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Utrum mundus sit ab aeterno.
109. Distinguenda hic est quaestio possibilitatis a quaestione facti. Si enim de possibilitate aeternae creationis agatur, Theologi et Philosophi in varias abeunt sententias, quas omnes ad quatuor revocat Valentia, tom. 1. disp. 3. q. 3. p. 2. Plures cum D. Thoma 1. p. q. 46. a. 2., censent saltem non posse evidenter probari ex sola ratione repugnantiam aeternae creationis. Sed quidquid sit de possibilitatis quaestione, quam nos philosophis relinquimus, hic solum agitur de quaestione facti.
109. Here the question of possibility must be distinguished from the question of fact. For if the matter concerns the possibility of eternal creation, theologians and philosophers go off into various opinions, all of which Valentia reduces to four, tome 1, disputation 3, question 3, point 2. Many, with St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 2, judge that at least the repugnance of eternal creation cannot be evidently proved from reason alone. But whatever may be true concerning the question of possibility, which we leave to the philosophers, here the matter concerns only the question of fact.
110. Jamvero est veritas catholica mundum non fuisse creatum ab aeterno, sed in tempore, seu cum tempore. Etenim Joannes XXII. sequentes Ekkardi propositiones haereseos stigmate notavit: "Quam cito Deus fuit, tam cito mundum creavit." - 2. "Concedi posse, quod mundus ab aeterno fuerit." - 3. "Quod simul et semel, quando Deus fuit, quando Filium sibi coaeternum per omnia coaequalem Deum genuit, etiam mundum creavit." - In Conc. autem Lat. IV. cap. Firmiter, dicitur: "credimus ... Deum esse Creatorem omnium ... qui sua omnipotente virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam etc." - Eamdem formulam confirmavit Conc. Vat. saepe cit. cap. 1. Const. Dei Filius.
110. Now it is a Catholic truth that the world was not created from eternity, but in time, or with time. For John XXII marked the following propositions of Eckhart with the stigma of heresy: "As soon as God was, so soon he created the world." 2. "That it can be conceded that the world was from eternity." 3. "That together and at once, when God was, when he begot the Son, God co-eternal with himself and in all things co-equal, he also created the world." But in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, it is said: "we believe ... that God is the Creator of all things ... who by his omnipotent power at once from the beginning of time founded each creature, spiritual and corporeal, from nothing, etc." The same formula was confirmed by the Vatican Council, in the often cited chapter 1 of the constitution Dei Filius.
111. Cum tempus non distinguatur realiter ab ipsa successione rerum, quae mundum constituunt, nequit admitti temporariam durationem fuisse ante cre-
ationem. Unde melius dicitur mundus creatus cum tempore, quam in tempore; semper autem intelligitur non ab aeterno. Quod jam notaverunt S. Ambrosius et S. Augustinus. Primus enim (In Hexaem. l. 1. c. 6.) ait: "In principio temporis Deus caelum et terram fecit. Tempus enim ab hoc mundo, non ante mundum." Alter (Lib. 11. de civ. Dei c. 5.) inquit: "Procul dubio non est factus mundus in tempore, sed cum tempore."
PROP. XIII. Non aeternam, sed temporariam mundo tribuendam esse existentiam, certis argumentis demonstratur.
Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Legitur 1. Gen.: "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram."
Ut probetur thesis ex hoc testimonio, notandum est cum D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 3. c., illud "in principio" tripliciter exponi. Exponitur enim 1. ad significandum initium temporis, ante quod mundus non erat - 2. ad significandum Deum omnia fecisse in Filio, seu per Filium, de quo similiter ad Coloss. 1. dicitur: "In quo condita sunt universa;" et Jo. 8.: "Principium, qui et loquor vobis." - 3. ad significandum ante omnia, seu priusquam Deus alia faceret, creavit caelum et terram. Vid. Petavium, de Op. sex dier. l. 1. c. 1. a n. 11. Ex his autem tribus expositionibus, prima, uti patet, facit ad usum praesentis quaestionis.
Unde: Ex cit. testimonio constat mundum habuisse initium et non semper fuisse; ergo.
Prob. antec. Hoc constat, si constat illud "in principio" praeferre sensum "in initio temporis, antequam mundus esset;" atqui hoc constat; ergo.
Prob. min. Quamvis dentur tres diversi sensus, ut vidimus, illius "in principio," non tamen pugnant inter se, et possunt esse omnes simul veri, uti docet S. Aug. l. 12. Conf. 32. Jamvero primum etiam sensum, qui thesim probat, esse retinendum, constat a) auctoritate Patrum. Nam plures exhibent expresse hunc sensum: et qui alterum aut tertium tradunt, non excludunt primum, sed imo explicite etiam illum docent, ut videre est apud Valentia tom. 1. disp. 3. q. 3. p. 1.: ergo habetur consensus SS. Patrum - b) ex aliis Sac. Script. locis. Ps. 89. 2.: "Priusquam montes fierent, aut formaretur terra et orbis: a saeculo usque in saeculum tu es Deus." - Jo. 17. 5.: "Clarifica me tu, Pater, apud temetipsum, claritate, quam habui, prius quam mundus esset, apud te." V. 24. "Dilexisti me ante constitutionem mundi." - Eph. 1. 4.: "Elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem." Vid. etiam Prov. 8. In quibus omnibus aeternitas soli Deo tribuitur, ita ut ipse semper fuerit, mundus vero non item. c) ex superius cit. cap. Conc. Later. et Conc. Vat.
Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Patres propugnantes divinitatem Verbi contra Arianos, frequenter ex eo probabant, quod ei tribueretur aeternitas. Unde in Conc. Nicaeno, haec prolata fuit sententia: "Quicumque dicit Filium creaturam, dicit eum coepisse." Eadem argumentatione usus est Sanctus Athanasius ad probandam divinitatem Spiritus Sancti (Ep. ad Serap.), dicens: "Quemadmodum Filius quia semper est, non est creatura, ita quoniam semper est Trinitas, nulla est in ea creatura, quapropter non est creatura Spiritus." - S. Basilius
(In Hexaem. Hom. 1. n. 6.) "Quoniam multi opinabantur, mundum Deo esse coaeternum ... ad istorum hominum errorem tollendum consulto haec verba elegit, et dixit: In principio temporis." - S. Ambrosius (In Hexaem. Praef. con. Perip.): "Quid tam inconveniens, ut aeternitatem operis cum Dei omnipotentis aeternitate conjungerent?" - S. Fulgentius (de Fid. ad Pet. c. 3.): "Deus, qui sine initio semper est, quia summe est, dedit rebus a se creatis, ut sint; non tamen sine initio, quia nulla creatura ejusdem naturae est, cujus est Trinitas." - Idem docent S. Chrys. (Hom. 1. in Joan.); et saepissime S. Augustinus.
NOTA. I. Cum nos abstineamus a quaestione de possibilitate vel repugnantia creationis ab aeterno, nullum possumus afferre argumentum a priori ex ratione ut ostendamus mundum non fuisse creatum ab aeterno. Solent tamen plures, etiam praetermissa illa quaestione, aliquibus argumentis ex ratione uti, quibus nisi demonstretur, saltem suadeatur creatio in tempore facta: urgent praecipue argumentum ex omnium populorum traditione desumptum - Praeterea adduci solent quaedam rationes convenientiae. Ita D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 1. ad 6., inquit: "Dedit (Deus) effectui suo tempus, quantum et quando voluit, et secundum quod conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset; omne enim quod non semper fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de eo quod semper fuit." - Et c. g. l. 1. c. 13.: "Via efficacissima ad probandum Deum esse, est ex suppositione novitatis mundi, non
autem sic, ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi; qua posita, minus videtur esse manifestum, quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus et motus de novo incepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam, quae de novo producat mundum et motum; quia omne, quod de novo fit, ab aliquo innovatore oportet sumere originem, quum nihil educat se de potentia in actum vel de non-esse in esse." - Et l. 2. c. 38.: "Ex hoc enim quia res non semper fuerunt, ostenditur etiam quod Deus non agit per necessitatem naturae; et quod virtus sua est infinita in agendo."
NOTA. II. Multae objectiones fieri solent contra hanc thesim, quae videri possunt praesertim apud D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 1. et 3.: duas solum, quae specialem difficultatem praeferre videntur, breviter proponam. Prima est: Si mundus creatus fuisset in tempore, Deus esset in tempore et non ab aeterno Creator; hoc autem videtur absurdum, quia Deus videretur mutari. - Resp. Inter nomina, quae de Deo dicuntur, cum relatione ad creaturas, alia consequuntur actionem Dei immanentem, et non praesupponunt existentiam creaturae: alia vero consequuntur actionem Dei transeuntem in exteriorem effectum, et praesupponunt existentiam rei creatae. Prima dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et sic, ex. gr., Deus dicitur ab aeterno cognoscere creaturas. Quoad alia vero, notandum est quod ea nomina dici possunt de Deo vel secundum potestatem, vel secundum actum: secundum potestatem etiam dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, quia potestas ab aeterno est in Deo. Imo, secundum hunc respectum, non praesupponunt existentiam creaturae, ideoque possunt ad prima nomina revocari. Secun-
dum actum vero, dicuntur de Deo in tempore. Sic, ex. gr., Deus dicitur Dominus et Creator, secundum potestatem, ab aeterno, ex data ratione; dicitur vero Dominus, secundum actum in tempore: Dominus enim et Creator, secundum actum, dicitur ille qui servum habet, in quem actu dominetur: creaturae autem in quas Deus dominatur, sunt in tempore. Ex hoc autem nulla sequitur mutatio in Deo; siquidem nec Deus tunc agit cum creaturae incipiunt esse, nec aliquid novi acquirit ex creaturarum reali existentia. Vid. 1. p. q. 13. a. 7. et Sylv. in h. l.
Altera difficultas est: posita causa sufficiente creationis in actu, debet statim poni effectus in actu; sed Deus est causa sufficiens creationis ab aeterno in actu; ergo - Praeclarissime hanc difficultatem solvit D. Th. c. g. l. 2. c. 35., dicens: "Nec tamen oportet quod, si primi agentis actio sit aeterna, ejus effectus sit aeternus. Ostensum est enim supra (c. 23) quod Deus agit voluntarie in rerum productione, non autem ita quod sit aliqua actio ipsius media, sicut in nobis actio virtutis motivae est media inter actum voluntatis et effectum, ut in precedentibus ostensum est; sed oportet quod suum intelligere et velle sit suum facere; effectus autem ab intellectu et voluntate sequitur, secundum determinationem intellectus et imperium voluntatis. Sicut autem per intellectum determinatur rei factio et quaecumque alia conditio, ita et praescribitur ei tempus; non enim solum ars determinat ut hoc tale sit, sed ut tunc sit, sicut medicus ut tunc detur potus; unde, si ejus velle per se esset efficax ad effectum producendum, sequeretur de novo effectus ab antiqua voluntate, nulla actione
de novo existente. Nihil igitur prohibet dicere actionem Dei ab aeterno fuisse, effectum autem ejus non ab aeterno, sed tunc quum ab aeterno disposuit. Ex quo etiam patet quod, etsi Deus sit sufficiens causa productionis rerum in esse, non tamen oportet quod ejus effectus aeternus ponatur, eo existente aeterno. Posita enim causa sufficiente, ponitur ejus effectus, non autem effectus extraneus a causa: hoc enim esset ex insufficientia causae, ac si calidum non calefaceret. Proprius autem effectus voluntatis est ut sit hoc quod voluntas vult; si autem aliquid aliud esset quam voluntas velit, non poneretur effectus proprius causae, sed alienus ab ea; voluntas autem, sicut dictum est, sicut vult hoc esse tale, ita vult hoc esse tunc; unde oportet, ad hoc quod voluntas sit sufficiens causa, quod effectus sit quando voluntas est ut sit et quando effectum esse disposuit. In his autem quae a causa naturaliter agente procedunt, secus est, quia actio naturae est secundum quod ipsa est; unde ad esse causae sequi oportet effectum. Voluntas autem agit non secundum modum sui esse, sed secundum modum sui propositi; et ideo, sicut effectus naturalis agentis sequitur esse agentis, si sit sufficiens, ita effectus agentis per voluntatem sequitur modum propositi."
ationem. Unde melius dicitur mundus creatus cum tempore, quam in tempore; semper autem intelligitur non ab aeterno. Quod jam notaverunt S. Ambrosius et S. Augustinus. Primus enim (In Hexaem. l. 1. c. 6.) ait: "In principio temporis Deus caelum et terram fecit. Tempus enim ab hoc mundo, non ante mundum." Alter (Lib. 11. de civ. Dei c. 5.) inquit: "Procul dubio non est factus mundus in tempore, sed cum tempore."
PROP. XIII. Non aeternam, sed temporariam mundo tribuendam esse existentiam, certis argumentis demonstratur.
Prob. I. Ex Scriptura. Legitur 1. Gen.: "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram."
Ut probetur thesis ex hoc testimonio, notandum est cum D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 3. c., illud "in principio" tripliciter exponi. Exponitur enim 1. ad significandum initium temporis, ante quod mundus non erat - 2. ad significandum Deum omnia fecisse in Filio, seu per Filium, de quo similiter ad Coloss. 1. dicitur: "In quo condita sunt universa;" et Jo. 8.: "Principium, qui et loquor vobis." - 3. ad significandum ante omnia, seu priusquam Deus alia faceret, creavit caelum et terram. Vid. Petavium, de Op. sex dier. l. 1. c. 1. a n. 11. Ex his autem tribus expositionibus, prima, uti patet, facit ad usum praesentis quaestionis.
Unde: Ex cit. testimonio constat mundum habuisse initium et non semper fuisse; ergo.
Prob. antec. Hoc constat, si constat illud "in principio" praeferre sensum "in initio temporis, antequam mundus esset;" atqui hoc constat; ergo.
Prob. min. Quamvis dentur tres diversi sensus, ut vidimus, illius "in principio," non tamen pugnant inter se, et possunt esse omnes simul veri, uti docet S. Aug. l. 12. Conf. 32. Jamvero primum etiam sensum, qui thesim probat, esse retinendum, constat a) auctoritate Patrum. Nam plures exhibent expresse hunc sensum: et qui alterum aut tertium tradunt, non excludunt primum, sed imo explicite etiam illum docent, ut videre est apud Valentia tom. 1. disp. 3. q. 3. p. 1.: ergo habetur consensus SS. Patrum - b) ex aliis Sac. Script. locis. Ps. 89. 2.: "Priusquam montes fierent, aut formaretur terra et orbis: a saeculo usque in saeculum tu es Deus." - Jo. 17. 5.: "Clarifica me tu, Pater, apud temetipsum, claritate, quam habui, prius quam mundus esset, apud te." V. 24. "Dilexisti me ante constitutionem mundi." - Eph. 1. 4.: "Elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem." Vid. etiam Prov. 8. In quibus omnibus aeternitas soli Deo tribuitur, ita ut ipse semper fuerit, mundus vero non item. c) ex superius cit. cap. Conc. Later. et Conc. Vat.
Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Patres propugnantes divinitatem Verbi contra Arianos, frequenter ex eo probabant, quod ei tribueretur aeternitas. Unde in Conc. Nicaeno, haec prolata fuit sententia: "Quicumque dicit Filium creaturam, dicit eum coepisse." Eadem argumentatione usus est Sanctus Athanasius ad probandam divinitatem Spiritus Sancti (Ep. ad Serap.), dicens: "Quemadmodum Filius quia semper est, non est creatura, ita quoniam semper est Trinitas, nulla est in ea creatura, quapropter non est creatura Spiritus." - S. Basilius
(In Hexaem. Hom. 1. n. 6.) "Quoniam multi opinabantur, mundum Deo esse coaeternum ... ad istorum hominum errorem tollendum consulto haec verba elegit, et dixit: In principio temporis." - S. Ambrosius (In Hexaem. Praef. con. Perip.): "Quid tam inconveniens, ut aeternitatem operis cum Dei omnipotentis aeternitate conjungerent?" - S. Fulgentius (de Fid. ad Pet. c. 3.): "Deus, qui sine initio semper est, quia summe est, dedit rebus a se creatis, ut sint; non tamen sine initio, quia nulla creatura ejusdem naturae est, cujus est Trinitas." - Idem docent S. Chrys. (Hom. 1. in Joan.); et saepissime S. Augustinus.
NOTA. I. Cum nos abstineamus a quaestione de possibilitate vel repugnantia creationis ab aeterno, nullum possumus afferre argumentum a priori ex ratione ut ostendamus mundum non fuisse creatum ab aeterno. Solent tamen plures, etiam praetermissa illa quaestione, aliquibus argumentis ex ratione uti, quibus nisi demonstretur, saltem suadeatur creatio in tempore facta: urgent praecipue argumentum ex omnium populorum traditione desumptum - Praeterea adduci solent quaedam rationes convenientiae. Ita D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 1. ad 6., inquit: "Dedit (Deus) effectui suo tempus, quantum et quando voluit, et secundum quod conveniens fuit ad suam potentiam demonstrandam. Manifestius enim mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset; omne enim quod non semper fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de eo quod semper fuit." - Et c. g. l. 1. c. 13.: "Via efficacissima ad probandum Deum esse, est ex suppositione novitatis mundi, non
autem sic, ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi; qua posita, minus videtur esse manifestum, quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus et motus de novo incepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam, quae de novo producat mundum et motum; quia omne, quod de novo fit, ab aliquo innovatore oportet sumere originem, quum nihil educat se de potentia in actum vel de non-esse in esse." - Et l. 2. c. 38.: "Ex hoc enim quia res non semper fuerunt, ostenditur etiam quod Deus non agit per necessitatem naturae; et quod virtus sua est infinita in agendo."
NOTA. II. Multae objectiones fieri solent contra hanc thesim, quae videri possunt praesertim apud D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 1. et 3.: duas solum, quae specialem difficultatem praeferre videntur, breviter proponam. Prima est: Si mundus creatus fuisset in tempore, Deus esset in tempore et non ab aeterno Creator; hoc autem videtur absurdum, quia Deus videretur mutari. - Resp. Inter nomina, quae de Deo dicuntur, cum relatione ad creaturas, alia consequuntur actionem Dei immanentem, et non praesupponunt existentiam creaturae: alia vero consequuntur actionem Dei transeuntem in exteriorem effectum, et praesupponunt existentiam rei creatae. Prima dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et sic, ex. gr., Deus dicitur ab aeterno cognoscere creaturas. Quoad alia vero, notandum est quod ea nomina dici possunt de Deo vel secundum potestatem, vel secundum actum: secundum potestatem etiam dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, quia potestas ab aeterno est in Deo. Imo, secundum hunc respectum, non praesupponunt existentiam creaturae, ideoque possunt ad prima nomina revocari. Secun-
dum actum vero, dicuntur de Deo in tempore. Sic, ex. gr., Deus dicitur Dominus et Creator, secundum potestatem, ab aeterno, ex data ratione; dicitur vero Dominus, secundum actum in tempore: Dominus enim et Creator, secundum actum, dicitur ille qui servum habet, in quem actu dominetur: creaturae autem in quas Deus dominatur, sunt in tempore. Ex hoc autem nulla sequitur mutatio in Deo; siquidem nec Deus tunc agit cum creaturae incipiunt esse, nec aliquid novi acquirit ex creaturarum reali existentia. Vid. 1. p. q. 13. a. 7. et Sylv. in h. l.
Altera difficultas est: posita causa sufficiente creationis in actu, debet statim poni effectus in actu; sed Deus est causa sufficiens creationis ab aeterno in actu; ergo - Praeclarissime hanc difficultatem solvit D. Th. c. g. l. 2. c. 35., dicens: "Nec tamen oportet quod, si primi agentis actio sit aeterna, ejus effectus sit aeternus. Ostensum est enim supra (c. 23) quod Deus agit voluntarie in rerum productione, non autem ita quod sit aliqua actio ipsius media, sicut in nobis actio virtutis motivae est media inter actum voluntatis et effectum, ut in precedentibus ostensum est; sed oportet quod suum intelligere et velle sit suum facere; effectus autem ab intellectu et voluntate sequitur, secundum determinationem intellectus et imperium voluntatis. Sicut autem per intellectum determinatur rei factio et quaecumque alia conditio, ita et praescribitur ei tempus; non enim solum ars determinat ut hoc tale sit, sed ut tunc sit, sicut medicus ut tunc detur potus; unde, si ejus velle per se esset efficax ad effectum producendum, sequeretur de novo effectus ab antiqua voluntate, nulla actione
de novo existente. Nihil igitur prohibet dicere actionem Dei ab aeterno fuisse, effectum autem ejus non ab aeterno, sed tunc quum ab aeterno disposuit. Ex quo etiam patet quod, etsi Deus sit sufficiens causa productionis rerum in esse, non tamen oportet quod ejus effectus aeternus ponatur, eo existente aeterno. Posita enim causa sufficiente, ponitur ejus effectus, non autem effectus extraneus a causa: hoc enim esset ex insufficientia causae, ac si calidum non calefaceret. Proprius autem effectus voluntatis est ut sit hoc quod voluntas vult; si autem aliquid aliud esset quam voluntas velit, non poneretur effectus proprius causae, sed alienus ab ea; voluntas autem, sicut dictum est, sicut vult hoc esse tale, ita vult hoc esse tunc; unde oportet, ad hoc quod voluntas sit sufficiens causa, quod effectus sit quando voluntas est ut sit et quando effectum esse disposuit. In his autem quae a causa naturaliter agente procedunt, secus est, quia actio naturae est secundum quod ipsa est; unde ad esse causae sequi oportet effectum. Voluntas autem agit non secundum modum sui esse, sed secundum modum sui propositi; et ideo, sicut effectus naturalis agentis sequitur esse agentis, si sit sufficiens, ita effectus agentis per voluntatem sequitur modum propositi."
111. Since time is not really distinguished from the very succession of things which constitute the world, it cannot be admitted that there was a temporal duration before creation. Hence it is better said that the world was created with time than in time; however, it is always understood that it was not from eternity. This had already been noted by St. Ambrose and St. Augustine. The first says (Hexaemeron, book 1, c. 6): "In the beginning of time God made heaven and earth. For time is from this world, not before the world." The other says (City of God, book 11, c. 5): "Without doubt the world was not made in time, but with time."
PROP. XIII. It is demonstrated by certain arguments that not eternal but temporal existence must be attributed to the world.
Proof I, from Scripture. It is read in Genesis 1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
In order that the thesis may be proved from this testimony, it must be noted with St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 3, corpus, that the phrase "in the beginning" is explained in three ways. For it is explained: first, to signify the beginning of time, before which the world was not; second, to signify that God made all things in the Son, or through the Son, concerning whom similarly it is said at Colossians 1: "In whom all things were founded"; and John 8: "The beginning, who also speak to you"; third, to signify before all things, or that before God made other things, he created heaven and earth. See Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book 1, c. 1, from n. 11. But of these three explanations, the first, as is clear, serves the use of the present question.
Hence: From the cited testimony it is evident that the world had a beginning and did not always exist. Therefore.
The antecedent is proved. This is evident if it is evident that the phrase "in the beginning" presents the sense "in the beginning of time, before the world existed." But this is evident. Therefore.
The minor is proved. Although there are, as we have seen, three diverse senses of that phrase "in the beginning," nevertheless they are not in conflict with each other, and all can be true at the same time, as St. Augustine teaches, Confessions, book 12, c. 32. Now that the first sense also, which proves the thesis, must be retained, is evident: a) from the authority of the Fathers. For many expressly exhibit this sense; and those who hand down the second or third do not exclude the first, but indeed explicitly also teach it, as may be seen in Valentia, tome 1, disputation 3, question 3, point 1. Therefore there is a consensus of the holy Fathers. b) From other places of Sacred Scripture. Psalm 89:2: "Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed: from age to age you are God." John 17:5: "Glorify me, Father, with yourself, with the glory which I had with you before the world was." Verse 24: "You loved me before the foundation of the world." Ephesians 1:4: "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world." See also Proverbs 8. In all these eternity is attributed to God alone, so that he himself always was, but the world was not likewise. c) From the above cited chapter of the Lateran Council and the Vatican Council.
Proof II, from the Fathers. The Fathers, defending the divinity of the Word against the Arians, frequently proved it from the fact that eternity was attributed to him. Hence in the Nicene Council this judgment was uttered: "Whoever says the Son is a creature says that he began." St. Athanasius used the same argumentation to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit (Letter to Serapion), saying: "Just as the Son, because he always is, is not a creature, so, since the Trinity always is, there is no creature in it; wherefore the Spirit is not a creature." St. Basil (Hexaemeron, Homily 1, n. 6): "Since many were thinking that the world is co-eternal with God ... to remove the error of those men he deliberately chose these words, and said: In the beginning of time." St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron, Preface against the Peripatetics): "What is so unfitting as that they should join the eternity of the work with the eternity of almighty God?" St. Fulgentius (On Faith to Peter, c. 3): "God, who is always without beginning, because he supremely is, gave to things created by him that they should be; yet not without beginning, because no creature is of the same nature as the Trinity is." St. Chrysostom teaches the same (Homily 1 on John), and St. Augustine very often.
NOTE I. Since we abstain from the question concerning the possibility or repugnance of creation from eternity, we can bring forward no a priori argument from reason to show that the world was not created from eternity. Yet many, even while passing over that question, are accustomed to use certain arguments from reason, by which, if creation in time is not demonstrated, it is at least made persuasive. They especially press the argument taken from the tradition of all peoples. Besides, certain reasons of fittingness are usually adduced. Thus St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 1, ad 6, says: "God gave to his effect time, as much and when he willed, and according as it was fitting for demonstrating his power. For the world more manifestly leads into knowledge of the divine creating power if the world did not always exist than if it had always existed; for everything which did not always exist is manifestly seen to have a cause, but it is not so manifest concerning that which always existed." And Contra Gentiles, book 1, c. 13: "The most efficacious way for proving that God exists is from the supposition of the newness of the world, but not in the same way from the supposition of the eternity of the world; once that is posited, it seems less manifest that God exists. For if the world and motion began anew, it is plain that some cause must be posited which newly produces the world and motion; because everything which newly comes to be must take its origin from some innovator, since nothing brings itself from potency into act or from non-being into being." And book 2, c. 38: "For from this, that things did not always exist, it is also shown that God does not act through necessity of nature, and that his power is infinite in acting."
NOTE II. Many objections are usually made against this thesis, which can be seen especially in St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 1 and 3. I shall briefly propose only two which seem to present a special difficulty. The first is: If the world had been created in time, God would be in time and not Creator from eternity; but this seems absurd, because God would seem to be changed. I reply. Among the names which are said of God with relation to creatures, some follow the immanent action of God, and do not presuppose the existence of the creature; others, however, follow the action of God passing over into an exterior effect, and presuppose the existence of the created thing. The first are said of God from eternity, and thus, for example, God is said from eternity to know creatures. But regarding the others, it must be noted that these names can be said of God either according to power or according to act. According to power they are also said of God from eternity, because power is in God from eternity. Indeed, according to this respect, they do not presuppose the existence of the creature, and therefore can be brought back to the first names. But according to act, they are said of God in time. Thus, for example, God is called Lord and Creator, according to power, from eternity, for the reason given; but he is called Lord according to act in time. For he is called Lord and Creator according to act who has a servant over whom he actually has dominion; but the creatures over whom God has dominion are in time. From this, however, no change in God follows, since God neither then acts when creatures begin to be, nor does he acquire anything new from the real existence of creatures. See Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7, and Sylvius on this place.
The other difficulty is: once the sufficient cause of creation is posited in act, the effect must immediately be posited in act; but God is the sufficient cause of creation from eternity in act; therefore. St. Thomas solves this difficulty most splendidly, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 35, saying: "Nor, however, is it necessary that, if the action of the first agent is eternal, its effect be eternal. For it was shown above (c. 23) that God acts voluntarily in the production of things; not, however, in such a way that there is some action of his as a middle, as in us the action of the moving power is a middle between the act of the will and the effect, as was shown in the preceding things; but his understanding and willing must be his making. But the effect follows from intellect and will according to the determination of the intellect and the command of the will. But just as through intellect the making of the thing and any other condition whatsoever is determined, so also time is prescribed to it; for art determines not only that this be such, but that it be then, as the physician determines that the drink be given then. Hence, if his willing were efficacious of itself for producing the effect, a new effect would follow from an ancient will, with no new action existing. Therefore nothing prevents saying that the action of God was from eternity, but that his effect was not from eternity, but then when he disposed from eternity. From this it is also clear that, although God is the sufficient cause of the production of things in being, nevertheless it is not necessary that his effect be posited as eternal, though he exists eternally. For when a sufficient cause is posited, its effect is posited, but not an effect foreign to the cause; for this would be from the insufficiency of the cause, as if something hot did not heat. But the proper effect of will is that there be what the will wills. But if there were something other than the will wills, the proper effect of the cause would not be posited, but one alien from it. Now will, as has been said, just as it wills this to be such, so it wills this to be then. Hence, in order that will be a sufficient cause, the effect must be when the will is that it be, and when it has disposed that the effect be. But in those things which proceed from a cause acting naturally, the matter is otherwise, because the action of nature is according as it itself is; hence the effect must follow upon the being of the cause. But will acts not according to the mode of its own being, but according to the mode of its purpose; and therefore, just as the effect of a natural agent follows the being of the agent, if it is sufficient, so the effect of an agent through will follows the mode of the purpose."
PROP. XIII. It is demonstrated by certain arguments that not eternal but temporal existence must be attributed to the world.
Proof I, from Scripture. It is read in Genesis 1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
In order that the thesis may be proved from this testimony, it must be noted with St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 3, corpus, that the phrase "in the beginning" is explained in three ways. For it is explained: first, to signify the beginning of time, before which the world was not; second, to signify that God made all things in the Son, or through the Son, concerning whom similarly it is said at Colossians 1: "In whom all things were founded"; and John 8: "The beginning, who also speak to you"; third, to signify before all things, or that before God made other things, he created heaven and earth. See Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book 1, c. 1, from n. 11. But of these three explanations, the first, as is clear, serves the use of the present question.
Hence: From the cited testimony it is evident that the world had a beginning and did not always exist. Therefore.
The antecedent is proved. This is evident if it is evident that the phrase "in the beginning" presents the sense "in the beginning of time, before the world existed." But this is evident. Therefore.
The minor is proved. Although there are, as we have seen, three diverse senses of that phrase "in the beginning," nevertheless they are not in conflict with each other, and all can be true at the same time, as St. Augustine teaches, Confessions, book 12, c. 32. Now that the first sense also, which proves the thesis, must be retained, is evident: a) from the authority of the Fathers. For many expressly exhibit this sense; and those who hand down the second or third do not exclude the first, but indeed explicitly also teach it, as may be seen in Valentia, tome 1, disputation 3, question 3, point 1. Therefore there is a consensus of the holy Fathers. b) From other places of Sacred Scripture. Psalm 89:2: "Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed: from age to age you are God." John 17:5: "Glorify me, Father, with yourself, with the glory which I had with you before the world was." Verse 24: "You loved me before the foundation of the world." Ephesians 1:4: "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world." See also Proverbs 8. In all these eternity is attributed to God alone, so that he himself always was, but the world was not likewise. c) From the above cited chapter of the Lateran Council and the Vatican Council.
Proof II, from the Fathers. The Fathers, defending the divinity of the Word against the Arians, frequently proved it from the fact that eternity was attributed to him. Hence in the Nicene Council this judgment was uttered: "Whoever says the Son is a creature says that he began." St. Athanasius used the same argumentation to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit (Letter to Serapion), saying: "Just as the Son, because he always is, is not a creature, so, since the Trinity always is, there is no creature in it; wherefore the Spirit is not a creature." St. Basil (Hexaemeron, Homily 1, n. 6): "Since many were thinking that the world is co-eternal with God ... to remove the error of those men he deliberately chose these words, and said: In the beginning of time." St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron, Preface against the Peripatetics): "What is so unfitting as that they should join the eternity of the work with the eternity of almighty God?" St. Fulgentius (On Faith to Peter, c. 3): "God, who is always without beginning, because he supremely is, gave to things created by him that they should be; yet not without beginning, because no creature is of the same nature as the Trinity is." St. Chrysostom teaches the same (Homily 1 on John), and St. Augustine very often.
NOTE I. Since we abstain from the question concerning the possibility or repugnance of creation from eternity, we can bring forward no a priori argument from reason to show that the world was not created from eternity. Yet many, even while passing over that question, are accustomed to use certain arguments from reason, by which, if creation in time is not demonstrated, it is at least made persuasive. They especially press the argument taken from the tradition of all peoples. Besides, certain reasons of fittingness are usually adduced. Thus St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 1, ad 6, says: "God gave to his effect time, as much and when he willed, and according as it was fitting for demonstrating his power. For the world more manifestly leads into knowledge of the divine creating power if the world did not always exist than if it had always existed; for everything which did not always exist is manifestly seen to have a cause, but it is not so manifest concerning that which always existed." And Contra Gentiles, book 1, c. 13: "The most efficacious way for proving that God exists is from the supposition of the newness of the world, but not in the same way from the supposition of the eternity of the world; once that is posited, it seems less manifest that God exists. For if the world and motion began anew, it is plain that some cause must be posited which newly produces the world and motion; because everything which newly comes to be must take its origin from some innovator, since nothing brings itself from potency into act or from non-being into being." And book 2, c. 38: "For from this, that things did not always exist, it is also shown that God does not act through necessity of nature, and that his power is infinite in acting."
NOTE II. Many objections are usually made against this thesis, which can be seen especially in St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 46, a. 1 and 3. I shall briefly propose only two which seem to present a special difficulty. The first is: If the world had been created in time, God would be in time and not Creator from eternity; but this seems absurd, because God would seem to be changed. I reply. Among the names which are said of God with relation to creatures, some follow the immanent action of God, and do not presuppose the existence of the creature; others, however, follow the action of God passing over into an exterior effect, and presuppose the existence of the created thing. The first are said of God from eternity, and thus, for example, God is said from eternity to know creatures. But regarding the others, it must be noted that these names can be said of God either according to power or according to act. According to power they are also said of God from eternity, because power is in God from eternity. Indeed, according to this respect, they do not presuppose the existence of the creature, and therefore can be brought back to the first names. But according to act, they are said of God in time. Thus, for example, God is called Lord and Creator, according to power, from eternity, for the reason given; but he is called Lord according to act in time. For he is called Lord and Creator according to act who has a servant over whom he actually has dominion; but the creatures over whom God has dominion are in time. From this, however, no change in God follows, since God neither then acts when creatures begin to be, nor does he acquire anything new from the real existence of creatures. See Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7, and Sylvius on this place.
The other difficulty is: once the sufficient cause of creation is posited in act, the effect must immediately be posited in act; but God is the sufficient cause of creation from eternity in act; therefore. St. Thomas solves this difficulty most splendidly, Contra Gentiles, book 2, c. 35, saying: "Nor, however, is it necessary that, if the action of the first agent is eternal, its effect be eternal. For it was shown above (c. 23) that God acts voluntarily in the production of things; not, however, in such a way that there is some action of his as a middle, as in us the action of the moving power is a middle between the act of the will and the effect, as was shown in the preceding things; but his understanding and willing must be his making. But the effect follows from intellect and will according to the determination of the intellect and the command of the will. But just as through intellect the making of the thing and any other condition whatsoever is determined, so also time is prescribed to it; for art determines not only that this be such, but that it be then, as the physician determines that the drink be given then. Hence, if his willing were efficacious of itself for producing the effect, a new effect would follow from an ancient will, with no new action existing. Therefore nothing prevents saying that the action of God was from eternity, but that his effect was not from eternity, but then when he disposed from eternity. From this it is also clear that, although God is the sufficient cause of the production of things in being, nevertheless it is not necessary that his effect be posited as eternal, though he exists eternally. For when a sufficient cause is posited, its effect is posited, but not an effect foreign to the cause; for this would be from the insufficiency of the cause, as if something hot did not heat. But the proper effect of will is that there be what the will wills. But if there were something other than the will wills, the proper effect of the cause would not be posited, but one alien from it. Now will, as has been said, just as it wills this to be such, so it wills this to be then. Hence, in order that will be a sufficient cause, the effect must be when the will is that it be, and when it has disposed that the effect be. But in those things which proceed from a cause acting naturally, the matter is otherwise, because the action of nature is according as it itself is; hence the effect must follow upon the being of the cause. But will acts not according to the mode of its own being, but according to the mode of its purpose; and therefore, just as the effect of a natural agent follows the being of the agent, if it is sufficient, so the effect of an agent through will follows the mode of the purpose."