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Seventh Article. Whether There Is Some Representation Of God In The World.
80. Cum quælibet causa effectum aliquo modo sibi similem faciat, ex eo quod Deus est causa mundi, uti ostensum est, facile deducitur mundum præseferre aliquam similitudinem ad Deum. Hæc autem aliqualis similitudo præsertim eruitur ex Dei causalitate exemplari ; ac proinde postquam de hac egimus, statim exponendam aggredimur Dei repræsentationem in mundo. § I. Status quæstionis.
80. Since any cause whatever makes its effect in some way like itself, from the fact that God is the cause of the world, as has been shown, it is easily deduced that the world displays some likeness to God. But this likeness, such as it is, is especially elicited from God's exemplar causality; and consequently, after we have treated this, we immediately undertake to explain God's representation in the world.
Section I. State Of The Question.
81. Proposita quæstio de Dei repræsentatione in mundo potest duplicem sensum habere : 1. utrum sit aliqua repræsentatio Dei ut est unus essentia-2. utrum sit aliqua repræsentatio Dei prout est trinus
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 83 Personis . Et quidem si omnis causæ est sibi aliquo modo effectum assimilare ; cum tres Personæ divinæ, ut diximus, sint causa mundi, videtur aliqua repræsentatio etiam Trinitatis debere in mundo inveniri.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 83 Personis . Et quidem si omnis causæ est sibi aliquo modo effectum assimilare ; cum tres Personæ divinæ, ut diximus, sint causa mundi, videtur aliqua repræsentatio etiam Trinitatis debere in mundo inveniri.
81. The proposed question concerning God's representation in the world can have a twofold sense: 1. whether there is some representation of God as he is one in essence; 2. whether there is some representation of God insofar as he is three in Persons. And indeed, if it belongs to every cause in some way to assimilate an effect to itself, since the three divine Persons, as we have said, are the cause of the world, it seems that some representation even of the Trinity ought to be found in the world.
82. Verum quidem est effectum assimilari causæ potius secundum principium quo producitur (secundum illud enim participat de perfectione causæ), quam secundum principium quod illum producit. Nihilominus cum Personæ divinæ cum divina essentia identificentur ; cumque inter se distinguantur secundum originem , quæ in unaquaque re est secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ : necesse est ut ubi est repræsentatio Dei secundum id quod est in eo absolutum, et commune tribus Personis, sit etiam Personarum repræsentatio. "Distinctio, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 93. a. 5. c., “divinarum Personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus ; sed modus originis uniuscujusque est secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ. Aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata, aliter animalia, atque aliter plantæ. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum Personarum est secundum quod divinæ naturæ convenit. Unde esse ad imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinæ naturæ non excludit hoc quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repræsentationem trium Personarum, sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur."
82. It is indeed true that an effect is assimilated to the cause rather according to the principle by which it is produced (for according to that it participates in the perfection of the cause) than according to the principle which produces it. Nevertheless, since the divine Persons are identified with the divine essence, and since they are distinguished among themselves according to origin, which in each thing is according to the fittingness of its own nature, it is necessary that where there is a representation of God according to that which is absolute in him and common to the three Persons, there also be a representation of the Persons. "The distinction," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 5, corpus, "of the divine Persons is only according to origin, or rather according to relations of origin. But the mode of origin is not the same in all things; rather, the mode of origin of each thing is according to the fittingness of its own nature. For animate things are produced in one way, inanimate things in another, animals in another, and plants in another. Hence it is manifest that the distinction of the divine Persons is according as it befits the divine nature. Hence to be to the image of God according to imitation of the divine nature does not exclude being to the image of God according to representation of the three Persons, but rather one follows upon the other."
83. Dei autem unius et trini repræsentatio in creaturis potest inveniri vel per modum vestigii, vel per modum imaginis. Repræsentatio per modum vestigii habetur, cum 1. p. q. 45. a. 7. "aliquis effectus
84 De Deo Creatore. repræsentat solam causalitatem causæ, non autem formam ejus ;" seu, ut docet idem S. Doctor, q. 93. a. 6. c. , " vestigium autem repræsentat per modum effectus, qui sic repræsentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingat. Impressionem enim quæ ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia : et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis, et desolatio terræ vestigium hostilis exercitus ."
84 De Deo Creatore. repræsentat solam causalitatem causæ, non autem formam ejus ;" seu, ut docet idem S. Doctor, q. 93. a. 6. c. , " vestigium autem repræsentat per modum effectus, qui sic repræsentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingat. Impressionem enim quæ ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia : et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis, et desolatio terræ vestigium hostilis exercitus ."
83. Now the representation of God one and triune in creatures can be found either by way of vestige or by way of image. Representation by way of vestige is had when, as Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 7 says, "some effect represents only the causality of the cause, but not its form"; or, as the same holy Doctor teaches, q. 93, a. 6, corpus, "a vestige represents by way of an effect, which so represents its cause that nevertheless it does not attain to likeness of species. For impressions which are left from the motion of animals are called vestiges; and similarly ash is called the vestige of fire, and the desolation of land the vestige of a hostile army."
84. Unde sequitur quod per vestigium proprie investigari possumus existentiam causæ, et ad summum ejus naturam quoad aliqua communia, non vero quoad propriam ejus formam. Notandum tamen est cum de Valentia Tom. 1. Disp. 3. q. 2. p. 3. " cum dicimus ex sententia D. Thomæ, de ratione vestigii esse , ut non perfecte per id veniamus in rei cognitionem ; intelligendum hoc esse ex vi vestigii. Nam accedente nostro discursu, ex vestigio quoque aliquando venimus in cognitionem causæ, secundum proprium ejus esse ; ut ex hominis vestigio intelligimus hominem ibi fuisse secundum propriam formam. Hoc tamen non cognoscimus, quia vestigium perfecte hominem repræsentet . "-Imo, magis ad rem nostram , advertendum est supposita fide Trinitatis nos aliqua ejus vestigia posse invenire ; at si nullam habeamus de hoc mysterio notitiam, nec possumus ullum ejus vestigium agnoscere, ac per consequens nec Trinitatis notitiam consequi. Sicut si nihil sciremus de leone, quamvis ejus vestigium videremus, non possemus dicere illud esse vestigium leonis, nec per illud ad propriam leonis formæ notitiam assurgere.
84. Hence it follows that through a vestige we can properly investigate the existence of the cause, and at most its nature with respect to certain common things, but not with respect to its proper form. Yet it must be noted with de Valentia, vol. 1, disp. 3, q. 2, p. 3: "When we say, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, that it belongs to the notion of a vestige that through it we do not come perfectly into knowledge of the thing, this must be understood from the force of the vestige. For when our discourse is added, from a vestige also we sometimes come into knowledge of the cause according to its proper being; as from the vestige of a man we understand that a man was there according to his proper form. Yet we do not know this because the vestige perfectly represents the man." Indeed, more to our matter, it must be observed that, once faith in the Trinity is supposed, we can find some of its vestiges; but if we have no knowledge of this mystery, we cannot recognize any vestige of it, and consequently cannot obtain knowledge of the Trinity. Just as, if we knew nothing about a lion, although we saw its footprint, we could not say that it was the vestige of a lion, nor through it rise to knowledge of the lion's proper form.
85. Repræsentatio autem per modum imaginis non modo requirit ut ex vi productionis aliquid sit
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 85 alteri simile, sed præsertim ut ei sit simile in natura specifica, vel in signo speciei, ut in figura. "Requiritur autem, " ait D. Th. 1. p . q. 93. a. 2. c. "ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo ; vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et præcipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius dicit, in lib . de Synod., can. 1. quod imago est species indifferens."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 85 alteri simile, sed præsertim ut ei sit simile in natura specifica, vel in signo speciei, ut in figura. "Requiritur autem, " ait D. Th. 1. p . q. 93. a. 2. c. "ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo ; vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et præcipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius dicit, in lib . de Synod., can. 1. quod imago est species indifferens."
85. But representation by way of image requires not only that by force of production something be like another, but especially that it be like it in specific nature, or in a sign of species, as in figure. "It is required," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 2, corpus, "for the notion of image that there be likeness according to species, as the image of the king is in his son; or at least according to some accident proper to the species, and especially according to figure, as the image of a man is said to be in bronze. Hence Hilary says pointedly, in On the Synods, canon 1, that image is an undiffering species."
86. Cum vero in Deo nullum sit accidens, ejus repræsentatio in creaturis per modum imaginis nequit haberi, nisi secundum similitudinem speciei. Unde idem S. Doctor mox cit. 1. subdit : " Manifestum est autem quod similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam. Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, in quantum sunt ; secundo , in quantum vivunt ; tertio vero, in quantum sapiunt vel intelligunt ; quæ, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. 83 QQ., quæst. 51 , in med., ita sunt Deo similitudine proxima ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. Sic ergo patet quod solæ intellectuales creaturæ, proprie loquendo, sunt ad imaginem Dei."
86. But since there is no accident in God, his representation in creatures by way of image cannot be had except according to likeness of species. Hence the same holy Doctor, in the place just cited, immediately adds: "It is manifest that likeness of species is considered according to the ultimate difference. But some things are assimilated to God, first indeed, and most commonly, insofar as they are; second, insofar as they live; third, insofar as they know or understand. These, as Augustine says in the book Eighty-Three Questions, q. 51, middle, are so near to God in likeness that in creatures there is nothing nearer. Thus, therefore, it is clear that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are to the image of God."
87. Ne tamen hac in re ullus sit errori locus, animadvertamus oportet cum eodem D. Th. 1. p. q. 4. a. 3. c. , " quod cum ' similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam, vel communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo secundum multos modos communicandi in forma. Quædam enim dicuntur similia, quæ communicant in eadem forma secundum eamdem rationem, et secundum eumdem modum ; et hæc non solum dicuntur similia, sed æqualia in sua
86 De Deo Creatore. similitudine ; sicut duo æqualiter alba dicuntur similia in albedine ; et hæc est perfectissima similitudo . Alio modo dicuntur similia, quæ communicant in forma secundum eamdem rationem, et non secundum eumdem modum, sed secundum magis et minus ; ut minus album dicitur simile magis albo ; et hæc est similitudo imperfecta. Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quæ communicant in eadem forma, sed non secundum eamdem rationem, ut patet in agentibus non univocis ... Si ergo agens sit contentum in eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitudo inter faciens, et factum in forma, secundum eamdem rationem speciei, sicut homo generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, erit similitudo , sed non secundum eamdem rationem speciei ... sed secundum similitudinem generis. Si igitur sit aliquod agens quod non in genere contineatur, effectus ejus adhuc magis remote accedet ad similitudinem formæ agentis, non tamen ita quod participet similitudinem formæ agentis secundum eamdem rationem speciei, aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo illa quæ sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei, in quantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse."
86 De Deo Creatore. similitudine ; sicut duo æqualiter alba dicuntur similia in albedine ; et hæc est perfectissima similitudo . Alio modo dicuntur similia, quæ communicant in forma secundum eamdem rationem, et non secundum eumdem modum, sed secundum magis et minus ; ut minus album dicitur simile magis albo ; et hæc est similitudo imperfecta. Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quæ communicant in eadem forma, sed non secundum eamdem rationem, ut patet in agentibus non univocis ... Si ergo agens sit contentum in eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitudo inter faciens, et factum in forma, secundum eamdem rationem speciei, sicut homo generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, erit similitudo , sed non secundum eamdem rationem speciei ... sed secundum similitudinem generis. Si igitur sit aliquod agens quod non in genere contineatur, effectus ejus adhuc magis remote accedet ad similitudinem formæ agentis, non tamen ita quod participet similitudinem formæ agentis secundum eamdem rationem speciei, aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo illa quæ sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei, in quantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse."
87. Nevertheless, lest there be any place for error in this matter, we must observe with the same St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, a. 3, corpus, "that since likeness is considered according to agreement or communication in form, likeness is multiple according to many modes of communicating in form. For some things are called similar which communicate in the same form according to the same notion and according to the same mode; and these are not only called similar, but equal in their likeness, as two equally white things are called similar in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, things are called similar which communicate in form according to the same notion, and not according to the same mode, but according to more and less; as the less white is called similar to the more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way, some things are called similar which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same notion, as is clear in non-univocal agents ... Therefore if the agent is contained in the same species with its effect, there will be likeness between the maker and the thing made in form, according to the same notion of species, as man generates man. But if the agent is not contained in the same species, there will be likeness, but not according to the same notion of species ... but according to likeness of genus. Therefore if there is some agent which is not contained in a genus, its effect will still more remotely approach likeness of the form of the agent; yet not so that it participates in the likeness of the form of the agent according to the same notion of species or genus, but according to some analogy, just as being itself is common to all things. And in this way the things which are from God are assimilated to him, insofar as they are beings, as to the first and universal principle of the whole of being."
88. Ex his omnibus sequitur a) quod etsi, juxta Patres quos videre est apud Petavium (de Op. sex dier. 1. 2. cc. 2-4.) multiplex sit in homine similitudo ad Deum ; repræsentatio tamen per modum imaginis ei competit solum in quantum mentem habet : si qua alia sit repræsentatio etiam secundum corpus, ea non erit, nisi per modum vestigii. “Quam
Disp. I.-De Mundi Origine. 87 vis, " inquit D. Th. q. 93. a. 6. ad 3., "imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream ; tamen quia corpus hominis solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est ut ad contemplandum cælum sit aptius, magis hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cætera corpora animalium factum jure videri potest, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. 82 QQ., qu. 51. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei ; sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repræsentat imaginem Dei in anima per modum vestigii. " Sequitur b) quod repræsentatio Dei in homine etiam per modum imaginis est valde imperfecta, siquidem cum Deus sit supra omne genus et supra omnem speciem, nihil potest ei secundum similitudinem speciei convenire ; seu qualibet repræsentatio Dei in creatura est analogica, non univoca. Unde D. Th. q. 93. a. 1. ad 3. dicit : " Cum unum sit ens indivisum , eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid, non solum numero, aut specie, aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quamdam ; et sic est unitas, vel convenientia creaturæ ad Deum. " Sequitur c) quod imago Dei perfecta non sit, nec possit esse nisi una. "Primogenitus," inquit idem S. Doctor 1. mox cit. ad 2., "omnis creaturæ est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cujus imago est. Et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago, et propter imperfectionem similitudinis dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest
88 De Deo Creatore. esse nisi identitate naturæ, imago Dei est in Filio suo primogenito , sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali ; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo, ut patet per Augustinum in lib . de decem Chordis, (cap. 8. circ. med.) " Sequitur d) quod hæc licet repræsentatio per modum imaginis valde perfectior sit repræsentatione per modum vestigii ; quoad notitiam tamen Trinitatis Personarum in Deo, quod de hac diximus, et de illa dicendum est. Etenim repræsentatio Trinitatis habetur tum per attributa, quæ, ut diximus , appropriantur Personis, tum præsertim in homine per ea attributa et per illas operationes, per quas processiones Personarum locum habent in Deo ; sed neque sciremus attributa illa appropriari Personis divinis, aut operationes, quæ homini competunt ut ratione est præditus, imaginem esse Trinitatis, nisi antea revelatione edoceremur esse Trinitatem Personarum in Deo. Sic , ex. gr., ex intellectione et amore, quem in nobis experimur, colligeremus ad summum esse intellectionem et amorem in Deo ; sed absque revelatione numquam possemus cognoscere Verbum et amorem in Deo esse duas subsistentias. Unde D. Th. cum sibi objecisset q. 93. a. 5.: "Si igitur in homine est imago Dei secundum Trinitatem Personarum , cum homo per naturalem rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum Personarum ; quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est, (quæst. 32, art. 1.) ; " respondet : "Ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine perfecte repræsentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit, 15 de
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 89 Trin. , cap. 6. versus fin., maxima est differentia trinitatis quæ est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, trinitatem, quæ in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus ; Deum vero esse Trinitatem credimus potius quam videmus ." Quare ea quæ partim diximus, partim dicturi sumus de imagine Trinitatis in homine, plane conveniunt cum can. 1. in cap. IV. Const. Dei Filius Conc. Vat.: "Si quis dixerit, in revelatione divina nulla et proprie dicta mysteria contineri, sed universa fidei dogmata posse per rationem rite excultam e naturalibus principiis intelligi et demonstrari ; anathema sit."
Disp. I.-De Mundi Origine. 87 vis, " inquit D. Th. q. 93. a. 6. ad 3., "imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream ; tamen quia corpus hominis solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est ut ad contemplandum cælum sit aptius, magis hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cætera corpora animalium factum jure videri potest, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. 82 QQ., qu. 51. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei ; sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repræsentat imaginem Dei in anima per modum vestigii. " Sequitur b) quod repræsentatio Dei in homine etiam per modum imaginis est valde imperfecta, siquidem cum Deus sit supra omne genus et supra omnem speciem, nihil potest ei secundum similitudinem speciei convenire ; seu qualibet repræsentatio Dei in creatura est analogica, non univoca. Unde D. Th. q. 93. a. 1. ad 3. dicit : " Cum unum sit ens indivisum , eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid, non solum numero, aut specie, aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quamdam ; et sic est unitas, vel convenientia creaturæ ad Deum. " Sequitur c) quod imago Dei perfecta non sit, nec possit esse nisi una. "Primogenitus," inquit idem S. Doctor 1. mox cit. ad 2., "omnis creaturæ est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cujus imago est. Et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago, et propter imperfectionem similitudinis dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest
88 De Deo Creatore. esse nisi identitate naturæ, imago Dei est in Filio suo primogenito , sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali ; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo, ut patet per Augustinum in lib . de decem Chordis, (cap. 8. circ. med.) " Sequitur d) quod hæc licet repræsentatio per modum imaginis valde perfectior sit repræsentatione per modum vestigii ; quoad notitiam tamen Trinitatis Personarum in Deo, quod de hac diximus, et de illa dicendum est. Etenim repræsentatio Trinitatis habetur tum per attributa, quæ, ut diximus , appropriantur Personis, tum præsertim in homine per ea attributa et per illas operationes, per quas processiones Personarum locum habent in Deo ; sed neque sciremus attributa illa appropriari Personis divinis, aut operationes, quæ homini competunt ut ratione est præditus, imaginem esse Trinitatis, nisi antea revelatione edoceremur esse Trinitatem Personarum in Deo. Sic , ex. gr., ex intellectione et amore, quem in nobis experimur, colligeremus ad summum esse intellectionem et amorem in Deo ; sed absque revelatione numquam possemus cognoscere Verbum et amorem in Deo esse duas subsistentias. Unde D. Th. cum sibi objecisset q. 93. a. 5.: "Si igitur in homine est imago Dei secundum Trinitatem Personarum , cum homo per naturalem rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum Personarum ; quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est, (quæst. 32, art. 1.) ; " respondet : "Ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine perfecte repræsentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit, 15 de
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 89 Trin. , cap. 6. versus fin., maxima est differentia trinitatis quæ est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, trinitatem, quæ in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus ; Deum vero esse Trinitatem credimus potius quam videmus ." Quare ea quæ partim diximus, partim dicturi sumus de imagine Trinitatis in homine, plane conveniunt cum can. 1. in cap. IV. Const. Dei Filius Conc. Vat.: "Si quis dixerit, in revelatione divina nulla et proprie dicta mysteria contineri, sed universa fidei dogmata posse per rationem rite excultam e naturalibus principiis intelligi et demonstrari ; anathema sit."
88. From all these things it follows: a) that although, according to the Fathers whom one may see in Petavius (On the Work of the Six Days, book 2, chapters 2-4), there is in man a manifold likeness to God, nevertheless representation by way of image belongs to him only insofar as he has a mind. If there is any other representation even according to the body, it will be only by way of vestige. "Although," says St. Thomas, q. 93, a. 6, reply to objection 3, "the image of God in man is not taken according to bodily figure; nevertheless, because the body of man alone among the bodies of earthly animals is not prone, prostrate toward the belly, but is such that it is more apt for contemplating heaven, this can rightly seem to have been made more to the image and likeness of God than the other bodies of animals, as Augustine says in the book Eighty-Three Questions, q. 51. Yet this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in the body of man, but because the very figure of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of vestige."
It follows: b) that the representation of God in man, even by way of image, is very imperfect, since, because God is above every genus and above every species, nothing can agree with him according to likeness of species; or, every representation of God in a creature is analogical, not univocal. Hence St. Thomas, q. 93, a. 1, reply to objection 3, says: "Since one is undivided being, species is called undiffering in the way in which it is one. But something is called one not only in number, or species, or genus, but also according to analogy or a certain proportion; and thus there is unity or agreement of the creature with God."
It follows: c) that the perfect image of God is not, nor can be, except one. "The Firstborn," says the same holy Doctor in the place just cited, reply to objection 2, "of every creature is the perfect image of God, perfectly fulfilling that of which he is the image. And therefore he is called image, and never to the image. But man, both on account of likeness, is called image, and on account of the imperfection of likeness, is called to the image. And because the perfect likeness of God cannot exist except by identity of nature, the image of God is in his Firstborn Son, as the image of a king is in a son connatural to himself; but in man as in an alien nature, as the image of a king is in a silver coin, as is clear through Augustine in the book On the Ten Strings, chapter 8, around the middle."
It follows: d) that although this representation by way of image is much more perfect than representation by way of vestige, nevertheless, with respect to knowledge of the Trinity of Persons in God, what we have said concerning the latter must also be said concerning the former. For representation of the Trinity is had both through the attributes which, as we have said, are appropriated to the Persons, and especially in man through those attributes and through those operations through which the processions of the Persons have place in God. But we would not know that those attributes are appropriated to the divine Persons, or that the operations which belong to man insofar as he is endowed with reason are an image of the Trinity, unless we were first taught by revelation that there is a Trinity of Persons in God. Thus, for example, from intellection and love, which we experience in ourselves, we would gather at most that there is intellection and love in God; but without revelation we could never know that Word and Love in God are two subsistences. Hence when St. Thomas had objected to himself, q. 93, a. 5: "Therefore if in man there is the image of God according to the Trinity of Persons, since man can know himself through natural reason, it would follow that through natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of divine Persons; which is false, as was shown above (q. 32, a. 1)," he replies: "That argument would proceed if the image of God in man perfectly represented God. But, as Augustine says, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 6, toward the end, there is the greatest difference between the trinity which is in us and the divine Trinity. And therefore, as he says in the same place, we see rather than believe the trinity which is in us; but that God is Trinity we believe rather than see."
Wherefore those things which we have partly said, and partly are going to say, concerning the image of the Trinity in man plainly agree with canon 1 in chapter IV of the constitution Dei Filius of the Vatican Council: "If anyone shall say that in divine revelation no mysteries truly and properly so called are contained, but that all the dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated by reason duly cultivated from natural principles, let him be anathema."
It follows: b) that the representation of God in man, even by way of image, is very imperfect, since, because God is above every genus and above every species, nothing can agree with him according to likeness of species; or, every representation of God in a creature is analogical, not univocal. Hence St. Thomas, q. 93, a. 1, reply to objection 3, says: "Since one is undivided being, species is called undiffering in the way in which it is one. But something is called one not only in number, or species, or genus, but also according to analogy or a certain proportion; and thus there is unity or agreement of the creature with God."
It follows: c) that the perfect image of God is not, nor can be, except one. "The Firstborn," says the same holy Doctor in the place just cited, reply to objection 2, "of every creature is the perfect image of God, perfectly fulfilling that of which he is the image. And therefore he is called image, and never to the image. But man, both on account of likeness, is called image, and on account of the imperfection of likeness, is called to the image. And because the perfect likeness of God cannot exist except by identity of nature, the image of God is in his Firstborn Son, as the image of a king is in a son connatural to himself; but in man as in an alien nature, as the image of a king is in a silver coin, as is clear through Augustine in the book On the Ten Strings, chapter 8, around the middle."
It follows: d) that although this representation by way of image is much more perfect than representation by way of vestige, nevertheless, with respect to knowledge of the Trinity of Persons in God, what we have said concerning the latter must also be said concerning the former. For representation of the Trinity is had both through the attributes which, as we have said, are appropriated to the Persons, and especially in man through those attributes and through those operations through which the processions of the Persons have place in God. But we would not know that those attributes are appropriated to the divine Persons, or that the operations which belong to man insofar as he is endowed with reason are an image of the Trinity, unless we were first taught by revelation that there is a Trinity of Persons in God. Thus, for example, from intellection and love, which we experience in ourselves, we would gather at most that there is intellection and love in God; but without revelation we could never know that Word and Love in God are two subsistences. Hence when St. Thomas had objected to himself, q. 93, a. 5: "Therefore if in man there is the image of God according to the Trinity of Persons, since man can know himself through natural reason, it would follow that through natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of divine Persons; which is false, as was shown above (q. 32, a. 1)," he replies: "That argument would proceed if the image of God in man perfectly represented God. But, as Augustine says, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 6, toward the end, there is the greatest difference between the trinity which is in us and the divine Trinity. And therefore, as he says in the same place, we see rather than believe the trinity which is in us; but that God is Trinity we believe rather than see."
Wherefore those things which we have partly said, and partly are going to say, concerning the image of the Trinity in man plainly agree with canon 1 in chapter IV of the constitution Dei Filius of the Vatican Council: "If anyone shall say that in divine revelation no mysteries truly and properly so called are contained, but that all the dogmas of faith can be understood and demonstrated by reason duly cultivated from natural principles, let him be anathema."
Section II. Whether And How In Creatures Lacking Intelligence There Is A Vestige Of God One And Triune.
89. PROP. IX. In creaturis omnibus intelligentia et ratione destitutis invenitur Dei 1. unius-2. et trini repræsentatio per modum vestigii. Patet ex superius dictis hujusmodi creaturas non posse Deum repræsentare per modum imaginis : ac proinde, si probetur aliquam eas præseferre similitudinem cum Deo, eo ipso constabit Deum in ipsis repræsentari per modum vestigii. Unde Prob. I. 1ma pars. "Quidquid, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 4. a. 2. c. , "perfectionis est in effectu, oportet inveniri in causa effectiva vel secundum eamdem rationem, si sit agens univocum, ut homo generat hominem ; vel eminentiori modo, si sit agens æquivocum ; " atqui Deus est causa efficiens omnium creaturarum,
90 De Deo Creatore. ut probavimus ; ergo. Idem fere argumentum aliter proponi potest ex eodem S. Doctore, c. g. 1. 1. c. 40. : " quod per participationem dicitur aliquale non dicitur tale, nisi in quantum habet quamdam similitudinem ejus, quod per essentiam dicitur ;" atqui Deus dicitur ens per essentiam, et creaturæ omnes entia per participationem ; ergo. Unde creaturæ omnes repræsentant Deum summum et primum ens. Prob. II. Creaturæ omnes debent assimilari ideis quas de iisdem ab æterno habuit Deus, qui est earum causa exemplaris ; sed, si hoc, assimilantur ipsi Deo, uti patet ex dictis de natura divinarum idearum ; ergo. Unde creaturæ repræsentant Deum summum et primum verum. "Res naturales, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 16. a. 1., "dicuntur esse veræ, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum, quæ sunt in mente divina."-Et q. 17. a. 6.: "Si loquamur de veritate, secundum quod est in rebus ; sic omnes sunt veræ una prima veritate, cui unumquodque assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic licet plures sint essentiæ vel formæ rerum, tamen una est veritas divini intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur veræ." Prob. III. "Omne ens," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 5. a. 3. , "in quantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum ; quia omnis actus perfectio quædam est ; perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis, et boni, ut ex dictis patet art. 1 hujus quæst .; unde sequitur, omne ens, in quantum hujusmodi, bonum esse ; " atqui creaturæ omnes assimilantur Deo secundum esse, quod ab eo participant ; ergo. Unde creaturæ omnes repræsentant Deum summum et
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 91 primum bonum . Quod D. Th. 1. p. q. 6. a. 4. c. insuper explicat etiam de quadam bonitate extrinseca. "Unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo, et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinæ bonitatis sibi inhærente, quæ est formaliter sua bonitas, denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium, et etiam multæ bonitates." Prob. IV. Si creaturas omnes simul consideremus , videmus in earum multiplicitate, varietate et ordine relucere varias perfectiones divinas, quæ sunt unus Deus ; ergo. Hinc D. Th. 1. p. q. 47. a. 1. c. ait : "Unde dicendum est quod distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis , et per eas repræsentandam ; et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repræsentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas, et diversas ; ut quod deest uni ad repræsentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia. Nam bonitas, quæ in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim ; unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem, et repræsentat eam totum universum, quam alia quæcumque creatura. "- Et q. 47. a. 3. ad 1.: "Propter quod Aristoteles in Metaph ., text. 52, ex unitate ordinis in rebus existentis concludit unitatem Dei gubernantis ; et Plato, in Timeo, aliq. a princ., ex unitate exemplaris probat unitatem mundi, quasi exemplati." Vid. etiam c. g. l. 1. c. 42. arg. 6.
92 De Deo Creatore. Prob. 2da pars . In omnibus creaturis est aliquid unum, quod simul dici potest trinum ; et quod trinum est debet per appropriationis legem in divinas Personas reduci tamquam in causam. Ergo. Decl . et prob. antec. ex D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 7.: "In qualibet creatura inveniuntur aliqua quæ necesse est reducere in divinas Personas sicut in causam. Quælibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et habet formam, per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quædam substantia creata, repræsentat causam et principium ; et sic demonstrat Personam Patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod habet quamdam formam et speciem, repræsentat Verbum, secundum quod forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod habet ordinem, repræsentat Spiritum Sanctum, in quantum est amor ; quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, in 6 lib. de Trin., cap. 10, circa fin., quod vestigium Trinitatis invenitur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum aliquid est ; et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur ; et secundum quod quemdam ordinem tenet. Et ad hæc etiam reducuntur illa tria, numerus , pondus, et mensura, quæ ponuntur Sap. 11. Nam mensura refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis , numerus ad speciem, pondus ad ordiEt ad hæc tria reducuntur alia tria quæ ponit nem . Augustinus, in lib. de Natura boni, cap. 3 : Modus , species et ordo ; et ea quæ ponit in lib. 83 QQ. quæst . 18, in princ. , quo constat, quo discernitur, quo congruit. Constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur
Disp. I.- De Mundi Origine. 93 per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci possunt quæcumque sic dicuntur." Vid. S. Augustinum 1. 6. de Trinit. cap. ult.-toto l. 11. et lib. 14. cap. 8.
90 De Deo Creatore. ut probavimus ; ergo. Idem fere argumentum aliter proponi potest ex eodem S. Doctore, c. g. 1. 1. c. 40. : " quod per participationem dicitur aliquale non dicitur tale, nisi in quantum habet quamdam similitudinem ejus, quod per essentiam dicitur ;" atqui Deus dicitur ens per essentiam, et creaturæ omnes entia per participationem ; ergo. Unde creaturæ omnes repræsentant Deum summum et primum ens. Prob. II. Creaturæ omnes debent assimilari ideis quas de iisdem ab æterno habuit Deus, qui est earum causa exemplaris ; sed, si hoc, assimilantur ipsi Deo, uti patet ex dictis de natura divinarum idearum ; ergo. Unde creaturæ repræsentant Deum summum et primum verum. "Res naturales, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 16. a. 1., "dicuntur esse veræ, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum, quæ sunt in mente divina."-Et q. 17. a. 6.: "Si loquamur de veritate, secundum quod est in rebus ; sic omnes sunt veræ una prima veritate, cui unumquodque assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic licet plures sint essentiæ vel formæ rerum, tamen una est veritas divini intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur veræ." Prob. III. "Omne ens," inquit D. Th. 1. p. q. 5. a. 3. , "in quantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum ; quia omnis actus perfectio quædam est ; perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis, et boni, ut ex dictis patet art. 1 hujus quæst .; unde sequitur, omne ens, in quantum hujusmodi, bonum esse ; " atqui creaturæ omnes assimilantur Deo secundum esse, quod ab eo participant ; ergo. Unde creaturæ omnes repræsentant Deum summum et
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 91 primum bonum . Quod D. Th. 1. p. q. 6. a. 4. c. insuper explicat etiam de quadam bonitate extrinseca. "Unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo, et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinæ bonitatis sibi inhærente, quæ est formaliter sua bonitas, denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium, et etiam multæ bonitates." Prob. IV. Si creaturas omnes simul consideremus , videmus in earum multiplicitate, varietate et ordine relucere varias perfectiones divinas, quæ sunt unus Deus ; ergo. Hinc D. Th. 1. p. q. 47. a. 1. c. ait : "Unde dicendum est quod distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis , et per eas repræsentandam ; et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repræsentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas, et diversas ; ut quod deest uni ad repræsentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia. Nam bonitas, quæ in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim ; unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem, et repræsentat eam totum universum, quam alia quæcumque creatura. "- Et q. 47. a. 3. ad 1.: "Propter quod Aristoteles in Metaph ., text. 52, ex unitate ordinis in rebus existentis concludit unitatem Dei gubernantis ; et Plato, in Timeo, aliq. a princ., ex unitate exemplaris probat unitatem mundi, quasi exemplati." Vid. etiam c. g. l. 1. c. 42. arg. 6.
92 De Deo Creatore. Prob. 2da pars . In omnibus creaturis est aliquid unum, quod simul dici potest trinum ; et quod trinum est debet per appropriationis legem in divinas Personas reduci tamquam in causam. Ergo. Decl . et prob. antec. ex D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 7.: "In qualibet creatura inveniuntur aliqua quæ necesse est reducere in divinas Personas sicut in causam. Quælibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et habet formam, per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quædam substantia creata, repræsentat causam et principium ; et sic demonstrat Personam Patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod habet quamdam formam et speciem, repræsentat Verbum, secundum quod forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod habet ordinem, repræsentat Spiritum Sanctum, in quantum est amor ; quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, in 6 lib. de Trin., cap. 10, circa fin., quod vestigium Trinitatis invenitur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum aliquid est ; et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur ; et secundum quod quemdam ordinem tenet. Et ad hæc etiam reducuntur illa tria, numerus , pondus, et mensura, quæ ponuntur Sap. 11. Nam mensura refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis , numerus ad speciem, pondus ad ordiEt ad hæc tria reducuntur alia tria quæ ponit nem . Augustinus, in lib. de Natura boni, cap. 3 : Modus , species et ordo ; et ea quæ ponit in lib. 83 QQ. quæst . 18, in princ. , quo constat, quo discernitur, quo congruit. Constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur
Disp. I.- De Mundi Origine. 93 per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci possunt quæcumque sic dicuntur." Vid. S. Augustinum 1. 6. de Trinit. cap. ult.-toto l. 11. et lib. 14. cap. 8.
89. Proposition IX. In all creatures destitute of intelligence and reason there is found a representation by way of vestige of God, 1. one, 2. and triune.
It is clear from what was said above that creatures of this kind cannot represent God by way of image; and consequently, if it is proved that they display some likeness with God, by that very fact it will be established that God is represented in them by way of vestige. Hence:
First proof, first part. "Whatever of perfection," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, a. 2, corpus, "is in the effect, must be found in the effective cause, either according to the same notion, if it is a univocal agent, as man generates man; or in a more eminent mode, if it is an equivocal agent." But God is the efficient cause of all creatures, as we have proved; therefore. Almost the same argument can be proposed otherwise from the same holy Doctor, Contra Gentiles I, chapter 40: "What is called such by participation is not called such except insofar as it has some likeness of that which is called such by essence." But God is called being by essence, and all creatures beings by participation; therefore. Hence all creatures represent God as the highest and first being.
Second proof. All creatures must be assimilated to the ideas which God, who is their exemplar cause, had concerning them from eternity; but if this is so, they are assimilated to God himself, as is clear from what has been said concerning the nature of the divine ideas; therefore. Hence creatures represent God as the highest and first true. "Natural things," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 1, "are said to be true according as they attain the likeness of the species which are in the divine mind." And q. 17, a. 6: "If we speak of truth according as it is in things, then all are true by one first truth, to which each thing is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although there are several essences or forms of things, nevertheless there is one truth of the divine intellect, according to which all things are denominated true."
Third proof. "Every being," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 5, a. 3, "insofar as it is being, is in act and in some way perfect, because every act is a certain perfection; but the perfect has the notion of the appetible and of the good, as is clear from what was said in article 1 of this question; hence it follows that every being, insofar as it is such, is good." But all creatures are assimilated to God according to being, which they participate from him; therefore. Hence all creatures represent God as the highest and first good. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 6, a. 4, corpus, further explains this also concerning a certain extrinsic goodness: "Each thing is called good by divine goodness as by the first exemplary, effective, and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless each thing is called good by a likeness of divine goodness inhering in it, which is formally its own goodness, denominating it. And thus there is one goodness of all things, and also many goodnesses."
Fourth proof. If we consider all creatures together, we see in their multiplicity, variety, and order various divine perfections shining forth, which are one God; therefore. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 47, a. 1, corpus, says: "Hence it must be said that the distinction and multitude of things is from the intention of the first agent, which is God. For he produced things into being for the sake of communicating his goodness to creatures, and representing it through them; and because it cannot be sufficiently represented through one creature, he produced many and diverse creatures, so that what is lacking to one for representing the divine goodness might be supplied from another. For the goodness which is in God simply and uniformly is in creatures manifoldly and dividedly; hence the whole universe participates in and represents divine goodness more perfectly than any other creature whatever." And q. 47, a. 3, reply to objection 1: "On account of this Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, text 52, from the unity of order existing in things concludes the unity of God governing; and Plato, in the Timaeus, somewhat from the beginning, from the unity of the exemplar proves the unity of the world, as of the thing exemplated." See also Contra Gentiles I, chapter 42, argument 6.
Proof of the second part. In all creatures there is something one which at the same time can be called threefold; and what is threefold must, by the law of appropriation, be reduced into the divine Persons as into a cause. Therefore. The antecedent is explained and proved from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 7: "In any creature there are found certain things which it is necessary to reduce into the divine Persons as into a cause. For any creature subsists in its own being, and has a form by which it is determined to a species, and has an order to something else. Therefore, according as it is a certain created substance, it represents cause and principle; and thus it manifests the Person of the Father, who is principle not from a principle. But according as it has a certain form and species, it represents the Word, according as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the artisan. But according as it has order, it represents the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is Love; because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the creator. And therefore Augustine says, in book 6 On the Trinity, chapter 10, around the end, that the vestige of the Trinity is found in each creature, according as it is some one thing, and according as it is formed by some species, and according as it holds a certain order. And to these are also reduced those three: number, weight, and measure, which are posited in Wisdom 11. For measure is referred to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, number to species, weight to order. And to these three are reduced the other three which Augustine posits in the book On the Nature of the Good, chapter 3: mode, species, and order; and those which he posits in the book Eighty-Three Questions, q. 18, at the beginning: that by which it is established, that by which it is discerned, that by which it agrees. For something is established by its substance, discerned by its form, and agrees by its order. And to the same can easily be reduced whatever things are so called." See St. Augustine, book 6 On the Trinity, final chapter; the whole of book 11 and book 14, chapter 8.
It is clear from what was said above that creatures of this kind cannot represent God by way of image; and consequently, if it is proved that they display some likeness with God, by that very fact it will be established that God is represented in them by way of vestige. Hence:
First proof, first part. "Whatever of perfection," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, a. 2, corpus, "is in the effect, must be found in the effective cause, either according to the same notion, if it is a univocal agent, as man generates man; or in a more eminent mode, if it is an equivocal agent." But God is the efficient cause of all creatures, as we have proved; therefore. Almost the same argument can be proposed otherwise from the same holy Doctor, Contra Gentiles I, chapter 40: "What is called such by participation is not called such except insofar as it has some likeness of that which is called such by essence." But God is called being by essence, and all creatures beings by participation; therefore. Hence all creatures represent God as the highest and first being.
Second proof. All creatures must be assimilated to the ideas which God, who is their exemplar cause, had concerning them from eternity; but if this is so, they are assimilated to God himself, as is clear from what has been said concerning the nature of the divine ideas; therefore. Hence creatures represent God as the highest and first true. "Natural things," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 1, "are said to be true according as they attain the likeness of the species which are in the divine mind." And q. 17, a. 6: "If we speak of truth according as it is in things, then all are true by one first truth, to which each thing is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although there are several essences or forms of things, nevertheless there is one truth of the divine intellect, according to which all things are denominated true."
Third proof. "Every being," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 5, a. 3, "insofar as it is being, is in act and in some way perfect, because every act is a certain perfection; but the perfect has the notion of the appetible and of the good, as is clear from what was said in article 1 of this question; hence it follows that every being, insofar as it is such, is good." But all creatures are assimilated to God according to being, which they participate from him; therefore. Hence all creatures represent God as the highest and first good. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 6, a. 4, corpus, further explains this also concerning a certain extrinsic goodness: "Each thing is called good by divine goodness as by the first exemplary, effective, and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless each thing is called good by a likeness of divine goodness inhering in it, which is formally its own goodness, denominating it. And thus there is one goodness of all things, and also many goodnesses."
Fourth proof. If we consider all creatures together, we see in their multiplicity, variety, and order various divine perfections shining forth, which are one God; therefore. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 47, a. 1, corpus, says: "Hence it must be said that the distinction and multitude of things is from the intention of the first agent, which is God. For he produced things into being for the sake of communicating his goodness to creatures, and representing it through them; and because it cannot be sufficiently represented through one creature, he produced many and diverse creatures, so that what is lacking to one for representing the divine goodness might be supplied from another. For the goodness which is in God simply and uniformly is in creatures manifoldly and dividedly; hence the whole universe participates in and represents divine goodness more perfectly than any other creature whatever." And q. 47, a. 3, reply to objection 1: "On account of this Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, text 52, from the unity of order existing in things concludes the unity of God governing; and Plato, in the Timaeus, somewhat from the beginning, from the unity of the exemplar proves the unity of the world, as of the thing exemplated." See also Contra Gentiles I, chapter 42, argument 6.
Proof of the second part. In all creatures there is something one which at the same time can be called threefold; and what is threefold must, by the law of appropriation, be reduced into the divine Persons as into a cause. Therefore. The antecedent is explained and proved from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 7: "In any creature there are found certain things which it is necessary to reduce into the divine Persons as into a cause. For any creature subsists in its own being, and has a form by which it is determined to a species, and has an order to something else. Therefore, according as it is a certain created substance, it represents cause and principle; and thus it manifests the Person of the Father, who is principle not from a principle. But according as it has a certain form and species, it represents the Word, according as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the artisan. But according as it has order, it represents the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is Love; because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the creator. And therefore Augustine says, in book 6 On the Trinity, chapter 10, around the end, that the vestige of the Trinity is found in each creature, according as it is some one thing, and according as it is formed by some species, and according as it holds a certain order. And to these are also reduced those three: number, weight, and measure, which are posited in Wisdom 11. For measure is referred to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, number to species, weight to order. And to these three are reduced the other three which Augustine posits in the book On the Nature of the Good, chapter 3: mode, species, and order; and those which he posits in the book Eighty-Three Questions, q. 18, at the beginning: that by which it is established, that by which it is discerned, that by which it agrees. For something is established by its substance, discerned by its form, and agrees by its order. And to the same can easily be reduced whatever things are so called." See St. Augustine, book 6 On the Trinity, final chapter; the whole of book 11 and book 14, chapter 8.
Section III. Whether And How In Man There Is The Image Of God One And Triune.
90. PROP. X. Est in homine repræsentatio per modum imaginis Dei 1. unius-2. et Trini. Prob. 1a pars. I. Ex Scriptura. Gen. 1. 27.: " Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam : ad imaginem Dei creavit illum : masculum et feminam creavit eos. "-Sap. 2. 23.: "Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem, et ad imaginem similitudinis suæ fecit illum. " Eccli. 17. 1.: "Deus creavit de terra hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum."- 1 Cor. 11. 7.: "Vir quidem non debet velare caput suum : quoniam imago et gloria Dei est." Vid. h. textum 1. p. q. 93. a. 4. ad 1., et lect. 2. in istud caput. Prob. II. Ex dictis tum de idearum natura, tum de Dei repræsentatione in creaturis per modum imaginis, tria ad hanc requiruntur et sufficiunt : ut ex vi productionis sit similis alteri-ut sit similis secundum gradum naturæ intellectualis-ut sit ex alio expressa, seu producta ad similitudinem alterius. Atqui primum et tertium constant ex argumentis adductis in thesi præcedente ; secundum vero ex ipsa hominis natura. Ergo . Prob. 2da pars. I. Gen. 1. 26. legitur : "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem
94 De Deo Creatore. nostram." Et S. Aug. 1. 12. de Trinit. cap. 6. ait ; "Dixit Deus, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram. Paulo post autem dictum est, et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei. Nostram certe, quia pluralis est numerus , non recte diceretur, si homo ad unius Personæ imaginem fieret sive Patris, sive Filii, sive Spiritus Sancti. Sed quia fiebat ad imaginem Trinitatis, propterea dictum est, ad imaginem nostram. Rursus autem, ne in Trinitate credendos arbitraremur tres deos, cum sit eadem Trinitas unus Deus ; et fecit, inquit, Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei, pro eo ac si diceret ad imaginem suam. "-Ibidem autem refutat S. Doctor errorem eorum, qui dicebant hominem factum ad imaginem solius Filii. Cap. seq etiam refutat eos qui asserebant imaginem Trinitatis non esse in uno homine, sed tribus, nempe viro, uxore, et filio. Reliqua SS. PP. testimonia videri possunt apud Petavium 1. c. in § præc. Prob. II. Probavimus esse in homine Dei secundum essentiam repræsentatio per modum imaginis ; ergo debet etiam homo repræsentare per modum imaginis Deum secundum Trinitatem Personarum ; tum quia Personæ divinæ sunt idem cum divina essentia, tum quia distinctio Personarum in Deo non est nisi secundum relationes originis, et modus originis uniuscujusque, est secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ, ut audivimus a D. Thoma. Prob. III. In divinis est Pater generans Verbum per intellectum, Pater et Filius spirantes Spiritum Sanctum per voluntatem ; Pater autem, Verbum, et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unum natura... Atqui in homine, prout ratione est præditus, datur processio Verbi
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 95 per intellectum ; siquidem inquit S. Aug. de Trin. l. 11. c. 7. n. 10. "cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus, etiam illo interiore verbo, quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam. " Ergo-"Cum increata Trinitas, " ait D. Th. 1. p. q. 93. a. 6. c. "distinguatur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est, qu. 45, art. 7, in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem , potest dici imago Trinitatis increatæ per quamdam repræsentationem speciei."-et 1. p. q. 37. a. 1.: "Sicut ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit provenit quædam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectæ in intelligente, quæ dicitur verbum ; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quædam impressio (ut ita loquar) rei amatæ in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente ; ita quod cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in se ipso, non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante." Quod jam expresserat S. Aug. de Trin. l. 9. c. 11. n. 18., dicens : "Est quædam imago Trinitatis ipsa mens et notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus ac de se ipsa verbum ejus, et amor tertius : et hæc tria unum sunt atque una substantia. " Quod argumentum confirmans et explicans D. Thomas docet 1. quod licet imago Trinitatis sit in anima nostra secundum potentias ; distinctior tamen est, cum actu cogitamus et amamus. "Ad rationem," inquit q. 93. a. 7., "imaginis pertinet aliqualis repræsentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinæ
96 De Deo Creatore. debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur quod maxime accedit (prout possibile est) ad repræsentandum speciem divinarum Personarum. Divinæ autem Personæ distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque . Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cognitione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit, 14 de Trin., cap. 7, a med. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando, interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiæ, unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio ; secundario et quasi ex consequenti imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et præcipue secundum habitus , prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt." Docet 2. quod etsi imago quædam Trinitatis sit in homine actu intelligente et volente quodcumque objectum ; adhuc tamen perfectior est imago quando cogitamus et amamus nos ipsos ; tunc enim homo " est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente , et amatum in amante. " Docet 3. quod adhuc perfectior est imago Trinitatis in homine, quando homo seipsum intelligit et amat in ordine ad Deum. " Verbum Dei," inquit q. 93. a. 8. , "nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ipsius, et amor procedit a Deo, secundum quod seipsum amat. Manifestum est autem quod diversitas objectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris. Non enim idem est specie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et equo ; nec idem specie amor.
Disp. I-. De Mundi Origine. 97 Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum ; Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima, secundum quod fertur vel nata est ferri in Deum." Docet 4. quod tripliciter considerari potest imago Trinitatis in homine prout ipsa Dei cognitio et amor spectari potest in triplici ordine , naturali, supernaturali in via, et supernaturali in patria, q. 93. a. 4. Cum cognitio Dei per fidem et amor charitatis perfectior sit cognitione et amore Dei naturali, perfectiorem etiam in nobis exprimunt imaginem Trinitatis. Sed cum fides locum cedit visioni, et Deus amatur charitate tali visioni respondente, sicut fit in cœlis , tunc perfectissima, quoad possibile nobis est, erit in nobis imago Dei. Unde de hoc statu dicitur, 1. Jo. 3. 2. " scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est."
94 De Deo Creatore. nostram." Et S. Aug. 1. 12. de Trinit. cap. 6. ait ; "Dixit Deus, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram. Paulo post autem dictum est, et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei. Nostram certe, quia pluralis est numerus , non recte diceretur, si homo ad unius Personæ imaginem fieret sive Patris, sive Filii, sive Spiritus Sancti. Sed quia fiebat ad imaginem Trinitatis, propterea dictum est, ad imaginem nostram. Rursus autem, ne in Trinitate credendos arbitraremur tres deos, cum sit eadem Trinitas unus Deus ; et fecit, inquit, Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei, pro eo ac si diceret ad imaginem suam. "-Ibidem autem refutat S. Doctor errorem eorum, qui dicebant hominem factum ad imaginem solius Filii. Cap. seq etiam refutat eos qui asserebant imaginem Trinitatis non esse in uno homine, sed tribus, nempe viro, uxore, et filio. Reliqua SS. PP. testimonia videri possunt apud Petavium 1. c. in § præc. Prob. II. Probavimus esse in homine Dei secundum essentiam repræsentatio per modum imaginis ; ergo debet etiam homo repræsentare per modum imaginis Deum secundum Trinitatem Personarum ; tum quia Personæ divinæ sunt idem cum divina essentia, tum quia distinctio Personarum in Deo non est nisi secundum relationes originis, et modus originis uniuscujusque, est secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ, ut audivimus a D. Thoma. Prob. III. In divinis est Pater generans Verbum per intellectum, Pater et Filius spirantes Spiritum Sanctum per voluntatem ; Pater autem, Verbum, et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unum natura... Atqui in homine, prout ratione est præditus, datur processio Verbi
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 95 per intellectum ; siquidem inquit S. Aug. de Trin. l. 11. c. 7. n. 10. "cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus, etiam illo interiore verbo, quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam. " Ergo-"Cum increata Trinitas, " ait D. Th. 1. p. q. 93. a. 6. c. "distinguatur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est, qu. 45, art. 7, in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem , potest dici imago Trinitatis increatæ per quamdam repræsentationem speciei."-et 1. p. q. 37. a. 1.: "Sicut ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit provenit quædam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectæ in intelligente, quæ dicitur verbum ; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quædam impressio (ut ita loquar) rei amatæ in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente ; ita quod cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in se ipso, non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante." Quod jam expresserat S. Aug. de Trin. l. 9. c. 11. n. 18., dicens : "Est quædam imago Trinitatis ipsa mens et notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus ac de se ipsa verbum ejus, et amor tertius : et hæc tria unum sunt atque una substantia. " Quod argumentum confirmans et explicans D. Thomas docet 1. quod licet imago Trinitatis sit in anima nostra secundum potentias ; distinctior tamen est, cum actu cogitamus et amamus. "Ad rationem," inquit q. 93. a. 7., "imaginis pertinet aliqualis repræsentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinæ
96 De Deo Creatore. debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur quod maxime accedit (prout possibile est) ad repræsentandum speciem divinarum Personarum. Divinæ autem Personæ distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque . Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cognitione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit, 14 de Trin., cap. 7, a med. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando, interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiæ, unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio ; secundario et quasi ex consequenti imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et præcipue secundum habitus , prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt." Docet 2. quod etsi imago quædam Trinitatis sit in homine actu intelligente et volente quodcumque objectum ; adhuc tamen perfectior est imago quando cogitamus et amamus nos ipsos ; tunc enim homo " est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente , et amatum in amante. " Docet 3. quod adhuc perfectior est imago Trinitatis in homine, quando homo seipsum intelligit et amat in ordine ad Deum. " Verbum Dei," inquit q. 93. a. 8. , "nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ipsius, et amor procedit a Deo, secundum quod seipsum amat. Manifestum est autem quod diversitas objectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris. Non enim idem est specie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et equo ; nec idem specie amor.
Disp. I-. De Mundi Origine. 97 Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum ; Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima, secundum quod fertur vel nata est ferri in Deum." Docet 4. quod tripliciter considerari potest imago Trinitatis in homine prout ipsa Dei cognitio et amor spectari potest in triplici ordine , naturali, supernaturali in via, et supernaturali in patria, q. 93. a. 4. Cum cognitio Dei per fidem et amor charitatis perfectior sit cognitione et amore Dei naturali, perfectiorem etiam in nobis exprimunt imaginem Trinitatis. Sed cum fides locum cedit visioni, et Deus amatur charitate tali visioni respondente, sicut fit in cœlis , tunc perfectissima, quoad possibile nobis est, erit in nobis imago Dei. Unde de hoc statu dicitur, 1. Jo. 3. 2. " scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est."
90. Proposition X. In man there is a representation by way of image of God, 1. one, 2. and triune.
Proof of the first part. I. From Scripture. Genesis 1:27: "God created man to his image: to the image of God he created him; male and female he created them." Wisdom 2:23: "God created man inexterminable, and made him to the image of his likeness." Ecclesiasticus 17:1: "God created man from the earth, and made him according to his image." 1 Corinthians 11:7: "A man indeed ought not to veil his head, because he is the image and glory of God." See this text in Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 4, reply to objection 1, and lecture 2 on that chapter.
Proof II. From what has been said both concerning the nature of ideas and concerning the representation of God in creatures by way of image, three things are required and suffice for this representation: that, by the force of production, it be like another; that it be like according to the grade of intellectual nature; and that it be expressed from another, or produced according to the likeness of another. But the first and third are established from the arguments adduced in the preceding thesis; the second from the very nature of man. Therefore.
Proof of the second part. I. Genesis 1:26 reads: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." And St. Augustine, book 12 On the Trinity, chapter 6, says: "God said, Let us make man to our image. But a little later it was said: and God made man to the image of God. Certainly our, because it is plural in number, would not rightly be said if man were made to the image of one Person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit. But because he was made to the image of the Trinity, therefore it was said, to our image. Again, however, lest we think that in the Trinity three gods must be believed, since the same Trinity is one God, it says, And God made man to the image of God, as if it said, to his own image." In the same place the holy Doctor refutes the error of those who said that man was made to the image of the Son alone. In the following chapter he also refutes those who asserted that the image of the Trinity is not in one man, but in three, namely husband, wife, and son. The remaining testimonies of the holy Fathers can be seen in Petavius in the cited place in the preceding section.
Proof II. We have proved that in man there is a representation of God according to essence by way of image; therefore man must also represent by way of image God according to the Trinity of Persons: both because the divine Persons are the same as the divine essence, and because the distinction of Persons in God is only according to relations of origin, and the mode of origin of each is according to the fittingness of its nature, as we have heard from St. Thomas.
Proof III. In divine things there is the Father generating the Word through intellect, the Father and the Son spirating the Holy Spirit through will; but the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are one in nature. But in man, insofar as he is endowed with reason, there is a procession of word through intellect; for St. Augustine says, On the Trinity, book 11, chapter 7, n. 10: "we think everything that we say, even by that interior word which pertains to the language of no nation." Therefore. "Since the uncreated Trinity," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 6, corpus, "is distinguished according to the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both, as was held above, q. 45, a. 7, in the rational creature, in which there is found procession of word according to intellect and procession of love according to will, there can be said to be an image of the uncreated Trinity by a certain representation of species." And in I, q. 37, a. 1: "Just as from the fact that someone understands some thing there comes forth a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood in the one understanding, which is called word, so from the fact that someone loves some thing there comes forth a certain impression, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover, according to which the loved is said to be in the lover, just as the understood is in the one understanding; so that when someone understands and loves himself, he is in himself, not only by identity of thing, but also as understood in the one understanding and loved in the lover." St. Augustine had already expressed this, On the Trinity, book 9, chapter 11, n. 18, saying: "There is a certain image of the Trinity: the mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as the third; and these three are one and one substance."
Confirming and explaining this argument, St. Thomas teaches: 1. that although the image of the Trinity is in our soul according to powers, nevertheless it is more distinct when we actually think and love. "To the notion," he says, q. 93, a. 7, "of image belongs some representation of species. Therefore if the image of the divine Trinity ought to be taken in the soul, it must be considered principally according to that which most closely approaches, so far as is possible, to representing the species of the divine Persons. But the divine Persons are distinguished according to the procession of word from the speaker, and of love connecting both. Now word cannot exist in our soul without actual cognition, as Augustine says, book 14 On the Trinity, chapter 7, from the middle. And therefore first and principally the image of the Trinity is considered in the mind according to acts, namely insofar as from the knowledge which we have, by thinking, we form an interior word, and from this we burst forth into love. But because the principles of acts are habits and powers, and each thing is virtually in its own principle, secondarily and as if consequently the image of the Trinity can be considered in the soul according to powers, and especially according to habits, insofar as acts exist virtually in them."
He teaches: 2. that although some image of the Trinity is in man when actually understanding and willing any object whatever, nevertheless the image is still more perfect when we think and love ourselves; for then man "is in himself not only by identity of thing, but also as understood in the one understanding and loved in the lover."
He teaches: 3. that the image of the Trinity in man is still more perfect when man understands and loves himself in order to God. "The Word of God," he says, q. 93, a. 8, "is born from God according to knowledge of himself, and Love proceeds from God according as he loves himself. But it is manifest that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love. For a word conceived in the heart of man concerning stone and horse is not the same in species; nor is the love the same in species. Therefore the divine image in man is considered according to the word conceived from the knowledge of God, and the love derived from it. And thus the image of God is considered in the soul according as it is borne, or is by nature able to be borne, into God."
He teaches: 4. that the image of the Trinity in man can be considered in three ways, according as the very knowledge and love of God can be regarded in a threefold order: natural, supernatural on the way, and supernatural in the homeland, q. 93, a. 4. Since knowledge of God through faith and the love of charity is more perfect than natural knowledge and love of God, they also express in us a more perfect image of the Trinity. But when faith gives place to vision, and God is loved by charity corresponding to such vision, as happens in heaven, then the image of God in us will be most perfect, so far as is possible for us. Hence of this state it is said, 1 John 3:2: "we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is."
Proof of the first part. I. From Scripture. Genesis 1:27: "God created man to his image: to the image of God he created him; male and female he created them." Wisdom 2:23: "God created man inexterminable, and made him to the image of his likeness." Ecclesiasticus 17:1: "God created man from the earth, and made him according to his image." 1 Corinthians 11:7: "A man indeed ought not to veil his head, because he is the image and glory of God." See this text in Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 4, reply to objection 1, and lecture 2 on that chapter.
Proof II. From what has been said both concerning the nature of ideas and concerning the representation of God in creatures by way of image, three things are required and suffice for this representation: that, by the force of production, it be like another; that it be like according to the grade of intellectual nature; and that it be expressed from another, or produced according to the likeness of another. But the first and third are established from the arguments adduced in the preceding thesis; the second from the very nature of man. Therefore.
Proof of the second part. I. Genesis 1:26 reads: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." And St. Augustine, book 12 On the Trinity, chapter 6, says: "God said, Let us make man to our image. But a little later it was said: and God made man to the image of God. Certainly our, because it is plural in number, would not rightly be said if man were made to the image of one Person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit. But because he was made to the image of the Trinity, therefore it was said, to our image. Again, however, lest we think that in the Trinity three gods must be believed, since the same Trinity is one God, it says, And God made man to the image of God, as if it said, to his own image." In the same place the holy Doctor refutes the error of those who said that man was made to the image of the Son alone. In the following chapter he also refutes those who asserted that the image of the Trinity is not in one man, but in three, namely husband, wife, and son. The remaining testimonies of the holy Fathers can be seen in Petavius in the cited place in the preceding section.
Proof II. We have proved that in man there is a representation of God according to essence by way of image; therefore man must also represent by way of image God according to the Trinity of Persons: both because the divine Persons are the same as the divine essence, and because the distinction of Persons in God is only according to relations of origin, and the mode of origin of each is according to the fittingness of its nature, as we have heard from St. Thomas.
Proof III. In divine things there is the Father generating the Word through intellect, the Father and the Son spirating the Holy Spirit through will; but the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are one in nature. But in man, insofar as he is endowed with reason, there is a procession of word through intellect; for St. Augustine says, On the Trinity, book 11, chapter 7, n. 10: "we think everything that we say, even by that interior word which pertains to the language of no nation." Therefore. "Since the uncreated Trinity," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 6, corpus, "is distinguished according to the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both, as was held above, q. 45, a. 7, in the rational creature, in which there is found procession of word according to intellect and procession of love according to will, there can be said to be an image of the uncreated Trinity by a certain representation of species." And in I, q. 37, a. 1: "Just as from the fact that someone understands some thing there comes forth a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood in the one understanding, which is called word, so from the fact that someone loves some thing there comes forth a certain impression, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover, according to which the loved is said to be in the lover, just as the understood is in the one understanding; so that when someone understands and loves himself, he is in himself, not only by identity of thing, but also as understood in the one understanding and loved in the lover." St. Augustine had already expressed this, On the Trinity, book 9, chapter 11, n. 18, saying: "There is a certain image of the Trinity: the mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as the third; and these three are one and one substance."
Confirming and explaining this argument, St. Thomas teaches: 1. that although the image of the Trinity is in our soul according to powers, nevertheless it is more distinct when we actually think and love. "To the notion," he says, q. 93, a. 7, "of image belongs some representation of species. Therefore if the image of the divine Trinity ought to be taken in the soul, it must be considered principally according to that which most closely approaches, so far as is possible, to representing the species of the divine Persons. But the divine Persons are distinguished according to the procession of word from the speaker, and of love connecting both. Now word cannot exist in our soul without actual cognition, as Augustine says, book 14 On the Trinity, chapter 7, from the middle. And therefore first and principally the image of the Trinity is considered in the mind according to acts, namely insofar as from the knowledge which we have, by thinking, we form an interior word, and from this we burst forth into love. But because the principles of acts are habits and powers, and each thing is virtually in its own principle, secondarily and as if consequently the image of the Trinity can be considered in the soul according to powers, and especially according to habits, insofar as acts exist virtually in them."
He teaches: 2. that although some image of the Trinity is in man when actually understanding and willing any object whatever, nevertheless the image is still more perfect when we think and love ourselves; for then man "is in himself not only by identity of thing, but also as understood in the one understanding and loved in the lover."
He teaches: 3. that the image of the Trinity in man is still more perfect when man understands and loves himself in order to God. "The Word of God," he says, q. 93, a. 8, "is born from God according to knowledge of himself, and Love proceeds from God according as he loves himself. But it is manifest that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love. For a word conceived in the heart of man concerning stone and horse is not the same in species; nor is the love the same in species. Therefore the divine image in man is considered according to the word conceived from the knowledge of God, and the love derived from it. And thus the image of God is considered in the soul according as it is borne, or is by nature able to be borne, into God."
He teaches: 4. that the image of the Trinity in man can be considered in three ways, according as the very knowledge and love of God can be regarded in a threefold order: natural, supernatural on the way, and supernatural in the homeland, q. 93, a. 4. Since knowledge of God through faith and the love of charity is more perfect than natural knowledge and love of God, they also express in us a more perfect image of the Trinity. But when faith gives place to vision, and God is loved by charity corresponding to such vision, as happens in heaven, then the image of God in us will be most perfect, so far as is possible for us. Hence of this state it is said, 1 John 3:2: "we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is."