt non in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, ut melius deinde patebit.
"Ad eundem modum," ait Suarez n. 47., "considerari potest alius status, in quo simul justitia originalis sine justitia gratiae, cum statu peccati conjungatur, nam hic status possibilis est quia inter illa duo non est formalis repugnantia.
Sic beatissima Virgo habuit quemdam peculiarem statum (pro humano genere solum possibilem) naturae lapsae, conjunctum cum statu gratiae, et perfectae innocentiae personalis, et cum carentia fomitis, quae ad naturae integritatem pertinet, et nihilominus statum justitiae originalis non habuit, ut explicavi in 2. t. 3. p. d. 4. sect. 6."
Status naturae elevatae, in quo homo esset elevatus ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, ac consequenter haberet omnia illa dona, quae ad illam consequendam requiruntur: quod quidem commune esset huic statui cum statu justitiae originalis. Sed in statu naturae simpliciter elevatae, non haberet homo caetera dona propria justitiae originalis, uti est immortalitas, immunitas a concupiscentia, etc.
Status naturae integrae solet distingui a statu justitiae originalis. "Nam posset Deus," inquit Suarez, l. c. n. 46., "condere hominem perfectum intra ordinem naturalem, et sine fomite, vel rebellione inter carnem, et spiritum, absque aliis peculiaribus privilegiis datis Adae in primo statu; et ille status sic conceptus vocatur integritatis naturae qui separabilis est a statu gratiae, ut ex dictis constat, et praeterea distingueretur ab statu originalis justitiae, quia non haberet adjuncta privilegia, vel immortalitatis, vel indolentiae, aut praeservationis ab omni errore, vel defectu veniali."
Sic a multis distinguitur, ait idem Auctor n. 45. status justitiae originalis perficientis hominem intra ordinem et finem naturalem, a statu gratiae, seu statu justitiae ut includentis gratiam. In hoc statu concipitur homo instructus non modo dono immunitatis a concupiscentia, quod invenitur in statu naturae integrae, sed etiam aliis donis, quae plenam rectitudinem in naturali ordine, justitia originalis conferebat. Dicitur autem rectitudo in naturali ordine, non quia esset debita humanae naturae, dona enim illa essent praeternaturalia; sed quia per se perficiunt non in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, ut melius deinde patebit.
"Ad eundem modum," ait Suarez n. 47., "considerari potest alius status, in quo simul justitia originalis sine justitia gratiae, cum statu peccati conjungatur, nam hic status possibilis est quia inter illa duo non est formalis repugnantia.
Sic beatissima Virgo habuit quemdam peculiarem statum (pro humano genere solum possibilem) naturae lapsae, conjunctum cum statu gratiae, et perfectae innocentiae personalis, et cum carentia fomitis, quae ad naturae integritatem pertinet, et nihilominus statum justitiae originalis non habuit, ut explicavi in 2. t. 3. p. d. 4. sect. 6."
220. Besides the state of pure nature, several other possible states of the way are usually distinguished, although theologians do not seem to agree in designating their number. This is not wonderful, since, as Suarez well observes (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 20, n. 45), since the matter concerns possible states, "these can be multiplied either by dividing one or several states, or by making others from the mixture of several." Hence there is:
The state of elevated nature, in which man would be elevated to supernatural beatitude, and consequently would have all those gifts which are required for attaining it; and this indeed would be common to this state with the state of original justice. But in the state of nature simply elevated, man would not have the other gifts proper to original justice, such as immortality, immunity from concupiscence, etc.
The state of integral nature is usually distinguished from the state of original justice. "For God could," says Suarez in the cited place, n. 46, "establish man perfect within the natural order, and without the tinder, or rebellion between flesh and spirit, apart from the other peculiar privileges given to Adam in the first state; and that state so conceived is called the state of integrity of nature, which is separable from the state of grace, as is clear from what has been said, and furthermore would be distinguished from the state of original justice, because it would not have the joined privileges either of immortality, or of freedom from suffering, or of preservation from every error or venial defect."
Thus, the same author says in n. 45, by many the state of original justice perfecting man within the natural order and end is distinguished from the state of grace, or the state of justice as including grace. In this state man is conceived as furnished not only with the gift of immunity from concupiscence, which is found in the state of integral nature, but also with the other gifts which original justice conferred as full rectitude in the natural order. It is called rectitude in the natural order, not because it would be owed to human nature, for those gifts would be preternatural, but because of themselves they perfect not in order to a supernatural end, as will be clearer later.
"In the same way," says Suarez, n. 47, "another state can be considered, in which original justice without the justice of grace is joined together with the state of sin; for this state is possible because there is no formal repugnance between those two.
Thus the most blessed Virgin had a certain peculiar state (only possible for the human race) of fallen nature, joined with the state of grace and of perfect personal innocence, and with the lack of the tinder, which pertains to the integrity of nature, and nevertheless she did not have the state of original justice, as I explained in 2, t. 3, p., d. 4, sect. 6."
The state of elevated nature, in which man would be elevated to supernatural beatitude, and consequently would have all those gifts which are required for attaining it; and this indeed would be common to this state with the state of original justice. But in the state of nature simply elevated, man would not have the other gifts proper to original justice, such as immortality, immunity from concupiscence, etc.
The state of integral nature is usually distinguished from the state of original justice. "For God could," says Suarez in the cited place, n. 46, "establish man perfect within the natural order, and without the tinder, or rebellion between flesh and spirit, apart from the other peculiar privileges given to Adam in the first state; and that state so conceived is called the state of integrity of nature, which is separable from the state of grace, as is clear from what has been said, and furthermore would be distinguished from the state of original justice, because it would not have the joined privileges either of immortality, or of freedom from suffering, or of preservation from every error or venial defect."
Thus, the same author says in n. 45, by many the state of original justice perfecting man within the natural order and end is distinguished from the state of grace, or the state of justice as including grace. In this state man is conceived as furnished not only with the gift of immunity from concupiscence, which is found in the state of integral nature, but also with the other gifts which original justice conferred as full rectitude in the natural order. It is called rectitude in the natural order, not because it would be owed to human nature, for those gifts would be preternatural, but because of themselves they perfect not in order to a supernatural end, as will be clearer later.
"In the same way," says Suarez, n. 47, "another state can be considered, in which original justice without the justice of grace is joined together with the state of sin; for this state is possible because there is no formal repugnance between those two.
Thus the most blessed Virgin had a certain peculiar state (only possible for the human race) of fallen nature, joined with the state of grace and of perfect personal innocence, and with the lack of the tinder, which pertains to the integrity of nature, and nevertheless she did not have the state of original justice, as I explained in 2, t. 3, p., d. 4, sect. 6."
221. Nobis in hac disputatione agendum est imprimis de statu justitiae originalis, in quo Adam conditus fuit. - Cum autem dona hujus status sint, ut diximus, naturae indebita; ex hoc deducemus possibilitatem status purae naturae. - In disputatione vero sequente erit sermo de amissione justitiae, seu de statu naturae lapsae. - De natura lapsa et reparata agitur in aliis Theologiae Tractatibus.
221. In this disputation we must deal first with the state of original justice, in which Adam was established. But since the gifts of this state are, as we have said, not owed to nature, from this we shall deduce the possibility of the state of pure nature. In the following disputation there will be discussion of the loss of justice, or of the state of fallen nature. Fallen and repaired nature is treated in other treatises of Theology.