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Corrected Latin Text
Utrum una tantum in homine sit anima.
Utrum una tantum in homine sit anima.
185. Post ea quae diximus de humani generis origine et propagatione, disserendum est de hominis natura. Hanc pulchre describit S. Augustinus (Serm. 43. de verbis Isaiae 7. c. 2. 3.): "A Deo habemus esse quod sumus. Quia quod non nihil sumus, nisi a Deo, a quo habemus? - sed sunt et ligna, sunt et lapides, a quo nisi a Deo? nos ergo quid plus? non vivunt ligna (caesa et exsiccata), et lapides: nos autem vivimus. Sed adhuc nobis idipsum vivere cum arboribus fructetisque commune est. Dicuntur enim et vites vivere. Nam si non viverent, non scriptum esset: Occidit in grandine vineas eorum: vivit cum viret, arescit, cum moritur. Sed vita ista non habet sensum. Quid nos amplius? - Sentimus. Quinquepartitus notus est sensus: videmus, audimus, olfacimus, gustamus, tactu etiam per totum corpus nostrum mollia dijudicamus, et dura, aspera et lenia, calida et frigida. Est ergo in nobis sensus quinquepartitus. Sed hunc habent et bestiae. Habemus ergo aliquid amplius nos? - Et iste tamen, quae enumeravimus, fratres mei, si consideremus in nobis, quantam de his gratiarum actionem, quantam Creatori laudem debemus? Sed tamen amplius quid habemus? Mentem, rationem, consilium, quod non habent bestiae, non habent volucres, non habent pisces; in eo facti sumus ad imaginem Dei."
185. After the things which we have said concerning the origin and propagation of the human race, the nature of man must be discussed. St. Augustine beautifully describes it (Sermon 43, On the Words of Isaiah 7, c. 2, 3): "From God we have the being that we are. For that we are not nothing, unless from God, from whom do we have it? But there are also trees, there are also stones; from whom, unless from God? What more, then, have we? Trees, when cut and dried, and stones do not live; but we live. Yet this very living is still common to us with trees and shrubs. For vines also are said to live. For if they did not live, it would not have been written: He killed their vines with hail. It lives when it is green; it dries up when it dies. But that life does not have sense. What more do we have? We sense. The fivefold sense is known: we see, hear, smell, taste; also by touch through our whole body we discern soft and hard things, rough and smooth, hot and cold. Therefore there is in us a fivefold sense. But beasts also have this. Therefore do we have something more? And yet these things which we have enumerated, my brothers, if we consider them in ourselves, how great thanksgiving, how great praise to the Creator we owe for them. But nevertheless what more do we have? Mind, reason, counsel, which beasts do not have, birds do not have, fish do not have; in this we have been made to the image of God."
186. At si triplex est vita in homine, estne multiplex anima, anima enim est primum vitae principium in iis, quae vivunt? Teste S. Irenaeo (l. 1. adv. haereses c. 5.) Gnostici hominem ex tribus partibus compositum dicebant. - Manichaei, teste S. Augustino (l. 1. Retract. c. 15.), praeter corpus, duas animas, unam bonam, alteram malam homini tribuebant. - Apollinaris negans in Christo esse animam rationalem, huic errori Platonicam sententiam substruebat de reali discrimine inter animam hominis sensitivam et rationalem; et illam quidem, hanc vero minime Verbum assumpsisse affirmabat. "Apollinaris," inquit Theodoretus (Haerit. fabul. l. 4. c. 8.), "Incarnatum Deum Verbum dixit corpore assumpto et anima, non rationali, sed experte rationis, quam φυτικην aut ζωτικην quidam vocant. Mentem aliud esse statuens ac animam, minime assumptam fuisse ait, sed divinam suffecisse naturam ad usum mentis explendum." - Errorem de alia anima praeter rationalem in homine renovarunt Gunther et Baltzer, quorum opera damnata fuerunt a S. P. Pio IX. - Haereticorum commentum trichotomia dictum est, eo quod hominem in triplicem veluti substantiam dividat.
186. But if there is a threefold life in man, is there a manifold soul, since the soul is the first principle of life in those things which live? According to the testimony of St. Irenaeus (book 1, Against Heresies, c. 5), the Gnostics used to say that man is composed of three parts. The Manichaeans, according to the testimony of St. Augustine (book 1, Retractations, c. 15), attributed to man, besides the body, two souls, one good and the other evil. Apollinaris, denying that there is a rational soul in Christ, underlaid this error with the Platonic opinion concerning a real distinction between the sensitive and rational soul of man; and he affirmed that the Word assumed the former indeed, but by no means the latter. "Apollinaris," says Theodoret (Heretical Fables, book 4, c. 8), "said that God the Word was incarnate by assuming a body and a soul, not a rational one, but one lacking reason, which some call vegetative or vital. Holding that mind is something other than soul, he says that it was by no means assumed, but that the divine nature sufficed to fulfill the use of mind." Gunther and Baltzer renewed the error concerning another soul besides the rational soul in man; their works were condemned by the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX. The invention of the heretics was called trichotomy, because it divides man into, as it were, a threefold substance.
187. Catholica autem doctrina, quae praeter animam rationalem et corpus nullam aliam animam agnoscit in homine, et quae propterea dichotomia dicitur, definita fuit in Conc. CPno. IV. a. 869, quod statuit: "Veteri et Novo Testamento unam animam rationalem et intellectualem habere (vel potius ut Raderus vertit, unicam homini, eamque ratione et intelligentia pollentem esse animam), et omnibus deiloquis patribus et magistris Ecclesiae eandem opinionem asseverantibus, in tantum impietatis quidam, malorum inventionibus dantes operam, devenerunt, ut duas eum habere animas impudenter dogmatizare, et quibusdam irrationalibus conatibus per sapientiam, quae stulta facta est, propriam haeresim confirmare pertentent (vitiosis ratiunculis suam haeresim stabiliant.) Itaque sancta haec et universalis Synodus, veluti quoddam pessimum zizanium, nunc germinantem nequam opinionem evellere festinans, - talis impietatis inventores et patratores, et his similia sentientes, magna voce anathematizat, et definit, atque promulgat, neminem prorsus habere vel servare (debere) quoquomodo statuta hujus impietatis auctorum. Si quis autem contraria gerere praesumpserit huic sanctae et magnae Synodo, anathema sit, et a fide atque cultura Christianorum alienus." Sunt et aliae Ecclesiae de hac re definitiones, quas in sequentibus articulis dabimus.
187. The Catholic doctrine, however, which acknowledges in man no soul other than the rational soul and the body, and which for that reason is called dichotomy, was defined in the Fourth Council of Constantinople in 869, which decreed: "Although the Old and New Testament have one rational and intellectual soul (or rather, as Rader translates, that man has one only soul, and that it is endowed with reason and intelligence), and although all the God-speaking Fathers and teachers of the Church assert the same opinion, certain men, giving themselves to inventions of evils, have come to such a degree of impiety that they shamelessly dogmatize that he has two souls, and by certain irrational attempts, through wisdom which has been made foolish, they strive to confirm their own heresy (they establish their heresy by faulty little reasonings). Therefore this holy and universal Synod, hastening to pull up the wicked opinion now springing up, as though it were a certain very evil tare, anathematizes with a loud voice the inventors and perpetrators of such impiety, and those who think things similar to them, and defines and promulgates that absolutely no one is to hold or preserve in any way the statutes of the authors of this impiety. But if anyone presumes to do things contrary to this holy and great Synod, let him be anathema and alien from the faith and worship of Christians." There are also other definitions of the Church concerning this matter, which we shall give in the following articles.
188. Antequam hanc doctrinam catholicam probemus, ad praecavendas aliquas difficultates, quae tum ex Scriptura tum ex Patribus peti solent, aliqua praenotemus oportet. Ac 1. Anima humana prout vita intellectiva a materia independente gaudet dicitur spiritus; prout vero est vitae vegetativae et sensitivae principium in corpore dicitur anima. Etenim, ut docet Nyssenus (de anima et resurrectione), Damascenus [l. 2. c. 12.], omnes Scholastici DD. post Aristotelem: "anima est substantia vivificans, corpori organico conferens vitam et sensum per seipsam." Ita etiam Gennadius (de eccle. dog.). Quando ergo sive in Scriptura sive apud Patres, spiritus et anima ponitur in homine, non duae res distinctae assignantur, sed una eademque res, quae duplicem habet essendi gradum.
2. Aliquando in Scriptura et apud Patres distinguitur spiritus ab anima in homine, sed nomine spiritus veniunt dona supernaturalia, quae sunt vitae supernaturalis principium; nomine autem animae significatur homo interior naturalis.
3. Aliquando Patres videntur tria ponere in homine, spiritum vel mentem, animam, et corpus. Sed nomine spiritus intelligunt vel facultatem animae, quae est mens, vel donum infusum Spiritus Sancti, ut diximus etiam in praecedente animadversione.
4. Generatim ergo loquendo, nomine spiritus in Scriptura modo significatur quod pertinet ad hominem ut animans est, uti Gen. 7. 15. - modo id, quod est in homine intelligens, uti Eccl. 12. 7. - modo dona supernaturalia, vel Deus Spiritus Sanctus eorum Dator, uti Matth. 1. 18.; 1. Cor. 3. 4.; Thess. 5. 19. - Nomine autem animae exprimitur tum principium vitale, uti Exod. 4. 19., tum principium intelligens, uti Sap. 1. 4.; Matth. 10. 28.
Sic etiam quoad Patres. 5. a) iidem qui videntur distinguere inter spiritum vel mentem, et animam, explicite, ut Nyssenus, vel implicite, ut Origenes et Ephrem, tradunt dichotomiam. - b) S. Epiphanius testatur nullum Ecclesiae filium asseruisse mentem esse substantiam distinctam et non facultatem unius animae in homine. c) Unde Auctor orationis in verba Pauli "non quod volo facio, etc." [inter opp. Chrys.] contra Apollinaristas ita concludit: "Verum haec ad haereticos qui animam et corpus et spiritum memorant, et vim inferunt apostolico verbo dicenti: Deus custodiat corpus vestrum, et animam, et spiritum. Spiritum putant esse mentem. Cur ergo Apostolus dixit: psallam spiritu, psallam et mente? Mos est Scripturae spiritum vocare gratiam spiritus." Cf. etiam D. Thomam [in Ep. 1. ad Thess. c. 5. lect. 2.]
2. Aliquando in Scriptura et apud Patres distinguitur spiritus ab anima in homine, sed nomine spiritus veniunt dona supernaturalia, quae sunt vitae supernaturalis principium; nomine autem animae significatur homo interior naturalis.
3. Aliquando Patres videntur tria ponere in homine, spiritum vel mentem, animam, et corpus. Sed nomine spiritus intelligunt vel facultatem animae, quae est mens, vel donum infusum Spiritus Sancti, ut diximus etiam in praecedente animadversione.
4. Generatim ergo loquendo, nomine spiritus in Scriptura modo significatur quod pertinet ad hominem ut animans est, uti Gen. 7. 15. - modo id, quod est in homine intelligens, uti Eccl. 12. 7. - modo dona supernaturalia, vel Deus Spiritus Sanctus eorum Dator, uti Matth. 1. 18.; 1. Cor. 3. 4.; Thess. 5. 19. - Nomine autem animae exprimitur tum principium vitale, uti Exod. 4. 19., tum principium intelligens, uti Sap. 1. 4.; Matth. 10. 28.
Sic etiam quoad Patres. 5. a) iidem qui videntur distinguere inter spiritum vel mentem, et animam, explicite, ut Nyssenus, vel implicite, ut Origenes et Ephrem, tradunt dichotomiam. - b) S. Epiphanius testatur nullum Ecclesiae filium asseruisse mentem esse substantiam distinctam et non facultatem unius animae in homine. c) Unde Auctor orationis in verba Pauli "non quod volo facio, etc." [inter opp. Chrys.] contra Apollinaristas ita concludit: "Verum haec ad haereticos qui animam et corpus et spiritum memorant, et vim inferunt apostolico verbo dicenti: Deus custodiat corpus vestrum, et animam, et spiritum. Spiritum putant esse mentem. Cur ergo Apostolus dixit: psallam spiritu, psallam et mente? Mos est Scripturae spiritum vocare gratiam spiritus." Cf. etiam D. Thomam [in Ep. 1. ad Thess. c. 5. lect. 2.]
188. Before we prove this Catholic doctrine, it is necessary that we make some preliminary notes, in order to forestall certain difficulties which are commonly sought both from Scripture and from the Fathers. And 1. The human soul, insofar as it enjoys intellective life independent of matter, is called spirit; but insofar as it is the principle of vegetative and sensitive life in the body, it is called soul. For, as Nyssen teaches (On the Soul and Resurrection), Damascene [book 2, c. 12], and all the scholastic Doctors after Aristotle: "the soul is a vivifying substance, conferring life and sense upon an organic body through itself." Thus also Gennadius (On Ecclesiastical Dogmas). Therefore, when either in Scripture or among the Fathers spirit and soul are posited in man, two distinct things are not assigned, but one and the same thing, which has a twofold grade of being.
2. Sometimes in Scripture and among the Fathers spirit is distinguished from soul in man; but under the name of spirit come the supernatural gifts, which are the principle of supernatural life, while by the name of soul the natural interior man is signified.
3. Sometimes the Fathers seem to posit three things in man: spirit or mind, soul, and body. But by the name of spirit they understand either the faculty of the soul which is mind, or the infused gift of the Holy Spirit, as we said also in the preceding observation.
4. Generally speaking, therefore, by the name spirit in Scripture sometimes there is signified what pertains to man as he is a living being, as in Gen. 7:15; sometimes that which is intelligent in man, as in Eccles. 12:7; sometimes supernatural gifts, or God the Holy Spirit, the Giver of them, as in Matt. 1:18; 1 Cor. 3:4; 1 Thess. 5:19. But by the name soul there is expressed both the vital principle, as in Exod. 4:19, and the intelligent principle, as in Wis. 1:4; Matt. 10:28.
So also with regard to the Fathers. 5. a) The same Fathers who seem to distinguish between spirit or mind and soul hand down dichotomy, either explicitly, as Nyssen, or implicitly, as Origen and Ephrem. b) St. Epiphanius testifies that no son of the Church asserted that the mind is a distinct substance and not the faculty of one soul in man. c) Hence the author of the oration on the words of Paul, "I do not do what I will," etc. [among the works of Chrysostom], concludes against the Apollinarists in this way: "But these things are against the heretics who mention soul and body and spirit, and do violence to the apostolic word saying: May God keep your body, and soul, and spirit. They think spirit to be mind. Why then did the Apostle say: I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing also with the mind? It is the custom of Scripture to call the grace of the spirit, spirit." Cf. also St. Thomas [on 1 Thess. c. 5, lect. 2].
2. Sometimes in Scripture and among the Fathers spirit is distinguished from soul in man; but under the name of spirit come the supernatural gifts, which are the principle of supernatural life, while by the name of soul the natural interior man is signified.
3. Sometimes the Fathers seem to posit three things in man: spirit or mind, soul, and body. But by the name of spirit they understand either the faculty of the soul which is mind, or the infused gift of the Holy Spirit, as we said also in the preceding observation.
4. Generally speaking, therefore, by the name spirit in Scripture sometimes there is signified what pertains to man as he is a living being, as in Gen. 7:15; sometimes that which is intelligent in man, as in Eccles. 12:7; sometimes supernatural gifts, or God the Holy Spirit, the Giver of them, as in Matt. 1:18; 1 Cor. 3:4; 1 Thess. 5:19. But by the name soul there is expressed both the vital principle, as in Exod. 4:19, and the intelligent principle, as in Wis. 1:4; Matt. 10:28.
So also with regard to the Fathers. 5. a) The same Fathers who seem to distinguish between spirit or mind and soul hand down dichotomy, either explicitly, as Nyssen, or implicitly, as Origen and Ephrem. b) St. Epiphanius testifies that no son of the Church asserted that the mind is a distinct substance and not the faculty of one soul in man. c) Hence the author of the oration on the words of Paul, "I do not do what I will," etc. [among the works of Chrysostom], concludes against the Apollinarists in this way: "But these things are against the heretics who mention soul and body and spirit, and do violence to the apostolic word saying: May God keep your body, and soul, and spirit. They think spirit to be mind. Why then did the Apostle say: I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing also with the mind? It is the custom of Scripture to call the grace of the spirit, spirit." Cf. also St. Thomas [on 1 Thess. c. 5, lect. 2].
189. His positis dicimus:
PROP. XIX. Unica est anima in homine, eaque rationalis; ac proinde distributio hominis in spiritum, animam et corpus, ac ejusdem partitio in spiritum et corpus informatum anima rejicienda est.
Prob. I. ex Scriptura. a) Gen. 2. 7. legitur: "Formavit igitur Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem." Unde: describitur hic formatio hominis, et duo solum traduntur elementa, corpus et anima, qua vivificatur; ergo duobus solum elementis constat humana natura. - Revera, spiraculum vitae, de quo hic agitur, est certe anima hominis siquidem per illud factus est homo in animam viventem; atqui illud idem spiraculum vitae est spiritus. Nam hoc fert communis SS. Patrum interpretatio: nullo alio elemento commemorato, dicitur in Gen. 1. homo factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, et ut praesit animantibus ac dominetur illis: - Statim post recitata verba ex cap. 2. dicitur Deus praeceptum homini dedisse - adjungitur hominem imposuisse nomina caeteris animalibus: haec autem omnia non possunt ipsi competere, nisi prout est mente praeditus. Ergo. Vid. Suarez de anim. l. 1. cap. 12. nn. 4. 5.
b) Eccl. 12., 1. 7.: "Memento Creatoris tui in diebus juventutis tuae, antequam veniat tempus afflictionis, et veniant anni de quibus dicas: Non mihi placent: antequam ... revertatur pulvis in terram suam unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum." In quo loco duplex solum humanae naturae elementum commemoratur, pulvis - de limo terrae - et spiritus - spiraculum vitae; spiritus autem, qui ad Deum redit, est immortalis, ac proinde intelligentia praeditus.
c) Matth. 10. 28.: "Nolite timere eos, qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere: sed potius timete eum, qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam." - 27. 50.: "Jesus autem iterum clamans voce magna emisit spiritum." - Luc. 8. 55. de filia Jairi a Domino in vitam revocata dicitur: "Reversus est spiritus ejus, et surrexit continuo." In quibus omnibus duo solum ponuntur, corpus et anima, quam homines non possunt occidere, seu immortalis, vel spiritus: si autem principium vivificans corpus est anima immortalis, spiritus: nulla alia praeter illam, anima agnoscitur in homine.
Prob. II. ex Patribus. a) Multi ante exortam haeresim Apollinaris hanc doctrinam tradiderunt. Ita Athenagoras [de Resur. c. 15.], ait: "Hominis natura ex anima immortali constat et corpore, quod cum anima in creatione conjunctum fuit; unum ex utroque est animal quod patitur quaecumque anima patitur et corpus." Exinde demonstrat convenientiam resurrectionis. Clemens Alex. (Strom. l. 5.) enarrans verba Moyses, Gen 2. 7.: "Merito," ait, "ex terra corpus dicit formari Moyses, animam autem ratione praeditam desuper inspiratam fuisse in faciem. Hic enim dicunt collocatam principalem animae facultatem, ingressum animae in protoplastum per accessionem sensuum interpretantes, et ideo factum esse hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei." Ita etiam Tertullianus [de Poen. c. 3.] - S. Irenaeus [l. 5. c. 8.] - Methodius [ex lib. de resurr. apud Photium cod. 234.] - Origenes [in Matth. tom. 13. n. 18., et Periar. l. 1. c. 7.] etc.
b) Ab exorta vero Apollinaris haeresi, perspicua omnino dichotomia in eorum scriptis invenitur. S. Athanasius [l. 2. con. Apollin. n. 14.], inquit: "Qui de hominis inobedientia quaestionem habuit, judicium dedit quo duplicem poenae sententiam protulit: terreno corpori dicens: Terra es et in terram reverteris; atque ita, Domino sententiam ferente, corruptio corpus excipit; animae autem: morte morieris; et sic in duas dividitur partes homo, damnatus ad duo secedere loca ... quod si mihi alium damnationis locum, praeter hos duos indicare valetis, merito dixeritis in tres partes dividi hominem et ex duobus quidem locis revocationem factam esse: in tertio vero tertiam partem manere vinculis colligatam. Si vero nullum alium locum ostendere potestis praeter sepulcrum et infernum, ex quibus homo perfecte ereptus sit [Esto per suam perfectam et verissimam formam nos liberante], cur adhuc talia profertis, quasi Deus humano generi nondum reconciliatus sit?" S. Ephrem [de Inspirat.]: "Anima ita est in corpore, ut physicum vinculum solutu difficile. In omnibus operatur, velut dominatrix in corpore. Ita vitam in carne operatur ut naturali vinculo detenta. Non est alia anima in sensibilibus agens, alia in intelligibilibus, cum corpore condita est, sed propriam habet substantiam." - S. Leo [Ep. ad Flav.]: "Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis, hoc est, in ea carne quam assumpsit ex homine, et quam spiritu vitae rationalis animavit." (de Eccles. dog. c. 15.): "Neque duas animas credimus esse in uno homine, unam animalem, qua animatur corpus et quae immixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritualem; sed dicimus, unam eandemque esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificat, et semetipsam sua ratione disponit." S. Augustinus (Serm. 150. de verb. Apost.): "Nihil est in homine, quod ad ejus substantiam pertineat et naturam, praeter corpus et animam."
NOTA. Ex dicendis in articulis sequentibus haec thesis confirmabitur, ideoque abstinemus ab aliis probationibus adducendis. - Objectiones ex auctoritate facile solvuntur ex animadversionibus praemissis. - Ex ratione autem praecipue objiciunt: unum idemque principium nequit habere oppositas tendentias; sed caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Ergo.
Resp. 1. Hoc argumentum nimis probat. Nam quandoque oritur pugna etiam inter desideria pertinentia ad vitam rationalem, ut ipsa experientia constat; ergo si quid probaret haec pugna, probaret etiam admittendas esse in nobis duas animas rationales. - D. Thomas (Quodl. 11. q. 5. a. 5.) jam responderat huic difficultati, dicens: "Non est inconveniens aliquid idem existens secundum diversas vires vel partes moveri ad opposita; et ideo, licet substantia sit eadem sensitivae et intellectivae, tamen potest secundum diversas partes et vires moveri ad opposita, ut scilicet sensus moveatur ad ea, quae sunt sibi propria, et ratio ad ea, ad quae ordinatur." Quam responsionem perspicue evolvit Maurus (Quaest. phil. Vol. 4. ad 2.), "Sicut," inquit, "quum quis trahitur a duobus in partes oppositas, experitur in suo corpore pugnam contrariarum tractionum, sic cum animus a bonis oppositis trahitur ad contrarias inclinationes, e. g., a bono virtutis trahitur ad electionem honesti, et a bono voluntatis trahitur ad electionem jucundi contrarii honesto, experitur in se pugnam contrariarum inclinationum ... Si quis urgeat: non possunt in unica anima dari simul inclinationes et actus contrarii; distinguo: efficaces, concedo; inefficaces, nego. Sicut idem corpus non potest efficaciter trahi simul ad dexteram et sinistram, ita ut moveatur simul in utramque partem, potest tamen inefficaciter trahi, ita ut ad neutram moveatur, vel efficaciter ad unam, inefficaciter ad alteram, ita ut ad unam moveatur, ad alteram non: sic una anima potest inefficaciter trahi ad electiones contrarias honesti et jucundi, e. g., ita ut neutrum, aut alterum tantum eligat, sed non potest efficaciter trahi simul ad electionem contrariorum, ita ut eligat simul contraria." Vid. Liberatore, Del Composto um. cap. 6.
PROP. XIX. Unica est anima in homine, eaque rationalis; ac proinde distributio hominis in spiritum, animam et corpus, ac ejusdem partitio in spiritum et corpus informatum anima rejicienda est.
Prob. I. ex Scriptura. a) Gen. 2. 7. legitur: "Formavit igitur Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem." Unde: describitur hic formatio hominis, et duo solum traduntur elementa, corpus et anima, qua vivificatur; ergo duobus solum elementis constat humana natura. - Revera, spiraculum vitae, de quo hic agitur, est certe anima hominis siquidem per illud factus est homo in animam viventem; atqui illud idem spiraculum vitae est spiritus. Nam hoc fert communis SS. Patrum interpretatio: nullo alio elemento commemorato, dicitur in Gen. 1. homo factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, et ut praesit animantibus ac dominetur illis: - Statim post recitata verba ex cap. 2. dicitur Deus praeceptum homini dedisse - adjungitur hominem imposuisse nomina caeteris animalibus: haec autem omnia non possunt ipsi competere, nisi prout est mente praeditus. Ergo. Vid. Suarez de anim. l. 1. cap. 12. nn. 4. 5.
b) Eccl. 12., 1. 7.: "Memento Creatoris tui in diebus juventutis tuae, antequam veniat tempus afflictionis, et veniant anni de quibus dicas: Non mihi placent: antequam ... revertatur pulvis in terram suam unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum." In quo loco duplex solum humanae naturae elementum commemoratur, pulvis - de limo terrae - et spiritus - spiraculum vitae; spiritus autem, qui ad Deum redit, est immortalis, ac proinde intelligentia praeditus.
c) Matth. 10. 28.: "Nolite timere eos, qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere: sed potius timete eum, qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam." - 27. 50.: "Jesus autem iterum clamans voce magna emisit spiritum." - Luc. 8. 55. de filia Jairi a Domino in vitam revocata dicitur: "Reversus est spiritus ejus, et surrexit continuo." In quibus omnibus duo solum ponuntur, corpus et anima, quam homines non possunt occidere, seu immortalis, vel spiritus: si autem principium vivificans corpus est anima immortalis, spiritus: nulla alia praeter illam, anima agnoscitur in homine.
Prob. II. ex Patribus. a) Multi ante exortam haeresim Apollinaris hanc doctrinam tradiderunt. Ita Athenagoras [de Resur. c. 15.], ait: "Hominis natura ex anima immortali constat et corpore, quod cum anima in creatione conjunctum fuit; unum ex utroque est animal quod patitur quaecumque anima patitur et corpus." Exinde demonstrat convenientiam resurrectionis. Clemens Alex. (Strom. l. 5.) enarrans verba Moyses, Gen 2. 7.: "Merito," ait, "ex terra corpus dicit formari Moyses, animam autem ratione praeditam desuper inspiratam fuisse in faciem. Hic enim dicunt collocatam principalem animae facultatem, ingressum animae in protoplastum per accessionem sensuum interpretantes, et ideo factum esse hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei." Ita etiam Tertullianus [de Poen. c. 3.] - S. Irenaeus [l. 5. c. 8.] - Methodius [ex lib. de resurr. apud Photium cod. 234.] - Origenes [in Matth. tom. 13. n. 18., et Periar. l. 1. c. 7.] etc.
b) Ab exorta vero Apollinaris haeresi, perspicua omnino dichotomia in eorum scriptis invenitur. S. Athanasius [l. 2. con. Apollin. n. 14.], inquit: "Qui de hominis inobedientia quaestionem habuit, judicium dedit quo duplicem poenae sententiam protulit: terreno corpori dicens: Terra es et in terram reverteris; atque ita, Domino sententiam ferente, corruptio corpus excipit; animae autem: morte morieris; et sic in duas dividitur partes homo, damnatus ad duo secedere loca ... quod si mihi alium damnationis locum, praeter hos duos indicare valetis, merito dixeritis in tres partes dividi hominem et ex duobus quidem locis revocationem factam esse: in tertio vero tertiam partem manere vinculis colligatam. Si vero nullum alium locum ostendere potestis praeter sepulcrum et infernum, ex quibus homo perfecte ereptus sit [Esto per suam perfectam et verissimam formam nos liberante], cur adhuc talia profertis, quasi Deus humano generi nondum reconciliatus sit?" S. Ephrem [de Inspirat.]: "Anima ita est in corpore, ut physicum vinculum solutu difficile. In omnibus operatur, velut dominatrix in corpore. Ita vitam in carne operatur ut naturali vinculo detenta. Non est alia anima in sensibilibus agens, alia in intelligibilibus, cum corpore condita est, sed propriam habet substantiam." - S. Leo [Ep. ad Flav.]: "Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis, hoc est, in ea carne quam assumpsit ex homine, et quam spiritu vitae rationalis animavit." (de Eccles. dog. c. 15.): "Neque duas animas credimus esse in uno homine, unam animalem, qua animatur corpus et quae immixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritualem; sed dicimus, unam eandemque esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificat, et semetipsam sua ratione disponit." S. Augustinus (Serm. 150. de verb. Apost.): "Nihil est in homine, quod ad ejus substantiam pertineat et naturam, praeter corpus et animam."
NOTA. Ex dicendis in articulis sequentibus haec thesis confirmabitur, ideoque abstinemus ab aliis probationibus adducendis. - Objectiones ex auctoritate facile solvuntur ex animadversionibus praemissis. - Ex ratione autem praecipue objiciunt: unum idemque principium nequit habere oppositas tendentias; sed caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Ergo.
Resp. 1. Hoc argumentum nimis probat. Nam quandoque oritur pugna etiam inter desideria pertinentia ad vitam rationalem, ut ipsa experientia constat; ergo si quid probaret haec pugna, probaret etiam admittendas esse in nobis duas animas rationales. - D. Thomas (Quodl. 11. q. 5. a. 5.) jam responderat huic difficultati, dicens: "Non est inconveniens aliquid idem existens secundum diversas vires vel partes moveri ad opposita; et ideo, licet substantia sit eadem sensitivae et intellectivae, tamen potest secundum diversas partes et vires moveri ad opposita, ut scilicet sensus moveatur ad ea, quae sunt sibi propria, et ratio ad ea, ad quae ordinatur." Quam responsionem perspicue evolvit Maurus (Quaest. phil. Vol. 4. ad 2.), "Sicut," inquit, "quum quis trahitur a duobus in partes oppositas, experitur in suo corpore pugnam contrariarum tractionum, sic cum animus a bonis oppositis trahitur ad contrarias inclinationes, e. g., a bono virtutis trahitur ad electionem honesti, et a bono voluntatis trahitur ad electionem jucundi contrarii honesto, experitur in se pugnam contrariarum inclinationum ... Si quis urgeat: non possunt in unica anima dari simul inclinationes et actus contrarii; distinguo: efficaces, concedo; inefficaces, nego. Sicut idem corpus non potest efficaciter trahi simul ad dexteram et sinistram, ita ut moveatur simul in utramque partem, potest tamen inefficaciter trahi, ita ut ad neutram moveatur, vel efficaciter ad unam, inefficaciter ad alteram, ita ut ad unam moveatur, ad alteram non: sic una anima potest inefficaciter trahi ad electiones contrarias honesti et jucundi, e. g., ita ut neutrum, aut alterum tantum eligat, sed non potest efficaciter trahi simul ad electionem contrariorum, ita ut eligat simul contraria." Vid. Liberatore, Del Composto um. cap. 6.
189. With these things laid down, we say:
PROP. XIX. There is one soul in man, and it is rational; and consequently the distribution of man into spirit, soul, and body, and likewise his partition into spirit and body informed by soul, must be rejected.
Proof I, from Scripture. a) In Gen. 2:7 it is read: "Therefore God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Hence: the formation of man is described here, and only two elements are handed down, body and soul, by which he is vivified; therefore human nature consists of only two elements. In truth, the breath of life, of which there is question here, is certainly the soul of man, since through it man became a living soul; but that same breath of life is spirit. For this is what the common interpretation of the holy Fathers bears: with no other element mentioned, man is said in Gen. 1 to have been made to the image and likeness of God, and to preside over living things and have dominion over them. Immediately after the words recited from chapter 2, God is said to have given a command to man; it is added that man imposed names upon the other animals. But all these things cannot belong to him except insofar as he is endowed with mind. Therefore. See Suarez, On the Soul, book 1, c. 12, nn. 4, 5.
b) Eccles. 12:1, 7: "Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth, before the time of affliction comes, and the years come of which thou shalt say: They please me not: before ... the dust returns to its earth from which it was, and the spirit returns to God, who gave it." In this passage only a twofold element of human nature is commemorated: dust - from the slime of the earth - and spirit - the breath of life; but the spirit which returns to God is immortal, and consequently endowed with intelligence.
c) Matt. 10:28: "Fear not those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell." Matt. 27:50: "But Jesus, again crying with a loud voice, gave up the spirit." Luke 8:55 says of the daughter of Jairus, recalled by the Lord to life: "Her spirit returned, and she rose immediately." In all these places only two things are posited: body and soul, which men cannot kill, or the immortal soul, that is, spirit. But if the principle vivifying the body is the immortal soul, spirit, then no other soul besides that one is acknowledged in man.
Proof II, from the Fathers. a) Many before the rise of the heresy of Apollinaris handed down this doctrine. Thus Athenagoras [On the Resurrection, c. 15] says: "The nature of man consists of an immortal soul and a body, which was joined with the soul in creation; from both there is one animal which suffers whatever the soul and the body suffer." From this he demonstrates the fittingness of the resurrection. Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, book 5), explaining the words of Moses, Gen. 2:7, says: "Deservedly Moses says that the body was formed from the earth, but that the soul endowed with reason was breathed from above into the face. For they say that the principal faculty of the soul was placed here, interpreting the entrance of the soul into the first-formed man through the accession of the senses; and therefore man was made to the image and likeness of God." Thus also Tertullian [On Penance, c. 3], St. Irenaeus [book 5, c. 8], Methodius [from the book On the Resurrection, apud Photius, cod. 234], Origen [on Matthew, tom. 13, n. 18, and Peri Archon, book 1, c. 7], etc.
b) But after the heresy of Apollinaris had arisen, an altogether clear dichotomy is found in their writings. St. Athanasius [book 2, against Apollinaris, n. 14] says: "He who had the question concerning man's disobedience gave a judgment by which he brought forth a twofold sentence of punishment: saying to the earthly body, Earth thou art and unto earth thou shalt return; and thus, when the Lord pronounces the sentence, corruption receives the body; but to the soul, Thou shalt die the death; and thus man is divided into two parts, condemned to depart to two places. But if you are able to indicate to me another place of condemnation besides these two, you will deservedly have said that man is divided into three parts and that a recall has been made from two places, but that in the third place the third part remains bound in chains. But if you cannot show any other place besides the sepulcher and hell, from which man has been perfectly rescued [with his perfect and most true form liberating us], why do you still bring forward such things, as if God has not yet been reconciled to the human race?" St. Ephrem [On Inspiration]: "The soul is in the body as a physical bond difficult to loose. It operates in all things, as a mistress in the body. It operates life in the flesh as held by a natural bond. There is not one soul acting in sensibles and another in intelligibles; it was established with the body, but it has its own substance." St. Leo [Epistle to Flavian]: "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, that is, in that flesh which he assumed from man, and which he animated by the spirit of rational life." (On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, c. 15): "Nor do we believe that there are two souls in one man, one animal soul by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and another spiritual soul; but we say that there is one and the same soul in man, which both vivifies the body by its association and disposes itself by its reason." St. Augustine (Sermon 150, On the Words of the Apostle): "There is nothing in man which pertains to his substance and nature except body and soul."
NOTE. This thesis will be confirmed from the things to be said in the following articles; and therefore we abstain from bringing forward other proofs. Objections from authority are easily solved from the preliminary observations already set down. But from reason they especially object: one and the same principle cannot have opposite tendencies; but the flesh lusts against the spirit. Therefore.
Reply 1. This argument proves too much. For sometimes a conflict also arises between desires pertaining to rational life, as experience itself establishes; therefore if this conflict proved anything, it would also prove that two rational souls must be admitted in us. St. Thomas (Quodlibet 11, q. 5, a. 5) had already answered this difficulty, saying: "It is not unsuitable that something existing as one and the same thing should, according to diverse powers or parts, be moved toward opposites; and therefore, although the substance of the sensitive and intellective [soul] is the same, nevertheless according to diverse parts and powers it can be moved toward opposites, namely so that sense is moved toward those things which are proper to it, and reason toward those things to which it is ordered." Maurus (Philosophical Questions, vol. 4, ad 2) clearly unfolds this response: "Just as," he says, "when someone is drawn by two men in opposite directions, he experiences in his body the conflict of contrary pullings, so when the mind is drawn by opposed goods toward contrary inclinations, for example, by the good of virtue it is drawn toward the choice of the honorable, and by the good of the will it is drawn toward the choice of the pleasant contrary to the honorable, it experiences in itself the conflict of contrary inclinations. ... If someone urges: contrary inclinations and acts cannot be given simultaneously in one soul, I distinguish: efficacious ones, I concede; inefficacious ones, I deny. Just as the same body cannot be efficaciously drawn at the same time to the right and to the left, so that it is moved at the same time in both directions, yet it can be inefficaciously drawn, so that it is moved toward neither, or efficaciously toward one, inefficaciously toward the other, so that it is moved toward one and not toward the other; so one soul can be inefficaciously drawn toward contrary choices of the honorable and the pleasant, for example, so that it chooses neither, or only one of the two, but it cannot be efficaciously drawn at the same time toward the choice of contraries, so that it chooses contraries at the same time." See Liberatore, Del Composto um., c. 6.
PROP. XIX. There is one soul in man, and it is rational; and consequently the distribution of man into spirit, soul, and body, and likewise his partition into spirit and body informed by soul, must be rejected.
Proof I, from Scripture. a) In Gen. 2:7 it is read: "Therefore God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Hence: the formation of man is described here, and only two elements are handed down, body and soul, by which he is vivified; therefore human nature consists of only two elements. In truth, the breath of life, of which there is question here, is certainly the soul of man, since through it man became a living soul; but that same breath of life is spirit. For this is what the common interpretation of the holy Fathers bears: with no other element mentioned, man is said in Gen. 1 to have been made to the image and likeness of God, and to preside over living things and have dominion over them. Immediately after the words recited from chapter 2, God is said to have given a command to man; it is added that man imposed names upon the other animals. But all these things cannot belong to him except insofar as he is endowed with mind. Therefore. See Suarez, On the Soul, book 1, c. 12, nn. 4, 5.
b) Eccles. 12:1, 7: "Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth, before the time of affliction comes, and the years come of which thou shalt say: They please me not: before ... the dust returns to its earth from which it was, and the spirit returns to God, who gave it." In this passage only a twofold element of human nature is commemorated: dust - from the slime of the earth - and spirit - the breath of life; but the spirit which returns to God is immortal, and consequently endowed with intelligence.
c) Matt. 10:28: "Fear not those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell." Matt. 27:50: "But Jesus, again crying with a loud voice, gave up the spirit." Luke 8:55 says of the daughter of Jairus, recalled by the Lord to life: "Her spirit returned, and she rose immediately." In all these places only two things are posited: body and soul, which men cannot kill, or the immortal soul, that is, spirit. But if the principle vivifying the body is the immortal soul, spirit, then no other soul besides that one is acknowledged in man.
Proof II, from the Fathers. a) Many before the rise of the heresy of Apollinaris handed down this doctrine. Thus Athenagoras [On the Resurrection, c. 15] says: "The nature of man consists of an immortal soul and a body, which was joined with the soul in creation; from both there is one animal which suffers whatever the soul and the body suffer." From this he demonstrates the fittingness of the resurrection. Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, book 5), explaining the words of Moses, Gen. 2:7, says: "Deservedly Moses says that the body was formed from the earth, but that the soul endowed with reason was breathed from above into the face. For they say that the principal faculty of the soul was placed here, interpreting the entrance of the soul into the first-formed man through the accession of the senses; and therefore man was made to the image and likeness of God." Thus also Tertullian [On Penance, c. 3], St. Irenaeus [book 5, c. 8], Methodius [from the book On the Resurrection, apud Photius, cod. 234], Origen [on Matthew, tom. 13, n. 18, and Peri Archon, book 1, c. 7], etc.
b) But after the heresy of Apollinaris had arisen, an altogether clear dichotomy is found in their writings. St. Athanasius [book 2, against Apollinaris, n. 14] says: "He who had the question concerning man's disobedience gave a judgment by which he brought forth a twofold sentence of punishment: saying to the earthly body, Earth thou art and unto earth thou shalt return; and thus, when the Lord pronounces the sentence, corruption receives the body; but to the soul, Thou shalt die the death; and thus man is divided into two parts, condemned to depart to two places. But if you are able to indicate to me another place of condemnation besides these two, you will deservedly have said that man is divided into three parts and that a recall has been made from two places, but that in the third place the third part remains bound in chains. But if you cannot show any other place besides the sepulcher and hell, from which man has been perfectly rescued [with his perfect and most true form liberating us], why do you still bring forward such things, as if God has not yet been reconciled to the human race?" St. Ephrem [On Inspiration]: "The soul is in the body as a physical bond difficult to loose. It operates in all things, as a mistress in the body. It operates life in the flesh as held by a natural bond. There is not one soul acting in sensibles and another in intelligibles; it was established with the body, but it has its own substance." St. Leo [Epistle to Flavian]: "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, that is, in that flesh which he assumed from man, and which he animated by the spirit of rational life." (On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, c. 15): "Nor do we believe that there are two souls in one man, one animal soul by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and another spiritual soul; but we say that there is one and the same soul in man, which both vivifies the body by its association and disposes itself by its reason." St. Augustine (Sermon 150, On the Words of the Apostle): "There is nothing in man which pertains to his substance and nature except body and soul."
NOTE. This thesis will be confirmed from the things to be said in the following articles; and therefore we abstain from bringing forward other proofs. Objections from authority are easily solved from the preliminary observations already set down. But from reason they especially object: one and the same principle cannot have opposite tendencies; but the flesh lusts against the spirit. Therefore.
Reply 1. This argument proves too much. For sometimes a conflict also arises between desires pertaining to rational life, as experience itself establishes; therefore if this conflict proved anything, it would also prove that two rational souls must be admitted in us. St. Thomas (Quodlibet 11, q. 5, a. 5) had already answered this difficulty, saying: "It is not unsuitable that something existing as one and the same thing should, according to diverse powers or parts, be moved toward opposites; and therefore, although the substance of the sensitive and intellective [soul] is the same, nevertheless according to diverse parts and powers it can be moved toward opposites, namely so that sense is moved toward those things which are proper to it, and reason toward those things to which it is ordered." Maurus (Philosophical Questions, vol. 4, ad 2) clearly unfolds this response: "Just as," he says, "when someone is drawn by two men in opposite directions, he experiences in his body the conflict of contrary pullings, so when the mind is drawn by opposed goods toward contrary inclinations, for example, by the good of virtue it is drawn toward the choice of the honorable, and by the good of the will it is drawn toward the choice of the pleasant contrary to the honorable, it experiences in itself the conflict of contrary inclinations. ... If someone urges: contrary inclinations and acts cannot be given simultaneously in one soul, I distinguish: efficacious ones, I concede; inefficacious ones, I deny. Just as the same body cannot be efficaciously drawn at the same time to the right and to the left, so that it is moved at the same time in both directions, yet it can be inefficaciously drawn, so that it is moved toward neither, or efficaciously toward one, inefficaciously toward the other, so that it is moved toward one and not toward the other; so one soul can be inefficaciously drawn toward contrary choices of the honorable and the pleasant, for example, so that it chooses neither, or only one of the two, but it cannot be efficaciously drawn at the same time toward the choice of contraries, so that it chooses contraries at the same time." See Liberatore, Del Composto um., c. 6.