LatineEnglish
Corrected Latin Text
Utrum homo sit substantialiter unus.
Utrum homo sit substantialiter unus.
190. Ex dictis in articulo praecedente constat totam humanam naturam anima rationali et corpore absolvi; cum autem hae veluti partes inter se distinctae concurrant ad efformandum unum hominem, investiganda est natura hujus unitatis.
190. From the things said in the preceding article it is established that the whole human nature is completed by the rational soul and the body. But since these, as parts distinct from one another, concur in forming one man, the nature of this unity must be investigated.
191. Quod ut intelligatur, notandum est imprimis cum Bellarmino (de Incarn. l. 3. c. 8.) "tribus modis posse aliqua uniri. Primo essentialiter, cum videlicet ex pluribus fit una essentia: quomodo uniuntur materia et forma, genus et differentia. Et hoc modo non est facta unio incarnationis, ut patet, tum quia una esset in Christo natura, et illa nec esset divina, nec humana, sed tertia quaedam; tum etiam quia unio essentialis numquam fit, nisi ex imperfectis naturis, vel, si ex perfectis, per corruptionem, aut conversionem aliquam; in Christo autem sunt naturae perfectae et integrae. Secundo modo accidentaliter, ut cum accidentia subjecto adjunguntur, vel cum substantia substantiae copulatur, sed ex copula non exsurgit, nisi forma accidentalis, ut cum ex lapidibus vel lignis fit domus; et hoc modo non est facta unio hypostatica, quia Deus, ut notum est, nec potest esse accidens, nec accidentium subjectum. Tertio modo substantialiter, ut cum substantia, quae alioqui per se existeret, trahitur ad esse alterius suppositi, et ab illo pendet tamquam pars ipsius, et hoc modo facta est incarnatio. Et licet nullum sit exemplum omnino simile; tamen aliqua dantur a doctoribus, quae utcumque rem explicant."
191. In order that this may be understood, it must first be noted with Bellarmine (On the Incarnation, book 3, c. 8) that "some things can be united in three ways. First, essentially, namely when from several things there comes to be one essence, in the way in which matter and form, genus and difference are united. And the union of the Incarnation was not made in this way, as is clear, both because there would be one nature in Christ, and that nature would be neither divine nor human, but a certain third nature; and also because essential union never occurs except from imperfect natures, or, if from perfect natures, through some corruption or conversion; but in Christ there are perfect and integral natures. In a second way, accidentally, as when accidents are joined to a subject, or when substance is coupled with substance, but from the coupling there arises only an accidental form, as when a house is made from stones or wood; and the hypostatic union was not made in this way, because God, as is known, can neither be an accident nor the subject of accidents. In a third way, substantially, as when a substance which would otherwise exist per se is drawn to the being of another supposit, and depends upon it as a part of it; and in this way the Incarnation was made. And although there is no example altogether similar, still some examples are given by the doctors which explain the matter in some way."
192. Jamvero quemadmodum fatentur omnes hominem non esse unum per accidens, ac proinde unionem animae et corporis non esse accidentalem; ita communiter dicunt hominem esse unum substantialiter, ac proinde unionem animae cum corpore esse substantialem. Sed observandum est cum D. Th. 3. p. q. 2. a. 6. ad 3., quod "Substantia dupliciter dicitur: uno modo pro essentia, sive natura; alio modo pro supposito, sive hypostasi." Utroque sensu dicitur unio animae cum corpore in homine substantialis, videlicet ex unione animae cum corpore fit una persona et una essentia. "Ex anima et corpore," inquit D. Thomas, 3. p. q. 2. a. 1. ad 2., "constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas: naturae et personae."
192. Now just as all confess that man is not one per accidens, and consequently that the union of soul and body is not accidental, so they commonly say that man is one substantially, and consequently that the union of soul with body is substantial. But it must be observed with St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3, that "substance is said in two ways: in one way for essence, or nature; in another way for supposit, or hypostasis." In both senses the union of soul with body in man is called substantial, namely because from the union of soul with body there comes to be one person and one essence. "From soul and body," says St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2, "there is constituted in each of us a twofold unity: of nature and of person."
193. Notandum insuper est quod sicut substantia aliquando dicitur pro essentia, ita essentia dicitur pro natura. "Nomen naturae," inquit D. Thomas, 1. p. q. 29. a. 1. ad 4., "primo impositum est ad significandam generationem viventium, quae dicitur nativitas. Et quia hujusmodi generatio est a principio intrinseco, extensum est hoc nomen ad significandum principium intrinsecum cujuscumque motus. Et sic definitur natura in 2 Phys., text. 3. Et quia hujusmodi principium est formale vel materiale, communiter tam materia quam forma dicitur natura. Et quia per formam completur essentia uniuscujusque rei, communiter essentia uniuscujusque rei, quam significat ejus definitio, vocatur natura. Et sic accipitur hic natura. Unde Boetius in eodem lib. de duab. Naturis a princ., dicit quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Specifica enim differentia est quae complet distinctionem, et sumitur a propria forma rei."
193. It must further be noted that just as substance is sometimes said for essence, so essence is said for nature. "The name nature," says St. Thomas, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 4, "was first imposed to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity. And because generation of this kind is from an intrinsic principle, this name was extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any motion whatsoever. And in this way nature is defined in Physics II, text 3. And because a principle of this kind is formal or material, commonly both matter and form are called nature. And because through form the essence of each thing is completed, commonly the essence of each thing, which its definition signifies, is called nature. And nature is taken here in this way. Hence Boethius in the same book On the Two Natures, at the beginning, says that nature is that which informs each thing by its specific difference. For the specific difference is that which completes the distinction and is taken from the proper form of the thing."
194. Ex his omnibus, quae communiter a Theologis traduntur, sequitur 1. quod substantia, essentia, natura habent diversos conceptus formales. Etenim essentia, juxta communem doctrinam, dicitur, "id, quo aliquid est id, quod est;" seu, "id, quo aliquid constituitur in propria natura;" seu id, quo respondetur quaestioni quid est, unde vocari etiam solet quidditas. Substantia vero dicitur "ens per se stans;" seu id, quod non indiget alia re, cui tamquam subjecto inhaereat. - Natura dicitur "primum principium (quo) operationis."
Sequitur 2. quod notio essentiae latius patet, quam notio substantiae; substantia enim dividitur contra accidens: essentia autem competit tum substantiae, tum accidenti. Unde D. Thomas (Opusc. de Ente et Essentia, cap. 1.), ait: "ens per se dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, quod dividitur per decem genera ... sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia, in diversis generibus collocantur." Et postquam ostenderit quomodo essentia sit in substantia, sive simplici sive composita; deinde, cap. 7., explicat quomodo sit in accidentibus.
Sequitur 3. quod in ente, quod est substantia et non accidens, substantia, essentia, natura sint unum idemque secundum rem. Hinc factum est, ut cum una sit essentia et natura hominis composita ex anima et corpore, una sit etiam substantia. S. Irenaeus (l. 5. c. 8.) inquit: "Substantia nostra, idest animae et carnis adunatio." - S. Augustinus (Serm. 150. de verb. Apost.) ait: "Nihil est in homine, quod ad ejus substantiam pertineat et naturam, praeter corpus et animam." - Vinc. Lirin. (cap. 19.): "In Deo una substantia, sed tres Personae; in Christo duae substantiae, sed una Persona." - Et ex eadem ratione in Conc. Lat. IV. dicitur quod in Deo sunt tres Personae, "sed una essentia, substantia, seu natura." Unde merito Theologi, cum de unitate humanae naturae adstruenda agitur, promiscue usurpant nomen substantiae, essentiae, naturae. Vid., ex. gr., Suarez de anim. l. 1. c. 1. n. 9.
Sequitur 2. quod notio essentiae latius patet, quam notio substantiae; substantia enim dividitur contra accidens: essentia autem competit tum substantiae, tum accidenti. Unde D. Thomas (Opusc. de Ente et Essentia, cap. 1.), ait: "ens per se dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, quod dividitur per decem genera ... sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia, in diversis generibus collocantur." Et postquam ostenderit quomodo essentia sit in substantia, sive simplici sive composita; deinde, cap. 7., explicat quomodo sit in accidentibus.
Sequitur 3. quod in ente, quod est substantia et non accidens, substantia, essentia, natura sint unum idemque secundum rem. Hinc factum est, ut cum una sit essentia et natura hominis composita ex anima et corpore, una sit etiam substantia. S. Irenaeus (l. 5. c. 8.) inquit: "Substantia nostra, idest animae et carnis adunatio." - S. Augustinus (Serm. 150. de verb. Apost.) ait: "Nihil est in homine, quod ad ejus substantiam pertineat et naturam, praeter corpus et animam." - Vinc. Lirin. (cap. 19.): "In Deo una substantia, sed tres Personae; in Christo duae substantiae, sed una Persona." - Et ex eadem ratione in Conc. Lat. IV. dicitur quod in Deo sunt tres Personae, "sed una essentia, substantia, seu natura." Unde merito Theologi, cum de unitate humanae naturae adstruenda agitur, promiscue usurpant nomen substantiae, essentiae, naturae. Vid., ex. gr., Suarez de anim. l. 1. c. 1. n. 9.
194. From all these things, which are commonly handed down by the theologians, it follows, 1. that substance, essence, and nature have diverse formal concepts. For essence, according to the common doctrine, is called "that by which something is that which it is"; or, "that by which something is constituted in its proper nature"; or that by which the question what is it is answered, whence it is also commonly called quiddity. But substance is called "a being standing per se," or that which does not need another thing in which it inheres as in a subject. Nature is called "the first principle by which there is operation."
It follows, 2. that the notion of essence extends more broadly than the notion of substance; for substance is divided against accident, but essence belongs both to substance and to accident. Hence St. Thomas (On Being and Essence, c. 1) says: "Being per se is said in two ways: in one way, that which is divided through the ten genera ... essence is taken from being said in the first way. And because, as was said, being said in this way is divided through the ten genera, it is necessary that essence signify something common to all natures through which diverse beings are located in diverse genera." And after he has shown how essence is in substance, whether simple or composite, he then explains, in chapter 7, how it is in accidents.
It follows, 3. that in a being which is substance and not accident, substance, essence, and nature are one and the same according to the thing. Hence it has come about that, since the essence and nature of man composed from soul and body is one, the substance also is one. St. Irenaeus (book 5, c. 8) says: "Our substance, that is, the union of soul and flesh." St. Augustine (Sermon 150, On the Words of the Apostle) says: "There is nothing in man which pertains to his substance and nature except body and soul." Vincent of Lerins (c. 19): "In God there is one substance, but three Persons; in Christ two substances, but one Person." And from the same reason it is said in the Fourth Lateran Council that in God there are three Persons, "but one essence, substance, or nature." Hence theologians rightly, when the unity of human nature is to be established, use the names substance, essence, and nature promiscuously. See, for example, Suarez, On the Soul, book 1, c. 1, n. 9.
It follows, 2. that the notion of essence extends more broadly than the notion of substance; for substance is divided against accident, but essence belongs both to substance and to accident. Hence St. Thomas (On Being and Essence, c. 1) says: "Being per se is said in two ways: in one way, that which is divided through the ten genera ... essence is taken from being said in the first way. And because, as was said, being said in this way is divided through the ten genera, it is necessary that essence signify something common to all natures through which diverse beings are located in diverse genera." And after he has shown how essence is in substance, whether simple or composite, he then explains, in chapter 7, how it is in accidents.
It follows, 3. that in a being which is substance and not accident, substance, essence, and nature are one and the same according to the thing. Hence it has come about that, since the essence and nature of man composed from soul and body is one, the substance also is one. St. Irenaeus (book 5, c. 8) says: "Our substance, that is, the union of soul and flesh." St. Augustine (Sermon 150, On the Words of the Apostle) says: "There is nothing in man which pertains to his substance and nature except body and soul." Vincent of Lerins (c. 19): "In God there is one substance, but three Persons; in Christ two substances, but one Person." And from the same reason it is said in the Fourth Lateran Council that in God there are three Persons, "but one essence, substance, or nature." Hence theologians rightly, when the unity of human nature is to be established, use the names substance, essence, and nature promiscuously. See, for example, Suarez, On the Soul, book 1, c. 1, n. 9.
195. His itaque expositis, dicimus:
PROP. XX. Anima rationalis et corpus ita inter se uniuntur in homine, ut ex iis 1. una resultet persona - 2. et una natura.
Prob. 1ma pars. Ex anima et corpore una resultat persona, si uni eidemque subjecto tribuuntur tum quae ad animam, tum quae ad corpus pertinent; primum enim subjectum attributionis est suppositum. Atqui ita est. Ergo.
Prob. min. Sive ex Scriptura, sive ex communi loquendi usu, unus idemque est ille, qui dicitur nasci, nutriri, mori, resurgere, videre, etc.; et dicitur intelligere, eligere, credere, colere Deum, etc.; atqui prima ei competunt secundum corpus, altera secundum animam rationalem. Ergo.
Confirmari potest hoc argumentum ex eo, quod eodem modo probatur unitas Personae in Christo; uni enim eidemque tribuuntur quae pertinent tum ad divinam tum ad humanam naturam: ex hoc autem Patres et Theologi concludunt unam esse in Christo Personam.
Nec obstat 1. quod aliquando adhibentur tales dicendi modi, qui videntur indicare solam animam constituere humanam personam. Illi enim non secundum proprietatem verborum, sed secundum quamdam accommodationem intelligendi sunt. "Illud potissime," inquit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 75. a. 4. ad 1., "videtur esse unumquodque quod est principale in ipso; sicut quod facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas facere. Et hoc modo aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo."
Nec obstat 2. quod saepe dicatur corpus instrumentum animae; est enim instrumentum ei substantialiter, et non accidentaliter unitum. Unde fit quod uni homini tribui potest quidquid pertinet ad corpus, et non solum quod ad ipsum pertinet secundum actionem instrumentalem; cum hoc solum possit causae principali tribui, quando instrumentum ei solum accidentaliter unitur. Sic, ex. gr., possum dicere ego sentio et corpus sentit, sicut dicere possum calamus scribit et ego scribo; sed dum possum dicere ego cado si corpus cadit, non possum dicere me cadere si calamus cadat. "Non omne quod assumitur," ait D. Thomas, 3. p. q. 2. a. 6. ad 4., "ut instrumentum, pertinet ad hypostasim assumentis, sicut patet de securi et gladio; nihil tamen prohibet illud quod assumitur ad unitatem hypostasis, se habere ut instrumentum, sicut corpus hominis vel membra ejus."
Prob. 2da pars. I. Ex Patribus. Nam a) communis est apud Patres hominis definitio "animal rationale." Ita, ex. gr., illum definiunt Cyrillus (In Jo. l. 1. c. 1. v. 13.) - S. Augustinus (De Quantitate animae, c. 25.) - Pseudo Athanasius (De communi essentia, n. 53.) etc.
b) Expresse asserunt unam esse in homine naturam. Ita, ex. gr., S. Augustinus (De civ. Dei l. 10. c. 29.) ait: "corpus animae cohaerere, ut homo totus et plenus sit, natura nostra ipsa teste agnoscimus." - Nemesius (De Natura hominis cap. 3.) improbat sententiam Platonis "qui non vult animal constare ex anima et corpore, sed ipsum esse animam, quae corpore utatur, et velut corpore vestita sit ... Quomodo enim unum esse potest cum vestitu anima? non enim unum est tunica cum eo, quod tunica indutum est." - Cyrillus Alex. [Dial. Quod unus sit Christus]: "Nonne unum dicimus hominem, atque unam ipsius naturam, etsi uniformis et simplex non sit?" - S. Athanasius [adv. Apollin. l. 2. c. 1.]: "Forma servi humanae substantiae intelligens natura, cum organica compositione agnoscitur." Cf. etiam quaedam SS. PP. testimonia in praeced. artic. recitata.
c) Cum Patres unitatem Personae in Christo tuentur, saepe ad mysterium hoc aliquo modo illustrandum, utuntur similitudine ex unitate hominis substantiali ducta; simul tamen in hac comparatione, sive Patres ipsi, sive communiter Theologi notant discrimen, quod in eo reponunt, quod dum in Christo habetur una Persona, in qua subsistunt duae naturae, divina et humana; in homine ex anima et corpore fit etiam una natura. Unde S. Athanasius, ex. gr., qui ad ostendendum unitatem personae in Christo, dicit in symb. "Sicut anima rationalis, et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus;" ut explicet differentiam inter utramque unionem, ait: "Hic (Christus) enim non ex rebus imperfectis habet, ut sit (sicut homo), sed perfectarum naturarum concursum ostendit in seipso: atque illic quidem partes hominis sunt anima et corpus."
d) Unde Conc. Later. IV. et Conc. Vat. in decretis saepe citatis docent Deum condidisse creaturam, seu naturam spiritualem et corporalem "ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam."
Prob. II. Ibi est una natura, ubi est unum primum operationis principium; atqui in homine, si inspiciamus operationes vitae sensitivae, unum est operationis principium, constans corpore et anima (rationali uti patet ex art. praec.); ergo ex corpore et anima rationali fit in homine una natura. "Impossibile est," inquit D. Th. (c. g. l. 2. c. 57.), "quod eorum quae sunt diversa secundum esse, sit operatio una. Dico autem operationem unam, non ex parte ejus in quod terminatur actio, sed secundum quod egreditur ab agente. Multi enim trahentes navim, unam actionem faciunt ex parte operati, quod est unum, sed tamen ex parte trahentium sunt multae actiones, quia sunt diversi impulsus ad trahendum. Cum enim actio consequatur formam, et virtutem, oportet quod quorum sunt diversae formae, et virtutes, esse et actiones diversas. Quamvis autem animae sit aliqua operatio propria, in qua non communicat corpus, sicut intelligere; sunt tamen aliquae operationes communes sibi et corpori, ut timere, irasci, et sentire, et hujusmodi. Haec enim accidunt secundum aliquam transmutationem alicujus determinatae partis corporis. Ex quo patet quod simul sunt animae et corporis operationes. Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint secundum esse diversa."
Decl. breviter. Ratione et experientia constat operationes omnes vitae sensitivae non exerceri sine concursu corporis, ac proinde animam ab eodem pendere quoad illas operationes. At vero, qualis est hic concursus corporis ad operationes vitae sensitivae?
Si dicitur esse solum extrinsecus, concomitans, sicut concursus phantasiae ad operationes vitae intellectivae; sequitur nullum esse essentiale discrimen inter utriusque vitae operationes: quemadmodum ergo intelligere dicitur independens a corpore non obstante concomitanti actione phantasiae; ita etiam videre, audire, etc., essent actiones a corpore independentes. Sed independentia operationis dicit independentiam principii, a quo illa procedit; principium agens et subsistens independenter a materia, dicitur spirituale; spiritualitas est fundamentum immortalitatis: ergo si actiones vitae sensitivae solum praedicto modo penderent a corpore, sicut anima rationalis est vere et intrinsece independens a materia, spiritualis, immortalis; ita etiam anima brutorum. - Sin vero concursus corporis ad operationes vitae sensitivae est intrinsecus, quatenus organum est principium partiale earum operationum; tum quidem, anima sensitiva est intrinsece dependens quoad suas operationes a corpore; intrinsece dependens quoad esse, ac proinde nec erit spiritualis, nec immortalis.
Quapropter non valeo intelligere quomodo aliqui philosophi dicant - 1. sensitivae vitae operationes esse solius animae et non totius compositi - vel 2. easdem operationes esse quidem a materia dependentes, at vero animam ipsam, a qua illae procedunt in brutis, a corpore non pendere quoad ipsum esse. Juxta primum destruitur essentiale discrimen inter animam humanam et animas brutorum; juxta alterum destruitur unicum principium, quo, ex ratione, animae humanae spiritualitatem ostendere possumus. Mirum vero est, quod addant animam brutorum esse subsistentem, quatenus a corpore non pendet ut sit; non esse vero subsistentem quatenus est pars. - At etiam anima humana est pars humanae naturae; videndum potius est qualis sit pars. Si enim anima bruti talis est pars animalis, ut sine materia possit operari, vel, ut illi philosophi volunt, esse et subsistere; tollitur, ut diximus essentiale discrimen inter illam et animam humanam.
His ergo positis, facile intelligitur vis propositi argumenti: datur in homine operatio vitae sensitivae; cum sensatio sit una debet a potentia procedere, quae sit una; potentia una, nequit esse nisi unius naturae; natura ergo, a qua sensatio procedit debet esse una. Sed sensatio procedit ab anima et corpore, et in homine nulla alia anima est praeter rationalem; ergo ex corpore et anima rationali una fit in homine natura. Cf. Liberatore (Del Composto umano, cap. 4. art. 5. 6.) pro hoc argumento - pro tota vero thesi (cap. 1. art. 1. 4.)
PROP. XX. Anima rationalis et corpus ita inter se uniuntur in homine, ut ex iis 1. una resultet persona - 2. et una natura.
Prob. 1ma pars. Ex anima et corpore una resultat persona, si uni eidemque subjecto tribuuntur tum quae ad animam, tum quae ad corpus pertinent; primum enim subjectum attributionis est suppositum. Atqui ita est. Ergo.
Prob. min. Sive ex Scriptura, sive ex communi loquendi usu, unus idemque est ille, qui dicitur nasci, nutriri, mori, resurgere, videre, etc.; et dicitur intelligere, eligere, credere, colere Deum, etc.; atqui prima ei competunt secundum corpus, altera secundum animam rationalem. Ergo.
Confirmari potest hoc argumentum ex eo, quod eodem modo probatur unitas Personae in Christo; uni enim eidemque tribuuntur quae pertinent tum ad divinam tum ad humanam naturam: ex hoc autem Patres et Theologi concludunt unam esse in Christo Personam.
Nec obstat 1. quod aliquando adhibentur tales dicendi modi, qui videntur indicare solam animam constituere humanam personam. Illi enim non secundum proprietatem verborum, sed secundum quamdam accommodationem intelligendi sunt. "Illud potissime," inquit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 75. a. 4. ad 1., "videtur esse unumquodque quod est principale in ipso; sicut quod facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas facere. Et hoc modo aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo."
Nec obstat 2. quod saepe dicatur corpus instrumentum animae; est enim instrumentum ei substantialiter, et non accidentaliter unitum. Unde fit quod uni homini tribui potest quidquid pertinet ad corpus, et non solum quod ad ipsum pertinet secundum actionem instrumentalem; cum hoc solum possit causae principali tribui, quando instrumentum ei solum accidentaliter unitur. Sic, ex. gr., possum dicere ego sentio et corpus sentit, sicut dicere possum calamus scribit et ego scribo; sed dum possum dicere ego cado si corpus cadit, non possum dicere me cadere si calamus cadat. "Non omne quod assumitur," ait D. Thomas, 3. p. q. 2. a. 6. ad 4., "ut instrumentum, pertinet ad hypostasim assumentis, sicut patet de securi et gladio; nihil tamen prohibet illud quod assumitur ad unitatem hypostasis, se habere ut instrumentum, sicut corpus hominis vel membra ejus."
Prob. 2da pars. I. Ex Patribus. Nam a) communis est apud Patres hominis definitio "animal rationale." Ita, ex. gr., illum definiunt Cyrillus (In Jo. l. 1. c. 1. v. 13.) - S. Augustinus (De Quantitate animae, c. 25.) - Pseudo Athanasius (De communi essentia, n. 53.) etc.
b) Expresse asserunt unam esse in homine naturam. Ita, ex. gr., S. Augustinus (De civ. Dei l. 10. c. 29.) ait: "corpus animae cohaerere, ut homo totus et plenus sit, natura nostra ipsa teste agnoscimus." - Nemesius (De Natura hominis cap. 3.) improbat sententiam Platonis "qui non vult animal constare ex anima et corpore, sed ipsum esse animam, quae corpore utatur, et velut corpore vestita sit ... Quomodo enim unum esse potest cum vestitu anima? non enim unum est tunica cum eo, quod tunica indutum est." - Cyrillus Alex. [Dial. Quod unus sit Christus]: "Nonne unum dicimus hominem, atque unam ipsius naturam, etsi uniformis et simplex non sit?" - S. Athanasius [adv. Apollin. l. 2. c. 1.]: "Forma servi humanae substantiae intelligens natura, cum organica compositione agnoscitur." Cf. etiam quaedam SS. PP. testimonia in praeced. artic. recitata.
c) Cum Patres unitatem Personae in Christo tuentur, saepe ad mysterium hoc aliquo modo illustrandum, utuntur similitudine ex unitate hominis substantiali ducta; simul tamen in hac comparatione, sive Patres ipsi, sive communiter Theologi notant discrimen, quod in eo reponunt, quod dum in Christo habetur una Persona, in qua subsistunt duae naturae, divina et humana; in homine ex anima et corpore fit etiam una natura. Unde S. Athanasius, ex. gr., qui ad ostendendum unitatem personae in Christo, dicit in symb. "Sicut anima rationalis, et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus;" ut explicet differentiam inter utramque unionem, ait: "Hic (Christus) enim non ex rebus imperfectis habet, ut sit (sicut homo), sed perfectarum naturarum concursum ostendit in seipso: atque illic quidem partes hominis sunt anima et corpus."
d) Unde Conc. Later. IV. et Conc. Vat. in decretis saepe citatis docent Deum condidisse creaturam, seu naturam spiritualem et corporalem "ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam."
Prob. II. Ibi est una natura, ubi est unum primum operationis principium; atqui in homine, si inspiciamus operationes vitae sensitivae, unum est operationis principium, constans corpore et anima (rationali uti patet ex art. praec.); ergo ex corpore et anima rationali fit in homine una natura. "Impossibile est," inquit D. Th. (c. g. l. 2. c. 57.), "quod eorum quae sunt diversa secundum esse, sit operatio una. Dico autem operationem unam, non ex parte ejus in quod terminatur actio, sed secundum quod egreditur ab agente. Multi enim trahentes navim, unam actionem faciunt ex parte operati, quod est unum, sed tamen ex parte trahentium sunt multae actiones, quia sunt diversi impulsus ad trahendum. Cum enim actio consequatur formam, et virtutem, oportet quod quorum sunt diversae formae, et virtutes, esse et actiones diversas. Quamvis autem animae sit aliqua operatio propria, in qua non communicat corpus, sicut intelligere; sunt tamen aliquae operationes communes sibi et corpori, ut timere, irasci, et sentire, et hujusmodi. Haec enim accidunt secundum aliquam transmutationem alicujus determinatae partis corporis. Ex quo patet quod simul sunt animae et corporis operationes. Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint secundum esse diversa."
Decl. breviter. Ratione et experientia constat operationes omnes vitae sensitivae non exerceri sine concursu corporis, ac proinde animam ab eodem pendere quoad illas operationes. At vero, qualis est hic concursus corporis ad operationes vitae sensitivae?
Si dicitur esse solum extrinsecus, concomitans, sicut concursus phantasiae ad operationes vitae intellectivae; sequitur nullum esse essentiale discrimen inter utriusque vitae operationes: quemadmodum ergo intelligere dicitur independens a corpore non obstante concomitanti actione phantasiae; ita etiam videre, audire, etc., essent actiones a corpore independentes. Sed independentia operationis dicit independentiam principii, a quo illa procedit; principium agens et subsistens independenter a materia, dicitur spirituale; spiritualitas est fundamentum immortalitatis: ergo si actiones vitae sensitivae solum praedicto modo penderent a corpore, sicut anima rationalis est vere et intrinsece independens a materia, spiritualis, immortalis; ita etiam anima brutorum. - Sin vero concursus corporis ad operationes vitae sensitivae est intrinsecus, quatenus organum est principium partiale earum operationum; tum quidem, anima sensitiva est intrinsece dependens quoad suas operationes a corpore; intrinsece dependens quoad esse, ac proinde nec erit spiritualis, nec immortalis.
Quapropter non valeo intelligere quomodo aliqui philosophi dicant - 1. sensitivae vitae operationes esse solius animae et non totius compositi - vel 2. easdem operationes esse quidem a materia dependentes, at vero animam ipsam, a qua illae procedunt in brutis, a corpore non pendere quoad ipsum esse. Juxta primum destruitur essentiale discrimen inter animam humanam et animas brutorum; juxta alterum destruitur unicum principium, quo, ex ratione, animae humanae spiritualitatem ostendere possumus. Mirum vero est, quod addant animam brutorum esse subsistentem, quatenus a corpore non pendet ut sit; non esse vero subsistentem quatenus est pars. - At etiam anima humana est pars humanae naturae; videndum potius est qualis sit pars. Si enim anima bruti talis est pars animalis, ut sine materia possit operari, vel, ut illi philosophi volunt, esse et subsistere; tollitur, ut diximus essentiale discrimen inter illam et animam humanam.
His ergo positis, facile intelligitur vis propositi argumenti: datur in homine operatio vitae sensitivae; cum sensatio sit una debet a potentia procedere, quae sit una; potentia una, nequit esse nisi unius naturae; natura ergo, a qua sensatio procedit debet esse una. Sed sensatio procedit ab anima et corpore, et in homine nulla alia anima est praeter rationalem; ergo ex corpore et anima rationali una fit in homine natura. Cf. Liberatore (Del Composto umano, cap. 4. art. 5. 6.) pro hoc argumento - pro tota vero thesi (cap. 1. art. 1. 4.)
195. With these things set forth, therefore, we say:
PROP. XX. The rational soul and the body are so united with one another in man that from them there results 1. one person, and 2. one nature.
Proof of the first part. From soul and body there results one person if the things which pertain both to the soul and to the body are attributed to one and the same subject; for the first subject of attribution is the supposit. But so it is. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. Whether from Scripture or from common usage of speech, he who is said to be born, nourished, to die, rise again, see, etc., and who is said to understand, choose, believe, worship God, etc., is one and the same. But the former things belong to him according to the body, the latter according to the rational soul. Therefore.
This argument can be confirmed from the fact that the unity of Person in Christ is proved in the same way. For the things which pertain both to the divine nature and to the human nature are attributed to one and the same; and from this the Fathers and theologians conclude that there is one Person in Christ.
Nor is it an obstacle, 1. that sometimes such modes of speaking are employed as seem to indicate that the soul alone constitutes the human person. For those modes are to be understood not according to the propriety of the words, but according to a certain accommodation of understanding. "That especially," says St. Thomas, I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 1, "seems to be each thing which is principal in it; just as what the ruler of a city does is said to be done by the city. And in this way sometimes that which is principal in man is called man."
Nor is it an obstacle, 2. that the body is often said to be the instrument of the soul; for it is an instrument united to it substantially, and not accidentally. Hence it happens that whatever pertains to the body can be attributed to one man, and not only what pertains to it according to instrumental action; since only this latter can be attributed to the principal cause when the instrument is united to it only accidentally. Thus, for example, I can say, I sense, and the body senses, just as I can say, the pen writes, and I write; but while I can say, I fall if the body falls, I cannot say that I fall if the pen falls. "Not everything that is assumed," says St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4, "as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one assuming, as is clear concerning an axe and a sword; nevertheless nothing prevents that which is assumed to the unity of hypostasis from having itself as an instrument, as the body of man or his members."
Proof of the second part. I. From the Fathers. For a) among the Fathers the common definition of man is "a rational animal." Thus, for example, Cyril defines him in this way (on John, book 1, c. 1, v. 13), St. Augustine (On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 25), Pseudo-Athanasius (On the Common Essence, n. 53), etc.
b) They expressly assert that there is one nature in man. Thus, for example, St. Augustine (City of God, book 10, c. 29) says: "We acknowledge, with our very nature as witness, that the body coheres with the soul so that man may be whole and complete." Nemesius (On the Nature of Man, c. 3) criticizes the opinion of Plato, "who does not want the animal to consist of soul and body, but wants it itself to be the soul which uses the body and is, as it were, clothed with the body. ... For how can the soul be one with clothing? For a tunic is not one with him who is clothed with the tunic." Cyril of Alexandria [Dialogue That Christ Is One]: "Do we not say that man is one, and that his nature is one, even if it is not uniform and simple?" St. Athanasius [against Apollinaris, book 2, c. 1]: "The form of a servant is acknowledged as the intelligent nature of human substance, with organic composition." Cf. also certain testimonies of the holy Fathers recited in the preceding article.
c) When the Fathers defend the unity of Person in Christ, they often use, in order to illustrate this mystery in some way, a likeness drawn from the substantial unity of man. At the same time, however, in this comparison, either the Fathers themselves or theologians commonly note the difference, which they place in this: that while in Christ there is one Person in whom two natures subsist, the divine and the human, in man from soul and body there also comes to be one nature. Hence St. Athanasius, for example, who, to show the unity of person in Christ, says in the Creed, "As the rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ," says, in order to explain the difference between the two unions: "For this one (Christ) does not have it from imperfect things that he is (as man does), but shows in himself the concurrence of perfect natures; and there indeed the parts of man are soul and body."
d) Hence the Fourth Lateran Council and the Vatican Council, in the decrees often cited, teach that God founded the spiritual and corporeal creature, or nature, "and then the human, as if common, constituted from spirit and body."
Proof II. There is one nature where there is one first principle of operation. But in man, if we inspect the operations of sensitive life, there is one principle of operation, consisting of body and soul (the rational soul, as is clear from the preceding article). Therefore from body and rational soul there comes to be one nature in man. "It is impossible," says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 57), "that there be one operation of those things which are diverse according to being. But I call an operation one, not on the part of that in which the action is terminated, but according as it goes forth from the agent. For many men drawing a ship perform one action on the part of the thing worked, which is one; nevertheless on the part of those drawing there are many actions, because there are diverse impulses toward drawing. For since action follows form and power, it is necessary that things whose forms and powers are diverse have diverse beings and actions. But although there is some operation proper to the soul, in which the body does not communicate, such as to understand, nevertheless there are some operations common to it and the body, such as to fear, to be angry, to sense, and things of this kind. For these occur according to some transmutation of some determinate part of the body. From this it is clear that they are at the same time operations of soul and body. Therefore it is necessary that from soul and body one thing come to be, and that they not be diverse according to being."
Brief explanation. By reason and experience it is established that all operations of sensitive life are not exercised without the concurrence of the body, and consequently that the soul depends upon the same body with respect to those operations. But what kind of concurrence of the body is this in relation to the operations of sensitive life?
If it is said to be only extrinsic and concomitant, like the concurrence of phantasy in the operations of intellective life, it follows that there is no essential distinction between the operations of either life. Therefore, just as understanding is called independent of the body notwithstanding the concomitant action of phantasy, so also seeing, hearing, etc., would be actions independent of the body. But the independence of an operation bespeaks the independence of the principle from which it proceeds; an acting and subsisting principle independent of matter is called spiritual; spirituality is the foundation of immortality. Therefore, if the actions of sensitive life depended upon the body only in the aforesaid way, then just as the rational soul is truly and intrinsically independent of matter, spiritual, and immortal, so also would be the soul of brutes. But if the concurrence of the body in the operations of sensitive life is intrinsic, insofar as the organ is a partial principle of those operations, then indeed the sensitive soul is intrinsically dependent upon the body with respect to its operations; it is intrinsically dependent with respect to being, and consequently will be neither spiritual nor immortal.
Therefore I cannot understand how some philosophers say, 1. that the operations of sensitive life belong to the soul alone and not to the whole composite; or 2. that these same operations are indeed dependent upon matter, but that the soul itself, from which they proceed in brutes, does not depend upon the body with respect to being itself. According to the first, the essential distinction between the human soul and the souls of brutes is destroyed; according to the second, the one principle by which we can show from reason the spirituality of the human soul is destroyed. But it is strange that they add that the soul of brutes is subsistent insofar as it does not depend upon the body in order to be, but is not subsistent insofar as it is a part. Yet even the human soul is a part of human nature; one must rather see what kind of part it is. For if the soul of a brute is such a part of the animal that it can operate without matter, or, as those philosophers wish, be and subsist without matter, then, as we have said, the essential distinction between it and the human soul is removed.
With these things laid down, therefore, the force of the proposed argument is easily understood: there is in man an operation of sensitive life; since sensation is one, it must proceed from a power which is one; one power cannot belong except to one nature; therefore the nature from which sensation proceeds must be one. But sensation proceeds from soul and body, and in man there is no other soul besides the rational soul; therefore from body and rational soul one nature comes to be in man. Cf. Liberatore (Del Composto umano, c. 4, art. 5, 6) for this argument, and for the whole thesis (c. 1, art. 1, 4).
PROP. XX. The rational soul and the body are so united with one another in man that from them there results 1. one person, and 2. one nature.
Proof of the first part. From soul and body there results one person if the things which pertain both to the soul and to the body are attributed to one and the same subject; for the first subject of attribution is the supposit. But so it is. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. Whether from Scripture or from common usage of speech, he who is said to be born, nourished, to die, rise again, see, etc., and who is said to understand, choose, believe, worship God, etc., is one and the same. But the former things belong to him according to the body, the latter according to the rational soul. Therefore.
This argument can be confirmed from the fact that the unity of Person in Christ is proved in the same way. For the things which pertain both to the divine nature and to the human nature are attributed to one and the same; and from this the Fathers and theologians conclude that there is one Person in Christ.
Nor is it an obstacle, 1. that sometimes such modes of speaking are employed as seem to indicate that the soul alone constitutes the human person. For those modes are to be understood not according to the propriety of the words, but according to a certain accommodation of understanding. "That especially," says St. Thomas, I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 1, "seems to be each thing which is principal in it; just as what the ruler of a city does is said to be done by the city. And in this way sometimes that which is principal in man is called man."
Nor is it an obstacle, 2. that the body is often said to be the instrument of the soul; for it is an instrument united to it substantially, and not accidentally. Hence it happens that whatever pertains to the body can be attributed to one man, and not only what pertains to it according to instrumental action; since only this latter can be attributed to the principal cause when the instrument is united to it only accidentally. Thus, for example, I can say, I sense, and the body senses, just as I can say, the pen writes, and I write; but while I can say, I fall if the body falls, I cannot say that I fall if the pen falls. "Not everything that is assumed," says St. Thomas, III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4, "as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one assuming, as is clear concerning an axe and a sword; nevertheless nothing prevents that which is assumed to the unity of hypostasis from having itself as an instrument, as the body of man or his members."
Proof of the second part. I. From the Fathers. For a) among the Fathers the common definition of man is "a rational animal." Thus, for example, Cyril defines him in this way (on John, book 1, c. 1, v. 13), St. Augustine (On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 25), Pseudo-Athanasius (On the Common Essence, n. 53), etc.
b) They expressly assert that there is one nature in man. Thus, for example, St. Augustine (City of God, book 10, c. 29) says: "We acknowledge, with our very nature as witness, that the body coheres with the soul so that man may be whole and complete." Nemesius (On the Nature of Man, c. 3) criticizes the opinion of Plato, "who does not want the animal to consist of soul and body, but wants it itself to be the soul which uses the body and is, as it were, clothed with the body. ... For how can the soul be one with clothing? For a tunic is not one with him who is clothed with the tunic." Cyril of Alexandria [Dialogue That Christ Is One]: "Do we not say that man is one, and that his nature is one, even if it is not uniform and simple?" St. Athanasius [against Apollinaris, book 2, c. 1]: "The form of a servant is acknowledged as the intelligent nature of human substance, with organic composition." Cf. also certain testimonies of the holy Fathers recited in the preceding article.
c) When the Fathers defend the unity of Person in Christ, they often use, in order to illustrate this mystery in some way, a likeness drawn from the substantial unity of man. At the same time, however, in this comparison, either the Fathers themselves or theologians commonly note the difference, which they place in this: that while in Christ there is one Person in whom two natures subsist, the divine and the human, in man from soul and body there also comes to be one nature. Hence St. Athanasius, for example, who, to show the unity of person in Christ, says in the Creed, "As the rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ," says, in order to explain the difference between the two unions: "For this one (Christ) does not have it from imperfect things that he is (as man does), but shows in himself the concurrence of perfect natures; and there indeed the parts of man are soul and body."
d) Hence the Fourth Lateran Council and the Vatican Council, in the decrees often cited, teach that God founded the spiritual and corporeal creature, or nature, "and then the human, as if common, constituted from spirit and body."
Proof II. There is one nature where there is one first principle of operation. But in man, if we inspect the operations of sensitive life, there is one principle of operation, consisting of body and soul (the rational soul, as is clear from the preceding article). Therefore from body and rational soul there comes to be one nature in man. "It is impossible," says St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 57), "that there be one operation of those things which are diverse according to being. But I call an operation one, not on the part of that in which the action is terminated, but according as it goes forth from the agent. For many men drawing a ship perform one action on the part of the thing worked, which is one; nevertheless on the part of those drawing there are many actions, because there are diverse impulses toward drawing. For since action follows form and power, it is necessary that things whose forms and powers are diverse have diverse beings and actions. But although there is some operation proper to the soul, in which the body does not communicate, such as to understand, nevertheless there are some operations common to it and the body, such as to fear, to be angry, to sense, and things of this kind. For these occur according to some transmutation of some determinate part of the body. From this it is clear that they are at the same time operations of soul and body. Therefore it is necessary that from soul and body one thing come to be, and that they not be diverse according to being."
Brief explanation. By reason and experience it is established that all operations of sensitive life are not exercised without the concurrence of the body, and consequently that the soul depends upon the same body with respect to those operations. But what kind of concurrence of the body is this in relation to the operations of sensitive life?
If it is said to be only extrinsic and concomitant, like the concurrence of phantasy in the operations of intellective life, it follows that there is no essential distinction between the operations of either life. Therefore, just as understanding is called independent of the body notwithstanding the concomitant action of phantasy, so also seeing, hearing, etc., would be actions independent of the body. But the independence of an operation bespeaks the independence of the principle from which it proceeds; an acting and subsisting principle independent of matter is called spiritual; spirituality is the foundation of immortality. Therefore, if the actions of sensitive life depended upon the body only in the aforesaid way, then just as the rational soul is truly and intrinsically independent of matter, spiritual, and immortal, so also would be the soul of brutes. But if the concurrence of the body in the operations of sensitive life is intrinsic, insofar as the organ is a partial principle of those operations, then indeed the sensitive soul is intrinsically dependent upon the body with respect to its operations; it is intrinsically dependent with respect to being, and consequently will be neither spiritual nor immortal.
Therefore I cannot understand how some philosophers say, 1. that the operations of sensitive life belong to the soul alone and not to the whole composite; or 2. that these same operations are indeed dependent upon matter, but that the soul itself, from which they proceed in brutes, does not depend upon the body with respect to being itself. According to the first, the essential distinction between the human soul and the souls of brutes is destroyed; according to the second, the one principle by which we can show from reason the spirituality of the human soul is destroyed. But it is strange that they add that the soul of brutes is subsistent insofar as it does not depend upon the body in order to be, but is not subsistent insofar as it is a part. Yet even the human soul is a part of human nature; one must rather see what kind of part it is. For if the soul of a brute is such a part of the animal that it can operate without matter, or, as those philosophers wish, be and subsist without matter, then, as we have said, the essential distinction between it and the human soul is removed.
With these things laid down, therefore, the force of the proposed argument is easily understood: there is in man an operation of sensitive life; since sensation is one, it must proceed from a power which is one; one power cannot belong except to one nature; therefore the nature from which sensation proceeds must be one. But sensation proceeds from soul and body, and in man there is no other soul besides the rational soul; therefore from body and rational soul one nature comes to be in man. Cf. Liberatore (Del Composto umano, c. 4, art. 5, 6) for this argument, and for the whole thesis (c. 1, art. 1, 4).