Article 6. How the Soul is United to the Body For Forming Man Substantially One

196. Since it is now established that man is one in nature and person, the explanation of this unity is now at issue; but the explanation depends upon the mode by which soul and body are united. Since, however, in this matter some things are certain among all sons of the Church, while others are still freely disputed among them, we shall take care to separate the former from the latter.

197. The Council of Vienne under Clement V has this: "Firmly adhering to the foundation of Catholic faith, besides which, according to the Apostle's testimony, no one can lay another, we openly confess with holy mother Church that the only-begotten Son of God, eternally subsisting together with the Father in all those things in which God the Father exists, assumed in time in the virginal chamber, unto the unity of his hypostasis and person, the parts of our nature united together, from which, existing in himself as true God, he would become true man, namely a passible human body and an intellective or rational soul, truly, per se, and essentially informing that body. ... Furthermore, with the aforesaid sacred council approving, we reprove every doctrine or position rashly asserting or calling into doubt that the substance of the rational or intellective soul is not truly and per se the form of the human body, as erroneous and hostile to the truth of Catholic faith; defining, so that the sincere truth of faith may be known to all and the entrance to all errors be closed off lest they creep in, that whoever henceforth shall presume pertinaciously to assert, defend, or hold that the rational or intellective soul is not the form of the human body per se and essentially, is to be judged as a heretic."

The Fifth Lateran Council under Leo X decreed: "With this sacred council approving, we condemn and reprove all who assert that the intellective soul is mortal, or one only in all men, and those who call these things into doubt: since it not only truly, per se, and essentially exists as the form of the human body, as is contained in the canon of Clement V, our predecessor of happy memory, issued in the General Council of Vienne, but also is immortal and, according to the multitude of bodies into which it is infused, singularly multipliable, multiplied, and to be multiplied."

The Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, in the Apostolic Letter to Cardinal Geissel, Archbishop of Cologne, in 1857, condemning the errors of Gunther, says: "We know that in those same books, that is, in the works of this writer, the Catholic opinion and doctrine concerning man is harmed, according to which man is completed by body and soul in such a way that the soul, and indeed the rational soul, is the true, per se, and immediate form of the body."

The same Supreme Pontiff, in the Apostolic Letter to the Bishop of Breslau, April 30, 1860, condemning the errors of Baltzer, says: "It has furthermore been noted that Baltzer, in that little book of his, after he had reduced the whole controversy to this: whether there is for the body a proper principle of life really distinct from the rational soul, advanced to such rashness that he both called the opposite opinion heretical and argued with many words that it must be held as such. This indeed we cannot but vehemently disapprove, considering that this opinion, which posits one principle of life in man, namely the rational soul, from which the body also receives motion and all life and sense, is very common in the Church of God, and seems so joined with the dogma of the Church to most Doctors, and indeed especially to the most approved, that it is the legitimate and only true interpretation of it, and consequently cannot be denied without error in faith."

198. In order that the true force of these definitions may become known, some things must be briefly noted. And 1. some more recent authors observe that the words of the Council of Vienne can be explained in two ways: a) the soul which is the form of the body is the rational soul; or b) the soul which is rational is the form of the body. According to the first exposition, they say, the intention of the Council is borne directly toward the definition concerning the unity of the soul in man, and only supposes that the soul is the form of the body; but according to the other, the definition falls directly upon the phrase "is the form of the body," and the unity of the soul in man is established only indirectly. They say that the first exposition is to be preferred, because the Council issued the aforesaid definition against Olivi, who seems to have renewed the error concerning plurality of souls in man.

But, on the contrary, a) if the words of the Council are taken as they sound, they seem directly to establish that the soul is the form of the body, all the more because they distinctly determine the very notion of form by adding "truly, per se, essentially." b) If the Council, wishing to define that there is one soul in man, and that it is intellective, used this formula, "the rational or intellective soul is the form of the human body per se and essentially," this is a sign that the truth of form is so intimately connected with the unity of the human soul that one cannot stand without the other. c) Finally they concede that the Council at least indirectly established that the soul is the form of the body; but this suffices for this doctrine to be held by all. d) Historically it is not well established, as all confess, what the errors of Olivi were; but it seems very well established that the definition of the Church is not restricted to the condemnation of these errors alone. For since the Council expressly says that it defines the soul to be per se and essentially the form of the body "so that the sincere truth of faith may be known to all and the entrance to all errors be closed off lest they creep in," it is clear that the errors of Olivi were the occasion of the definition, or that their condemnation was a partial purpose of the council; but that the whole purpose of the definition is openly comprehended in this: "that the entrance to all errors be closed off, lest they creep in."

II. When the Council of Vienne, whose decree later definitions of the Church confirmed, teaches that the soul is truly, per se, essentially the form of the body, that word form must be taken in a proper and determinate sense. For a) the Council says that the soul is truly form; but when the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 22, condemns those who say that "the justified man does not truly merit an increase of grace," all theologians gather from that truly that it is treating of merit properly so called, or merit de condigno. Therefore, by parity, when the Council of Vienne says that the soul is truly the form of the body, that word form must be taken in its proper sense. b) The purpose of the definition, which the Council itself expressed, was "so that the sincere truth of faith may be known to all and the entrance to all errors be closed off, lest they creep in"; but the Council could not have attained this purpose unless it had used that word form in a determinate sense. Therefore. c) Hence a Porrecta rightly says [appendix on article 1 of q. 76, I]: "Understand Clement to speak formally; for if the words of philosophers must be taken formally, much more certainly is each one bound to understand the dogmas of sacred Councils formally, and this is to be held as a universal rule. But this is all the truer in the present matter, insofar as we see the Pope speaking more explicitly: and truly, he says, and perfectly and per se and essentially the rational or intellective soul is the form of the human body. Who except a heretic would say that by so many and such weighty words formal speech is not implied here?"

III. Therefore one must see what, at the time of the aforesaid definition, was understood in the Catholic schools by the name form; for if there are some things which they commonly taught, those at least must be wholly retained as declared by the Council.

Now form generally was divided against matter; and since matter was called potency, form was called act, St. Thomas, opusculum 21. It was called act, however, because it constitutes the thing and determines it to a certain mode of being. They commonly distinguished form into subsisting and informing. A subsisting form is one which subsists per se, without being in some subject: thus angels are called subsisting forms; forms indeed, because they are determined to a certain mode of being; subsisting, however, because they are not received in any matter. But an informing form is one which is received in some subject.

The human soul is certainly an informing form. For a) the Council of Vienne in the same decree, speaking of the truth and integrity of the human nature in Christ, says that he has an informing soul. b) The soul is called not only form, but form of the body, from which the body receives life, etc. c) Hence Suarez rightly notes, On the Soul, book 1, c. 1, n. 12: "It is indubitable among Christian philosophers that every soul vivifying a corruptible body is a true informing form. We shall show below that this is of faith concerning the rational soul, and it will also be proved by reason."

IV. But form properly so called, or informing form, was commonly divided into accidental and substantial. A substantial form is one which gives being simply, that is, first being, which supposes no other; but an accidental form is one which supervenes upon a thing already constituted in its substantial being and gives it some being in a qualified respect, for example, speed to a horse. Is the human soul the substantial or accidental form of the body?

In order to satisfy this question, there must be handed down, 1. a more fully unfolded account of substantial form according to those things which were commonly admitted in the Catholic schools at the time of the Council of Vienne; and 2. certain words of the same Council must be weighed.

As to the first, substantial form is defined by Suarez (Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 15, sect. 5, n. 1, and all agree with him as to the matter): "a simple and incomplete substance, which as act constitutes the essence of a corporeal substance." It is called substance, that is, real, and consequently accidents and substantial modes are rejected. Simple is added in order to exclude composite substances. Incomplete, in order to exclude complete substances, for example, angels. As act, in order to distinguish form from matter, which constitutes the substantial composite in the mode of potency. Perhaps that word incomplete is not yet sufficiently clear. Suarez explains it, however, both in Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 33, sect. 1, n. 15, and in On the Soul, book 1, c. 12, n. 17. In this latter place he says: "For a twofold spiritual substance must be distinguished. One is altogether complete and absolute in its proper essence and in the manner of subsisting; and this cannot be the form of a body, nor be united with another substance for composing one complete substantial essence, because what is complete in the genus of substance cannot be further completed. But another can be a spiritual substance incomplete in the genus of substance and not altogether absolute transcendentally, but including in its essence a transcendental relation to body; because no repugnance can be conceived in this, and such a spiritual act can be the true form of a body." See also St. Thomas, I, q. 75, a. 7, corpus and ad 3.

From this definition of substantial form it follows that, according to all, three things especially belong to the nature of substantial form. 1. Just as it belongs to any form whatever to be a principle communicative of being, so it is proper to substantial form to be a principle communicative of substantial being. "For in order," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 68, "that something be the substantial form of another, two things are required. One of these is that the form be the principle of being substantially for that of which it is the form; but I call it a principle not effective but formal, by which something is and is denominated a being. Hence the other follows, namely that form and matter come together in one being; this does not happen with the effective principle and that to which it gives being. And this being is that in which the composite substance subsists, which is one according to being, consisting of matter and form." The holy Doctor repeats this very often. Scotus also, 4 Sentences, dist. 11, q. 3, confesses that substantial form gives being simply; and adds: "There is no cause why this one gives being simply and that one in a qualified respect, except because this one is a substantial form and that one accidental."

2. Since being and one are convertible, that which is the principle of being is also the principle of unity; and if it is substantial form, the principle of substantial being, per se, simply, it will also make one simply, per se. "From the same thing," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 58, "something has being and unity. For one follows upon being. Therefore, since each thing has being from form, it will also have unity from form. If, therefore, several souls are posited in man as diverse forms, man will not be one being, but several; nor will the order of forms suffice for the unity of man, because to be one according to order is not to be one simply, since unity of order is the least of unities." And chapter 69: "For body and soul are not two substances existing in act, but from these two there comes to be one substance existing in act."

But if someone asks what one per se signifies here, St. Thomas explains it very well, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 56, saying: "One simply is said in three ways: either as the indivisible, or as the continuous, or as that which is one in account. But from an intellectual substance and a body there cannot come to be one thing which is indivisible. For that must be composed from two. Nor again can there be one thing which is continuous, because the parts of a continuum are quantified. Therefore it remains to be inquired whether from an intellectual substance and a body there can come to be one thing as that which is one in account. But from two things remaining, nothing one in account comes to be except as from substantial form and matter. For from substance and accident there does not come to be one in account; for the account of man and of white is not the same."

3. Since substance is really the same as nature, and nature signifies the first principle of operation, that which is the principle of substantial being is also the principle of operation. Hence St. Thomas, I, q. 76, says: "That by which something first operates is its form. ... But it is manifest that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. For the soul is the first thing by which we are nourished and sense and are moved according to place, and likewise the first thing by which we understand. Therefore this principle by which we first understand, whether it is called intellect or intellective soul, is the form of the body."

As to the second, however, it must be briefly noted, 1. that the soul is called by the Church the form of the body per se. This can signify: a) that the soul is the form of the body not per accidens but by its nature; and this sense is certainly true, for in this our soul, a spiritual substance and informing form, is distinguished from an angelic substance; b) that the soul is the form of the body per se insofar as it does not necessarily always actually inform the body, but demands to inform the body; and this sense is also true, since the soul separated from the body does not cease to be form, although it does not actually inform; c) that the soul is form per se, namely through its own essence and not through another; and this sense is also true and is contained in the following words of the Council.

2. The soul is called the form of the body essentially. This can signify two things: either that it is essential to the soul that it be form, as we said; or that it informs through its very essence and not through something else.

3. The soul is called the immediate form of the body. This signifies that it informs the body not by means of another soul, not by means of some power of its own, not by means of some action of its own, but immediately, that is, through itself, through its substance. Hence the Council of Vienne said that the substance of the rational soul is the form of the body. "The soul," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 71, "is immediately united to the body; nor is it necessary to posit some medium as uniting the soul to the body: either phantasms, as Averroes says, or the powers of the soul, as some say, or even corporeal spirit, as others said. For it has been shown that the soul is united to the body as its form; but form is united to matter without any medium; for it belongs to form per se to be the act of the body, and not through something else." And in the Questions on the Soul, a. 9, corpus: "Among all things, being is that which belongs to things most immediately and intimately ... hence, since matter has actual being through form, it is necessary that the form giving being to matter inhere in it more immediately than the others. But it is proper to substantial form that it give matter being simply. ... Therefore, if there is some form which does not give matter being simply, but comes to matter already existing in act through some form, it will not be a substantial form. ... Only the first form, which would make substance exist in act, would be substantial; but all the others accidental." Cf. the whole article. See also I, q. 76, a. 7.

Now, from these things the proposed question can easily be answered; and we say that the human soul is the substantial form of the body and not an accidental form. For a) a form which is a substance and is united through itself cannot communicate anything except substantial being; but the human soul is a substance and is united through itself to the body; therefore it communicates substantial being. But the principle communicative of substantial being is called substantial form; therefore the human soul is substantial form. b) That the soul is substantial form is conceded even by Scotus in express words, as we have seen; whether afterwards he is consistent with himself will be seen below; but here we can assume as the common opinion in the Catholic schools that the soul is substantial form, and this suffices for the present matter.

V. From the things said we can gather that, according to the doctrine of the Church, the soul is the true form of the body, an informing form, a principle communicative of being, communicative of substantial being and therefore making one per se together with the body, and finally the first principle of operation in man.

Now it is asked what being the soul communicates to the body. And it is certain, 1. that "although the soul," as St. Thomas says in the disputed questions, Question on the Soul, a. 10, ad 2, "is the form of the body according to the essence of the intellectual soul, nevertheless not according to intellectual operation." For the soul communicates to matter the being of which matter is capable; but matter is not capable of the grade of intellective being. Hence, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 69, St. Thomas teaches: "Although there is one being of form and matter, nevertheless it is not necessary that matter always equal the being of the form; indeed, the nobler the form is, the more it exceeds matter in its being." Cf. the whole chapter, and the disputed questions, question On the Soul, a. 10.

2. It is certain that the human soul communicates to the body sensitive life and every life which is in it. This is clear a) from the fact that the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX expressly says in the aforesaid letter that the rational soul is the one principle of life in man, "from which the body also receives motion and all life and sense"; b) from the things said in the preceding article concerning the unity of the soul in man.

3. Although the Supreme Pontiff does not define that there is in man, besides sensitive life, another life, namely vegetative life, nevertheless it is altogether conformable to the aforesaid words of the Supreme Pontiff to admit this too. For if, besides sense, there were no other life in man, the meaning of those words "motion and all life" would not appear. Moreover, whatever some more recent authors may say, it is well proved by philosophers that vegetative life must be admitted. It will be enough for us to report what Suarez has in On the Soul, book 1, c. 4, n. 11: "Both in theology it is certain," he says, "and in philosophy it is evident, that plants live and that the vegetative form is a true soul. And for this reason all philosophers and theologians agree in asserting this truth. And first it has a foundation in Scripture, for Paul says in 1 Cor. 15: What thou sowest is not quickened unless it first die. There he calls the production of a plant a vivification; therefore what is produced in this way lives, certainly by vegetative life. As Augustine weighed it in book 1 of City of God, c. 20, saying: 'This kind of things, that is, of plants, although it does not sense, lives, and on this account can die and be killed'; and he adds that passage of Psalm 77: 'and he killed their vines with hail.' Hence Dionysius, c. 6 of On the Divine Names, near the beginning, as though responding to the third reason made by us, says: 'from it, that is, the life of God, all living things and plants have received to live according to the lowest harmony of life.' And again at the end, 'from it,' he says, 'are vivified and cherished both living beings and all trees; and whether you call it spiritual, or rational, or sensitive, or nutritive, or vegetative, it lives from it, etc.' Hence Augustine, book On True Religion, c. 55: 'Let not that life be your religion,' he says, 'by which trees are said to live, since there is no sense in it.' And he hands down the division of three souls in book 8 of City of God, c. 8. The same is in Aristotle in the cited place, and more certainly in book 2 of On the Soul, chapters 1 and 2, and often in other places which we shall note below. And St. Thomas, I, q. 18, a. 1 and 2, to omit other philosophers and theologians, who followed them without contradiction."

4. Consequently it is certain that the human soul is the principle of every vital operation whatsoever in man. Indeed, it seems more consonant with the previously cited words of the Supreme Pontiff to say that the soul is the principle of every operation, even non-vital, in the body. For although some wish to explain the phrase "from which the body receives motion ..." as concerning progressive life, or spontaneous motion, which is a more perfect grade within the limits of sensitive life, nevertheless it seems better to explain it of non-vital motion; for in this way the gradation is preserved in the words of the Supreme Pontiff, saying, "from which the body also receives motion (non-vital), and all life (vegetative), and sense (sensitive life)." But all Catholics agree in asserting that the rational soul is the one principle of every kind of life and of vital operation in man; whether the same soul is also the principle of motion, or of non-vital operation, in the body depends upon the following question.

199. The Catholic doctrine according to which the soul is the form of the body insofar as it gives to it the being of a living thing seemed so intimately connected to St. Thomas with the doctrine according to which the soul is the form of the body insofar as it gives to it the very being of a body, that he proved both by the same arguments, proved one for the other indiscriminately, and defended that the soul is not the true and substantial form of the body unless it also communicates to it the being of body. Hence he constantly taught that by the rational soul our body is constituted not only in the being of a living thing, but also in the being of body. Thus, for example, in On Spiritual Creatures, a. 3, he says: "Therefore we say that in this man there is no other substantial form than the soul, and that through it he is not only man, but animal, and living, and body, and being." And in On the Soul, a. 9: "Since the soul is substantial form, because it constitutes man in a determinate species of substance, there is no other substantial form mediating between the soul and first matter; but man is perfected by that same rational soul according to diverse grades of perfections, so that he is body, animated body, and rational animal." Thus also, to omit the rest in a manifest matter, he teaches in his last work, I, q. 76, a. 5.

200. Scotus and some more recent authors rose up against this doctrine, although by a different reasoning. Scotus, besides the rational soul, posited in man a form which he calls the form of corporeity, whose office is to constitute the organic body independently of the soul, yet ordered to it as its proper subject, which becomes living through it. Hence, according to St. Thomas, the subject immediately informed by the soul is first matter, receiving from it the very being of body; but according to Scotus, the subject immediately informed by the soul is the organic body, receiving from it the being of a living thing.

Nevertheless Scotus admitted the scholastic system of matter and form, the common notion of form received by all, the common notion, as we have seen, of substantial form, and the common notion concerning being simply and being in a qualified respect. Hence in 4 Sentences, dist. 11, q. 3, he says: "just as substance is being simply and accident is being in a qualified respect, so being simply is to be substance, and being in a qualified respect is to be according to accident."

But in order, with these notions received by all having been posited, to reconcile his form of corporeity with the doctrine concerning the soul as the substantial form of the body, he judged that the body with that form of corporeity remains indeterminate as to genus, as to species, and as to individual. "Through that form," he says in the cited place, "it is in partial act, and is the proximate receptive subject of the intellective soul, although through it it is not in the genus of body, as body is a genus." And: "Through this it is not an individual nor a species in the genus of body nor in the genus of substance." Therefore, since the body, notwithstanding the form of corporeity, would thus remain indeterminate, even in the genus of substance (a thing indeed difficult to understand), the soul informing it, and thus determining it, would be its substantial form.

201. Certain more recent authors, however, proceed by another reasoning. For, denying the scholastic system of matter and form, they state: 1. that the human body consists of atoms of elementary substances composed in some definite way and remaining in act; 2. that the human body, considered under the aspect of body alone, is a complete substance, indeed an aggregate of substances; 3. that the human body is a body not through some form, but by the force of cohesion by which atoms are joined, and that such a body is effected through mechanical and chemical forces operating under the conditions of the organism and under the influence of the soul; 4. that the subject which the soul informs is not first matter, but an organic body, or rather the nervous system and especially the nervous fluid; 5. that for the body to be informed by the soul signifies nothing other than that the soul pervades the body and associates and commingles its own power with the proper power of the body; 6. and finally, that the soul is the substantial form of the composite, or man, but not of the part, or body, to which it communicates only accidental being.

202. Before we disclose what seems to us must be held in this matter, we shall make a few preliminary notes for the sake of clarity. And 1. some contend that this question is merely philosophical and in no way theological. But this is false. For a truth must be judged theological not only when it is formally revealed and to be believed with divine faith, but also when it has such a connection with revealed truths that these cannot be defended without it. See Franzelin, On Tradition and Scripture, p. 111 ff. Now a) we do not say that it is defined as of faith that the soul gives the very being of body; although the fact that this is not of faith is by no means proved by the fact that not a few Doctors before the Council of Vienne denied it. Many among Catholics, distinguished in knowledge and dignity, taught the errors of Gallicanism and Liberalism; from this it does not follow that these errors are not now condemned by the Church.

b) Nevertheless it is certain that the present question has at least a connection with truths of faith. For since it has been defined that the soul is the form of the body per se, essentially, truly, immediately, whatever pertains to the understanding and definition of this truth has a connection with the truth of faith, and is theological at least in this sense. Besides, those who attack the opinion of St. Thomas use theological arguments drawn from the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Eucharist, as we shall see. Therefore either the truth about which there is question here has a connection with those mysteries, and then it is a theological truth; or it has no connection with them, and cannot be attacked from them.

c) It is the office of a Catholic theologian not only to defend what cannot be asserted without the note of heresy, error, rashness, etc., but also whatever seems more conformable to the mind and definitions of the Church; for greater conformity with the mind of the Church is of more weight for us than any argument derived by our own ingenuity either from principles of reason or from the sources of revelation. Hence all theologians institute similar questions, as, for example, when there is question of contrition and attrition, or of the reward immediately following works weaker than preexisting habits, etc. In all these matters greater conformity with the definitions of the Council of Trent is sought, although no note is branded upon contrary opinions.

203. It must be noted, 2. that we scarcely understand why the opinion of St. Thomas in this matter is continually passed off as the opinion of Thomists. It is true that, since it is the open doctrine of the holy Doctor, it is asserted by all the theologians of that school; but it is not, as it were, proper to that school in the way, for example, that the opinion concerning physical predetermination is. Indeed, with the adversaries admitting it, after the Council of Vienne the opinion of St. Thomas became very common in the Catholic schools; and Suarez, de Lugo, Toletus, Vasquez, Valencia, the Conimbricenses, Hurtado, Arriaga, Tellez, Oviedo, Soares, Lossada, etc., all the principal theologians and philosophers of our Society, teach it.

204. It must be noted, 3. that, lest we go on at length, we at the same time assert the opinion of St. Thomas and attack both contrary opinions, bringing forward arguments, some of which strike more directly at Scotus's opinion, others at the more recent opinion. Nevertheless we brand neither of these opposed opinions with any note. For although we do not understand how, especially with the more recent opinion, the truth that the human soul is a true and substantial form can stand (a truth which, from the things said, is altogether to be held), nevertheless, since certain Catholic authors defend that opinion while the Church is silent, we are silent. In almost the same way, although we do not understand how human liberty can stand safe with physical predetermination, we do not condemn it, but leave it to its authors.

205. With these things having been set down.

206. Proof I. It belongs to the nature of substantial form that it be a principle communicative of substantial being; but neither in the opinion of Scotus nor in the opinion of the more recent authors would the human soul be a principle communicative of substantial being. Therefore.

The major is clear from the things said in the preceding section. But before the minor is proved, we make three preliminary notes so that the force of the argument may become known.

1. The sense in which the human soul is the form of the body must be taken at least from those things which, at the time of the Council of Vienne, were commonly handed down concerning this matter in the Catholic schools. For it cannot be said that the Council issued a definition which would be understood in the Church only after five or six centuries. This is all the more so because, if the word form were not used in the sense determined at that time, the Council could not have attained its end, "that the entrance to all errors be closed off, lest they creep in."

2. Although form is said to be and is the cause of the composite, this nevertheless does not exclude, indeed it necessarily includes, that it be the cause of the subject which it informs. Hence, since the intellective soul is our form, it must be the formal cause not only of man, but also of the subject, whether matter or body, which it informs. In reality, if the human soul is the form of the body at least with respect to the being of a living thing, which must be admitted by all, this is not only because it makes man living, but also because it makes the body itself living. Hence a) in the definitions cited above the body is said to receive life, motion, and sense from the soul; b) the soul is defined by the Fathers and commonly by the Doctors (n. 188) as a substance conferring life upon the body through itself; c) Gennadius (On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, c. 15) teaches that "there is one and the same soul in man, which also vivifies the body by its association"; d) the body itself is called vivified. Indeed, if at times by certain Fathers the flesh in Christ is said to be deified, the Fathers and theologians themselves note the distinction: the flesh of Christ is called deified only because it is the flesh of the Word; our body is called vivified in the proper sense, namely insofar as the soul pours life into it; e) hence not only man, but even the body itself, is said to live, grow, be nourished, and sense; and consequently the body itself is said to die: "it is not the soul," says St. Athanasius (oration against idols), "which dies, but the body dies because of its departure"; f) hence, in the opinion of all, the subject which is informed is supposed to be in potency to something which it receives from the form, and from which it is consequently said to become in act according to that thing. Therefore, in the mode in which our soul is form, it must cause something not only in the composite, but in the subject itself which it immediately informs, or it must communicate some being to it.

3. The soul is called substantial form not only because it makes the substantial composite, but also because it communicates to the subject which it informs substantial being, and not accidental being. For a) the soul is not united to the body through some accident, but through its essence, through itself; the very substance of the soul is united to the body as form, as is clear from the things said in the preceding section. Therefore, if it communicates being to the subject which it informs, it can communicate nothing except its own being, which is substantial. b) And this was the common sense in the Catholic schools at the time of the Council of Vienne. Concerning St. Thomas there is no doubt; but Scotus, as we have seen, said that the body with the form of corporeity remains indeterminate and incomplete even in the genus of substance, precisely so that he could then assert that it receives substantial being from the soul. With these things posited, the force of the proposed argument is easy.

Proof of the minor against Scotus. Substantial being is first being; for "it is impossible," says St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, "that there be something intermediate between substance and accident"; but accident supposes a substance in which it inheres. But if there were in the human body a form of corporeity, the intellective soul, coming to it, would not give it first being; for the body would have this from the preceding form. Therefore, if that form of corporeity were given in man, the intellective soul would not give substantial being to the body, and consequently would not be substantial form. "For the evidence of this," says St. Thomas in the place last cited, in the body, "it must be considered that substantial form differs from accidental form in this: that accidental form does not give being simply, but being of such a kind; as heat makes its subject not simply to be, but to be hot. And therefore, when accidental form comes, something is not said to come to be or to be generated simply, but to become such, or to have itself in some way; and likewise when accidental form departs, something is not said to be corrupted simply, but in a qualified respect. But substantial form gives being simply; and therefore by its coming something is said to be generated simply, and by its departure to be corrupted simply. And on account of this the ancient natural philosophers, who posited that first matter is some being in act, for example fire or air or something of this sort, said that nothing is generated or corrupted simply, but held that every coming-to-be is alteration, as is said in Physics I, text 33. If therefore it were the case that besides the intellective soul some other substantial form preexisted in matter, through which the subject of the soul were a being in act, it would follow that the soul would not give being simply, and consequently that it would not be substantial form, and that by the coming of the soul there would not be generation simply, nor by its departure corruption simply, but only in a qualified respect; and these things are manifestly false."

Nor does it help to say that, according to Scotus, the body with the form of corporeity alone remains incomplete as to species, as to individual, in the genus of substance. For a) Scotus admitted the theory of substantial composition from matter and form; but according to this theory from matter and form there is had a complete being. b) According to Scotus, the body with the form of corporeity alone exists, subsists, and is distinguished from every other thing; indeed, after separation from the intellective soul, the body would remain with the form of corporeity alone, which Scotus admitted precisely to avoid the production of a new form in death. But that which exists, subsists, is distinguished from every other thing, and operates, is certainly complete in the account of substance. Therefore.

Proof of the minor against the opinion of the more recent authors. a) "Whatever," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 58, "comes to a thing after the first substantial form will come accidentally"; or, whatever comes to a thing already complete in the account of substance is an accident. But in the more recent opinion, the body is already complete in the account of substance when the intellective soul comes to it. Therefore the soul could communicate to it only accidental being. b) Moreover the authors of this opinion themselves expressly confess that the soul is the essential principle of the composite, or man, but not of the body which it informs. c) Nor does it help to say that the body independently of the intellective soul is complete in the account of body, but not in the account of human body. For either that human being is really the same as bodily being, or it is really distinguished from it. If the first, then the soul, in giving human being, by this very fact gives bodily being; but if the other, since human being comes to bodily being, the soul no longer communicates substantial being to the body, which is first being. "The substantial being of any thing," says St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, "consists in an indivisible; and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers. Hence it is impossible that any substantial form receive more and less." d) If the soul did not communicate substantial being, or first being, to the body, then in the opinion of the more recent authors it would communicate no being to it, and consequently in no way would be its form. In reality they themselves deny that an accident has any real entity really distinct from the substance in which it inheres; but between accident and substance no middle is given. Therefore if the soul did not communicate substantial being to the body, it would communicate no real being.

Proof II. The adversaries concede, and it must be conceded from the definitions of the Church, that the soul communicates to the body the being of a living thing; but it cannot communicate to it the being of a living thing without communicating the very first being, and consequently the very being of body. Therefore.

Explanation and proof of the minor. We suppose from the things demonstrated above not only that man lives, but that the body itself in man is given life. Now, what is life? "Life," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1, "is said in two ways: in one way, the very being of a living thing ... in another way, the very operation of a living thing, according to which the principle of life is reduced to act." And I, q. 18, a. 1: "The proper account of life is from this, that something is naturally apt to move itself ... For we say that those things are without life which can be moved only by an exterior principle." If therefore the body lives, it must be said that to live is its very being, and that the body moves itself. But what does it signify that living is the very being of the body and that the body moves itself? When man is said to live, by the confession of the adversaries themselves, this signifies that the soul, the principle of life, is intrinsically united to man; and it is said to be intrinsically united to him because it is part of the essence of man. Therefore if the body truly lives, and if thus living is its being, this signifies that the principle of life, the soul, is intrinsically united to it and pertains to its essence. Therefore if the body receives life from the soul, it is constituted by it in its essence. Essence is what is first conceived in a being; therefore the body receives first being from the soul. But if it had bodily being independently of the soul, by this very fact it would not receive first being from it. Therefore if the soul did not communicate bodily being to the body, neither would it truly communicate to it the being of a living thing.

Confirmation. All, even the adversaries themselves, confess that the soul is united to the body immediately and intrinsically. But if to be united immediately and intrinsically does not signify that the soul constitutes the body in its being, we ask what it can signify. Does it mean a) that the soul is intimately present to the body? But God also is intimately present to it; an angel too can become intimately present to it; and yet God is not said, nor would an angel be said, to vivify the body in the way that is said of the soul. Does it mean b) that the soul moves the body? But if the body is moved by the soul without the soul pertaining to its being, then the body does not move itself, and so will not be truly living; now the soul will not be form, but mover of the body, as Plato wished. See St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 57. Does it mean c) that the soul produces in the body some mode which is the life of the body? But then that mode, and not the soul, will be intrinsic to the body; through that mode, and not through the soul formally and immediately, the body will live; accidental life and not substantial life will belong to the body; and consequently the soul will not be its substantial form. Indeed it would in no way be a true form, since that mode, they say, is not really distinguished from the subject; and the soul, they add, is not the formal cause of the reality of the subject, or body. Therefore the soul would communicate nothing real to the body. And these things we say while passing over in silence what is arbitrary and unheard-of in this explanation of the life of the body through some mode inhering in it, of which the soul is said to be the reason.

Proof III, more directly against the more recent opinion. The information of the body by the intellective soul, or the account of informing form, according to the more recent authors, is constituted in this: that the soul pervades the body already complete in the being of body and mingles its powers with the powers of the body. But the account of informing form cannot be constituted in this. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. a) The account of informing form cannot be constituted in that which was handed down in no Catholic school at the time when it was defined that the soul is truly, per se, and essentially the form of the body. But neither in the school of St. Thomas nor in the school of Scotus, as we have seen, was the account of information constituted in that in which the more recent authors constitute it. b) What does pervade signify? That the soul is present to the body, so that there is no atom to which the soul is not present? That the soul either touches or moves the body? But these things have already been exploded in the preceding argument; and besides, they do not make it so that from soul and body there results one substance. c) What does it signify to mingle and associate powers? First, if soul and body are united through the mixture of powers, the soul would inform the body not immediately through its essence, but by means of its powers; the very substance of the soul would not be the immediate form of the body. Next, the body would also seem to be the form of the soul, since the body too would mingle its powers with the powers of the soul. d) Moreover, while the powers of soul and body are mingled in the union, do they remain the same, or do new powers arise from their mixture? If new powers arise, diverse from the powers of the components, it must be admitted that from the union of soul and body there arises a new being; for operation follows being. Is this new being accidental or substantial? If accidental, soul and body in man do not make one substance. If substantial, how does it arise? For powers suppose being, they do not constitute the being from which they proceed. But if the powers of soul and body remain the same in the mixture, from the union of soul and body no new being comes to be, for operation follows being.

e) To explain the matter, some have recourse to chemical combinations, as they themselves understand them. They say, for example, that the properties of gold chloride differ from the properties of chlorine and gold; and thus that the powers and properties of man differ from the proper powers and properties both of the body and of the soul. But again, if the properties differ, insofar as they differ accidentally or substantially, a being accidentally or substantially diverse must be acknowledged. If accidentally diverse, from the union of soul and body no new substance arises. But if substantially diverse, how does it happen, on their opinion, that the component substances remain in the mixture according to their proper being? Here let the argument be recalled by which theologians commonly, after St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 1, show that the union of the Word was not made in nature. We abstain from that argument, because it is to be expounded in another school this same year.

Someone says: from the union of the soul with the body there comes to be a new nature, or a new intrinsic principle of operation, but not a new substance. But what must be judged concerning this strange invention is clear both from the things which we said (n. 194, consequence 3), and from the principle often repeated and admitted by all: "operation follows being."

Proof IV, more directly against Scotus. It is a principle which Scotus frequently uses: "entities are not to be multiplied without necessity." Hence: the form of corporeity ought not to be admitted if there is no necessity for admitting it; but there is no necessity of this kind. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. There is no necessity of admitting the form of corporeity if 1. the intellective soul can provide what that form would provide, and 2. there is no reason why it should not provide it. But so it is. Therefore.

Proof of this minor. As to the second part, from the solution of the objections; but as to the first: the intellective soul can provide in man what the sensitive soul provides in brutes and the vegetative soul in plants, since in man there is one soul, and it is intellective, from which the body receives sense and all life. Therefore it will be able to provide also what form provides in inorganic bodies. "The more perfect form," says St. Thomas, disputed questions, fourth On the Soul, a. 11, "does through one thing all that lower forms do through diverse things, and still more; for example, if the form of an inanimate body gives to matter being and being a body, the form of a plant will give it both this and, in addition, to live. But the sensitive soul gives both this and, in addition, to be sensible. For thus the forms of natural things are found to differ according to the perfect and the more perfect, as is clear to one considering. On account of this, species are compared to numbers, whose species are varied by the addition and subtraction of unity."

207. From the things which we have touched upon concerning the opinion of Scotus and of the more recent authors, it is easily clear that Scotus, admitting the general theory of substantial composition from matter and form, retains the true and common notion of substantial form; but while he admits in man a form of corporeity distinct from the soul, he is hardly consistent with himself. On the contrary, the more recent authors, rejecting that theory, do not retain the true notion of substantial form. Therefore, while they explain in their own way the union of the soul with the body, they are consistent with their principles; but how the truth remains safe that the soul is truly, per se, essentially, and immediately the form of the body, we certainly do not understand.

For the question is not whether the soul is the form of the body; all teach this, and all confess that it has at least indirectly been defined. The question is concerning the sense in which the soul must be called form. The more recent authors indeed adhere to a certain new signification; but we, weighing the words of the Church truly, per se, essentially, immediately, understand that word form in the sense commonly received at the time of the definition. We judge that one must adhere to this sense still more strictly, if possible, because St. Thomas had already used the same words beforehand; for example, in the single question On the Soul, a. 9, ad 12, he said that the soul is the form of the body according to the essence of the intellectual soul, and in the same place, ad 18, that it is "united per se and immediately."

208. It is not our intention to report and solve all the difficulties which are usually made against the doctrine established; we shall bring forward the principal ones, which in the judgment of the adversaries seem to have greater force. We shall respond to them briefly, because some are more fully unraveled in other treatises of Theology, and others we suppose to have been solved from philosophy.

Objection I. If, besides the soul, there were not in the human body a form of corporeity, the body of Christ, separated from the soul in the three days of death, would not have remained the same body; but this cannot be said; therefore. This is one of the principal reasons of Scotus, as he himself confesses.

Reply 1. Suarez, who is not a Thomist, when this difficulty was proposed to him, says in III, disp. 38, sect. 3, n. 3: "But this opinion concerning the form of corporeity supposes two false philosophical principles. One is that the form of corporeity is really distinct from the soul. The other is that the substantial individual of the body can remain, yet constituted in no species of body. There is no place here for disputing about these things; let it be enough to say that true theological doctrine cannot depend upon these false principles, as we shall immediately explain."

Reply 2. What wonder is it if, in the three days of death, Christ was not properly man, III, q. 50, a. 4? Hence St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 5, ad 2, says: "Because something is said to be numerically the same according to supposit, but specifically the same according to form, wherever the supposit subsists in one nature alone, it is necessary that when unity of species is removed, numerical unity be removed. But the hypostasis of the Word of God subsists in two natures; and therefore, although in Christ the same body does not remain according to the species of human nature, nevertheless it remains numerically the same according to the supposit of the Word of God."

Instance. If it were so, the body of Christ would have been subject to corruption, for a substantial change would have been made in it; but this cannot be said. Therefore.

Reply. From Damascene apud St. Thomas in the cited place: "The name corruption signifies two things: in one way, the separation of soul from body, and other things of this kind; in another way, perfect dissolution into the elements. Therefore, to say that the body of the Lord was incorruptible before the resurrection according to the first mode of corruption, according to Julian and Gaianus, is impious: both because the body of Christ would not be consubstantial with us, and because he would not truly have died, nor would we have been saved according to truth. But according to the second mode the body of Christ was incorrupt."

Instance. If it were so, a cadaveric form would have to be admitted in the body of Christ in the three days of death; but this cannot be said.

Reply 1. It is not absolutely necessary to admit a cadaveric form in the body of Christ; for some explain otherwise how the body of Christ after death remained a true body. See Toletus in the cited place of St. Thomas. Reply 2. There is no inconvenience in admitting that cadaveric form.

Instance. But it is inconvenient. For there is the axiom, "what the Word once assumed, he never dismissed"; but he would have assumed that cadaveric form, which nevertheless he certainly would have dismissed in the resurrection. Therefore.

Reply 1. That axiom is commonly cited from Damascene, but it is found only in his Scholiast. Therefore its whole force comes from the authority of the theologians who use it by common consent; and consequently it cannot be extended beyond that to which that common consent is extended. But notwithstanding this principle, which they admit, very many Doctors, as we have seen, reject that form of corporeity. Therefore. Reply 2. Toletus notes in the cited place, according to the opinion of those who admit a cadaveric form: "Understand that such a form is not united to the Word, but only the matter; but that it came to the united matter, just as heat came to Christ; nevertheless it was not united immediately." Reply 3. That axiom must be understood of the nature assumed, and of the parts which pertain to its truth and integrity. But what wonder is it if Christ, made like us in all things apart from sin, dismissed the cadaveric form in his resurrection, since men also do not retain it in the resurrection? See in the cited chapter of St. Thomas, and in III, q. 5, a. 2.

Objection II. The Council of Trent teaches (session 13, c. 3) that after consecration the true body and Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ are under the species of bread and wine together with his soul and Divinity; yet in such a way that by force of the words the body is under the species of bread, and the blood under the species of wine; but the body itself under the species of wine, and the blood under the species of bread, and the soul under both, by force of that natural connection and concomitance by which the parts of Christ the Lord are joined among themselves. But if the soul gave to the body the very being of body, it would be under the species of bread not by force of concomitance but by force of the words, since it would be an essential part of the body itself. Therefore.

Reply 1. Cardinal de Lugo, who is not a Thomist, had already proposed this difficulty to himself in the treatise On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, disp. 8, sect. 4; and after reporting the opinion of those who responded to it by admitting the body as already constituted in the being of body independently of the soul, he says in n. 62: "Yet this opinion supposes a thing less true in philosophy, namely that in man there is at the same time another substantial form of corporeity with the rational soul in the same matter; which I attacked in I Physics, disp. 3, and it is briefly rejected because, etc."

Reply 2. The same most eminent author wisely observes in n. 78: "From the common mode of speaking ... body does not signify the whole composite, but the part of it distinct from the soul. For although among philosophers body is sometimes taken for the whole substantial composite and is predicated directly of man, nevertheless in the common mode of speaking body is scarcely taken in this signification, but for one part of the human composite, as it is distinguished from the soul; and therefore we say that man has a body, consists of body and soul; that the Word assumed humanity consisting of body and soul; and in the same sense it is said in the Athanasian Creed that the rational soul and flesh is one man. Finally in this sense the Tridentine Council speaks where above concerning the body of Christ, which is placed in the Eucharist by force of the words, as concerning a part distinguished from the soul; for it says that the body is placed together with the soul, and the body is placed by force of the words, but the soul through the concomitance of the parts among themselves: by these things it sufficiently indicates that it speaks of body and soul as they are two parts of man really distinguished among themselves."

Reply 3. Therefore, in order that it may become known what comes under the name body, which by force of the words is placed under the species of bread, one must see what was understood by the name body; and in the cited section diverse probable opinions are reported, all of which are founded upon the doctrine, very common at the time of the Council of Trent, according to the very confession of the adversaries, that the soul gives to the body the very being of body. See also Liberatore, Del Composto Umano, c. 10, art. 2.

Objection III. If the soul gave to the body the very being of body, it would have to be called an essential part of it; but this is absurd. Therefore.

Reply: deny the minor. For a) since the soul, with all confessing it, gives to the body the being of a living thing, and since life, from the things said, is the very being of a living thing, or pertains to its essence, the soul is already part of the essence of the living body. But in a living body there are not two essences, one of body, the other of living thing, but one and the same thing is at once a living body. Therefore the soul is part of the essence of the body. b) Certainly the repugnance that the soul be part of the essence of the body is not shown from the soul's simplicity, unless it is shown that some simple element cannot be an element of a body; nor from the spirituality of the human soul, unless it is shown that the soul, by the very fact that it becomes an essential part of the body as its form, loses its operations of intellective life and its being independent of matter. c) Certainly those who so easily say, against the minor, "this is absurd," bring forward no proof. See Liberatore, Del Comp. Um., c. 10, art. 4.

Objection IV. In a corpse the same accidents remain; therefore the body remains the same in species; but in it the soul does not remain; therefore another form remains, the form of corporeity.

Reply: deny the first consequence. For those accidents belong to the body by reason of matter and extension; therefore it is enough that these remain the same for the same accidents to remain. In reality, there is never lacking a subject in which those accidents inhere, nor, if you please, a first root from which they spring. For on the one hand, information, as Scotus himself confesses, is instantaneous, and consequently at the same time the soul departs from the body and another form is united to it; but on the other hand, why can the new form induced not be the root of those accidents which previously depended upon the soul according to the requirement of the subject?

Instance. If it were so, a new form would have to be admitted in the corpse; but this seems repugnant, because no cause appears which could produce it. If someone, for example, is pierced by an arrow and dies, is the arrow the cause of that form? This is another principal objection of Scotus.

Reply. Certainly there are many agents which can cause death, and which would cause it unless the vital principle resisted them. Therefore if in some way, for example from an arrow, some alteration is produced in the organism, so that the vital principle becomes unfit to exercise its efficacy, those same agents which are the cause of death will also be able to be the cause of the new form. This must more easily be admitted in the opinion of Scotus, who both defends the scholastic system and admits the principle "the corruption of one thing is the generation of another." Nor should the name cadaveric form deter anyone; either because the name matters little when the thing must be retained, or because it is called cadaveric from falling. "Bodies fall by dying," says St. Augustine, City of God, book 20, c. 10, "for corpses too are named from falling." Consult Liberatore, cited work, c. 10, art. 3, from n. 481, and Sanseverino, Elements of Christian Philosophy, vol. 3, Anthropology, c. 2, art. 7.

Objection V. The opinion of Scotus and of the more recent authors is especially attacked because two substances, although they are called incomplete, cannot be united with one another except accidentally; and thus the soul would not communicate first being, and consequently will not be substantial form. But the same inconvenience has place in the opinion of St. Thomas, since matter and soul are also called incomplete substances in this opinion. Therefore.

Reply: let the major pass. As to the minor, however, lest we enter questions which do not belong to this place, it is enough for our matter to note these things.

In the opinion of St. Thomas, the subject which is informed by the soul, matter, the determinable part of the composite, is called incomplete in such a way that without form it cannot, at least naturally, exist and subsist. But the soul is called an incomplete substance insofar as, although it can exist and subsist without actual information of matter, it nevertheless bespeaks an order to matter, as the form which must actuate and determine it by communicating its very being to it. But in the opinion of Scotus and of the more recent authors, the determinable subject itself, the body, although it is called incomplete in the account of substance, is nevertheless such that without the soul it can exist, subsist, and operate, as in fact it will, they say, after death, without any introduction of a new form. Now it is impossible, as we have shown, that two components, each of which is and operates independently of the other, be united in such a way that one of them communicates first being to the other, and thus they make one substance. On the contrary, it is easily understood how, from two components of which one cannot be independently of the other, through union it receives from the other the very first being, and thus from both there comes to be one substance. To illustrate the matter by example: if the human nature in Christ had its own subsistence, as the divine nature does, they could not be united in such a way that there would be one Person in Christ. But if the human nature does not have its own subsistence, then the Person proper to the divine nature will draw human nature to himself, and thus personal unity is had in Christ.

"That which comes," says St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 2, "after completed being, comes accidentally, unless it is drawn into the communion of that completed being; as in the resurrection the body comes to the preexisting soul, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed to the same being, namely so that the body may have vital being through the soul. But it is not so with whiteness, because the being of white and the being of man to whom whiteness comes are different. But the Word of God had completed being from eternity according to hypostasis or person; in time, however, human nature came to him, not as assumed to one being as it belongs to nature, as the body is assumed to the being of the soul, but to one being as it belongs to hypostasis or person. And therefore human nature is not united accidentally to the Son of God."