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Eighth Article. Whether God Is The Final Cause Of The World.
Section I. Certain Things Are Set Forth Beforehand.
Section I. Certain Things Are Set Forth Beforehand.
91. Concilium Vaticanum in cap. 1. Const. Dei Filius (n. 27) declaravit Deum mundum creavisse "non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quæ creaturis impertitur." Et can. 5. in
98 De Deo Creatore. h. cap. definivit : "Si quis mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit ; anathema sit."
98 De Deo Creatore. h. cap. definivit : "Si quis mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit ; anathema sit."
91. The Vatican Council, in chapter 1 of the constitution Dei Filius (n. 27), declared that God created the world "not for increasing his own beatitude, nor for acquiring it, but for manifesting his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures." And in canon 5 of the same chapter it defined: "If anyone shall deny that the world was founded for the glory of God, let him be anathema."
92. Ad hujus catholicæ doctrinæ intelligentiam et defensionem, necesse est ut aliqua in antecessum statuamus. Ac imprimis probe distinguendum est inter quæstionem de fine creationis ex parte actus, seu volitionis divinæ, qua Deus mundum voluit; et aliam de fine creationis ex parte voliti, seu mundi. Si quæratur de fine creationis ex parte volitionis divinæ, sensus quæstionis est : quid est quod movit voluntatem divinam ad creandum mundum ?-Si autem idem finis inspiciatur ex parte voliti, sensus quæstionis est : supposito quod Deus ex ratione etiam nobis ignota mundum voluerit, ad quem finem illum ordinavit, quem finem mundo præstituit ?
92. For the understanding and defense of this Catholic doctrine, it is necessary that we establish some things beforehand. And first, one must carefully distinguish between the question concerning the end of creation on the part of the act, or of the divine volition by which God willed the world, and the other question concerning the end of creation on the part of the thing willed, or of the world. If one asks about the end of creation on the part of the divine volition, the sense of the question is: what is it that moved the divine will to creating the world? But if the same end is considered on the part of the thing willed, the sense of the question is: supposing that God, for a reason even unknown to us, willed the world, to what end did he order it, what end did he assign to the world?
93. Distinguendum insuper est inter finem proprie dictum, seu causam finalem, et rationem volendi. Nam causa finalis tria, quoad rem præsentem, sibi necessario vindicat : ut realiter distinguatur a suo effectu- ut sit magis amabilis, quam ea quæ ad ipsam ordinantur ; siquidem finis diligitur propter se, media autem propter finem-ut consequenter ejus effectus ab eadem dependeat. At contra, ut aliquid sit solum ratio volendi et non causa, sufficit distinctio rationis inter ipsam et rationatum. Quæ distinctio inter causam et rationem communiter admittitur a Theologis quando tradunt unum attributum divinum esse rationem alterius, ex. gr. immutabilitatem æternitatis ; cum certum sit nullum attributum esse causam alterius attributi. Eamdem distinctionem sæpe docuit D. Thomas, sed præsertim 1. p. q. 19. a. 5. с. ubi concludens ait : "vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc ."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 99
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 99
93. Moreover, one must distinguish between an end properly so called, or a final cause, and a reason for willing. For a final cause, as to the present matter, necessarily claims three things for itself: that it be really distinguished from its effect; that it be more lovable than the things which are ordered to it, since the end is loved for its own sake, but means for the sake of the end; and that consequently its effect depend on it. On the contrary, for something to be only a reason for willing and not a cause, a distinction of reason between it and the thing reasoned is sufficient. This distinction between cause and reason is commonly admitted by theologians when they hand down that one divine attribute is the reason for another, for example immutability the reason for eternity; since it is certain that no attribute is the cause of another attribute. St. Thomas often taught the same distinction, but especially in Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 5, corpus, where in concluding he says: "therefore he wills this to be for the sake of this, but he does not will this on account of this."
94. His positis, statuendum est imprimis : nulla est causa finalis creationis ex parte ipsius volitionis divinæ. Nam hujusmodi causa vel esset ipsa divina bonitas, vel aliqua alia bonitas extra Deum ; finis enim est bonum. Atqui neutrum dici potest.-Non 1um , nam divina volitio est idem cum divina bonitate ; ergo si divina bonitas esset causa divinæ volitionis esset causa sui ipsius ; esset magis amabilis se ipsa : penderet a se ipsa : quæ omnia sunt absurda-Non 2um, quia Deus penderet ab alio, sicut effectus a causa : quod iterum absurdissimum est. Has ipsas rationes jam indicaverat S. Augustinus (de Genes. cont. Manichæos l. 2.) eas simul sua auctoritate confirmans . " Si ergo," inquit, "isti dixerint, quid placuit Deo facere cœlum et terram ? respondendum est eis ut prius discant vim voluntatis humanæ qui voluntatem Dei nosse desiderant. "Causas voluntatis scire quærunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quæ sunt , ipsa sit causa. Si enim habet causam voluntas Dei, est aliquid quod antecedat voluntatem Dei ; quod nefas est credere. Qui ergo dicit : quare fecit Deus cælum et terram, respondendum est ei, quia voluit. Voluntas enim Dei causa est cæli et terræ, et ideo major est voluntas Dei quam cælum et terra. Qui autem dicit, quare voluit facere cœlum et terram ; majus aliquid quærit, quam est voluntas Dei ; nihil autem majus inveniri potest." Et D. Thomas sæpe tradit eamdem veritatem ; ex. gr. l. mox c. ad 1. inquit ; "voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi, sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud."
94. These things having been posited, it must first be established: there is no final cause of creation on the part of the divine volition itself. For a cause of this kind would be either divine goodness itself, or some other goodness outside God; for the end is a good. But neither can be said. Not the first, for the divine volition is the same as divine goodness; therefore if divine goodness were the cause of the divine volition, it would be the cause of itself, it would be more lovable than itself, and it would depend on itself, all of which are absurd. Not the second, because God would depend on another, as an effect on a cause, which again is most absurd. St. Augustine had already indicated these very reasons (On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, book 2), at the same time confirming them by his authority. "Therefore," he says, "if they say, What pleased God to make heaven and earth? they must be answered that they should first learn the force of human will, who desire to know the will of God. They seek to know the causes of the will, when the will of God is itself the cause of all things that are. For if the will of God has a cause, there is something that precedes the will of God, which it is impious to believe. Therefore to one who says: why did God make heaven and earth? one must answer: because he willed. For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth, and therefore the will of God is greater than heaven and earth. But one who says, why did he will to make heaven and earth, seeks something greater than the will of God; but nothing greater can be found." And St. Thomas often hands down the same truth; for example, in the place just cited, reply to objection 1, he says: "the will of God is reasonable, not because something is for God the cause of willing, but insofar as he wills one thing to be for the sake of another."
95. Si vero agatur de ratione et non de causa divinæ voluntatis creandi mundum, dicendum est 1.
100 De Deo Creatore. quod ratio adæquata cur Deus voluerit mundum creare, seu cur ejus volitio terminetur ad mundum ut creandum, debet necessario complecti ipsam liberam determinationem divinæ voluntatis . Cum enim creatio in Deo sit libera, si præscindamus a libera determinatione voluntatis divinæ, habemus rationem cur Deus possit creare mundum, sed non cur creet. Unde S. Aug. dixit Deum creavisse mundum quia voluit.- Dicendum est 2. quod etiam divina bonitas est ratio, cur Deus voluerit creare mundum. Etenim velle creare est amare creaturas, quibus tribuitur existentia ; non possunt amari creaturæ nisi sint bonæ : non possunt esse bonæ, nisi per participationem divinæ bonitatis ; si ergo Deus non amaret suam bonitatem, nec amare posset creaturas, ac proinde nec illas creare. Unde S. Aug. l. 11. de Civ. Dei c. 24. ait : " sola bonitate et liberrima voluntate fecit Deus quidquid fecit".
100 De Deo Creatore. quod ratio adæquata cur Deus voluerit mundum creare, seu cur ejus volitio terminetur ad mundum ut creandum, debet necessario complecti ipsam liberam determinationem divinæ voluntatis . Cum enim creatio in Deo sit libera, si præscindamus a libera determinatione voluntatis divinæ, habemus rationem cur Deus possit creare mundum, sed non cur creet. Unde S. Aug. dixit Deum creavisse mundum quia voluit.- Dicendum est 2. quod etiam divina bonitas est ratio, cur Deus voluerit creare mundum. Etenim velle creare est amare creaturas, quibus tribuitur existentia ; non possunt amari creaturæ nisi sint bonæ : non possunt esse bonæ, nisi per participationem divinæ bonitatis ; si ergo Deus non amaret suam bonitatem, nec amare posset creaturas, ac proinde nec illas creare. Unde S. Aug. l. 11. de Civ. Dei c. 24. ait : " sola bonitate et liberrima voluntate fecit Deus quidquid fecit".
95. But if the question concerns the reason and not the cause of the divine will to create the world, it must be said: 1. that the adequate reason why God willed to create the world, or why his volition is terminated at the world as to be created, must necessarily include the free determination itself of the divine will. For since creation in God is free, if we prescind from the free determination of the divine will, we have the reason why God can create the world, but not why he creates. Hence St. Augustine said that God created the world because he willed. 2. It must be said that divine goodness also is the reason why God willed to create the world. For to will to create is to love creatures, to which existence is attributed; creatures cannot be loved unless they are good; they cannot be good except by participation in divine goodness. Therefore if God did not love his own goodness, he also could not love creatures, and consequently could not create them. Hence St. Augustine, book 11 The City of God, chapter 24, says: "by goodness alone and most free will God made whatever he made."
96. Quoad 2am autem quæstionem, certum est Deum aliquem finem mundo præstituisse ; sapientis est enim aliquem finem operi suo præstituere. Doctrina etiam communis est divinam bonitatem esse ultimum creationis finem. Sed ut hoc bene intelligatur notandum est finem agentis dupliciter dici : uno modo, quem agens sibi suique gratia intendit ; alio modo, quem alteri proponit et præscribit ut ipse eum assequatur. Si ex. gr. dominus aliquid operetur in gratiam famuli, absque dubio agit propter finem , non tamen ob finem sui, quem ipse sibi intendit consequi, sed ob finem alterius. Juxta priorem modum divina bonitas nequit dici finis, ob quem Deus mundum creavit : juxta alterum vero modum divina bonitas dici
Disp. I-. De Mundi Origine. 101 tur finis creationis, quatenus est finis ad cujus participationem vult creaturas perducere, quemque illis præscribit ut in eum tendant. Unde D. Th. 1. p. q. 44. a. 4. c. ait ; " primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicujus finis, sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quæ est ejus bonitas : et unaquæque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quæ est similitudo perfectionis, et bonitatis divinæ. Sic ergo divina bonitas erit finis rerum omnium."-Vid. Sylv. in h. l.
Disp. I-. De Mundi Origine. 101 tur finis creationis, quatenus est finis ad cujus participationem vult creaturas perducere, quemque illis præscribit ut in eum tendant. Unde D. Th. 1. p. q. 44. a. 4. c. ait ; " primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicujus finis, sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quæ est ejus bonitas : et unaquæque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quæ est similitudo perfectionis, et bonitatis divinæ. Sic ergo divina bonitas erit finis rerum omnium."-Vid. Sylv. in h. l.
96. As to the second question, however, it is certain that God assigned some end to the world; for it belongs to one who is wise to assign some end to his work. The common doctrine also is that divine goodness is the ultimate end of creation. But in order that this be well understood, it must be noted that the end of an agent is said in two ways: in one way, the end which the agent intends for himself and for his own sake; in another way, the end which he proposes and prescribes to another so that the other may attain it. If, for example, a master does something for the sake of a servant, without doubt he acts for the sake of an end, yet not on account of an end of himself which he intends to attain for himself, but on account of the end of another. According to the former mode, divine goodness cannot be called the end on account of which God created the world; but according to the latter mode, divine goodness is called the end of creation, insofar as it is the end to whose participation he wills to lead creatures, and which he prescribes to them so that they may tend into it. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 4, corpus, says: "it does not belong to the first agent, who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end, but he intends only to communicate his perfection, which is his goodness; and each creature intends to attain its perfection, which is a likeness of divine perfection and goodness. Thus, therefore, divine goodness will be the end of all things." See Sylvius in this place.
97. Ex quibus patet apertissime Deum non creavisse mundum ad aliquod bonum sibi acquirendum "non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam. " Hoc 1. sæpe docent scripturæ. Sic ex. gr. Ps. 15. 1. legitur : Dixi Domino : Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges "-Job 22. 3.: "quid prodest Deo, si justus fueris, aut quid ei confers, si immaculata fuerit vita tua ? "-Hoc 2. constanter tradunt Patres. Athenagoras (de Resurrect. mortuorum, n. 12.), scribit : " Deus nec frustra hominem fecit, est enim sapiens, nullum autem sapientiæ opus inutile ; nec ad proprium suum usum, nulla enim re indiget ; qui autem nulla omnino re indiget, sua ei opera nihil ad proprium usum attulerint. Sed nec ob aliquam rerum a se creatarum hominem condidit ... Quapropter si nec sine causa, nec frustra creatus est homo, nec ad ipsius Creatoris usum, ... nec ad alterius cujuspiam rei ab ipso conditæ ; liquet Deum," etc.-S. Jo. Chrys. (hom. 3. in Epist. Philem.): "Nulla re indigens Deus quæ in nostra sit potestate, nos condidit. Nullius autem ipsum eguisse monstravit in eo quod postea fecit. Nam si opus
1 102 De Deo Creatore. habuisset , olim condidisset . Quod si sine nobis erat ille, nos autem posterioribus temporibus facti sumus, non utique fecit nos indigens nostri. "-S. Hilarius (in Ps. 2um) : "Nullum a nobis nisi innocentiæ et religionis et fidei obsequium Deus postulat. Amari se a nobis exigit, non utique amoris in se nostri fructum aliquem seu causam ipse percipiens, sed amore ipso nobis potius, qui eum amabimus, profuturo ." S. Aug. (de Doct. Christ. l. 1. c. 31.) : “Diligit nos Deus , quomodo ergo diligit ? ut nobis utatur, an ut fruatur ? Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit, omne enim bonum nostrum vel ipse vel ab ipso est. Cui autem obscurum est non egere lucem rerum harum nitore quas ipsa illustraverit ; Dicit etiam apertissime propheta : Dixi Domino : Deus meus es tu quia bonorum meorum non eges. Non ergo fruitur nobis, sed utitur. Nam si neque fruitur neque utitur, non invenio quemadmodum diligat. Sed neque sic utitur ut nos : nam nos quibus utimur, ad id referimus, ut Dei bonitate fruamur : Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert. Quia enim bonus est sumus, et in quantum sumus boni sumus ... Ille igitur usus qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur non ad ejus sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur ; ad ejus autem tantummodo bonitatem." Unde D. Th. l. 2. c. g. c. 35. scribit : "Finis autem divinæ voluntatis non potest esse nisi ejus bonitas. Non autem agit propter hunc finem producendum in esse, sicut artifex agit propter constitutionem artificiati, cum bonitas ejus sit æterna et immutabilis, itaque ei nihil accrescere potest. Nec etiam potest dici, quod propter ejus meliorationem
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 103 Deus agat, nec etiam agit propter hunc finem acquirendum sibi, sicut rex pugnat, ut acquirat civitatem. Ipse enim est sua bonitas. Restat igitur quod agat propter finem, in quantum effectum producit ad participationem finis ."
1 102 De Deo Creatore. habuisset , olim condidisset . Quod si sine nobis erat ille, nos autem posterioribus temporibus facti sumus, non utique fecit nos indigens nostri. "-S. Hilarius (in Ps. 2um) : "Nullum a nobis nisi innocentiæ et religionis et fidei obsequium Deus postulat. Amari se a nobis exigit, non utique amoris in se nostri fructum aliquem seu causam ipse percipiens, sed amore ipso nobis potius, qui eum amabimus, profuturo ." S. Aug. (de Doct. Christ. l. 1. c. 31.) : “Diligit nos Deus , quomodo ergo diligit ? ut nobis utatur, an ut fruatur ? Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit, omne enim bonum nostrum vel ipse vel ab ipso est. Cui autem obscurum est non egere lucem rerum harum nitore quas ipsa illustraverit ; Dicit etiam apertissime propheta : Dixi Domino : Deus meus es tu quia bonorum meorum non eges. Non ergo fruitur nobis, sed utitur. Nam si neque fruitur neque utitur, non invenio quemadmodum diligat. Sed neque sic utitur ut nos : nam nos quibus utimur, ad id referimus, ut Dei bonitate fruamur : Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert. Quia enim bonus est sumus, et in quantum sumus boni sumus ... Ille igitur usus qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur non ad ejus sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur ; ad ejus autem tantummodo bonitatem." Unde D. Th. l. 2. c. g. c. 35. scribit : "Finis autem divinæ voluntatis non potest esse nisi ejus bonitas. Non autem agit propter hunc finem producendum in esse, sicut artifex agit propter constitutionem artificiati, cum bonitas ejus sit æterna et immutabilis, itaque ei nihil accrescere potest. Nec etiam potest dici, quod propter ejus meliorationem
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 103 Deus agat, nec etiam agit propter hunc finem acquirendum sibi, sicut rex pugnat, ut acquirat civitatem. Ipse enim est sua bonitas. Restat igitur quod agat propter finem, in quantum effectum producit ad participationem finis ."
97. From these things it is most openly clear that God did not create the world in order to acquire some good for himself, "not for increasing his own beatitude, nor for acquiring it." This, 1. the Scriptures often teach. Thus, for example, Psalm 15:1 reads: "I said to the Lord: you are my God, since you do not need my goods." Job 22:3: "What does it profit God if you have been just, or what do you confer on him if your life has been immaculate?" This, 2. the Fathers constantly hand down. Athenagoras (On the Resurrection of the Dead, n. 12) writes: "God did not make man in vain, for he is wise, and no work of wisdom is useless; nor for his own use, for he needs nothing, and to one who needs absolutely nothing, his works would bring nothing for his own use. But neither did he found man on account of any of the things created by him ... Wherefore, if man was created neither without cause, nor in vain, nor for the use of the Creator himself ... nor for the use of any other thing founded by him, it is clear that God," etc. St. John Chrysostom (homily 3 on the Epistle to Philemon): "God, needing nothing which is in our power, founded us. But that he needed nothing he showed in that which he did later. For if he had needed the work, he would have founded it long ago. But if he existed without us, and we were made in later times, he certainly did not make us because he needed us." St. Hilary (on Psalm 2): "God asks from us no service except that of innocence and religion and faith. He demands that he be loved by us, not indeed as himself receiving some fruit or cause of our love in himself, but rather because the love itself will profit us, who shall love him." St. Augustine (On Christian Doctrine, book 1, chapter 31): "God loves us; how therefore does he love? So that he may use us, or so that he may enjoy us? But if he enjoys us, he needs our good, which no sane person would say; for all our good either is he himself or is from him. But to whom is it obscure that the light does not need the brightness of those things which it has itself illumined? The prophet also says most openly: I said to the Lord: you are my God, because you do not need my goods. Therefore he does not enjoy us, but uses us. For if he neither enjoys nor uses us, I do not find how he loves. But neither does he use us as we do; for we refer the things which we use to this, that we may enjoy the goodness of God; but God refers our use to his own goodness. For because he is good, we are, and insofar as we are, we are good ... Therefore that use which is called God's, by which he uses us, is referred not to his utility but to ours; but to his goodness alone." Hence St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, chapter 35, writes: "But the end of the divine will can be nothing except his goodness. Yet he does not act for this end as something to be produced into being, as an artisan acts for the constitution of the thing made, since his goodness is eternal and immutable, and so nothing can accrue to it. Nor can it be said that God acts for the sake of improving it, nor again does he act for the sake of acquiring this end for himself, as a king fights to acquire a city. For he himself is his goodness. It remains, therefore, that he acts for the sake of an end insofar as he produces an effect for participation in the end."
Section II. Whether And How The Ultimate End Of The World Is The Extrinsic Glory Of God. The Question Is Proposed.
98. Cum sit communis apud Theologos doctrina, mundum creatum esse propter gloriam Dei extrinsecam ; necesse est ostendere quomodo hæc doctrina cum iis, quæ paulo ante diximus, cohæreat, et quodnam fundamentum habeat. Nonnulla prænotamus ad declarandum statum quæstionis.
98. Since it is a common doctrine among theologians that the world was created for the sake of the extrinsic glory of God, it is necessary to show how this doctrine coheres with those things which we said a little before, and what foundation it has. We pre-note a few things for declaring the state of the question.
99. Quando finis divisiones traduntur, non semper iisdem vocibus idem sensus ab omnibus tribuitur ; ne ergo vocum æquivocatio perspicuitati noceat, ea de hac re attingemus, quæ ad præsentem quæstionem sunt necessaria .
99. When divisions of end are handed down, the same sense is not always attributed by all to the same words. Therefore, lest an equivocation of terms harm clarity, we shall touch on those things concerning this matter which are necessary for the present question.
100. Itaque finis communiter definitur : id cujus gratia aliquid fit. Illud cujus gratia idem sonat ac propter quod. Unde distinguere solent inter finem quia, et finem propter quem : ille proprie non est causa finalis, sed ratio, de qua superius locuti sumus ; hic vero est proprie causa finalis, præcognitus ab agente ut in se bonus, et bonitate sua movet agens ad operandum, ipsum alliciendo, ac velut invitando. Finis propter quem dividitur in finem qui (ab aliis dicitur cujus), et est ipsum bonum quod intenditur ab agente ; et finem cui. Et est persona vel subjectum, cui procuratur finis qui, tamquam bonum ejus. Dum ægro, ex. gr. , sanitatem procuras, sanitas est finis qui, æger est finis cui.-Uterque dividitur in finem ultimum et proximum : primus est, in quo ultimo sistit intentio agentis : alter, propter quem ponitur aliquod medium, sic tamen ut ad ulteriorem finem agens progrediatur. Si simul comparentur finis qui et finis cui, patet quod ille ad hunc ordinatur : bonum quod intenditur, intenditur alicui subjecto. Cæteras divisiones finis omittimus, quia ad præsentem quæstionem non sunt necessaria.
100. And so an end is commonly defined: that for the sake of which something is done. That for the sake of which sounds the same as on account of which. Hence they are accustomed to distinguish between the end because of which, and the end for the sake of which: the former is not properly a final cause, but the reason about which we spoke above; the latter is properly a final cause, foreknown by the agent as good in itself, and by its own goodness it moves the agent to operating, alluring him and, as it were, inviting him. The end for the sake of which is divided into the end which (called by others the end whose), and this is the good itself which is intended by the agent; and the end for whom, and this is the person or subject for whom the end which is procured as his good. When, for example, you procure health for a sick man, health is the end which, the sick man is the end for whom. Each is divided into ultimate and proximate end: the first is that in which the intention of the agent ultimately rests; the other is that for the sake of which some means is posited, yet in such a way that the agent proceeds toward a further end. If the end which and the end for whom are compared together, it is clear that the former is ordered to the latter: the good which is intended is intended for some subject. We omit the other divisions of end, because they are not necessary for the present question.
101. His positis, juxta doctrinam inter Theologos communem quoad rem, finis qui proximus creationis est communicatio divinæ bonitatis. Quæ communicatio fit eo ipso quod effectus producuntur a Deo , siquidem debent de ejus bonitate, ut vidimus, participare, eique aliquo pacto similes fieri. Et si consideremus omnia opera Dei ad extra, eadem communicatio fit speciali modo cognoscentibus et amantibus Deum, potissimum si cognitio sit intuitiva, et amor huic cognitioni respondeat; tunc enim vere Deus possidetur a creatura. Cum autem nostra felicitas consistat in cognitione et amore Dei; dici potest eamdem esse finem qui creationis.-Finis qui ultimus creationis est manifestatio divinæ bonitatis et perfectionis, seu divina gloria.-Item finis cui proximus seu secundarius creationis (quoad rem præsentem) est creatura intelligentia prædita, cui Deus vult felicitatem, ei communicando suam bonitatem.-Finis cui ultimus seu primarius est ipse Deus ; sibi enim Deus vult gloriam , ad quam ordinat ipsam nostram felicitatem. "Bonum
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 105 rerum creatarum, " inquit Lessius (de div. Perf. 1. 14. c. 3. n. 58.) "dupliciter posse considerari. Primo , Ut rem creatam perficit. Secundo , Ut ad Dei gloriam pertinet, et divinas perfectiones repræsentat : et hoc secundo modo consideratum longe pluris æstimandum, et a Deo semper intendi. Tertio, Sicut impossibile est esse aliquam rem creatam, quæ non dependeat ab influxu Dei ut primæ causæ efficientis : ita etiam impossibile est esse aliquam rem creatam quæ non dependeat ab intentione gloriæ Dei, et ad eam tamquam ultimum finem non ordinetur."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 105 rerum creatarum, " inquit Lessius (de div. Perf. 1. 14. c. 3. n. 58.) "dupliciter posse considerari. Primo , Ut rem creatam perficit. Secundo , Ut ad Dei gloriam pertinet, et divinas perfectiones repræsentat : et hoc secundo modo consideratum longe pluris æstimandum, et a Deo semper intendi. Tertio, Sicut impossibile est esse aliquam rem creatam, quæ non dependeat ab influxu Dei ut primæ causæ efficientis : ita etiam impossibile est esse aliquam rem creatam quæ non dependeat ab intentione gloriæ Dei, et ad eam tamquam ultimum finem non ordinetur."
101. These things having been posited, according to the doctrine common among theologians as to the matter, the proximate end which of creation is the communication of divine goodness. This communication occurs by the very fact that effects are produced by God, since, as we have seen, they must participate in his goodness and in some way become like him. And if we consider all the works of God outside himself, the same communication occurs in a special way for those knowing and loving God, especially if the cognition is intuitive and the love corresponds to this cognition; for then God is truly possessed by the creature. But since our happiness consists in the cognition and love of God, the same can be said to be the end which of creation. The ultimate end which of creation is the manifestation of divine goodness and perfection, or divine glory. Likewise the proximate or secondary end for whom of creation (as to the present matter) is the creature endowed with intelligence, to whom God wills happiness by communicating his goodness to it. The ultimate or primary end for whom is God himself; for God wills glory for himself, to which he orders our very happiness. "The good of created things," says Lessius (On the Divine Perfections, book 14, chapter 3, n. 58), "can be considered in two ways. First, as it perfects the created thing. Second, as it pertains to the glory of God and represents the divine perfections; and considered in this second way, it is to be esteemed far more, and is always intended by God. Third, just as it is impossible that there be some created thing which does not depend on the influx of God as first efficient cause, so it is also impossible that there be some created thing which does not depend on the intention of God's glory and is not ordered to it as ultimate end."
102. Contra hanc communem Theologorum doctrinam quæ nunc catholica est, insurrexerunt plures ex Reformatis ; Moshemius (Elem. theol. dog. p. 1. sect. 2. c. 1.) , Wegscheider (Inst. theol. § 96.), Kant (In critica rationis practicæ), etc.-Inter ipsos Catholicos, Cartesius (Medit. 4.) irridet doctrinam eorum, qui statuunt Deum mundum condidisse ad nominis sui gloriam-Hermes (In introduct. Phil. q. 2. § 71.), etc. Hi omnes assignant felicitatem hominum vel tamquam finem unicum, vel primarium creationis universi ; ac proinde vel penitus excludunt divinam gloriam, vel eam hominum felicitati subordinant.
102. Against this common doctrine of theologians, which is now Catholic, several from the Reformed have risen up: Mosheim (Elements of Dogmatic Theology, part 1, section 2, chapter 1), Wegscheider (Institutions of Theology, § 96), Kant (In the Critique of Practical Reason), etc. Among Catholics themselves, Descartes (Meditation 4) ridicules the doctrine of those who establish that God founded the world for the glory of his name; Hermes (Introduction to Philosophy, q. 2, § 71), etc. All these assign the happiness of human beings either as the sole end, or as the primary end, of the universe's creation; and consequently they either entirely exclude divine glory, or subordinate it to human happiness.
103. Antequam doctrinam catholicam statuamus, adhuc notandum est cum Lessio (l. c. c. 1. n. 7.) 1. "gloriam dupliciter accipi. Primo, pro quavis excellentia interna vel externa, ratione cujus dignus est quis cognosci, laudari, æstimari, honorari, amari. Secundo, pro ipso cognosci, amari, laudari, esse in admiratione, veneratione, etc. Hoc enim proprie et formaliter gloria dicitur, quæ definiri solet clara cum laude notitia : notitia inquam, quæ habetur de excellentia alicujus. Itaque duplex est Dei gloria, interna et externa. Interna iterum duplex est, objectiva et formalis . Objectiva gloria Deo intrinseca est ipsa Divinitas, seu splendor et excellentia Divinitatis, et Personarum divinarum : ob hanc enim dignissimus est qui ab omnibus cognoscatur, ametur, laudetur, etc. Sic passim in Scripturis excellentia Divinitatis, et omnia hujus excellentiæ signa dicuntur gloria Dei. Formalis gloria Deo intrinseca est cognitio, amor et gaudium Dei de seipso : sive quod ipse a seipso infinite et adæquate cognoscatur, ametur et cum infinito gaudio ac suavitate gustetur ... Gloria extrinseca duplex est. Altera enim est objectiva, et consistit in excellentia et pulchritudine rerum creatarum ; sed maxime filiorum Dei, ut sunt omnes Beati. Sicut enim gloria Principis sæcularis dicitur consistere potissimum in splendore et multitudine aulicorum : ita externa gloria Dei objectiva consistit potissimum in splendore et multitudine aulicorum cælestium, secundario in aliis rebus creatis. Altera est gloria formalis, quæ sita est in Dei visione, amore, gaudio, et actibus hinc sequentibus : nimirum quatenus ipse a Beatis cognoscitur, amatur, gustatur, laudatur et benedicitur in omnem æternitatem. In hac re completur tota gloria Dei externa, et ad illam tota rerum creatarum species et pulchritudo ordinatur." Notandum est 2. cum eodem Lessio (l. c. cap. 4. 1.), quod "cum natura ratione carens, non sit capax talium actuum (quibus Deo tribuitur gloria extrinseca), videndum qua ratione ad gloriam Dei ordinetur , illique serviat. Quod ut intelligatur, notandum est, Deum ita esse finem ultimum naturæ rationalis, ut
6 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 107 etiam sit ejus finis proximus ; cum non sit aliquid infra Deum ad cujus gloriam vel commodum ipsa possit ordinari. Unde solus Deus est finis immediatus ad cujus solius gloriam ipsa est condita. Verum naturæ irrationalis Deus ita est finis ultimus, ut ipsa etiam alium finem habeat ad quem proxime natura sua destinetur, nempe naturam humanam, ad cujus obsequium mundus iste corporeus cum omnibus rebus corporalibus quæ ipso continentur, conditus est. " Ibidem autem imprimis probat ex Scripturis et ex Patribus , creaturas inferiores factas esse immediate propter homines ; et deinde ostendit quomodo ex eis possit et debeat homo Deum glorificare . Notandum 3. quomodo finis qui proximus et secundarius apprime cohæreat cum fine qui ultimo. "Summa, " inquit idem Auctor (l. c. cap. 3. n. 62. ) "ejus (Dei) gloria externa est ipsum a nobis perfecte cognosci, amari et gustari ... Summum bonum nostrum, et formalis beatitas est Deum videre, amare, gustare. Itaque in summa Dei gloria formaliter et intrinsece includitur summum bonum nostrum, ita ut sine illo concipi nequeat : et hoc ipso quod Deus illam gloriam intendit et quærit, intendit et quærit summum bonum et commodum nostrum. Unde non minus Deo gratias agere debemus quod quærat gloriam suam, quam quod quærat salutem nostram ; quia gloria ejus est salus nostra. Hoc in Hymno Angelico Ecclesia insinuat cum ait : Gratias agimus tibi propter magnam gloriam tuam : beneficia enim ipsius in nos, sunt gloria ejus."
6 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 107 etiam sit ejus finis proximus ; cum non sit aliquid infra Deum ad cujus gloriam vel commodum ipsa possit ordinari. Unde solus Deus est finis immediatus ad cujus solius gloriam ipsa est condita. Verum naturæ irrationalis Deus ita est finis ultimus, ut ipsa etiam alium finem habeat ad quem proxime natura sua destinetur, nempe naturam humanam, ad cujus obsequium mundus iste corporeus cum omnibus rebus corporalibus quæ ipso continentur, conditus est. " Ibidem autem imprimis probat ex Scripturis et ex Patribus , creaturas inferiores factas esse immediate propter homines ; et deinde ostendit quomodo ex eis possit et debeat homo Deum glorificare . Notandum 3. quomodo finis qui proximus et secundarius apprime cohæreat cum fine qui ultimo. "Summa, " inquit idem Auctor (l. c. cap. 3. n. 62. ) "ejus (Dei) gloria externa est ipsum a nobis perfecte cognosci, amari et gustari ... Summum bonum nostrum, et formalis beatitas est Deum videre, amare, gustare. Itaque in summa Dei gloria formaliter et intrinsece includitur summum bonum nostrum, ita ut sine illo concipi nequeat : et hoc ipso quod Deus illam gloriam intendit et quærit, intendit et quærit summum bonum et commodum nostrum. Unde non minus Deo gratias agere debemus quod quærat gloriam suam, quam quod quærat salutem nostram ; quia gloria ejus est salus nostra. Hoc in Hymno Angelico Ecclesia insinuat cum ait : Gratias agimus tibi propter magnam gloriam tuam : beneficia enim ipsius in nos, sunt gloria ejus."
103. Before we establish the Catholic doctrine, it must still be noted with Lessius (cited place, chapter 1, n. 7): 1. "that glory is taken in two ways. First, for any internal or external excellence, by reason of which someone is worthy to be known, praised, esteemed, honored, loved. Second, for the very being known, loved, praised, being in admiration, veneration, etc. For this is properly and formally called glory, which is customarily defined as clear knowledge with praise: knowledge, I say, which is had concerning someone's excellence. And so God's glory is twofold, internal and external. Internal glory is again twofold, objective and formal. Objective glory intrinsic to God is the Divinity itself, or the splendor and excellence of the Divinity and of the divine Persons; for on account of this he is most worthy to be known, loved, praised, etc., by all. Thus throughout the Scriptures the excellence of the Divinity, and all the signs of this excellence, are called the glory of God. Formal glory intrinsic to God is God's cognition, love, and joy concerning himself: namely, that he is known, loved, and tasted by himself infinitely and adequately, and with infinite joy and sweetness ... Extrinsic glory is twofold. One is objective, and consists in the excellence and beauty of created things, but especially of the children of God, as all the Blessed are. For just as the glory of a secular prince is said to consist especially in the splendor and multitude of courtiers, so the objective external glory of God consists especially in the splendor and multitude of heavenly courtiers, secondarily in other created things. The other is formal glory, which is situated in the vision, love, joy of God, and the acts following from these: namely, insofar as he is known, loved, tasted, praised, and blessed by the Blessed for all eternity. In this matter the whole external glory of God is completed, and to it the whole beauty and species of created things is ordered."
It must be noted: 2. with the same Lessius (cited place, chapter 4, n. 1), that "since nature lacking reason is not capable of such acts (by which extrinsic glory is attributed to God), it must be seen in what way it is ordered to the glory of God and serves it. For this to be understood, it must be noted that God is the ultimate end of rational nature in such a way that he is also its proximate end, since there is nothing below God to whose glory or advantage it can be ordered. Hence God alone is the immediate end, for whose glory alone it has been founded. But of irrational nature God is the ultimate end in such a way that it also has another end to which it is proximately destined by its nature, namely human nature, for whose service this corporeal world with all corporeal things which are contained in it has been founded." In the same place he first proves from the Scriptures and from the Fathers that inferior creatures were made immediately for human beings; and then he shows how from them man can and ought to glorify God.
It must be noted: 3. how the proximate and secondary end which coheres especially well with the ultimate end which. "The sum," says the same author (cited place, chapter 3, n. 62), "of his (God's) external glory is that he be perfectly known, loved, and tasted by us ... Our highest good and formal beatitude is to see, love, and taste God. And so in the sum of God's glory our highest good is formally and intrinsically included, so that without it that glory cannot be conceived; and by the very fact that God intends and seeks that glory, he intends and seeks our highest good and advantage. Hence we ought to give thanks to God no less because he seeks his own glory than because he seeks our salvation; because his glory is our salvation. The Church intimates this in the Angelic Hymn when it says: We give thanks to you for your great glory; for his benefits toward us are his glory."
It must be noted: 2. with the same Lessius (cited place, chapter 4, n. 1), that "since nature lacking reason is not capable of such acts (by which extrinsic glory is attributed to God), it must be seen in what way it is ordered to the glory of God and serves it. For this to be understood, it must be noted that God is the ultimate end of rational nature in such a way that he is also its proximate end, since there is nothing below God to whose glory or advantage it can be ordered. Hence God alone is the immediate end, for whose glory alone it has been founded. But of irrational nature God is the ultimate end in such a way that it also has another end to which it is proximately destined by its nature, namely human nature, for whose service this corporeal world with all corporeal things which are contained in it has been founded." In the same place he first proves from the Scriptures and from the Fathers that inferior creatures were made immediately for human beings; and then he shows how from them man can and ought to glorify God.
It must be noted: 3. how the proximate and secondary end which coheres especially well with the ultimate end which. "The sum," says the same author (cited place, chapter 3, n. 62), "of his (God's) external glory is that he be perfectly known, loved, and tasted by us ... Our highest good and formal beatitude is to see, love, and taste God. And so in the sum of God's glory our highest good is formally and intrinsically included, so that without it that glory cannot be conceived; and by the very fact that God intends and seeks that glory, he intends and seeks our highest good and advantage. Hence we ought to give thanks to God no less because he seeks his own glory than because he seeks our salvation; because his glory is our salvation. The Church intimates this in the Angelic Hymn when it says: We give thanks to you for your great glory; for his benefits toward us are his glory."
104. His rite constitutis
PROP. XI. Supremus creationis finis, cui etiam felicitas intelligentis creaturae est obnoxia, alius non est ab extrinseca Dei gloria.
Prob. I. ex Scriptura, Prov. 16. 4. dicitur: "Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus; impium quoque ad diem malum." - Is. 43. 7.: "Omnem qui invocat nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavi eum, formavi eum, et feci eum." - Deut. 26. 19. sermo est de "cunctis gentibus, quas creavit in laudem, et nomen, et gloriam suam." Ps. 18. 1.: "Caeli enarrant gloriam Dei, et opera manuum ejus annuntiat firmamentum." - Is. 6. 3.: "Plena est omnis terra gloria ejus." - Rom. 1. 20.: "Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas: ita ut sint inexcusabiles. Quia cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt." - Apoc. 1. 8.: "Ego sum Alpha et Omega, principium et finis." Unde:
In recitatis testimoniis asseritur creaturas omnes factas esse ad gloriam Dei manifestandam - hominem creatum fuisse propter Deum - propter gloriam Dei: quae omnia ostendunt finem creationis. Atqui haec omnia intelligenda sunt de supremo creationis fine. Ergo.
Prob. min. gloria Dei designatur non modo ut finis, sed ut supremus creationis finis, si ei subordinatur
ipsa felicitas creaturarum intelligentium; atqui ita est; dicitur enim "impium quoque ad diem malum;" ergo. Si gloria Dei non esset supremus finis, subordinaretur, ut adversarii contendunt, felicitati intelligentis creaturae; atqui hoc dici nequit, siquidem, ut patebit ex argumento tertio loco afferendo, hoc esset contra rectum rerum ordinem; ergo si gloria Dei designatur in Scriptura ut creationis finis, designatur ut supremus finis.
Prob. II. ex Patribus. Athenagoras (De resurrectione mortuorum, n. 12.) "Manifestum est, Deum, si prima et maxime universalis ratio spectetur, propter seipsum et propter suam bonitatem et sapientiam ex omnibus operibus suis resplendentem, impulsum fuisse, ut hominem crearet." - Tertullianus (Apol. c. 17.) "De nihilo (mundum) expressit in ornamentum majestatis suae." - Theophilus Antiochenus (l. 1. ad Autol. 4.) "Deus omnia fecit, quae antea non extiterunt, ut ex operibus magnitudo ipsius cognosceretur et intelligeretur." - Lactantius (Lib. 7. instit. c. 6.) "Idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur; ideo nascimur, ut agnoscamus factorem mundi, ac nostri, Deum; ideo agnoscimus, ut colamus: ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboribus cultus Dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis afficimur, ut similes Angelis effecti, summo Patri ac Domino in perpetuum serviamus, et simus aeternum Dei regnum." - S. Hieronymus (In Eph. 1. 14.) "Non quod Deus laude alicujus indigeat, sed quod laus Dei laudatoribus prosit, et dum per singula opera majestatem ipsius magnitudinemque cognoscunt, ad laudandum eum miraculo
stuporis erumpant." - S. Augustinus (Lib. 3. de lib. arbitr. c. 11. n. 32.) "Naturas igitur omnes Deus fecit non solum in virtute et justitia mansuras, sed etiam peccaturas, non ut peccarent, sed ut essent ornaturae universum, sive peccare, sive non peccare voluissent." S. Chrysostomus (Hom. II. n. 2.) propugnat contra Manichaeos Deum fecisse mundum pulchrum et corruptibilem "per pulchritudinem in conditoris admirationem, per infirmitatem vero a colenda nos abducens creatura."
Prob. III. ex ratione. Deus ex infinita perfectione suae naturae non potest res nisi ordinatissimo amore prosequi; atqui non ita Deus res creando amaret, nisi omnia, etiam felicitatem nostram, ad seipsum ultimo dirigeret; ergo debet omnia ad seipsum ultimo ordinare. Cum autem, ex dictis, non possit omnia ad se ordinare, nisi quatenus omnia dirigit ad gloriam suam extrinsecam (nihil aliud possunt creaturae Deo tribuere); sequitur omnia, etiam felicitatem nostram, ad hanc suam gloriam ordinasse.
Prob. min. Quodcumque, vel minimum bonum Dei, majus est quocumque creaturarum bono; atqui rectus ordo postulat ut bona inferiora praestantioribus subordinentur; ergo.
Prob. IV. ex ratione iterum. Finem ultimum creationis Deus absolute vult, ac proinde infallibiliter attingit: sed si finis ultimus esset hominis felicitas, Deus illum non semper attingeret, nisi velimus dicere neminem periisse, aut damnatorum poenas non esse aeternas; si vero est gloria Dei extrinseca, eam semper obtinet Deus, siquidem ipsa poena reprobis inflicta justitiam Dei manifestat. Pulchrum enim et
recto ordini conveniens est, ut qui injuriam Deo irrogaverunt, ei patiendo satisfaciant "experturi," inquit S. Aug. (De spir. et litt. c. 33.) "in suppliciis potestatem ejus, cujus in donis misericordiam contempserunt."
Quare Conc. Vat. cit. cap. dicit Deum mundum condidisse "ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur:" maximum autem bonum nobis communicatum, est aeterna felicitas; haec ipsa ergo ordinatur ad gloriam Dei. Et can. cit. definiens finem creationis commemorat solum "Dei gloriam"; soli enim ultimo fini simpliciter competit ratio finis.
NOTA. Ex dictis facile est solvere difficultates, quae contra thesim afferi solent. Duae sunt praecipuae. Prima est: asserere Deum creavisse mundum ultimo propter gloriam suam, est ambitionis vitium ei tribuere, ac proinde ei injuriam irrogare. Resp. Quaerere gloriam et honorem non est per se malum; unde ipse homo potest aliquando eam quaerere. Ita, ex. gr., potest superior debitam reverentiam exigere non modo quia hoc postulat subditorum bonum, sed etiam quia ordini naturae et morali legi conveniens est ut honor praestetur ei, qui talem obtinet dignitatem a Deo collatam, cui reverentia et honor debetur. Potest tamen homo facile peccare dum suam gloriam quaerit, sive quia quaerit indebitam, sive quia unice quaerit, ex. gr., ob delectationem in ea sistendo. At in Deo hi aut similes defectus non sunt possibiles; et aliunde est omnino rerum ordini conforme ut omnia externa sua opera ad gloriam sui, qui infinite perfectionis est, referat. Unde tantum abest ut hoc pos-
sit ei vitio verti, ut si contra ageret, esset in eo vitiosum.
Altera difficultas est: Si Deus omnia creavisset propter gloriam suam, non amaret creaturas suas propter seipsas, seu amore benevolentiae, sed amore concupiscentiae: ita quidem demitur grato animi sensui, quem nos habere debemus erga Deum. - Resp. Hic confunduntur duae quaestiones valde inter se distinctae: 1ma, cur Deus diligit creaturas? - 2da, cur eas refert ad gloriam suam? - Ratio cur Deus diligit creaturas est quia diligens bonitatem suam, diligit quidquid de ea participat; in creaturis autem Deus non praesupponit participationem suae bonitatis, sed amando illas ponit in ipsis sui rationem amoris, bonitatem suam illis communicando, citra suam utilitatem: qui sic diligit, amore benevolentiae diligit. - Refert Deus omnes creaturas ultimo ad gloriam suam, non quia iis indiget, vel quia ei sunt quoquomodo utiles; sed quia hoc exigit rectus ordo et Dei sanctitas: hoc vero nullo pacto impedit quominus amor Dei erga nos sit vere amor benevolentiae. An quando amicum diligimus ob bonum ejus et non ob commodum nostrum, amor noster desinit esse benevolentiae eo quod amicum diligimus, uti fieri debet, in ordine ad Deum? Quare merito D. Th. c. g. l. 1. c. 93., scribit: "Finis ultimus, propter quem vult Deus omnia, nullo modo dependet ab his quae sunt ad finem, nec quantum ad esse, nec quantum ad perfectionem aliquam; unde non vult alicui suam bonitatem communicare, ad hoc ut sibi exinde aliquid accrescat, sed quia ipsum communicare est sibi conveniens sicut fonti bonitatis. Dare autem, non propter aliquod commo-
dum ex datione expectatum, sed propter ipsam bonitatem et convenientiam dationis; est actus liberalitatis ... Hanc autem ejus liberalitatem Scriptura ostendit dicens: Aperiente te manum tuam, omnia implebuntur bonitate (Ps. 103. 29.)" - Et Rogaccius (Unum necessarium, p. 1. c. 25.) ait: "Sane, ullane liberalior esse potest ac beneficentior voluntas, seu lucis erga hominem caecum, quam si illum spectatorem suae pulchritudinis cupiat; seu fontis erga siti confectum, quam si ad gustandos suos latices eum provocet?"
PROP. XI. Supremus creationis finis, cui etiam felicitas intelligentis creaturae est obnoxia, alius non est ab extrinseca Dei gloria.
Prob. I. ex Scriptura, Prov. 16. 4. dicitur: "Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus; impium quoque ad diem malum." - Is. 43. 7.: "Omnem qui invocat nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavi eum, formavi eum, et feci eum." - Deut. 26. 19. sermo est de "cunctis gentibus, quas creavit in laudem, et nomen, et gloriam suam." Ps. 18. 1.: "Caeli enarrant gloriam Dei, et opera manuum ejus annuntiat firmamentum." - Is. 6. 3.: "Plena est omnis terra gloria ejus." - Rom. 1. 20.: "Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas: ita ut sint inexcusabiles. Quia cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt." - Apoc. 1. 8.: "Ego sum Alpha et Omega, principium et finis." Unde:
In recitatis testimoniis asseritur creaturas omnes factas esse ad gloriam Dei manifestandam - hominem creatum fuisse propter Deum - propter gloriam Dei: quae omnia ostendunt finem creationis. Atqui haec omnia intelligenda sunt de supremo creationis fine. Ergo.
Prob. min. gloria Dei designatur non modo ut finis, sed ut supremus creationis finis, si ei subordinatur
ipsa felicitas creaturarum intelligentium; atqui ita est; dicitur enim "impium quoque ad diem malum;" ergo. Si gloria Dei non esset supremus finis, subordinaretur, ut adversarii contendunt, felicitati intelligentis creaturae; atqui hoc dici nequit, siquidem, ut patebit ex argumento tertio loco afferendo, hoc esset contra rectum rerum ordinem; ergo si gloria Dei designatur in Scriptura ut creationis finis, designatur ut supremus finis.
Prob. II. ex Patribus. Athenagoras (De resurrectione mortuorum, n. 12.) "Manifestum est, Deum, si prima et maxime universalis ratio spectetur, propter seipsum et propter suam bonitatem et sapientiam ex omnibus operibus suis resplendentem, impulsum fuisse, ut hominem crearet." - Tertullianus (Apol. c. 17.) "De nihilo (mundum) expressit in ornamentum majestatis suae." - Theophilus Antiochenus (l. 1. ad Autol. 4.) "Deus omnia fecit, quae antea non extiterunt, ut ex operibus magnitudo ipsius cognosceretur et intelligeretur." - Lactantius (Lib. 7. instit. c. 6.) "Idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur; ideo nascimur, ut agnoscamus factorem mundi, ac nostri, Deum; ideo agnoscimus, ut colamus: ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboribus cultus Dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis afficimur, ut similes Angelis effecti, summo Patri ac Domino in perpetuum serviamus, et simus aeternum Dei regnum." - S. Hieronymus (In Eph. 1. 14.) "Non quod Deus laude alicujus indigeat, sed quod laus Dei laudatoribus prosit, et dum per singula opera majestatem ipsius magnitudinemque cognoscunt, ad laudandum eum miraculo
stuporis erumpant." - S. Augustinus (Lib. 3. de lib. arbitr. c. 11. n. 32.) "Naturas igitur omnes Deus fecit non solum in virtute et justitia mansuras, sed etiam peccaturas, non ut peccarent, sed ut essent ornaturae universum, sive peccare, sive non peccare voluissent." S. Chrysostomus (Hom. II. n. 2.) propugnat contra Manichaeos Deum fecisse mundum pulchrum et corruptibilem "per pulchritudinem in conditoris admirationem, per infirmitatem vero a colenda nos abducens creatura."
Prob. III. ex ratione. Deus ex infinita perfectione suae naturae non potest res nisi ordinatissimo amore prosequi; atqui non ita Deus res creando amaret, nisi omnia, etiam felicitatem nostram, ad seipsum ultimo dirigeret; ergo debet omnia ad seipsum ultimo ordinare. Cum autem, ex dictis, non possit omnia ad se ordinare, nisi quatenus omnia dirigit ad gloriam suam extrinsecam (nihil aliud possunt creaturae Deo tribuere); sequitur omnia, etiam felicitatem nostram, ad hanc suam gloriam ordinasse.
Prob. min. Quodcumque, vel minimum bonum Dei, majus est quocumque creaturarum bono; atqui rectus ordo postulat ut bona inferiora praestantioribus subordinentur; ergo.
Prob. IV. ex ratione iterum. Finem ultimum creationis Deus absolute vult, ac proinde infallibiliter attingit: sed si finis ultimus esset hominis felicitas, Deus illum non semper attingeret, nisi velimus dicere neminem periisse, aut damnatorum poenas non esse aeternas; si vero est gloria Dei extrinseca, eam semper obtinet Deus, siquidem ipsa poena reprobis inflicta justitiam Dei manifestat. Pulchrum enim et
recto ordini conveniens est, ut qui injuriam Deo irrogaverunt, ei patiendo satisfaciant "experturi," inquit S. Aug. (De spir. et litt. c. 33.) "in suppliciis potestatem ejus, cujus in donis misericordiam contempserunt."
Quare Conc. Vat. cit. cap. dicit Deum mundum condidisse "ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur:" maximum autem bonum nobis communicatum, est aeterna felicitas; haec ipsa ergo ordinatur ad gloriam Dei. Et can. cit. definiens finem creationis commemorat solum "Dei gloriam"; soli enim ultimo fini simpliciter competit ratio finis.
NOTA. Ex dictis facile est solvere difficultates, quae contra thesim afferi solent. Duae sunt praecipuae. Prima est: asserere Deum creavisse mundum ultimo propter gloriam suam, est ambitionis vitium ei tribuere, ac proinde ei injuriam irrogare. Resp. Quaerere gloriam et honorem non est per se malum; unde ipse homo potest aliquando eam quaerere. Ita, ex. gr., potest superior debitam reverentiam exigere non modo quia hoc postulat subditorum bonum, sed etiam quia ordini naturae et morali legi conveniens est ut honor praestetur ei, qui talem obtinet dignitatem a Deo collatam, cui reverentia et honor debetur. Potest tamen homo facile peccare dum suam gloriam quaerit, sive quia quaerit indebitam, sive quia unice quaerit, ex. gr., ob delectationem in ea sistendo. At in Deo hi aut similes defectus non sunt possibiles; et aliunde est omnino rerum ordini conforme ut omnia externa sua opera ad gloriam sui, qui infinite perfectionis est, referat. Unde tantum abest ut hoc pos-
sit ei vitio verti, ut si contra ageret, esset in eo vitiosum.
Altera difficultas est: Si Deus omnia creavisset propter gloriam suam, non amaret creaturas suas propter seipsas, seu amore benevolentiae, sed amore concupiscentiae: ita quidem demitur grato animi sensui, quem nos habere debemus erga Deum. - Resp. Hic confunduntur duae quaestiones valde inter se distinctae: 1ma, cur Deus diligit creaturas? - 2da, cur eas refert ad gloriam suam? - Ratio cur Deus diligit creaturas est quia diligens bonitatem suam, diligit quidquid de ea participat; in creaturis autem Deus non praesupponit participationem suae bonitatis, sed amando illas ponit in ipsis sui rationem amoris, bonitatem suam illis communicando, citra suam utilitatem: qui sic diligit, amore benevolentiae diligit. - Refert Deus omnes creaturas ultimo ad gloriam suam, non quia iis indiget, vel quia ei sunt quoquomodo utiles; sed quia hoc exigit rectus ordo et Dei sanctitas: hoc vero nullo pacto impedit quominus amor Dei erga nos sit vere amor benevolentiae. An quando amicum diligimus ob bonum ejus et non ob commodum nostrum, amor noster desinit esse benevolentiae eo quod amicum diligimus, uti fieri debet, in ordine ad Deum? Quare merito D. Th. c. g. l. 1. c. 93., scribit: "Finis ultimus, propter quem vult Deus omnia, nullo modo dependet ab his quae sunt ad finem, nec quantum ad esse, nec quantum ad perfectionem aliquam; unde non vult alicui suam bonitatem communicare, ad hoc ut sibi exinde aliquid accrescat, sed quia ipsum communicare est sibi conveniens sicut fonti bonitatis. Dare autem, non propter aliquod commo-
dum ex datione expectatum, sed propter ipsam bonitatem et convenientiam dationis; est actus liberalitatis ... Hanc autem ejus liberalitatem Scriptura ostendit dicens: Aperiente te manum tuam, omnia implebuntur bonitate (Ps. 103. 29.)" - Et Rogaccius (Unum necessarium, p. 1. c. 25.) ait: "Sane, ullane liberalior esse potest ac beneficentior voluntas, seu lucis erga hominem caecum, quam si illum spectatorem suae pulchritudinis cupiat; seu fontis erga siti confectum, quam si ad gustandos suos latices eum provocet?"
104. These things having been duly established:
PROP. XI. The supreme end of creation, to which even the happiness of the intelligent creature is subject, is no other than the extrinsic glory of God.
Proof I, from Scripture. In Proverbs 16:4 it is said: "The Lord has made all things for himself; the wicked also for the evil day." Isaiah 43:7: "Everyone who invokes my name, I have created him for my glory, I have formed him, and I have made him." In Deuteronomy 26:19 the discourse concerns "all the nations, which he created for his praise, and name, and glory." Psalm 18:1: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of his hands." Isaiah 6:3: "The whole earth is full of his glory." Romans 1:20: "For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being understood through those things which have been made, are seen: his everlasting power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable. Because when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God." Apocalypse 1:8: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end." Hence:
In the testimonies recited it is asserted that all creatures were made for manifesting the glory of God; that man was created on account of God; on account of the glory of God. All these things show the end of creation. But all these things must be understood concerning the supreme end of creation. Therefore.
The minor is proved. The glory of God is designated not only as the end, but as the supreme end of creation, if the happiness itself of intelligent creatures is subordinated to it. But so it is; for it is said, "the wicked also for the evil day." Therefore. If the glory of God were not the supreme end, it would be subordinated, as the adversaries contend, to the happiness of the intelligent creature. But this cannot be said, since, as will be clear from the argument to be brought forward in the third place, this would be against the right order of things. Therefore, if the glory of God is designated in Scripture as the end of creation, it is designated as the supreme end.
Proof II, from the Fathers. Athenagoras (On the Resurrection of the Dead, n. 12): "It is manifest that God, if the first and maximally universal reason is considered, was moved to create man on account of himself and on account of his goodness and wisdom shining forth from all his works." Tertullian (Apology, c. 17): "From nothing he brought forth (the world) for the ornament of his majesty." Theophilus of Antioch (To Autolycus, book 1, 4): "God made all things which had not existed before, so that from his works his greatness might be known and understood." Lactantius (Institutes, book 7, c. 6): "For this reason the world was made, that we might be born; for this reason we are born, that we might acknowledge the maker of the world, and our maker, God; for this reason we acknowledge him, that we might worship him; for this reason we worship him, that we might receive immortality as the reward for labors, since the worship of God consists in very great labors; for this reason we are affected with the reward of immortality, that, having been made like the Angels, we may serve forever the highest Father and Lord, and may be the eternal kingdom of God." St. Jerome (On Ephesians 1:14): "Not that God needs anyone's praise, but because the praise of God benefits those who praise, and while through individual works they know his majesty and greatness, they burst forth to praising him by the wonder of astonishment." St. Augustine (On Free Choice of the Will, book 3, c. 11, n. 32): "Therefore God made all natures not only those that would remain in virtue and justice, but also those that would sin; not so that they should sin, but so that they would adorn the universe, whether they had willed to sin or not to sin." St. Chrysostom (Homily II, n. 2) maintains against the Manichaeans that God made the world beautiful and corruptible, "by beauty [leading us] into admiration of the Creator, but by weakness drawing us away from worshiping the creature."
Proof III, from reason. God, from the infinite perfection of his nature, cannot pursue things except with a most ordered love. But God would not love things in this way by creating them unless he ultimately directed all things, even our happiness, to himself. Therefore he must ultimately order all things to himself. But since, from the things said, he cannot order all things to himself except insofar as he directs all things to his extrinsic glory (creatures can attribute nothing else to God), it follows that he has ordered all things, even our happiness, to this his glory.
The minor is proved. Whatever good of God, even the least, is greater than any good whatsoever of creatures. But right order demands that lower goods be subordinated to more excellent goods. Therefore.
Proof IV, from reason again. God wills the ultimate end of creation absolutely, and therefore infallibly attains it. But if the ultimate end were man's happiness, God would not always attain it, unless we wished to say that no one has perished, or that the punishments of the damned are not eternal. But if it is the extrinsic glory of God, God always obtains it, since the very punishment inflicted on the reprobate manifests the justice of God. For it is beautiful and suitable to right order that those who have inflicted injury on God should satisfy him by suffering, "being about to experience," says St. Augustine (On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 33), "in punishments the power of him whose mercy in gifts they despised."
Wherefore the cited chapter of the Vatican Council says that God founded the world "for manifesting his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures." But the greatest good communicated to us is eternal happiness; therefore this very happiness is ordered to the glory of God. And the cited canon, when defining the end of creation, commemorates only "the glory of God"; for the ratio of end belongs simply to the ultimate end alone.
NOTE. From the things said, it is easy to solve the difficulties which are usually brought against the thesis. There are two principal ones. The first is: to assert that God created the world ultimately on account of his own glory is to attribute to him the vice of ambition, and therefore to inflict injury on him. I reply. To seek glory and honor is not evil in itself; hence man himself can sometimes seek it. Thus, for example, a superior can demand due reverence not only because the good of subjects demands this, but also because it is suitable to the order of nature and to the moral law that honor be rendered to him who obtains such dignity conferred by God, to whom reverence and honor are due. Yet a man can easily sin while he seeks his own glory, either because he seeks one not due, or because he seeks it alone, for example, by stopping in delight in it. But in God these or similar defects are not possible; and besides, it is entirely conformed to the order of things that he refer all his external works to the glory of himself, who is of infinite perfection. Hence so far is this from being able to be turned into a vice in him, that if he acted otherwise, it would be vicious in him.
The other difficulty is: If God had created all things on account of his own glory, he would not love his creatures on account of themselves, or by a love of benevolence, but by a love of concupiscence; and so indeed there is taken away the grateful feeling of mind which we ought to have toward God. I reply. Here two questions very distinct from each other are confused: first, why does God love creatures? second, why does he refer them to his own glory? The reason why God loves creatures is that, loving his own goodness, he loves whatever participates in it. But in creatures God does not presuppose a participation of his goodness; rather, by loving them he places in them the reason of his love, by communicating his goodness to them, apart from his own utility. He who loves thus loves with a love of benevolence. God refers all creatures ultimately to his own glory, not because he needs them, or because they are useful to him in any way whatever, but because right order and the holiness of God demand this. But this in no way prevents the love of God toward us from being truly a love of benevolence. When we love a friend on account of his good and not on account of our advantage, does our love cease to be one of benevolence because we love the friend, as ought to happen, in order to God? Wherefore St. Thomas rightly writes, Contra Gentiles, book 1, c. 93: "The ultimate end, for the sake of which God wills all things, in no way depends on those things which are for the end, neither as to being, nor as to any perfection; hence he does not will to communicate his goodness to someone in order that something might accrue to himself from it, but because communicating itself is suitable to him as to the fountain of goodness. But to give, not on account of some advantage expected from the giving, but on account of the very goodness and suitability of the giving, is an act of liberality ... Scripture shows this liberality of his when it says: When you open your hand, all things will be filled with goodness (Ps. 103:29)." And Rogaccius (The One Thing Necessary, part 1, c. 25) says: "Indeed, can there be any will more liberal and beneficent, either of light toward a blind man, than if it desires him as a spectator of its beauty; or of a fountain toward one exhausted by thirst, than if it summons him to taste its streams?"
PROP. XI. The supreme end of creation, to which even the happiness of the intelligent creature is subject, is no other than the extrinsic glory of God.
Proof I, from Scripture. In Proverbs 16:4 it is said: "The Lord has made all things for himself; the wicked also for the evil day." Isaiah 43:7: "Everyone who invokes my name, I have created him for my glory, I have formed him, and I have made him." In Deuteronomy 26:19 the discourse concerns "all the nations, which he created for his praise, and name, and glory." Psalm 18:1: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of his hands." Isaiah 6:3: "The whole earth is full of his glory." Romans 1:20: "For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being understood through those things which have been made, are seen: his everlasting power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable. Because when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God." Apocalypse 1:8: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end." Hence:
In the testimonies recited it is asserted that all creatures were made for manifesting the glory of God; that man was created on account of God; on account of the glory of God. All these things show the end of creation. But all these things must be understood concerning the supreme end of creation. Therefore.
The minor is proved. The glory of God is designated not only as the end, but as the supreme end of creation, if the happiness itself of intelligent creatures is subordinated to it. But so it is; for it is said, "the wicked also for the evil day." Therefore. If the glory of God were not the supreme end, it would be subordinated, as the adversaries contend, to the happiness of the intelligent creature. But this cannot be said, since, as will be clear from the argument to be brought forward in the third place, this would be against the right order of things. Therefore, if the glory of God is designated in Scripture as the end of creation, it is designated as the supreme end.
Proof II, from the Fathers. Athenagoras (On the Resurrection of the Dead, n. 12): "It is manifest that God, if the first and maximally universal reason is considered, was moved to create man on account of himself and on account of his goodness and wisdom shining forth from all his works." Tertullian (Apology, c. 17): "From nothing he brought forth (the world) for the ornament of his majesty." Theophilus of Antioch (To Autolycus, book 1, 4): "God made all things which had not existed before, so that from his works his greatness might be known and understood." Lactantius (Institutes, book 7, c. 6): "For this reason the world was made, that we might be born; for this reason we are born, that we might acknowledge the maker of the world, and our maker, God; for this reason we acknowledge him, that we might worship him; for this reason we worship him, that we might receive immortality as the reward for labors, since the worship of God consists in very great labors; for this reason we are affected with the reward of immortality, that, having been made like the Angels, we may serve forever the highest Father and Lord, and may be the eternal kingdom of God." St. Jerome (On Ephesians 1:14): "Not that God needs anyone's praise, but because the praise of God benefits those who praise, and while through individual works they know his majesty and greatness, they burst forth to praising him by the wonder of astonishment." St. Augustine (On Free Choice of the Will, book 3, c. 11, n. 32): "Therefore God made all natures not only those that would remain in virtue and justice, but also those that would sin; not so that they should sin, but so that they would adorn the universe, whether they had willed to sin or not to sin." St. Chrysostom (Homily II, n. 2) maintains against the Manichaeans that God made the world beautiful and corruptible, "by beauty [leading us] into admiration of the Creator, but by weakness drawing us away from worshiping the creature."
Proof III, from reason. God, from the infinite perfection of his nature, cannot pursue things except with a most ordered love. But God would not love things in this way by creating them unless he ultimately directed all things, even our happiness, to himself. Therefore he must ultimately order all things to himself. But since, from the things said, he cannot order all things to himself except insofar as he directs all things to his extrinsic glory (creatures can attribute nothing else to God), it follows that he has ordered all things, even our happiness, to this his glory.
The minor is proved. Whatever good of God, even the least, is greater than any good whatsoever of creatures. But right order demands that lower goods be subordinated to more excellent goods. Therefore.
Proof IV, from reason again. God wills the ultimate end of creation absolutely, and therefore infallibly attains it. But if the ultimate end were man's happiness, God would not always attain it, unless we wished to say that no one has perished, or that the punishments of the damned are not eternal. But if it is the extrinsic glory of God, God always obtains it, since the very punishment inflicted on the reprobate manifests the justice of God. For it is beautiful and suitable to right order that those who have inflicted injury on God should satisfy him by suffering, "being about to experience," says St. Augustine (On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 33), "in punishments the power of him whose mercy in gifts they despised."
Wherefore the cited chapter of the Vatican Council says that God founded the world "for manifesting his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures." But the greatest good communicated to us is eternal happiness; therefore this very happiness is ordered to the glory of God. And the cited canon, when defining the end of creation, commemorates only "the glory of God"; for the ratio of end belongs simply to the ultimate end alone.
NOTE. From the things said, it is easy to solve the difficulties which are usually brought against the thesis. There are two principal ones. The first is: to assert that God created the world ultimately on account of his own glory is to attribute to him the vice of ambition, and therefore to inflict injury on him. I reply. To seek glory and honor is not evil in itself; hence man himself can sometimes seek it. Thus, for example, a superior can demand due reverence not only because the good of subjects demands this, but also because it is suitable to the order of nature and to the moral law that honor be rendered to him who obtains such dignity conferred by God, to whom reverence and honor are due. Yet a man can easily sin while he seeks his own glory, either because he seeks one not due, or because he seeks it alone, for example, by stopping in delight in it. But in God these or similar defects are not possible; and besides, it is entirely conformed to the order of things that he refer all his external works to the glory of himself, who is of infinite perfection. Hence so far is this from being able to be turned into a vice in him, that if he acted otherwise, it would be vicious in him.
The other difficulty is: If God had created all things on account of his own glory, he would not love his creatures on account of themselves, or by a love of benevolence, but by a love of concupiscence; and so indeed there is taken away the grateful feeling of mind which we ought to have toward God. I reply. Here two questions very distinct from each other are confused: first, why does God love creatures? second, why does he refer them to his own glory? The reason why God loves creatures is that, loving his own goodness, he loves whatever participates in it. But in creatures God does not presuppose a participation of his goodness; rather, by loving them he places in them the reason of his love, by communicating his goodness to them, apart from his own utility. He who loves thus loves with a love of benevolence. God refers all creatures ultimately to his own glory, not because he needs them, or because they are useful to him in any way whatever, but because right order and the holiness of God demand this. But this in no way prevents the love of God toward us from being truly a love of benevolence. When we love a friend on account of his good and not on account of our advantage, does our love cease to be one of benevolence because we love the friend, as ought to happen, in order to God? Wherefore St. Thomas rightly writes, Contra Gentiles, book 1, c. 93: "The ultimate end, for the sake of which God wills all things, in no way depends on those things which are for the end, neither as to being, nor as to any perfection; hence he does not will to communicate his goodness to someone in order that something might accrue to himself from it, but because communicating itself is suitable to him as to the fountain of goodness. But to give, not on account of some advantage expected from the giving, but on account of the very goodness and suitability of the giving, is an act of liberality ... Scripture shows this liberality of his when it says: When you open your hand, all things will be filled with goodness (Ps. 103:29)." And Rogaccius (The One Thing Necessary, part 1, c. 25) says: "Indeed, can there be any will more liberal and beneficent, either of light toward a blind man, than if it desires him as a spectator of its beauty; or of a fountain toward one exhausted by thirst, than if it summons him to taste its streams?"