Article 3. Idea of a Supernatural Being or Gift

231. In order to attain the true concept of a supernatural gift, it is necessary first, after the various acceptations of supernatural have been handed down, to determine and polish the true one; then to bring forward and explain the documents of the Church, so that it may be shown that the true idea of the supernatural is founded in them. We shall accomplish these things in distinct paragraphs.

232. A twofold concept of the supernatural can be distinguished: one respective, insofar as a supernatural being is considered in order to the nature above which it is; the other absolute, insofar as a supernatural being is considered in itself, without attending to the nature which it surpasses. The absolute is better treated where there is discussion of supernatural beings in species; and therefore we shall say a few things about it at the end of the paragraph. Here we shall rather illustrate the respective concept of the supernatural.

233. Therefore supernatural, according to the force of the word, signifies something above nature; whence it is usually explained by opposition to natural. Now natural has manifold acceptations, which it will be useful to note both for illustrating the true concept of the supernatural and for forestalling objections which are usually drawn from equivocation of words.

234. a) "Natural is called," says Bellarmine (On the Grace of the First Man, chapter 5), "everything which is had from birth; by which signification we are called by nature children of wrath, Ephesians 2. And in this way we confess that original justice can be called natural. But this signification does not pertain to the present question, because natural accepted in this way is not opposed to supernatural, since both natural and supernatural gifts can be had from birth, as is known." - And in this way St. Augustine sometimes called the state of Adam before sin nature. Thus book 3, On Free Choice, chapter 19, n. 54: "We speak of nature in one way, when we properly speak of the nature of man, in which first, in its own kind, he was made blameless; in another way, this nature, in which from the punishment of that condemned man we are born mortal and ignorant and subjected to the flesh, according to which mode the Apostle says: for we too were by nature children of wrath." Likewise book 1, Retractations, chapter 10, n. 3: "For that itself in which he was established is truly and properly called the nature of man; but we use the word by transference, so that we also call nature that in which man is born;" etc. 15, n. 6: "Properly nature is called that in which we were created without defect."

b) Natural can be called that which is consonant with nature and which does not destroy it, but adorns and perfects it. By this reason St. Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 26, teaches that it was said by the Apostle: "The Gentiles who do not have the law, naturally do the things that are of the law," Romans 2. For because vice is contrary to nature, but grace heals nature, when the law is fulfilled from grace, it can not unfittingly be said to be fulfilled naturally. But concerning natural accepted in this way, there is no question, since natural of this kind is opposed not to supernatural, but to that which is contrary to nature; and not only original justice, but also any gift of grace whatsoever, and even eternal life itself, must be called natural in this way.

c) That is called natural which, although it is a gratuitous gift, nevertheless helps and perfects nature in natural works, and does not elevate it to any supernatural works. And in this way original justice, if it is understood to be distinct from grace making one pleasing, can be called a natural gift.

d) Something can be called natural extensively, insofar as it is not a merely personal good, but is extended to the whole nature. To this is opposed not supernatural, but personal; and according to this, the gifts of original justice can be called natural, insofar as they were conferred not only upon the person of Adam, but in him upon the whole of human nature.

e) Natural is also said transitively of that which, although it does not properly pertain to nature, nevertheless ought to be poured forth together with nature. Thus the gifts of original justice can be called natural, insofar as by divine ordination they had to be transmitted from Adam to all his descendants, and would have been transmitted if Adam had not sinned.

f) Natural is said of that which is owed to nature: to this supernatural is opposed. Therefore the supernatural is something superadded to nature, or that which, from its very excess above nature, is not owed to nature, and consequently is gratuitous.

235. First, the supernatural is called not owed. In order that this may be understood, it must be noted, first, with St. Thomas, I-II, q. 111, a. 1, ad 2, that "a twofold debt can be understood: one indeed coming from merit, which is referred to the person whose role it is to do meritorious works, according to Romans 4:4: To him who works, the reward is reckoned according to debt, not according to grace. Another is a debt according to the condition of nature; for instance, if we say that it is owed to man that he have reason, and the other things which pertain to human nature. But in neither way is it called debt because God is obligated to the creature, but rather insofar as the creature ought to be subjected to God, so that the divine ordination may be fulfilled in it; which indeed is that such a nature should have such conditions or properties, and that one doing such things should obtain such things. Therefore natural gifts lack the first debt. But supernatural gifts lack both debts."

It must be noted, second, that something can be owed to nature in three ways. a) Owed constitutively, because it constitutes it in its being; thus soul and body, by which human nature consists, are called owed to man. God could, according to his own will, create man or not create him; yet once the divine will of creating man is supposed, soul and body are owed to him. - b) Owed consecutively, because it flows from the essence itself, or, as the school of St. Thomas used to speak, is effected from the principles of nature, namely from the very substance of soul and body, of itself. - c) Owed exigently, because although it comes from without, it is nevertheless demanded by nature, not so that it may be, but so that it may be well, not by necessity of essence, but by necessity of the end; and on that account God cannot deny it while preserving his attributes. Thus concurrence for acting according to innate powers, and destination to a proportioned end, are called owed to man. - The supernatural excludes any debt whatsoever, and consequently is not owed to nature, insofar as it neither constitutes nature, nor flows from it, nor is demanded by it.

It must be noted, third, in what sense God is said to owe something to the creature, and how that thing is truly owed to himself. "Therefore in the name of debt," says St. Thomas, I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3, "there is imported a certain order of exigency or necessity of something to which it is ordered. Now a twofold order must be considered in things. One, by which some created thing is ordered to another created thing, as parts are ordered to the whole, and accidents to substances, and each thing to its own end. Another order, by which all created things are ordered to God. Thus, therefore, debt can be attended to in two ways in the divine operation: either according as something is owed to God, or according as something is owed to a created thing; and in both ways God renders what is owed. For it is owed to God that there be fulfilled in things that which his wisdom and will have, and which manifests his goodness; and according to this the justice of God regards his own fittingness, according to which he renders to himself what is owed to himself. It is also owed to some created thing that it have that which is ordered to it, as it is owed to man that he have hands, and that the other animals serve him; and so also God works justice when he gives to each thing what is owed to it according to the account of its nature and condition. But this debt depends on the first, because this is owed to each thing: that which is ordered to it according to the order of divine wisdom. And although God in this way gives a debt to something, nevertheless he himself is not a debtor, because he himself is not ordered to others, but rather others to him."

And book 2, Contra Gentiles, chapter 29: "In the production of creatures, debt is found in three ways. In the first way, so that a conditional debt is taken from the whole universe of things to any part of it which is required for the perfection of the universe; for if God willed such a universe to be made, it was owed that he make the sun and water and things of this sort, without which the universe cannot exist. Secondly, so that a conditional debt is taken from one creature to another; as, if God willed animals and plants to exist, it was owed that he make heavenly bodies here, by which they are preserved; and if he willed man to exist, it was necessary to make plants and animals and other things of this sort, which man needs for perfect being, although God made these and those from mere will. Thirdly, so that in each creature a conditional debt is taken from its parts and properties and accidents, upon which the creature depends with respect to being or with respect to some perfection of itself; as, supposing that God wished to make man, from this supposition it was owed that he join soul and body in him, and provide him with senses and other helps of this sort, both intrinsic and extrinsic. In all of these, if one attends rightly, God is not called debtor to the creature, but to his own disposition to be fulfilled."

236. The supernatural is called not owed to nature. Although the name nature is taken in many ways, yet, omitting here the significations which do not bear on the matter, we say that by the name nature there is denoted a finite substance, and every accident owed to it either consecutively or exigently. But according as one or another finite substance, or the whole complex of created substances, is considered, and something is said not to be owed to them, one has, as will soon be explained, the preternatural or the supernatural.

237. Now something must be said about the chief divisions of the supernatural. a) Some divide it into the supernatural such simply, which exceeds not one or another nature but universal nature, or all finite substances; and into the supernatural in a qualified respect, which surpasses only one or another nature; and this does not properly merit the name supernatural.

b) The supernatural such simply is divided into the absolutely and essentially supernatural, which belongs to God alone, whose excellence and dignity, exceeding every nature, is essential to him and belongs to him unparticipatedly; whence the Author of the book On the Divine Names, chapters 1 and 2, and often elsewhere, calls God and Deity supersubstantial; and into the participated supernatural, and hence such accidentally, whose excellence above nature is suitable to a creature.

c) Of the supernatural such accidentally, one kind is supernatural with respect to substance, whose entity or essence exceeds nature, as are sanctifying grace, the light of glory, and the hypostatic union; another is supernatural with respect to mode, whose entity does not surpass nature, yet the mode by which such an entity is produced or acquired does pass beyond nature, such as the instantaneous restoration of sight or recovery of health.

238. From these things it follows, first, that the handed-down partition of good into natural and supernatural is logically accurate, or adequate. For that division is called such which is made by members so opposed that they lack a middle; but between what is owed to nature (natural) and what is not owed (supernatural) there is no middle, since besides that which is contained within the ambit of all finite nature, and that which is above it, there is nothing. Therefore.

It follows, second, that nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, the supernatural can be divided in two ways. That which is not owed to nature is either such only by reason of mode, or only with respect to some nature; or it is such with respect to substance and with respect to the whole of nature. In the first way there is had what is usually called preternatural; in the other, what is called supernatural in the most proper sense. Hence the partition of order or good into natural, preternatural, and supernatural. Soul and body, intellect and sense, operation and proportioned end in man pertain to the natural order. - Sight in one blind from birth, immortality in man, pertain to the preternatural order. - Sanctifying grace and the intuitive vision of God in any creature pertain to the supernatural order.

And the same thing comes back to what Suarez explains a little differently (On the Work of the Six Days, book 3, chapter 12, n. 23): "I note," he says, "that natural and supernatural can be accepted in two ways in the present matter. For that can be called a supernatural gift which elevates man to a supernatural end and to the doing of something which is above the whole order of nature and cannot be done by merely natural powers. Whence, by distinction from and opposition to a supernatural gift of this sort, whatever perfects nature only in order to a natural end and rectitude is called natural. Nevertheless, natural gift taken so broadly must be subdivided; for one gift is perfective of nature in its own order, which is owed to it as somehow consequent upon nature, as are natural powers and acts, or concurrence toward them, and habits as they are acquired through acts, and anything else of this kind. But another gift can exist which indeed perfects nature in its own order, yet does not follow upon it nor is owed to it, as are sciences infused by accident, and extraordinary assistance for avoiding every natural deception, or venial sin, or the tinder, or bodily sufferings, etc."

It follows, third, that if the preternatural is compared with the natural and the supernatural, it will be able by a diverse account to approach either the one or the other. For if the preternatural is considered insofar as it is in some way not owed, it agrees with the supernatural. But if it is considered insofar as it is either not owed with respect to mode, but not with respect to substance; or, if not owed with respect to substance, not not-owed to the whole, but to some nature, then the perfection which it brings will either be owed with respect to substance, or will be owed to some nature, and in this it agrees with the natural. But this is not wonderful, since it is proper to the middle to participate something from each extreme.

239. These things indeed concern the supernatural considered respectively. Now a few things concerning the absolute concept of the supernatural. The supernatural, in its absolute concept, bespeaks something of the divine order. For, from what has been said, the supernatural is above every created and creatable nature; but this is either God or divine, or it is nothing. Hence intelligent creatures elevated to the supernatural order through sanctifying grace are called deified.

240. That this absolute concept of the supernatural is derived from revelation will be proved especially where there is discussion of the supernaturality of sanctifying grace and of the intuitive vision. Now, for illustrating it as much as is sufficient, we shall note three things.

1. Here we are not speaking of the essentially supernatural, but of the participated supernatural. Now participation cannot be understood except through a certain union. Therefore, if when creatures are elevated to the supernatural order they are deified, they must be united with God. Hence Dionysius the Areopagite (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 1) says: "Now this deification is, as far as can be, assimilation and union to God."

But what is the nature of this union? For some union with God is conceived even in the natural order. Union with God in the supernatural order is immediate union with God taken quidditatively, or with God as he is in himself. Hence, for example, human nature in Christ is called deified insofar as it is substantially and immediately united to the very Person of the Word. - The blessed in heaven are called deified insofar as, seeing God, they are united to him; for in cognition there is always union between the knower and the known. But the union is immediate in the intuitive vision, because through this they behold God quidditatively, as he is in himself.

2. The deification of the creature is made neither by destroying nature, nor by mixing nature and grace together, but by elevating through grace. This will easily be understood from the things to be said, especially in the treatise on Grace; but so that the matter may be placed before the eyes by some example, it is enough to attend to the mystery of the Incarnation: human nature, whole and unmixed, is united to the divine nature in the Person of the Word. See Schrader (On the Threefold Order, from n. 104).

3. Elevation to the supernatural order cannot be accomplished through a certain quasi-intrinsic unfolding of the goods of nature, for in that way nature would be perfected while nevertheless always remaining in its own order; but through the infusion of a new gift which is of the divine order.

Hence St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 53, says: "Nothing can be elevated to a higher operation except by this, that its power is strengthened. Now it happens that the power of something is strengthened in two ways. In one way, by the simple intensification of the power itself, as the active power of something hot is increased by the intensification of heat, so that it can effect a more vehement action in the same species. In another way, by the addition of a new form, as the power of something transparent is increased so that it can illuminate, by this, that it becomes actually luminous through the form of light newly received in it; and this increase of power is indeed required for attaining an operation of another species. But the natural power of a created intellect does not suffice for seeing the divine substance, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore its power must be increased for this, that it may reach such a vision. But increase by intensification of the natural power is not sufficient, because such a vision is not of the same account as the natural vision of the created intellect; which is clear from the distance of the things seen. Therefore it is necessary that there be an increase of the intellective power through the attainment of some new disposition."

241. The documents of the Church from which we draw the true concept of the supernatural are chiefly contained in the Constitution of St. Pius V, Ex omnibus afflictionibus, 1567; the Constitution of Gregory XIII, Provisionis nostrae, 1579; the Constitution of Urban VIII, In eminenti, 1641; the Constitution of Clement XI, Unigenitus, 1713; and the Constitution of Pius VI, Auctorem fidei, 1794.

242. From the Constitution of St. Pius V, the condemned propositions which bear upon our matter are especially the following. - XXI. "The sublimation and exaltation of human nature into fellowship with the divine nature was owed to the integrity of the first condition, and therefore must be called natural and not supernatural." - XXIII. "Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man from the beginning, by a certain supernatural and gratuitous gift, was exalted above the condition of his own nature, so that by faith, hope, and charity he might worship God supernaturally." - XXIV. "By vain and idle men, according to the folly of philosophers, there was devised the opinion, which must be rejected as Pelagianism, that man from the beginning was so constituted that by gifts superadded to nature he was elevated by the liberality of the Creator and adopted as a son of God." - XXVI. "The integrity of the first creation was not an exaltation not owed to human nature, but its natural condition." LV. "God could not from the beginning have created such a man as is now born." - LXXVIII. "The immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace, but a natural condition." - LXXIX. "False is the opinion of the doctors that the first man could have been created and established by God without natural justice."

But at the end of this Apostolic Constitution it is said: "These opinions, having indeed been weighed by strict examination before us, although some of them could in some way be sustained, in the rigor and proper sense of the words intended by the assertors, as respectively heretical, erroneous, suspect, rash, scandalous, and bringing offense to pious ears ... we condemn, circumscribe, and abolish."

243. Gregory XIII, in the cited Constitution, confirmed the judgment of his Predecessor, and sent Francis Toletus, his theologian from the Society of Jesus, who in the year 1580 ordered the Bull to be recited in a very full assembly of the whole Academy. Then Baius said, "I condemn (all the propositions condemned in the Bull), according to the intention of the Bull itself and as the Bull condemns"; but the other Doctors, Licentiates, Bachelors, and Students of Louvain repeated with one voice: "we condemn the articles, we reverently receive the Bull, and we promise obedience."

244. Urban VIII, in the prefaced Constitution condemning the book of Jansenius whose title is Augustinus, brings forward, among others, this reason: "But since," he says, "from a diligent and mature reading of the same Book, whose title is Augustinus, it was afterwards discovered that in the same Book many of the Propositions formerly condemned by our Predecessors, as is said above, are contained, and, to the great scandal of Catholics and contempt of the authority of the said See, are defended against the aforesaid condemnations and prohibitions, we, wishing to apply a suitable remedy to this evil which turns to the scandal of the whole Christian Commonwealth and the ruin of the Catholic faith, by the Apostolic authority of the present tenor perpetually confirm and approve the aforesaid Constitutions of Pius and Gregory our Predecessors, and each and all of the things contained in them; and the aforesaid Book, whose title is Augustinus, containing and renewing, as has been discovered by us, the articles, opinions, and judgments reproved and condemned in the said Constitutions ... we prohibit." - But the propositions of Baius renewed by Jansenius which bear on the present matter are the 26th, 55th, and 78th.

245. In the aforesaid Constitution of Clement XI, confirmed by several other Apostolic Constitutions, among others proposition XXXV is proscribed, which has itself thus: "The grace of Adam is a consequence of creation, and was owed to sound and integral nature."

246. Finally, from the cited Constitution of Pius VI, the censures which bear on this matter are the 16th and 17th. The first is: "The doctrine of the Synod concerning the state of happy innocence, as it represents that state in Adam before sin, comprising not only integrity, but also interior justice with an impulse toward God through the love of charity, and primeval sanctity restored in some way after the fall; insofar as, taken comprehensively, it insinuates that that state was a consequence of creation, owed from the natural exigency and condition of human nature, not a gratuitous benefit of God; false, elsewhere condemned in Baius and Quesnel, erroneous, favoring the Pelagian heresy."

The other is: "The proposition expressed in these words: taught by the Apostle, we regard death no longer as the natural condition of man, but truly as the just punishment of original fault; insofar as, with the name of the Apostle craftily alleged, it insinuates that death, which in the present state has been inflicted as the just punishment of sin through the just subtraction of immortality, was not the natural condition of man, as if immortality had not been a gratuitous benefit, but a natural condition; captious, rash, injurious to the Apostle, elsewhere condemned."

247. In order that the force of these condemnations may be clear, some things must here be laid down beforehand. I. Some judged, even among Catholic theologians, that not all the propositions of Baius were condemned on account of doctrine, but that some were condemned only on account of the harsh judgment by which they incriminate the contrary opinion. Hence they inferred that the opinion or doctrine could be retained, but that the censure, or that harsh judgment, had to be relinquished, especially for the peace of the faithful.

248. But it must be said that the propositions of Baius were condemned on account of doctrine. For a) in the cited Constitution of St. Pius V it is said: "these opinions, having indeed been weighed by strict examination before us." But what need is there of strict examination, if judgment is not to be rendered concerning the doctrine itself?

b) Those propositions are condemned "in the proper sense of the words intended by the Authors." These words of the Bull could not be understood if the propositions were condemned on account of the peace of the faithful, on account of the censure, and not the doctrine.

c) At the beginning of the cited Constitution the Supreme Pontiff grieves "that the Christian religion, already long agitated by such great storms, is being shaken by daily proposed new opinions, and that the people of Christ, cut apart by the suggestions of the ancient enemy, is being carried everywhere and indiscriminately into various errors"; all of which things, as Gregory XIII afterwards said in the previously cited Constitution, regard "especially the preservation of the Catholic faith." Therefore judgment was passed concerning the doctrine itself.

d) Certainly some propositions, which some undeservedly thought could be sustained with respect to doctrine, contain no censure, as, for example, 27, 55, etc.

e) With respect to the propositions concerning the present matter, reported above, certainly 21, 26, 55, and 78 contain no harsh judgment; and consequently they were condemned on account of doctrine. But since the others on the same matter, although they contain a censure of the contrary opinion, nevertheless repeat the same doctrine which is contained in the first propositions, they too must be said to have been condemned on account of doctrine.

f) If there were any doubt concerning this matter, it would wholly vanish from censure 16 in the Bull Auctorem fidei of Pius VI. For there not only is the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia concerning the state of the first man condemned, but it is said to have already been condemned in Baius. Therefore his propositions which are referred to the state of original justice were condemned on account of doctrine.

249. II. Immediately after the condemnation of Baius, it pleased some to say that those propositions were not condemned "in the sense intended by the assertors," but because they could be turned aside by others into a false sense. Hence the question concerning the "famous Pian comma." Namely, they said that the comma should not be placed immediately after the word "could" (recall the words of St. Pius V recited above), but after the word "intended," so that the sense would be that although those propositions could be sustained in the sense intended by the authors (here they placed the comma), nevertheless "as heretical, erroneous, we condemn them."

250. But it must be said wholly that those propositions were condemned in the sense intended by the assertors. For a) by order of Urban VIII, in the year 1644 at Rome an authentic copy of the Constitution of St. Pius V was printed, and that comma was placed where we placed it. - In that place that comma was in the copy of the Bull possessed by Toletus, as Ripalda testifies. Likewise in the Autograph kept in the Archives of the Holy Office, according to Cardinal de Lugo.

b) The very construction of the phrase requires that that comma be placed immediately after the word "could"; since then those words "although some could in some way be sustained" are opposed to the following words "in the rigor and proper sense of the words intended by the assertors." But if the comma is placed after "intended," there is nothing to which that "although in some way" is opposed.

c) If the propositions in question had not been condemned in the sense intended by the assertors, and therefore in the sense of Baius, why were they condemned? Because of a harsh judgment? But this escape has already been excluded. - Because they could be turned aside by others into a depraved sense? But then there would be no proposition which could not be condemned, since both Sacred Scripture and the Apostolic Constitutions themselves are sometimes turned aside into a depraved sense by depraved men.

d) If the same propositions had not been condemned in the objective sense of the author, or the "proper sense of the words intended by the assertors," no one could know what at last the Supreme Pontiff had condemned. - Each person could defend any one of those propositions, since none is determinately defined in the Bull as unable to be sustained in the rigor and proper sense of the words. - Consequently there would have been no effect of the condemnation.

III. Here it can be asked by what censure we think the propositions of Baius reported above, which bear on the present question, were punished; for the Supreme Pontiff did not apply a special censure to any special proposition. I reply: 1. with Suarez (Prolegomenon VI, On Grace), that the Supreme Pontiff was solicitous rather to exterminate the whole doctrine than about that special application of censure with respect to its species or degree; whence that general censure containing several members was sufficient, for any one of those notes sufficed for extirpating the doctrine. - 2. It is certain, from what has been said, that there is no proposition to which at least some minimal censure should not be applied; but which censure belongs to each proposition, since it is not determined in the Bull of St. Pius V, must be known from elsewhere. - 3. From the cited Bull Auctorem fidei of Pius VI, we know that the propositions denying the gratuity of the gifts of original justice are condemned in Baius as false, erroneous, favoring the Pelagian heresy.

251. We undertake to show that the concept of the supernatural which has been set forth is true, and not invented by our own talent. But we shall accomplish that here by examining more diligently the documents of the Church which have been recited; for we shall hand down several proofs, whether from Scripture or from the Fathers, when there is discussion of the supernaturality of the gifts of original justice in species.

252. Therefore we assert:

Proposition XXIII. According to the mind of the Church, that must be called supernatural which is 1. not owed; 2. of itself; 3. to nature; 4. constitutively, consecutively, and exigently.

Declaration of the first part. Since, from what has been said, supernatural is said by opposition to natural, it can have manifold acceptations, more or less proper. Therefore it must first be shown that the true acceptance, according to the mind of the Church, of supernatural is that it be a good not owed.

Proof. a) Baius in proposition 21 asserts that the exaltation of human nature into fellowship with the divine was therefore to be called natural and not supernatural, because it was owed. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church, which condemned that proposition, the exaltation of human nature must be called supernatural because it was not owed.

b) In proposition 26, Baius, asserting that the integrity of the first condition is natural, opposes what is not owed to what is natural. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church condemning that proposition, it must be denied that integrity is natural, and it must be asserted that it is not owed; or, what is the same, that must be called supernatural which is not owed.

c) In censure 16 of the Bull Auctorem fidei, it is said: "The doctrine of the Synod ... insofar as it insinuates that that state (of original justice) ... was owed from natural exigency, false, etc." Therefore we must call that state not owed, and in this sense supernatural. - The same can be drawn from the other propositions.

Declaration of the second part. Baius often used the words natural and supernatural in a true sense, and therefore said that the supernatural is that which is not owed to nature. But when he applied this notion of the supernatural to the exaltation of human nature, he taught that grace was owed to nature before sin, but not owed after sin; and therefore natural in Adam when he was first established, supernatural in us when we recover it through Christ; supernatural in us by accident or by reason of mode, not of itself and with respect to substance. Hence he maintained that, in order for sanctifying grace and eternal life corresponding to it to be supernatural to some subject, for example human nature, it is not sufficient that in that subject there be no exigency of those gifts according to nature, but there is required a positive unworthiness through sin.

"In that way," he says (On the Justice of the First Man, chapter 10), "in which health of body is grace, when it can be repaired neither by the powers of nature nor by the work of a physician, but is restored by the beneficence of the Creator alone; not because the thing is supernatural, or superadded to the natural integrity of man, as prophecy, the grace of healings, and many other things are, without which we lack no evil. But because the very mode and account of effecting it, according to the native custom of operating, is not found in created things, but proceeds from a certain higher and unusual and hidden counsel of divine wisdom."

Proof. a) According to propositions 21, 26, etc. of Baius, proposition 35 of Quesnel, and the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia in the cited censure 16, grace, integrity, and the exaltation of human nature into fellowship with the divine are called gifts owed, or natural, to Adam, and in him to human nature before sin. But those propositions have been condemned by the Church. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church, it must be said that those things were supernatural and not owed of themselves, and not by accident or on account of sin.

b) The sanctifying grace conferred upon the Angels is the same as the sanctifying grace which we obtain after sin through Christ; but in the innocent Angels themselves grace was, that is, was a gift not owed and supernatural. Therefore positive unworthiness through sin is not required in order that sanctifying grace and the intuitive vision consequent upon it be supernatural; or, what is the same, these gifts are not owed of themselves, and not by accident in the sense of Baius.

Hence St. Augustine says (City of God, book 12, chapter 9): "Who would make that good will of the Angels except he who created them with a good will, that is, with the chaste love by which they would adhere to him, at once establishing nature in them and bestowing grace? Hence it must be believed that the holy Angels were never without a good will, that is, without the love of God ... Therefore we must confess, with due praise of the Creator, that it pertains not only to holy men, but can also be said of the holy Angels, that the charity of God has been poured forth in them through the Holy Spirit who has been given to them."

St. Fulgentius says (book 2, to Transimundus, chapter 3): "No other grace could guard the standing Angel from ruin, except that which could repair fallen man after ruin. There is one grace in both, working in this one that he should rise, in that one lest he should fall."

St. Bernard says (On the Canticle, sermon 22): "He who raised fallen man gave to the standing Angel that he should not slip; thus freeing the one from captivity, as he defended the other from captivity; and by this reason he was equally the Redeemer of each, releasing the one and preserving the other."

Declaration of the third part. We distinguished above (n. 235) between the debt of nature and the debt of works: the first is usually called physical, the other moral. Jansenius taught that supernatural gifts are indeed not owed insofar as they exclude moral debt, but by no means insofar as they must also exclude physical merit. "It must be considered," he says (On the State of Pure Nature, book 1, chapter 2), "that according to the doctrine of the Scriptures and of Augustine, only the work of a creature to which grace is owed is repugnant to grace most properly so called. For this is what Apostolic doctrine hands down: if by grace, now not from works, otherwise grace is now not grace. For this reason in six hundred places Augustine removes only works, as destructive of grace, from the gratuitous calling and justification of the sinner ... he equally calls grace gratuitous that we sense and that we understand, as that we are men." - To exclude this error we assert that the supernatural is not owed to nature.

Proof. a) In the propositions condemned in Baius, in proposition 35 of Quesnel, and in censure 16 of the Bull of Pius VI, the doctrine of those who called the gifts of original justice natural because they were owed to nature is expressly condemned; there was no question of works. Therefore, according to the mind of the Church, it must be held that the supernatural excludes even physical debt.

b) Since Jansenius abuses the authority of St. Augustine, we add a few things from the holy Doctor. St. Augustine openly teaches: 1. that grace excludes every debt. Thus in the Epistle to Sixtus, n. 40: "But if grace, certainly not rendered by any merits, but given by gratuitous goodness." - On Original Sin, chapter 24: "For the grace of God will in no way be grace, unless it has been gratuitous in every way." - 2. St. Augustine openly distinguished between the merit of nature and of works. Thus in On Free Choice, book 3, chapter 24, he says: "Just as rational nature is, as it were, a merit for receiving a precept, so observance of the precept is a merit for receiving wisdom." Likewise book against Secundinus, chapter 10; book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 8. - 3. Comparing the heresy of the Manichaeans with the Pelagian heresy, he declares both hostile to the faith. "With these diseases," he says (Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians, book 7, chapter 2), "contrary to each other, the Manichaeans and Pelagians are in conflict, with dissimilar will, similar vanity, separated by diverse opinion. But now they together attack the grace of Christ, together empty out his baptism, together dishonor his flesh; but even these things in diverse ways and for diverse causes. For the Manichaeans declare that good things are divinely supplied to the merits of nature, but the Pelagians to the merits of a good will. The former say: God owes this to the labors, calamities, and inconveniences to which the nature of his members was liable; the latter say: God owes this to the virtues of his servants. Therefore to both the reward is reckoned not according to grace, but according to debt." - 4. If the gratuitous or supernatural excluded only the debt of works and not of nature, creation, our nature, its faculties, etc., would be supernatural just as sanctifying grace itself is. Pelagius indeed contended this, but St. Augustine constantly asserted the contrary. Thus, for example, in the Epistle to Sixtus, chapter 3, he says: "When it is asked of these men what grace Pelagius thought was given without any preceding merits, when [in the Synod of Diospolis] he anathematized those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits, they answer: without any preceding merits grace is human nature itself, in which we were established. For before we existed we could not merit anything so that we might exist. Let that fallacy be cast away from Christian hearts. For the Apostle does not commend at all that grace by which we were created, so that we should be men." - And [Epistle to Innocent, chapter 7]: "Although by a certain not disapproved reasoning that may be called the grace of God by which we were created so that ... we should exist and live, and sense and understand ... nevertheless that grace is another by which, having been predestined, we are called, justified, glorified ... Concerning this grace the question was being turned ... This grace Apostolic doctrine not undeservedly calls by that name, by which we are saved and justified from the faith of Christ... But that grace by which we were created men, although we understand that it may not undeservedly be so called, it is nevertheless wonderful if we read that it is so called in any legitimate, prophetic, evangelical, and apostolic letters."

c) Reason confirms the same thing. For, as Casini, S.J., argues well [What Is Man, or the Controversy concerning the State of Pure Nature, article 1]: "Physical debt is much narrower and stricter than moral debt. Indeed, for merit not only congruous but even condign to be remunerated by no reward, unless some promise or covenant has intervened, is most free to God without his thereby doing any injury to man. For since he is supreme lord, by that title he can command some work to a servant, and appoint no reward for him. But on the contrary, if he denies or takes away from nature what is proper to it, he brings some violence upon it, as the adversaries concede. Therefore physical debt, which is from natural condition and exigency, is much more opposed to grace and favor than moral debt arisen from a work and from some antecedent merit. Thus, that someone receive a kingdom to whom it is owed by right of blood and family, and cannot be denied without great injury and violence, has less of grace and favor than that some peoples and nations establish as king over themselves one who has done something bravely for them. For although what is given to the first is attributed in some way to nature and condition, namely to blood and family, while what is given to the other is attributed to works; nevertheless, if nature and condition produce a greater debt and a certain quasi-necessity, his election, as more owed and necessary, is also less gratuitous, and has either nothing or very little of favor and grace. What then in our matter, where the good things which the adversary usurps under the name of grace he says are bound and fastened to the nature of men by that kind of debt which brings upon God himself a necessity plainly insuperable, and which cannot be broken or violated by him?"

Declaration of the fourth part. Luther, Calvin, and their followers sometimes assert that the gifts of original justice are so proper to human nature that they seem to say they pertain to its very essence, and therefore are owed constitutively. More often, however, they say that the same gifts are owed only consecutively. See Bellarmine, On the Grace of the First Man, chapter 1. Baius, although he sometimes said that the gifts of original justice were owed consecutively, nevertheless was content if it were conceded to him that the same gifts were owed only exigently. Hence, in chapter 11, when he had objected to himself: "A natural quality is one which arises from the principles of nature; but no one will have said that Adam's justice, which was of such excellence that it rendered him a sharer of the divine nature, arose from his soul and body as from an efficient cause"; he responds: "Natural is not said by comparison with its cause or origin, but by comparison with the thing in which it so inheres that it pertains to its natural integrity, and its absence is an evil, whether it comes from its principles or from elsewhere.... Therefore the justice of the first man, whether it arose from the principles of nature, or was immediately conferred by God, nevertheless was still natural to him, because it so pertained to his integrity that without it he could not exist safe and lack misery." See also chapter 5. Wherefore we assert that supernatural gifts are not owed to nature, even exigently.

Proof. a) The propositions condemned in Baius were condemned in the objective sense intended by the assertors; but when Baius asserted that the gifts of original justice were owed, he understood that at least exigently. Therefore it must be held that they are also not owed exigently.

b) Hence in the often cited censure 16 from the Bull Auctorem fidei, it is said: The doctrine of the Synod concerning the state of happy innocence insofar as ... it insinuates that that state was a consequence of creation, owed from natural exigency, false, etc. But this part of the thesis will be treated more fully when the possibility of the state of pure nature is asserted.

253. Note. We have refuted in the disputations above the false notions of supernatural gift handed down by those who acknowledge Christian revelation. All know that the rationalists, rejecting revelation, cannot attain the true concept of the supernatural. Yet they speak of the supernatural order, but in such a way that they pervert its character. Thus, for example, they say that what lies beneath the senses and experience is natural; but supernatural is that which escapes sense and experience. Or they define that as natural which is accomplished immediately through secondary causes, but as supernatural that which God produces by immediate action.

By comparing these false concepts of the supernatural with the true one handed down by us, it would be easy to refute them; but this would be done in vain against rationalists who do not admit revelation, from whose sources we must draw the idea of the supernatural. Therefore, if it were necessary to deal against them, although they abuse the name supernatural, first the concept of the supernatural which we have given would have to be explained by us. Then, by the reasons which we shall indicate when there is discussion of the intuitive vision, the possibility of the supernatural gift as defined by us would have to be shown; Christian revelation would have to be asserted by the motives of credibility; from this the existence of the supernatural order would be demonstrated. - It is evident that questions with rationalists cannot take their beginning from the existence of a truly supernatural gift.