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Utrum Deus libere mundum creaverit.
105. Haec quaestio tradi solet in philosophia; paucis ergo ea solum attingemus, quae ad rerum intelligentiam necessaria hic sunt. Mundum a Deo non libere, sed necessario creatum esse docuerunt non modo fatalistae omnes et athei, sed et pantheistae. Hi revera negant veram creationem, quod plene concordat cum eorum principiis; sed creationis nomine saepe abutentes, creationem quamdam suo modo agnoscunt, quam dicunt necessariam. Sic Spinoza, ex. gr., (Ethic. p. 2. prop. 48.) ait: "Liberum Dei decretum fictitium esse demonstramus." - Non defuerunt ultimis his temporibus philosophi, qui licet catholico nomine gloriarentur, errorem tamen de necessitate creationis, antiquas objectiones centies refutatas repetentes, docuerunt. Inter quos Cousin, dum errorem suum retractare affirmabat, sophismatum repetitione confirmabat.
105. This question is usually handed down in philosophy; therefore we shall touch briefly only on those things which are necessary here for the understanding of the matters. That the world was created by God not freely, but necessarily, was taught not only by all fatalists and atheists, but also by pantheists. These in reality deny true creation, which fully agrees with their principles; but often abusing the name of creation, they acknowledge in their own way a certain creation, which they say is necessary. Thus Spinoza, for example (Ethics, part 2, prop. 48), says: "We demonstrate that the free decree of God is fictitious." In these last times there have not been lacking philosophers who, although they gloried in the Catholic name, nevertheless taught the error concerning the necessity of creation, repeating ancient objections refuted a hundred times. Among these was Cousin, who, while he affirmed that he was retracting his error, confirmed it by the repetition of sophisms.
106. Doctrina catholica quoad hanc rem sufficienter tradita fuit ab Eugenio IV. in Decreto pro Jacobitis, approbante Concilio Florentino. Ibi dicitur: "Firmissime credit, profitetur et praedicat (Romana Ecclesia), unum verum Deum ... esse omnium ... Creatorem, qui quando voluit, bonitate sua universas tam spirituales quam corporales condidit creaturas." - Docetur etiam in Catechismo Romano, ubi legitur: Deus non ex materia aliqua mundum fabricatus est, sed ex nihilo creavit: idque nulla vi aut necessitate coactus, sed sua sponte et voluntate instituit. Denique clarissime definita fuit in Concilio Vaticano, cap. cit. (n. 27.), ubi dicitur Deus mundum creavisse liberrimo consilio. - Et can. 5. in idem cap.: "Si quis ... Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, quam necessario amat seipsum ... anathema sit."
106. The Catholic doctrine concerning this matter was sufficiently handed down by Eugene IV in the Decree for the Jacobites, with the approval of the Council of Florence. There it is said: "The Roman Church most firmly believes, professes, and preaches that the one true God ... is the Creator of all things ... who, when he willed, by his goodness founded all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal." It is also taught in the Roman Catechism, where it is read: God did not fashion the world from some matter, but created it from nothing; and he established this, compelled by no force or necessity, but of his own accord and will. Finally, it was most clearly defined in the cited chapter of the Vatican Council (n. 27), where it is said that God created the world by a most free counsel. And canon 5 in the same chapter: "If anyone ... shall say that God created not by a will free from all necessity, but as necessarily as he necessarily loves himself ... let him be anathema."
107. Ad difficultates praecavendas in mentem revocandum est quod omnes divinae perfectiones sunt quid unum in Deo. Attamen quae secundum rem unum sunt, secundum rationem distinguuntur, quatenus diversae perfectiones diversum habent formalem conceptum: Sic, ex. gr., distinguimus divinam voluntatem a divina essentia. Haec autem distinctio quamvis non sit realis, non est tamen purum figmentum rationis nostrae, siquidem habet fundamentum in re; idque est ipsa divina perfectio, quae, cum infinita sit, debet cuicumque perfectioni aequivalere. Sub hac distinctione patet non valere argumentum a natura divina ad voluntatem respectu illorum, quae sunt a voluntate non ut natura est, sed ut voluntas. Sic dum natura Dei est et concipitur ut aliquid omnino
absolutum; voluntas dicit habitudinem ad aliquem terminum, quem amat. Duplex autem est terminus divinae voluntatis: Deus ipse, seu divina bonitas, et quidquid est aliud a Deo. Seipsum Deus necessario vult, hoc enim postulat ipsa infinita Dei Bonitas; caetera vero libere vult. Nam, ut docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 19. a. 3. c.: "Alia autem a se Deus vult, in quantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem. Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes finem, nisi sint talia sine quibus finis esse non potest; sicut volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem volentes transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum quia sine hoc possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde cum bonitas Dei sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis ex aliis accrescat, sequitur quod alia a se eum velle non sit necessarium absolute." Cum tandem voluntas in Deo non sit per modum potentiae prodeuntis in actum, sed per modum actus qui terminatur ad aliquid; si quid Deus libere vult, ac proinde ita vult ut potuerit non velle, tota contingentia se habet ex parte termini, qui potest esse et non esse, non vero ex parte actus divini, qui idem semper manet sive terminetur ad creaturas, sive non. Haec innuisse sufficiat, cum vera notio divinae libertatis tradita fuerit anno elapso in tract. de Deo. Vid. si lubet cit. qs. 19. a. 3. et 10.
absolutum; voluntas dicit habitudinem ad aliquem terminum, quem amat. Duplex autem est terminus divinae voluntatis: Deus ipse, seu divina bonitas, et quidquid est aliud a Deo. Seipsum Deus necessario vult, hoc enim postulat ipsa infinita Dei Bonitas; caetera vero libere vult. Nam, ut docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 19. a. 3. c.: "Alia autem a se Deus vult, in quantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem. Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes finem, nisi sint talia sine quibus finis esse non potest; sicut volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem volentes transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum quia sine hoc possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde cum bonitas Dei sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis ex aliis accrescat, sequitur quod alia a se eum velle non sit necessarium absolute." Cum tandem voluntas in Deo non sit per modum potentiae prodeuntis in actum, sed per modum actus qui terminatur ad aliquid; si quid Deus libere vult, ac proinde ita vult ut potuerit non velle, tota contingentia se habet ex parte termini, qui potest esse et non esse, non vero ex parte actus divini, qui idem semper manet sive terminetur ad creaturas, sive non. Haec innuisse sufficiat, cum vera notio divinae libertatis tradita fuerit anno elapso in tract. de Deo. Vid. si lubet cit. qs. 19. a. 3. et 10.
107. To forestall difficulties, it must be recalled to mind that all the divine perfections are one thing in God. Nevertheless, those things which are one according to reality are distinguished according to reason, insofar as diverse perfections have a diverse formal concept. Thus, for example, we distinguish the divine will from the divine essence. But this distinction, although it is not real, is nevertheless not a pure fiction of our reason, since it has a foundation in reality; and that foundation is the divine perfection itself, which, since it is infinite, must be equivalent to every perfection. Under this distinction it is clear that an argument from the divine nature to the will does not hold with respect to those things which are from the will not as it is nature, but as it is will. Thus, while the nature of God is and is conceived as something altogether absolute, will says a relation to some term which it loves. But the term of the divine will is twofold: God himself, or the divine goodness, and whatever is other than God. God necessarily wills himself, for the infinite Goodness of God itself demands this; but other things he freely wills. For, as St. Thomas teaches, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 3, corpus: "God wills things other than himself insofar as they are ordered to his goodness as to an end. But those things which are for the end we do not will from necessity while willing the end, unless they are such that without them the end cannot be; just as we will food, while willing the preservation of life; and a ship, while willing to cross the sea. But we do not in this way from necessity will those things without which the end can be, as a horse for walking, because without this we can go; and the same reasoning holds in other cases. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can be without other things, since nothing of perfection accrues to him from other things, it follows that for him to will things other than himself is not absolutely necessary." Finally, since will in God is not by way of a potency going forth into act, but by way of an act which is terminated at something; if God freely wills something, and therefore wills it in such a way that he could have not willed it, the whole contingency is on the part of the term, which can be and not be, but not on the part of the divine act, which always remains the same whether it is terminated at creatures or not. It suffices to have indicated these things, since the true notion of divine freedom was handed down last year in the treatise On God. See, if you please, the cited q. 19, a. 3 and 10.
108. His praenotatis, dicimus:
PROP. XII. Deus voluntate ab omni necessitate libera creavit mundum, qui proinde liberrimus Deo existimari debet.
Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Ps. 134. 6. dicitur: "Omnia quaecumque voluit, Deus fecit, in caelo, et in terra, in mari, et in omnibus abyssis." - Ps. 113. 3.: "Deus autem noster in caelo: omnia, quaecumque voluit, fecit." - Eph. 1. 11.: "In quo (Christo) etiam, et nos sorte vocati sumus praedestinati secundum propositum ejus, qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae." - Apoc. 4. 11.: "Dignus es, Domine Deus noster, accipere gloriam, et honorem, et virtutem: quia tu creasti omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam erant, et creata sunt."
Unde: Qui dicitur operari quaecumque vult, creare per voluntatem, operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae; dicitur ita operari, ut habeat dominium actuum suorum. Atqui qui ita agit ut habeat suorum actuum dominium, libere agit. Ergo.
Prob. II. ex Patribus. S. Irenaeus (L. 2. c. 1. n. 1.) ait: "Neque ab aliquo motus, sed sua sententia et libertate fecit omnia." - Et (L. 2. adv. haer. c. 30.): "Ipse a semetipso fecit libere et ex sua potestate, et disposuit et perfecit omnia, et est substantia omnium voluntas ejus." - S. Chrysostomus (In Gen. 1. 1. Hom. 2.): "Deus est qui omnia fecit et praeparat, et juxta voluntatem suam omnia apte disponit." - S. Aug. (L. 11. de civ. Dei c. 24.): "In eo vero, quod dicitur: vidit Deus, quia bonum est, satis significatur, Deum nulla necessitate, nulla sua cujusque utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse, quod factum est, id est quia bonum." - Et (De Gen. ad litt. l. 6. c. 15.): "Manifestum est etiam, sic non factum esse hominem contra quam erat in illa prima conditione causarum; quia ibi erat etiam sic fieri necesse esse: hoc enim
non erat in conditione creaturae, sed in placito Creatoris, cujus voluntas rerum necessitas est."
Prob. III. ex ratione. Si Deus mundum necessario creavisset, haec necessitas repetenda esset vel ex parte mundi vel ex parte Dei; atqui neutrum dici potest. - Non 1um; quia tunc mundus esset necessarius; atqui ipsa experientia constat ejus contingentia - hinc limitatio, etc.; ergo. - Non 2um; quia quocumque modo explicetur hujusmodi necessitas in Deo, semper importat aliquam in eo indigentiam mundi, quo veluti perficeretur; atqui hoc est absurdum; ergo. "Si enim," inquit D. Th. c. g. l. 2. c. 31., "universitatem creaturarum vel quamcumque unam creaturam necesse est esse, oportet quod necessitatem istam habeat ex se vel ex alio. Ex se quidem eam habere non potest. Ostensum est enim supra c. 15 quod omne ens oportet esse a primo ente. Quod autem non habet esse a se, impossibile est quod necessitatem essendi a se habeat; quia quod necesse est esse, impossibile est non esse; et sic quod de se habet quod sit necesse esse, de se habet quod non possit esse non-ens, et per consequens quod non sit non-ens, et ita quod sit ens. Si autem haec necessitas creaturae est ab alio, oportet quod sit ab aliqua causa quae sit extrinseca: quia, quidquid accipiatur intrinsecum creaturae, habet esse ab alio. Causa autem extrinseca est vel efficiens vel finis. Ex efficiente vero sequitur quod effectum necesse sit esse, per hoc quod agentem necesse est agere; per actionem enim agentis effectus a causa efficiente dependet. Si igitur agentem non necesse sit agere ad productionem effectus, nec effectum necesse est esse abso-
lute. Deus autem non agit ex aliqua necessitate ad creaturarum productionem, ut supra c. 23 ostensum est. Non est igitur absolute necesse creaturam esse, necessitate dependente a causa efficiente. Similiter, nec necessitate dependente a causa finali. Ea enim quae sunt ad finem, necessitatem a fine non recipiunt, nisi secundum quod finis sine eis vel non potest esse, sicut conservatio vitae sine cibo, vel non ita bene esse, sicut iter sine equo. Finis autem divinae voluntatis, ex qua res in esse processerunt, non potest aliud esse quam sua bonitas, ut ostensum est l. 1. c. 75.; quae quidem a creaturis non dependet nec quantum ad esse, quum sit per se necesse esse, nec quantum ad bene esse, quum sit secundum se perfecta simpliciter; quae omnia supra c. 13 et 28 ostensa sunt. Non est igitur creaturam esse absolute necessarium." Vid. alias rationes l. 1. c. g. c. 81.
NOTA. Omnes objectiones, quae contra hanc thesim urgeri solent, petuntur vel ex falsa ratione libertatis divinae; vel, quod fere idem est, ex comparatione inter libertatem divinam et humanam; hujus enim defectus illi etiam tribuendos falso putant. Non oportet ergo eas hic singillatim referre et refutare: videri possunt in q. 3. de pot. art. 15. Cousinius ipse nullam difficultatem a D. Thoma non solutam proposuit, ut videre est apud Gatti, Instit. Apologetico Polemicae, Vol. 1. Disp. 1. cap. 3.
PROP. XII. Deus voluntate ab omni necessitate libera creavit mundum, qui proinde liberrimus Deo existimari debet.
Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Ps. 134. 6. dicitur: "Omnia quaecumque voluit, Deus fecit, in caelo, et in terra, in mari, et in omnibus abyssis." - Ps. 113. 3.: "Deus autem noster in caelo: omnia, quaecumque voluit, fecit." - Eph. 1. 11.: "In quo (Christo) etiam, et nos sorte vocati sumus praedestinati secundum propositum ejus, qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae." - Apoc. 4. 11.: "Dignus es, Domine Deus noster, accipere gloriam, et honorem, et virtutem: quia tu creasti omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam erant, et creata sunt."
Unde: Qui dicitur operari quaecumque vult, creare per voluntatem, operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae; dicitur ita operari, ut habeat dominium actuum suorum. Atqui qui ita agit ut habeat suorum actuum dominium, libere agit. Ergo.
Prob. II. ex Patribus. S. Irenaeus (L. 2. c. 1. n. 1.) ait: "Neque ab aliquo motus, sed sua sententia et libertate fecit omnia." - Et (L. 2. adv. haer. c. 30.): "Ipse a semetipso fecit libere et ex sua potestate, et disposuit et perfecit omnia, et est substantia omnium voluntas ejus." - S. Chrysostomus (In Gen. 1. 1. Hom. 2.): "Deus est qui omnia fecit et praeparat, et juxta voluntatem suam omnia apte disponit." - S. Aug. (L. 11. de civ. Dei c. 24.): "In eo vero, quod dicitur: vidit Deus, quia bonum est, satis significatur, Deum nulla necessitate, nulla sua cujusque utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse, quod factum est, id est quia bonum." - Et (De Gen. ad litt. l. 6. c. 15.): "Manifestum est etiam, sic non factum esse hominem contra quam erat in illa prima conditione causarum; quia ibi erat etiam sic fieri necesse esse: hoc enim
non erat in conditione creaturae, sed in placito Creatoris, cujus voluntas rerum necessitas est."
Prob. III. ex ratione. Si Deus mundum necessario creavisset, haec necessitas repetenda esset vel ex parte mundi vel ex parte Dei; atqui neutrum dici potest. - Non 1um; quia tunc mundus esset necessarius; atqui ipsa experientia constat ejus contingentia - hinc limitatio, etc.; ergo. - Non 2um; quia quocumque modo explicetur hujusmodi necessitas in Deo, semper importat aliquam in eo indigentiam mundi, quo veluti perficeretur; atqui hoc est absurdum; ergo. "Si enim," inquit D. Th. c. g. l. 2. c. 31., "universitatem creaturarum vel quamcumque unam creaturam necesse est esse, oportet quod necessitatem istam habeat ex se vel ex alio. Ex se quidem eam habere non potest. Ostensum est enim supra c. 15 quod omne ens oportet esse a primo ente. Quod autem non habet esse a se, impossibile est quod necessitatem essendi a se habeat; quia quod necesse est esse, impossibile est non esse; et sic quod de se habet quod sit necesse esse, de se habet quod non possit esse non-ens, et per consequens quod non sit non-ens, et ita quod sit ens. Si autem haec necessitas creaturae est ab alio, oportet quod sit ab aliqua causa quae sit extrinseca: quia, quidquid accipiatur intrinsecum creaturae, habet esse ab alio. Causa autem extrinseca est vel efficiens vel finis. Ex efficiente vero sequitur quod effectum necesse sit esse, per hoc quod agentem necesse est agere; per actionem enim agentis effectus a causa efficiente dependet. Si igitur agentem non necesse sit agere ad productionem effectus, nec effectum necesse est esse abso-
lute. Deus autem non agit ex aliqua necessitate ad creaturarum productionem, ut supra c. 23 ostensum est. Non est igitur absolute necesse creaturam esse, necessitate dependente a causa efficiente. Similiter, nec necessitate dependente a causa finali. Ea enim quae sunt ad finem, necessitatem a fine non recipiunt, nisi secundum quod finis sine eis vel non potest esse, sicut conservatio vitae sine cibo, vel non ita bene esse, sicut iter sine equo. Finis autem divinae voluntatis, ex qua res in esse processerunt, non potest aliud esse quam sua bonitas, ut ostensum est l. 1. c. 75.; quae quidem a creaturis non dependet nec quantum ad esse, quum sit per se necesse esse, nec quantum ad bene esse, quum sit secundum se perfecta simpliciter; quae omnia supra c. 13 et 28 ostensa sunt. Non est igitur creaturam esse absolute necessarium." Vid. alias rationes l. 1. c. g. c. 81.
NOTA. Omnes objectiones, quae contra hanc thesim urgeri solent, petuntur vel ex falsa ratione libertatis divinae; vel, quod fere idem est, ex comparatione inter libertatem divinam et humanam; hujus enim defectus illi etiam tribuendos falso putant. Non oportet ergo eas hic singillatim referre et refutare: videri possunt in q. 3. de pot. art. 15. Cousinius ipse nullam difficultatem a D. Thoma non solutam proposuit, ut videre est apud Gatti, Instit. Apologetico Polemicae, Vol. 1. Disp. 1. cap. 3.
108. These things having been pre-noted, we say:
PROP. XII. God created the world by a will free from every necessity, and therefore the world must be considered most free to God.
Proof I, from Scripture. Psalm 134:6 says: "All things whatsoever God willed, he did, in heaven and on earth, in the sea, and in all the depths." Psalm 113:3: "But our God is in heaven: all things whatsoever he willed, he did." Ephesians 1:11: "In whom (Christ) we also have been called by lot, predestined according to his purpose, who works all things according to the counsel of his will." Apocalypse 4:11: "You are worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power: because you created all things, and on account of your will they were, and were created."
Hence: He who is said to operate whatever he wills, to create through will, to operate all things according to the counsel of his will, is said to operate in such a way that he has dominion over his acts. But he who acts in such a way that he has dominion over his acts acts freely. Therefore.
Proof II, from the Fathers. St. Irenaeus (book 2, c. 1, n. 1) says: "Not moved by anyone, but by his own judgment and freedom, he made all things." And (book 2, Against Heresies, c. 30): "He himself from himself made all things freely and from his own power, and disposed and perfected all things, and his will is the substance of all things." St. Chrysostom (On Genesis 1:1, Homily 2): "God is he who made and prepares all things, and suitably disposes all things according to his will." St. Augustine (City of God, book 11, c. 24): "But in this, that it is said, God saw that it was good, it is sufficiently signified that God made what was made by no necessity, by no indigence of any utility of his own, but by goodness alone, that is, because it was good." And (On Genesis Literally, book 6, c. 15): "It is manifest also that man was not made in a way contrary to that which was in that first condition of causes; because there also it was necessary that he be made in this way: for this was not in the condition of the creature, but in the good pleasure of the Creator, whose will is the necessity of things."
Proof III, from reason. If God had created the world necessarily, this necessity would have to be derived either on the part of the world or on the part of God. But neither can be said. Not the first, because then the world would be necessary; but from experience itself its contingency is evident, hence limitation, etc.; therefore. Not the second, because in whatever way a necessity of this kind in God is explained, it always imports in him some need of the world, by which he would, as it were, be perfected; but this is absurd. Therefore. "For if," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 31, "the universality of creatures or any one creature whatever must necessarily be, it is necessary that it have this necessity from itself or from another. It cannot have it from itself. For it was shown above, c. 15, that every being must be from the first being. But what does not have being from itself cannot possibly have necessity of being from itself; because what must necessarily be, cannot not be; and so what has of itself that it must necessarily be has of itself that it cannot be non-being, and consequently that it is not non-being, and thus that it is being. But if this necessity of the creature is from another, it must be from some cause which is extrinsic, because whatever is taken as intrinsic to the creature has being from another. But an extrinsic cause is either efficient or final. From the efficient cause, however, it follows that the effect must necessarily be through the fact that the agent must necessarily act; for through the action of the agent the effect depends on the efficient cause. Therefore, if the agent need not necessarily act for the production of the effect, neither must the effect necessarily be absolutely. But God does not act from any necessity for the production of creatures, as was shown above, c. 23. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary that the creature be, by a necessity depending on the efficient cause. Similarly, neither by a necessity depending on the final cause. For those things which are for the end do not receive necessity from the end except insofar as without them the end either cannot be, as the preservation of life without food, or cannot be so well, as a journey without a horse. But the end of the divine will, from which things have proceeded into being, cannot be anything other than his goodness, as was shown, book 1, c. 75; and this goodness does not depend on creatures either as to being, since it is necessary being through itself, or as to well-being, since it is according to itself perfect simply; all these things were shown above, c. 13 and 28. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary that the creature be." See other reasons in book 1, Contra Gentiles, c. 81.
NOTE. All the objections which are usually urged against this thesis are sought either from a false account of divine freedom, or, what is almost the same thing, from a comparison between divine and human freedom; for they falsely think that the defects of the latter must also be attributed to the former. Therefore it is not necessary to report and refute them individually here. They can be seen in De potentia, q. 3, a. 15. Cousin himself proposed no difficulty not solved by St. Thomas, as may be seen in Gatti, Institutions Apologetico-Polemical, vol. 1, disputation 1, chapter 3.
PROP. XII. God created the world by a will free from every necessity, and therefore the world must be considered most free to God.
Proof I, from Scripture. Psalm 134:6 says: "All things whatsoever God willed, he did, in heaven and on earth, in the sea, and in all the depths." Psalm 113:3: "But our God is in heaven: all things whatsoever he willed, he did." Ephesians 1:11: "In whom (Christ) we also have been called by lot, predestined according to his purpose, who works all things according to the counsel of his will." Apocalypse 4:11: "You are worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power: because you created all things, and on account of your will they were, and were created."
Hence: He who is said to operate whatever he wills, to create through will, to operate all things according to the counsel of his will, is said to operate in such a way that he has dominion over his acts. But he who acts in such a way that he has dominion over his acts acts freely. Therefore.
Proof II, from the Fathers. St. Irenaeus (book 2, c. 1, n. 1) says: "Not moved by anyone, but by his own judgment and freedom, he made all things." And (book 2, Against Heresies, c. 30): "He himself from himself made all things freely and from his own power, and disposed and perfected all things, and his will is the substance of all things." St. Chrysostom (On Genesis 1:1, Homily 2): "God is he who made and prepares all things, and suitably disposes all things according to his will." St. Augustine (City of God, book 11, c. 24): "But in this, that it is said, God saw that it was good, it is sufficiently signified that God made what was made by no necessity, by no indigence of any utility of his own, but by goodness alone, that is, because it was good." And (On Genesis Literally, book 6, c. 15): "It is manifest also that man was not made in a way contrary to that which was in that first condition of causes; because there also it was necessary that he be made in this way: for this was not in the condition of the creature, but in the good pleasure of the Creator, whose will is the necessity of things."
Proof III, from reason. If God had created the world necessarily, this necessity would have to be derived either on the part of the world or on the part of God. But neither can be said. Not the first, because then the world would be necessary; but from experience itself its contingency is evident, hence limitation, etc.; therefore. Not the second, because in whatever way a necessity of this kind in God is explained, it always imports in him some need of the world, by which he would, as it were, be perfected; but this is absurd. Therefore. "For if," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 31, "the universality of creatures or any one creature whatever must necessarily be, it is necessary that it have this necessity from itself or from another. It cannot have it from itself. For it was shown above, c. 15, that every being must be from the first being. But what does not have being from itself cannot possibly have necessity of being from itself; because what must necessarily be, cannot not be; and so what has of itself that it must necessarily be has of itself that it cannot be non-being, and consequently that it is not non-being, and thus that it is being. But if this necessity of the creature is from another, it must be from some cause which is extrinsic, because whatever is taken as intrinsic to the creature has being from another. But an extrinsic cause is either efficient or final. From the efficient cause, however, it follows that the effect must necessarily be through the fact that the agent must necessarily act; for through the action of the agent the effect depends on the efficient cause. Therefore, if the agent need not necessarily act for the production of the effect, neither must the effect necessarily be absolutely. But God does not act from any necessity for the production of creatures, as was shown above, c. 23. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary that the creature be, by a necessity depending on the efficient cause. Similarly, neither by a necessity depending on the final cause. For those things which are for the end do not receive necessity from the end except insofar as without them the end either cannot be, as the preservation of life without food, or cannot be so well, as a journey without a horse. But the end of the divine will, from which things have proceeded into being, cannot be anything other than his goodness, as was shown, book 1, c. 75; and this goodness does not depend on creatures either as to being, since it is necessary being through itself, or as to well-being, since it is according to itself perfect simply; all these things were shown above, c. 13 and 28. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary that the creature be." See other reasons in book 1, Contra Gentiles, c. 81.
NOTE. All the objections which are usually urged against this thesis are sought either from a false account of divine freedom, or, what is almost the same thing, from a comparison between divine and human freedom; for they falsely think that the defects of the latter must also be attributed to the former. Therefore it is not necessary to report and refute them individually here. They can be seen in De potentia, q. 3, a. 15. Cousin himself proposed no difficulty not solved by St. Thomas, as may be seen in Gatti, Institutions Apologetico-Polemical, vol. 1, disputation 1, chapter 3.